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This dissertation investigates the nature of transnational advocacy networks 
and the impact of domestic structures on the development and political relations of 
such networks. Drawing upon the theoretical frameworks built by Margaret Keck, 
Katherine Sikkink and Sanjeev Khagram, I, though, challenge the conceptual bias 
embedded in this body of literature emphasizing contentious political relations 
between advocacy actors and targeted governments. I use the method of in-depth 
comparative case studies, and focus on two transnational advocacy networks in nature 
conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention in China to illustrate my three-fold argument: 
First, it is necessary to relax the theoretical bias in existing transnational advocacy 
literature, and recognize that the triangular relationship among the state, local society 
and international NSAs varies both over time and across issue areas. The two cases 
studied reveals a what I call the “double-mobilization” character of such networks. 
This Double-mobilization pattern emphasizes that international advocacy actors 
endeavor to engage, collaborate with, and advocate around the state, even as they 
 establish connections and solidarity with local societal groups. I propose this double-
mobilization concept to capture the gradual, consensual, and sustainable aspect of 
transnational activism. Second, it is not sufficient to use political regime type as the 
main causal variable to examine the emergence and evolvement of transnational 
activism and advocacy networks. Evidence from China has shown that the politics 
generated by international NSAs in a non-democratic country is complex, and despite 
strict macro-structures, transnational advocacy networks are emerging. Third, I argue 
that two domestic micro-level structures—decentralization within the state, and 
interconnections within existing civil society groups—strongly influence the political 
relations of transnational activism and networks. With decentralized environmental 
governance, and a strong and connected local environmentalist community, 
international NGOs have been able to generate, expand, and consolidate their 
mobilization networks in both governmental and societal domains in nature 
conservation. While transnational NGO linkages and networks are surfacing in 
HIV/AIDS preventions in China, both the scope and level of deepening of such 
networks are still limited. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTERNATIONAL NON-STATE ACTORS, TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM,  
AND CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
A good rain does the proper season know, 
And as spring comes, it comes to fall also. 
Along with wind it steals into the night, 
Bathing the earth in a way most light. 
 
—— Du Pu (late Tang Dynasty), The Heartening Spring Rain 
 
 
 
The Caohai Lake, located in western Guizhou province, is the winter home to many 
migratory birds, including the exceedingly endangered black-necked crane. During 
the Great Leap Forward period, the lake was converted to arable land for agricultural 
production. By 1972, the lake ceased to exist. The Guizhou provincial government 
decided to restore the lake in the early 1980s; while, at the same time, the county 
government began to contracting the land in the region to individual families. In 1982, 
the provincial government ordered to re-flood half of the lake, and declared the lake 
and surrounding areas a nature reserve in 1985. Having watched their agricultural 
products washed away, enraged local farmers responded to the establishment of the 
nature reserve with protests and open hostility, going so far as to throw reserve staff 
into the lake. They boycotted the idea of conservation by continuing to hunt and fish. 
The Caohai Reserve staff replied by burning their nets and catches. 
In 1993, with funding from the Ford Foundation, two international non-
governmental non-profit organizations—International Crane Foundation (ICF) and 
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the Trickle Up Program—decided to launch micro-credit programs in the Caohai 
region. With the consent from the local government, the ICF/Trickle Up team 
established a system to offer small loans (100 USD) to local families to set up 
businesses that are compatible with conservation goals. In two years, a number of 
Community Trust Funds were established, each consisting of 10 to 15 families. Like 
the small loans, such funds provided a means for both poverty relief and conservation 
of the wetlands. Today, this Caohai model is recognized by both the Chinese 
government and the international conservation community as a best practice of 
participatory conservation in China. 
In Yunnan, Guizhou’s neighboring province, HIV/AIDS emerged as an acute 
public health problem, particularly among drug users in the southern bordering 
counties and large cities, by the end of 1980s. While the central and provincial 
governments were still in denial of the scope of the problem, a group of international 
non-governmental organizations and foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation, the Red 
Cross Australia and Save the Children U.K.) started to promote public awareness of 
the disease around the mid-1990s. Even though they were constrained in many ways 
(e.g., with whom and where they are allowed to work), these organizations introduced 
peer-education concept into the AIDS field in China. Daytop (an American private 
non-profit organization) provided the first funding to Yunnan provincial government 
to establish a drug rehabilitation center separate from the regular prison system.1  
                                                 
1 Drug users used to be treated as criminals in Yunnan. However, this initiative was not carried out 
until 1998 when both the provincial government and Daytop finally agreed to use the money to build 
the center. 
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Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF, Doctors without Borders) Holland2, at the 
same time, recognized that HIV/AIDS had become widely spread among the general 
public through unsafe sex and decided to conduct direct behavior intervention 
programs in Yunnan.3 However, when MSF Holland staff and volunteers distributed 
free condoms on the streets in Kunming (capital of Yunnan province) on the World 
AIDS Day in 1999, local police attempted to arrest them. Provincial authorities did 
not prove any further support to MSF’s programs. Despite such obstacles, MSF 
Holland experimented with providing treatment directly to HIV+ patients, most of 
whom were unidentified drug users. However, without the cooperation from 
provincial and local health bureaus, MSF Holland encountered great difficulty in 
maintaining contacts with HIV+ patients. They eventually retreated from China with 
deep frustration.  
The above two accounts both suggest that in the context of China’s domestic 
social-economic reforms, a particular group of international non-state actors 
(NSAs)—most importantly, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—
have played a unique role in solving emerging social problems and bringing new 
political dynamics between local communities and governmental authorities. This 
group of actors, represented by the IFC, the Trickle Up Program, Daytop, and MSF, 
usually mobilize resources transnationally, operate at grassroots levels, and carry out 
                                                 
2 MSF is a network of individual country-based branches and technical support units. Four MFS 
branches have worked in China at different times, i.e., Holland, Switzerland, France and Belgium. Only 
MFS France and Belgium are currently operating in China. 
3 Prior to this initiative, the Chinese government granted MSF Holland to implement disaster relief 
work in the country 
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solutions by building up various networks with domestic actors. Their budget and 
scale of activities may look small compared with multilateral or bilateral assistance 
agencies, yet their influence are extensive and lasting within the local political context. 
With effective demonstration projects and support from peer organizations and local 
allies, they can even “trickle up” to expand their influence in other parts of the 
country by persuading higher level governmental bodies and giving inputs in new 
policy-making.  
However, a puzzle is surfacing here: Why do international NGOs bring about 
different political dynamics within the seemingly constant political context of strong 
state control over both domestic and international affairs? In other words, the Chinese 
government seems to be more susceptible to external advocacy and persuasion in 
some issue areas, but not the others; and international NGOs and NSAs are more 
likely to integrate their work with local communities, and have sustainable impact in 
some issue areas than the others. 
Therefore, the first goal of this research is to identify and map the community 
of international NSAs and NGOs in China: Who are the main actors of this 
community? What do they mostly do? What is distinctive about them? By what means, 
and to what extent are they able to influence local populations and higher level policy 
makers? Moreover, do the international NSAs generate different patterns of political 
relations across issue areas? If so, what are the main causes? What can we learn about 
NSAs in general in transnational relations based on the experience of China, for 
international NGOs and networks are anything but exclusively related to China? 
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Based on many other countries’ experiences, international relations scholars have 
constructed relevant theoretical frameworks to understand the political dynamics of 
NSAs in changing state behavior and local politics through transnational networks, 
coalitions and social movements. Yet, they did not predict a vibrant transnational 
advocacy community would emerge in China. I hope to provoke reflection on the 
complex and dynamic political relations generated by NSAs, and the influence of 
domestic micro-level structures on the emergence and development, based on the 
findings from environmental and public health fields in China. 
In this introduction chapter, I first give a brief review of international NSAs in 
China in history to distinguish international NGOs and transnational advocacy 
networks from other types non-traditional state related actors. I then provide the 
working definitions and theoretical frameworks applied in the dissertation, and 
explain why a cross-issue area comparative study, focusing on one country, is needed 
to improve theory-building on the topic. At the end, I outline the main findings and 
arguments, and the organization of each chapter. 
International Non-state Actors and China 
I agree with Charles Tilly’s view that non-state actors and transnational activism are 
not novel or epiphenomenal matters in world affairs.4 International legal scholars 
noted that international NGOs have played a role in international law and governance 
                                                 
4 Introduction in Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest against the Neoliberal Order. Joe 
Bandy and Jackie Smith eds. 2005. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
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for the past two centuries, and their participation is increasingly expanding.5 As for 
China, a large body of works documented the social and political influences left by 
transnational missionary communities and movements in the middle and late 19th 
century.6 Before the Japanese invasion in the 1930s, a few international humanitarian 
charities and non-profit organizations had already established connections and 
operations in China, e.g., the Salvation Army. According to Margaret Keck and 
Katherine Sikkink’s archival research, the anti-footbinding movement in the 1910-20s 
was the fruit of a transnationally collaborated effort by Western missionaries, Western 
non-Christian women’s rights activists, and Chinese reformist intellectuals.7 Western 
philanthropic foundations also initiated and funded a large number of modern 
scientific projects in China at that time. As part of the Rockefeller Foundation’s global 
mission in medical science, the China Medical Commission (followed by the China 
                                                 
5 Charnovitz, Steve. 1997. "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance." 
Michigan Journal of International Law. 18: 183.  Afsharipour, Afra. 1999. "Empowering Ourselves: 
The Role of Women's NGOs in the Enforcement of the Women's Convention." Columbia Law Review. 
99, 1: 129-72. Mertus, Julie. 2000. "Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium: Toward 
Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application." New York University School of 
Law Journal of International Law and Politics. 32: 537. Peel, Jacqueline. 2001. "Giving the Public a 
Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute 
Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization." Colorado Journal of 
International Law and Policy. 12: 47.  
6 Varg, Paul  A. 1958. Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary 
Movement in China, 1890-1952. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Price, Allen Thomas. 1932. 
American Missions and American Diplomacy in China, 1830-1900: A Study of the Relations of 
American Missionaries, American Missions, and the American Missionary Movement to the Official 
Relations between the United States and China to 1900. [microform]. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. Lodwick, Kathleen L. 1996. Crusaders against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in 
China, 1874-1917. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. Gomez, Edmund Terence and Hsin-
Huang Michael Hsiao eds. 2004. Chinese Enterprise, Transnationalism, and Identity. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
7  Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp 60-74. 
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Medical Board, CMB) was established in 1914 to develop modern western medicine 
in China. The Peking Union Medical College was established in Beijing in 1917 as a 
research center as well as a medical school under the CMB's program. The College 
produced the first generation of western-style medical professionals for China. Today, 
it is still one of the leading Chinese medical institutions. It is estimated that before 
1947, the Rockefeller Foundation had invested 45 million USD in medical programs 
in China.8   
After 1949, most international NGOs and charities retreated from the 
Mainland China. Some moved to Hong Kong and Taiwan to continue their relief and 
social activism work. Before the People’s Republic of China officially obtained 
membership in the United Nations in 1972, most international NGOs only recognized 
the Republic of China resided in Taiwan.9 Entering the reform era led by Deng 
Xiaoping, the Chinese government gradually welcomed international exchanges 
among scholars and scientists. Occasionally, individual experts from international 
NGOs were invited to share information and help with domestic problems. For 
example, conservationists from World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 10 were among the first 
group of international experts invited by the government during the panda crisis in the 
                                                 
8 Ma, Quisha. 2002. “The Peking Union Medical College and the Rockefeller Foundation’s Medical 
Programs in China”. In William H. Schneider ed. Rockefeller Philanthropy & Modern Biomedicine - 
International Initiatives from World War I to the Cold War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Ninkovich, F. 1984. “The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change”. Journal of American 
History, 70, 4: 799-820. 
9 Chan, Gerald. 1989. China and International Organizations: Participation in Non-Governmental 
Organizations Since 1971. Hong Kong: Oxford University. 
10 Now the international headquarter has changed the name to World Wide Fund for Nature, but kept 
the abbreviation as WWF. 
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early 1980s. The government also began to accept funding from large western non-
profit foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation) in research and academic exchanges in 
natural sciences.  
In January 1988, for the first time, the Chinese government officially granted a 
small group of international NGOs and foundations the right to open offices in China 
and conduct international assistance, charity and poverty relief work. Since then, in 
spite of the lack of regulations for international NGOs to obtain legal non-profit status 
in China, the community of international NGOs has been growing steadily.11 As the 
China Development Brief—an NGO devoted to research on both domestic and 
international NGOs’ activities in China—reported in its 2005 Special Issue, there are 
over 200 international NGOs and foundations operating in the country.12 In Yunnan 
province alone, there are over 30 international NGOs currently working in rural 
development, health, women’s rights, environment and many other fields. The 
provincial government speaks highly about their contribution to local environmental 
protection and social development.13  
The growth of the international NGO community is reflected not only in the 
above numbers, but also in the scope of work they are able to conduct, and the multi-
level networks sprouting around them. Take the Ford Foundation as an example. Its 
grantees in China have expanded from two national research institutions in Beijing to 
hundreds of governmental and non-governmental organizations at all levels and in 
                                                 
11  Up to date, China still does not have regulations for international NGOs and charities. Such 
organizations are mostly registered as international businesses. 
12 Available online: http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com, accessed on 1 November, 2004. 
13 Interview with Yunnan provincial government officials in Kunming, August, 2004.  
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most provinces. WWF China Program has also grown from nine staff working on four 
projects, to a team of over 60 specialists and support staff 30 on projects covering 
forestry, renewable energy, climate change, water, species conservation, and many 
other environmental protection related fields. It has now established 15 regional 
offices across the country.  
Besides poverty relief, rural health, and conservation, international NGOs and 
foundations are even involved in many issues areas that are normally conceived as 
politically sensitive such as village direct election and international relations. The 
International Republican Institute, the Carter Center, and the Ford Foundation 
together assisted in the implementation of a number of village elections and self-
governance reforms in China. The MacArthur, Rockefeller, Luce, and Rockefeller 
Brothers foundations have joined the Ford Foundation in supporting exchanges of 
international relations studies between China and the United States. Participating 
institutions in China included four main think-tank institutions in China’s foreign 
relations and three leading university departments of international politics.14 Program 
activities included advanced training in the United States for Chinese scholars, short 
courses in China taught by American professors, study tours, conferences and 
meetings, and library development.  
The rise of international NGOs in China’s current affairs is not an isolated 
matter. In fact, it shall be viewed as a part of the internationalization and opening-up 
                                                 
14 These institutions include: the State Council Research Center on International Studies, Institute of 
International Studies (in China Academy of Social Sciences), Beijing Institute of International Strategic 
Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and the 
departments of international politics at Fudan, Beijing, and Renming universities. 
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of post-Mao China. As China achieves miraculous economic development and 
assumes its role in the global market entering the 21st century, scholars pointed out the 
emergent businesses elites and networks, even though it is still difficult to make a 
uniform argument about the political role and impact of this community.15 Hongying 
Wang successfully illustrated how informal personal networks became prominent in 
facilitating and constraining foreign business and investment in China when formal 
legal institutions failed to function in the early 1990s.16 David Zweig’s more recent 
studies on the emergence of “developmental communities” in the coastal region also 
evidenced the effects of transnational alliances through commerce and trade on the 
internationalization of rural China.17 Elizabeth Economy, from another angle, found 
that transnational scientific and diplomatic linkages and networks played a crucial 
role in China’s environmental policy-making at the central level.18  
However, international NGOs and advocacy groups are distinguished from the 
types of business, scientific, or policy networks mentioned above. They come together 
under principled ideas, aim at changing existing governmental policies and practices, 
and tend to form strong coalition with local activists groups. Before we go into the 
                                                 
15 Pearson, Margaret. 1997. China's New Business Elite. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
16 Wang, Hongying. 2001. Weak State, Strong Networks: The Institutional Dynamics of Foreign Direct 
Investment in China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
17  Zweig, David. 1995. “‘Developmental Communities’ on China’s Coast: The Impact of Trade, 
Investment, and Transnational Alliances”. Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No.3: 253-274. Also 2002. 
Internationalization China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
18  Economy, Elizabeth. 1997. "Chinese Policy-making and Global Climate Change: Two-Front 
Diplomacy and the International Community." In The Internationalization of Environmental 
Protection, edited by Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Economy, Elizabeth. 1998. "China's Environmental Diplomacy." In China and the World, edited 
by Kim, Samuel S. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
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working definitions of NGO and networks, I would like to point to the piece by the 
famous classic Chinese poet Du Pu quoted at the beginning. Not to romanticize the 
influence of these NSAs, I use the image of “spring rain” to visualize the timing, the 
gradual spread, the penetrative and sustainable effects, and the character of their 
political mobilization in improving the social and political development in today’s 
China. 
International NGOs and Transnational Advocacy Networks: Definitions  
In practice, NGOs can take up various forms, ranging from national security think-
tanks, independent research institutions, hobby clubs, religious associations, labor 
unions, independent media, to community-base support groups. Even crime networks 
and secret societies can claim to be NGOs.  In addition, each government has its own 
rules in regulating various types of NGOs. For example, the asset requirement to 
register as an NGO varies substantially from the United States to the Great Britain. 
However, in this research, I adopt Lester Salamon’s approach in studying NGOs. An 
NGO, according to Salamon, has five essential characteristics: organized, private, 
non-profit-distributing, self-governing, and voluntary.19 I will refer to an organization 
                                                 
19  Salamon, Lester and Helmut K. Anheier. 1997. Defining the Nonprofit Sector. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. pp: 33-34. This approach is also widely adopted by Chinese social 
scientists (esp. the NGO Research Center at Tsinghua University) who research on the topic of NGOs. 
e.g., Wang, Ming, ed. 2000. Zhongguo NGO Yanjiu (Research on NGOs in China). Beijing: UNCRD 
Research Report Series. For other approaches on NGOs, see: Stiles, Kendall. 2000. "A Rational Choice 
Model of Grassroots Empowerment." In Global Institutions and Local Empowerment, edited by Stiles, 
K. New York: St. Martin's Press. Boli, John, and George M. Thomas, eds. 1999. Constructing World 
Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fisher, Julie. 1998. Non-Governments: NGOs and 
the Political Development in the Third World. United States: Kumarian Press.  
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as an NGO, regardless of its nominal status, only if:  
1) it has some organizational reality to itself;  
2) it is institutionally separate from the state apparatus;  
3) it does not return any profits generated to its owners or director;  
4) it has its own internal procedures for governance and is not 
controlled by outside entities; and 
5) it involves some meaningful degree of voluntary participation, 
either in the actual conduct of the organization’s activities or in the 
management of its affairs. 20
International NGOs, in short, are those NGOs that operate across country 
borders. In theory, they still have the five basic features that an NGO ought to have. 
The only difference is that they either mobilize resources, or deliver services in more 
than one country, e.g., WWF, MSF, World Resource Institute, and Amnesty 
International. International NGOs may or may not interact with foreign governments. 
By being non-governmental-based themselves, they are essentially more transnational 
than international. However, I use the term “international” instead of “transnational” 
when speaking of individual NGOs in this research to highlight the difference 
between Chinese domestic NGOs and foreign NGOs operating inside China.  
 International NGOs first caught IR scholars’ attention for their mounting 
appearance at international meetings and involvement in international politics since 
the 1980s, particularly in human rights,21  environmental protection,22   and world 
                                                 
20 Even though I do not stress legal/formal status of an organization to be studied as an NGO, I exclude 
secrete societies or crime/organized violence groups for the research purposes here. 
21 Nanda, Ved et al, eds. 1981. Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and 
NGO Strategies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Clark, Roger S. 1981. "The International League for 
Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-1957: The Human Rights NGO as Catalyst in the 
International Legal Process." Human Rights Quarterly. 3, 4: 101-36.  Thakur, Ramesh. 1994. “Human 
Rights: Amnesty International and the Unites Nations”. Journal of Peace Research. 31, 2: 143-60. 
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peace and security.23 Scholars argued that professional expertise, mobilization skills, 
and ability to link the local with the global enable international NGOs to be norm 
entrepreneurs, negotiation facilitators, public educators, and practitioners in 
international norm and regime building. The community of international NGOs is 
rising as a “third force”—besides sovereign states and corporations—in the evolving 
global governance, filling gaps, improving the “checks and balances”, and reshaping 
principles.24  
Beyond their role at the international/global level, empirical research also 
evidenced that international NGOs are introducing new dynamics in national and 
local politics. Scholars noted that international NGOs can exert their influences on 
national and local governments and societies by being more accountable to grassroots 
populations and changing local social behaviors directly,25 innovating institutional 
                                                                                                                                            
22 Lipschutz, Ronnie and Ken Conca eds. 1993. The State and Social Power in Global Environmental 
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.  Princen, Thomas, and Matthias Finger. 1994. 
Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global. New York: Routledge.  
Raustiala, Kal. 1997. “States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions”. International 
Studies Quarterly. 41, 4: 719-40. 
23 Rotberg, Robert I., ed. 1996. Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided 
Societies. Washington, D.C., Cambridge, MA: Brooking Institution Press and World Peace Foundation.  
Carey, Henry F., and Oliver P. Richmond, eds. 2003. Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs. London, 
Portland: F. Cass.   
24 Weiss, Thomas G., and Leon Gordenker, eds. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Charnovitz, Steve. 1997. "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and 
International Governance." Michigan Journal of International Law. 18: 183. Rosenau, James. 1997. 
Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in A Turbulent World. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. Florini, Ann M. 2000. The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil 
Society. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
25 Wapner, Paul. 1996. Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. New York: State University 
of New York Press. 
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arrangements, 26  and socializing global norms domestically. 27  A more synthetic 
framework has thus been proposed, taking a network perspective, and projecting that 
NSAs are “restructuring world politics” by building up transnational advocacy 
networks and coalitions, and organizing transnational movements.28  
“Transnational advocacy networks” is a conceptual framework on how NSAs 
work in international affairs, first crystallized by Margaret Keck and Katherine 
Sikkink based on studies of transnational activism in human rights, environmental 
protection, and women’s rights fields.29 They adopted the view that “networks are 
forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns 
of communication and exchanges”.30 Political actors are able to form various types of 
networks, e.g., ethnic, social identity-based and policy networks.31 For Keck and 
Sikkink, advocacy networks are formed for promoting particular causes, principled 
ideas, and norms. Transnational advocacy networks are mostly generated by 
international NGOs, activists, and activist-minded professionals (e.g., journalists, 
                                                 
26 Potter, David, ed. 1996. NGOs and Environmental Policies: Asia and Africa. London and Portland, 
OR: F. Cass. Schreurs, Miranda, and Elizabeth Economy, eds. 1997. The Internationalization of 
Environmental Protection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
27 Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  Chan-Tiberghien, Jennifer. 2004. Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan: Global Norms 
and Domestic Networks. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.   
28 Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 2002. Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
29 Keck and Sikkink. 1998.  
30 Ibid, p8. 
31 Watts, Nicole F. 2004. "Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and 
Ethnic Contention in International Affairs." In Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the 
Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices, edited by Migdal, Joel. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Marin, Bernd, and Renate Mayntz, eds. 1991. Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence 
and Theoretical Considerations. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 
 15
professors, World Bank officials, and policy experts) across borders. Each group of 
networks is identified by a specific issue domain, particularly in “value-laden” issue 
areas, e.g., human rights, indigenous people’s rights, children’s health, and 
environmental protection. This concept stresses fluid and open relations among 
committed and knowledgeable actors and organizations.  
Keck and Sikkink also observed a Boomerang pattern explicating political 
dynamics of transnational advocacy networks: When channels between domestic 
groups and their governments are blocked or hampered, or such channels are 
ineffective for resolving a conflict between the two parties, domestic activists pursue 
networking and international resources. Via conferences and other forms of 
international contact transnational networks are consolidated among domestic and 
external advocates. International advocates would then lobby a powerful government 
or international organization to place pressure back onto the repressive government 
for changing domestic policies and practices.  
Studying Transnational Advocacy Networks in China 
While I started with Keck and Sikkink’s approach to study the community of 
international NGOs and advocacy networks in China, I found it unsatisfactory in 
explaining the political complexities on the ground. Following the Boomerang theory, 
little transnational activism and few advocacy networks would emerge in China due to 
its authoritarian regime, lack of domestic social activism, and long-time isolation 
from international politics. However, my field work in the environmental and public 
 16
health fields indicated that transnational advocacy networks are emerging in China. In 
addition, I found noticeable variance in political relations among the Chinese state, 
local communities, and external advocacy actors across issue areas. Therefore, I 
revisited the existing literature, and contend that there is a conceptual bias embedded 
in this body of literature emphasizing contentious political relations between 
advocacy actors and targeted governments. I suggest comparing transnational 
advocacy networks across cases within a single country to better understand the topic 
and identify most relevant domestic factors that shape the trajectories and political 
patterns of the networks. 
Current literature on transnational advocacy networks and other forms of 
transnational social activism is mostly built upon evidence from quasi-democratic or 
transitional countries, e.g., Central and Eastern European new democracies, and Latin 
American countries. Theories developed from empirical studies of these regions 
assumed three things: the zero-sum nature of state-society relations in domestic 
politics, the cooperation and solidarity among local and international NSAs, and the 
pressure-compliance relationship between a sovereign state and the transnational 
advocacy networks. The complexity of the form of contention among the state, local 
societal groups and transnational networks, however, needs to be reconsidered. 
Comparative Politics scholars have provided alternative models and explanations of 
state-society relations. 32   The zero-sum perspective is greatly challenged by the 
                                                 
32 Most important alternative perspectives on state-society relations include “corporatism”, “embedded 
autonomy”, and “developmental state”. Schmitter, Philippe, et al eds. 1979. Trends towards 
Corporatist Intermediation. Beverly Hills: SAGE. Wiarda, Howard J., ed. 1991. New Directions in 
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argument on the state-society synergy, which emphasizes that the state and society are 
mutually-empowering.33  
In addition, the relationship between the state and international advocates, and 
that between international advocates and domestic society are not as clear-cut as 
assumed. Keck and Sikkink pointed out that targeted actors must be vulnerable either 
to material sanctions from foreign governments or IGOs, or they must be sensitive to 
external pressures because of their stated commitments.34 Therefore, their work does 
not consider what might happen if targeted states or actors are not susceptible to 
external pressures or normative accusations. In other words, when leverage politics 
fail to change state behavior, do activists and non-state-actors simply dissolve their 
efforts? This seems to be contrary to what the word “advocacy” connotes.  
The third pillar of the Boomerang model is the ideological solidarity and dense 
information flows among domestic and international activist groups and NGOs—the 
main participants of transnational advocacy networks. This argument has been 
contested by many authors who are more critical about the international NGOs’ 
                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Politics. 2 ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and 
Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Migdal, Joel. 1988. Strong 
Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. White, Gordon, ed. 1988. Developmental States in East Asia. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
33 Evans, Peter, ed. 1997. State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development. 
Berkeley: University of California. Migdal, Joel, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds. 1994. State 
Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
34 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. p29.  
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accountability to local communities.35 There seem to be power hierarchies within the 
networks, and asymmetric relations between local and external groups. Even among 
international groups and NGOs, the strategic alliances involve more complex interest 
overlap and conflict, rather than ideological uniformity. 
The China case, however, presents a different situation from the countries that 
are frequently referred to in the existing literature, for in China the state is powerful in 
both domestic and international politics, and civil society is relatively weak. 
Nevertheless, it is not unique in terms of exhibiting qualitatively different forms of 
transnational networks in terms of the triangular relations among the state, domestic 
society, and international NSAs. Labor rights movement in Latin America and 
women’s rights movements in Eastern Europe initiated by American activist groups, 
and transnational environmental advocacy networks in Japan did not perform the 
Boomerang leverage politics. 36 As this research will present, even within a single 
country, i.e., China, political relations involving transnational advocacy networks 
differ. There is a need to revisit the theoretical assumptions applied by transnational 
advocacy networks literature, and further explain the variations across cases. 
                                                 
35 Fox, Jonathan, and L.David Brown, eds. 1998. The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, 
NGOs, and Grassroots Movements. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. Chapin, Mac. 2004. “A 
Challenge to Conservationists”. Worldwatch Magazine, November/December Issue. pp17-30. 
36 Ricker, Tom. "Boomerang, Battering-Rams, and Sustainable Solidarity: Transnational Advocacy and 
the Struggle for Workers Rights in Nicaragua's Maquila Industry." Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Maryland, College Park, 2001. McMahon, Patrice C. 2000. “Building Civil Societies in East Central 
Europe: The Effect of American NGOs on Women's Groups.” Paper prepared for delivery at the 2000 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 31-
September 3. Reimann, Kim D. 1999. “Building Networks form the Outside In: International 
Movements, Japanese NGOs and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference.” Winner of the Fred 
Hartmann Award for the Best International Studies Paper Delivered by a Graduate Student at the 1999 
Annual Meeting of the ISA-NE. 
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In their book, Keck and Sikkink concluded that domestic structures and 
politics are among the most crucial factors to the emergence and success of 
transnational advocacy networks, along with leadership and issue characteristics.37 
Based upon in-depth and first-hand sources, Sanjeev Khagram highlighted and 
explained how domestic political structures lead to different trajectories of anti-dam 
advocacy networks and movements across country cases. His main argument is that 
democratic regime and high level of social mobilization facilitate the 
transnationalization of anti-dam activism.38 While Keck and Sikkink began bridging 
International Relations and Comparative Politics fields by mapping and 
conceptualizing various advocacy networks, Khagram’s single issue cross-country 
research substantially advanced this theoretical endeavor by systematically assessing 
the association between domestic politics and the emergence of transnational 
advocacy networks. 
However, the weakness of Khagram’s approach is noticeable, due to its relying 
solely on macro-level variables (i.e., level of democracy and social mobilization). 
Khagram attributed the non-existence or failure of transnational anti-dam advocacy 
networks in China (specifically, the Three Gorges Dam) to its non-democratic regime, 
which in turn caused the low level of social mobilization. But this argument does not 
explain why transnational advocacy networks are actually emerging in a few issue 
areas other than dam (e.g., women’s rights and village election) in China. Nor can it 
                                                 
37 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. Introduction, and pp72-74. 
38 Khagram, Sanjeev. 2004. Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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explain changes in transnational activism and advocacy networks when the macro-
level variables remain constant. In 2004, Chinese anti-dam activists, with the help 
from international NGOs, successfully lobbied the government, organized public 
exhibitions, and called on media campaigns against a new dam project on the Nu 
River in Yunnan province. My research suggests that by holding international and 
national macro-level factors constant, we can see that domestic micro-level variables 
(particularly intra-state bureaucratic structures, local state autonomy, and civil society 
structures defined by issue area) have important effects on the patterns of 
transnational advocacy networks. Therefore, this research proposes to apply a cross-
sectoral comparative case study method, focusing on a single country, to examine how 
transnational advocacy networks diverge in forms when they arrive in different 
domestic political contexts.  
The sectoral perspective is not uncommon in comparative politics or China 
studies. In fact, the sectoral division, tiao, is considered a defining character of the 
Chinese state apparatus.39 Recent research in China’s economic development and 
industries pushes the argument even further to the local level. 40 My analysis of the 
environmental and public health sectors, however, includes not only bureaucratic and 
                                                 
39 The Chinese word “tiao” is used to describe the vertical relations within each sector, in contrast to 
“kuai” which refers to the horizontal relations across sectors at different administrative levels. Tiao and 
kuai together consist of the complex web of power relationships within the Chinese state. Lampton, 
David, ed. 1987. Policy Implementation: Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. 1988. Policy Making in China. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and David Lampton, eds. 1992. Bureaucracy, Politics, and 
Decision Making in Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
40  Segal, Adam, and Eric Thun. 2001. “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Local Governments, 
Industrial Sectors, and Development in China”. Politics & Society, Vol. 29, No.4: 557-588. 
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local-central relations, but also varying factors emerging from the civil society 
community within each sector.  
Hence, my contribution to China studies is to incorporate societal factors into 
the analysis of a sector, or a policy issue area.41 Even though state control is still a 
predominant feature in China’s political arena, scholars have noted that the level and 
form of such control actually fluctuates across issue areas, and the state’s social 
control mechanisms are undergoing changes.42 In the last two decades, hundreds of 
voluntary, organized, and not-for-profit social groups have gradually emerged in all 
fields of social welfare. While some hold doubts about the political implications of 
various social associations in current China, Kenneth Foster’s recent empirical 
research has demonstrated that many independent social associations are capable of 
seeking the state’s recognition and support, or to be “co-opted”, to achieve 
organizational goals. 43  The state is rather uncertain as to deal with such social 
organizations beyond blind oppression.44 Particularly in the fields of poverty relief, 
women’s rights, and environmental protection, Tony Saich argued that civil society 
sector in China is not only emerging, but also has learned how to negotiate with the 
                                                 
41 While the body of literature on societal factors and civil society in China is growing, research that 
incorporate both state and societal factors in a sector is still limited. 
42 Ton, Yanqi. 1994. "State, Society, and Political Change in China and Hungary." Comparative 
Politics. 26, 3: 333-53. Brook, Timothy, and Michael Frolic, eds. 1997. Civil Society in China. New 
York: M.E.Sharpe. Nathan, Andrew J., ed. 1997. China's Transition. New York: Columbia University 
Press. Goldman, Merle, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds. 1999. The Paradox of China's Post-Mao 
Reforms. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
43 Foster, Kenneth W. 2001. "Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State: State Domination 
of Society?" Studies in Comparative International Development. 35, 4: 84-109. 
44 In certain areas, e.g., the cracking down of the Falung Gong religious movement, the state certainly 
leaves no room for any kind of negotiation.  
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state, and gained bargaining power via various means of resource mobilization.45 
Many keen observers have began to realize that due to the Chinese state’s lack of 
capacity in coping with the growing social inequality and problems after 20 years of 
economic reform, civil society organizations have found a niche to influence new 
policy formation and policy implementation.46  
In this research, I push the argument on civil society in China further, arguing 
that as civil society has developed in China, and that noticeable variations are 
emerging. For instance, the scope of NGO activities, the density of information 
sharing among different groups, and the strength of a shared social identity differ 
visibly across issue areas. Societal structures in China, therefore, cannot be uniformly 
portrayed. Instead, I suggest identifying more indicators to examine the increasingly 
vibrant and diversifying civil society sector in China, with special attention to internal 
networking and common identity building. 
Nature Conservation and HIV/AIDS Prevention in China 
The two sectors and issue areas chosen in this study are environmental protection 
(specifically, nature conservation) and public health (specifically, HIV/AIDS 
prevention), for they offer both commonalities and variance. Because my purpose is 
to give an historical-institutionalist account for preliminary theory building, the 
                                                 
45 Saich, Tony. 2000. "Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China." The 
China Quarterly. 161: 125-41. 
46 Young, Nick. 2001. Introduction in "Searching for Civil Society: 250 NGOs in China". Hong Kong: 
China Development Brief. Kwong, Julia. 2004. "Educating Migrant Children: Negotiations between 
the State and Civil Society." The China Quarterly. 180: 1073-88. 
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number of cases in this research is small. This is a conscious decision to apply the 
method of most similar comparison to examine the consequences of missing key 
factors.47  
Countering to the conventional wisdom on transnational activism, the past 10 
to 15 years have witnessed a significant growth of attention to China within the 
international NGO and foundation community. Despite of policy barriers and the lack 
of Chinese counterparts, the total number of international environmental and health 
NGOs operating in China is continuously growing. International NGOs have been 
traveling around and establishing offices in all parts of China, and incubating 
networks for public education, social activism, and policy change. Despite this 
commonality, the nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention cases also present 
noticeable differences, as evidenced by differential scope and nature of the working 
partnerships, collaborative research, policy implementation pilot projects, and large-
scale public education campaigns generated by international NGOs, together with 
local societies, and state agencies. In the field of nature conservation, international 
NGOs, funding agencies and activists have mobilized a substantial amount of human, 
material and technological resources to promote ideas such as biodiversity and “eco-
hot spot” in southwestern China. Many international advocacy groups such as the 
Ford Foundation, World Wide Fund for Nature, the Nature Conservancy, 
Conservation International, Oxfam U.S., Wildlife Conservation Society, and 
                                                 
47 Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. Collier, David. 1993. "The Comparative Method." In Political Science: The State 
of the Discipline, edited by Finifter, Ada W., 105-19. Washington, DC: APSA. 
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International Fund for Animal Welfare have established solid partnerships with 
Chinese authorities at different levels and a large number of civil society 
organizations. They sponsored related field surveys, public education programs, 
training for officials and Chinese environmentalists, and demonstration projects to 
push for new policy formation and implementation in various parts of the country. 
Together, these organizations have formed widespread networks that reach from 
central and provincial governmental agencies to Chinese NGOs and local community-
based groups.  
In the case of public health and HIV/AIDS prevention, the international NGO 
community has slowly emerged since the late 1970s. While things have changed 
dramatically since 2003, for a long time, international NGOs were restricted from 
certain provinces or areas, or releasing information about China’s AIDS situation. A 
few international NGOs have experienced difficulty in overcoming political obstacles 
when trying to go the most-devastated regions or directly deliver medical services. 
Such as the story of MSF Holland mentioned at the beginning. By 2004, there are 
dozens of international NGOs and foundations that are active in AIDS relief, care and 
treatment in China. Like the nature conservation case, these organizations formed 
various connections with each other, local NGOs and governmental agencies. In the 
wake of the SARS crisis, the state completed the reform of China’s disease control 
governing system, and slowed the decentralization of the health governance. Local 
governments are becoming more constrained in deciding whether they can or not 
collaborate with external health organizations in AIDS-related issues. Such factors 
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have constrained the development of international advocacy groups to strengthen their 
mobilization work with local and non-governmental actors, even though their 
engagement and advocacy work with governmental agencies have continued to grow. 
Main Findings and Three-fold Argument 
Based on participatory observations and in-depth field research in the two cases, I 
have arrived at the following main conclusions: 
 1) Despite the non-democratic character of the Chinese regime, a community 
of international NGOs and advocacy networks has emerged and noticeably expanded 
across issue areas in the country since the mid-1990s, in terms of not only the total 
number of organizations and the scope of their work, but also the density of their 
connections with the Chinese state and society. Evidence from environmental and 
public health sectors shows that, with professional skills, innovative policy solutions, 
and the ability to transfer resources, international NGOs and advocates are able to 
engage both governmental and non-governmental actors in China with new ideas, 
practices and policy measures. In many cases, they have introduced significant 
practical changes in nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention at both local and 
national levels. 
 2) Unlike what most of the literature on transnational activism has emphasized, 
international NGOs and networks have achieved the goal of mobilizing the Chinese 
state even when the possibility of applying confrontational means or leverage politics 
is limited. They often mobilize the Chinese state by sharing information, collaborating 
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in research, partnering in policy implementation, providing advice for policy making, 
and assisting in institutional innovations.  
 3) International NGOs and advocates are able to network with Chinese 
activists and NGOs to promote bottom-up campaigns and actions for improvement in 
nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention in the country. Most international 
NGOs see supporting Chinese civil society groups as not only morally right but also 
practically necessary to reach their own goals. More international NGOs are able to 
identify Chinese civil society groups to work with who share similar visions on 
sustainable development, equal access to public health, or other social justice issues. 
On the one hand, many Chinese NGOs have survived and endured due to the financial 
and technical support from international NGOs. On the other, international advocates 
can gain more access to local communities to sustain their work, and to governmental 
authorities to influence policy changes through their contacts and coalitions with 
Chinese activists and NGOs. 
 4) Given the political context in China, more importantly, international 
advocates have created many communication opportunities between the Chinese state 
and society, and introduced tentative forms of public participation through their 
projects. Instead of confronting or criticizing the Chinese government’s top-down 
mentality and organizational culture, many international NGOs have been able to 
engage Chinese governmental officials in demonstration projects, thereby convincing 
them of the value of public participation. Moreover, they have been able to lead 
governmental agencies through each of the steps to incorporate NSAs in policy 
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implementation. In a few cases, international NGOs have played a unique role in 
modifying state-society relations at local levels, and made the communication 
between local authorities and social groups more possible and productive. 
5) Despite the above commonalities, there are also substantial disparities 
between the transnational advocacy networks in the two issue areas studied here. One 
may point out that it is obvious that history of transnational activism against the AIDS 
epidemic in China is much shorter than that of activism against environmental 
degradation. However, this is only partially true. Some AIDS-related international 
NGOs, in fact, started working in public health (particularly in reproductive health 
and the rural health-care system) in China as early as the late 1970s. And, many 
entered China before the mid-1990s. Therefore, the real difference between China’s 
experience with conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention international NGO 
community does not lie in the length of their histories, but the temporary trajectory of 
their development. International NGOs and advocacy groups remained very few, and 
with limited access and influence in both conservation and public health fields 
throughout the 1980s. Around 1995, the conservation community gained momentum 
and expanded rapidly. However, when the AIDS crisis was uncovered at the beginning 
of 2000s, there were far fewer international NGOs working in public health in China 
than that in conservation. By the time this research was conducted, the total number of 
international NGOs in the two fields has reached almost the same, but the level of 
maturity of transnational activism differed in various aspects. 
 6) In general, international advocacy actors have made more effort to engage 
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and support the Chinese government in the AIDS field, unlike those in nature 
conservation. Even though about half of the international AIDS-related NGOs work 
with both governmental and non-governmental partners, around same number of 
international NGOs collaborate exclusively with Chinese governmental agencies. 
While, very few international conservation NGOs exclusively collaborate with 
governmental bodies. Among other factors, high level of central control in China’s 
health governance and weakness of Chinese civil society groups contributed most to 
the uneven triangular relationship among the state, society and external advocates in 
the HIV/AIDS prevention field. 
 7) The two cases not only exhibit qualitatively different features in terms of 
the triangular relationship, but also in external advocates’ engagement with 
governmental bodies and social organizations independently. For example, 
international NGOs have not yet been able to directly influence policy-making in 
HIV/AIDS prevention as often and extensively as in conservation. In both cases, 
international NGOs have provided considerate financial and technical support to 
strengthen local capacity and promote social activism. However, there is only a 
minimal sign of solidarity established among international and Chinese NGOs, and no 
enduring transnational campaigns have emerged so far in the HIV/AIDS prevention 
field. Bureaucratic politics, local-central relations, and structures of civil society are 
of great importance to explain different characteristics of transnational NGO 
mobilization across the two cases. 
 My main argument in this dissertation is three-fold: First, it is necessary to 
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relax the theoretical bias in existing transnational advocacy literature, and recognize 
that the triangular relationship among the state, local society and international NSAs 
varies both over time and across issue areas. In other words, the Boomerang Pattern 
defined by Keck and Sikkink depicts only one type of political dynamics associated 
with transnational networks and NGO activism, one with relatively high levels of 
contention. The two cases studied here evidence a different pattern, revealing what I 
call the “double-mobilization” character of such networks. This double-mobilization 
pattern emphasizes that international advocacy actors endeavor to engage, collaborate 
with, and advocate around the state, even as they establish connections and solidarity 
with local societal groups. This concept also points out the role played by 
international NSAs in bridging the state and society, something missing in the 
Boomerang analogy. International NGOs often create new channels linking the state 
and society. Instead of transnationalizing domestic contention, they intend to 
experiment with state-society partnerships, introduce new avenues for public 
participation, and alleviate domestic contention. I propose this double-mobilization 
concept to capture the gradual, consensual, and sustainable aspect of transnational 
activism. 
 Second, it is not sufficient to use political regime type as the main causal 
variable to examine the emergence and evolvement of transnational activism and 
advocacy networks. Evidence from China has shown that the politics generated by 
international NSAs in a non-democratic country is complex, and despite strict macro-
structures, transnational advocacy networks are emerging.  
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Third, I argue that two domestic micro-level structures—decentralization 
within the state, and interconnections within existing civil society groups—strongly 
influence the development of transnational activism and networks. With decentralized 
environmental governance, and a strong and connected local environmentalist 
community, international NGOs have been able to generate, expand, and consolidate 
their mobilization networks in both governmental and societal domains in nature 
conservation. While transnational NGO linkages and networks are surfacing in 
HIV/AIDS preventions in China, both the scope and level of deepening of such 
networks are still limited.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of five additional chapters. The second clarifies conceptual 
and methodological questions. I first review of the scholarship on NSAs in the field of 
IR to bring the immediate empirical puzzles of my research on China back to the 
broader theoretical context—the transnationalism tradition in IR, and particularly, 
transnational activism and contentious politics. I then focus on Keck and Sikkink’s 
work on transnational advocacy networks for its relevance to the empirical questions 
dealt with in this dissertation. With careful examination of the Boomerang pattern, I 
introduce the concept of “double-mobilization”, which features the non-contentious 
activities transnational advocacy employ to modify state behavior, policy-making 
processes and societal practices. I then review the literature on domestic structures 
and transnational advocacy networks in general, as well as domestic state and society 
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structures in China in particular in order to lay out the main hypotheses of my 
research.  
In the rest of Chapter 2, I address research design questions. Mapping, 
measuring, and comparing transnational mobilization generated by NGOs and 
networks are my central tasks in this research. Detailed descriptions and 
interpretations of individual international NGOs involved in the networks are 
provided to map the complex interactions, collaborations, and negotiations between 
them and Chinese governmental and non-governmental actors. I develop four 
indicators to capture the forms of international NGOs’ mobilization of the Chinese 
state—information dissemination, involvement in policy implementation, direct 
policy-making input, and institution building. I also apply three indicators to measure 
international NGOs’ mobilization of the Chinese society—public education, training 
and capacity building, and promotion of social activism. I discuss why these 
indicators are suitable, what are to be measured, and what cannot be quantitatively 
measured, but qualitatively inferred. 
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I present detailed case studies of transnational advocacy 
networks in nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention in China. There are three 
parts to each chapter. The first two parts elaborate the issue background, particularly 
international, state, and societal responses to the policy issue. In the third part, I first 
analyze the international NGO community and networks as a whole that shed light on 
the similarities and differences between the two cases. I then introduce a group of 
international NGOs involved in the transnational advocacy networks to demonstrate 
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the development trajectory of the networks in China, and the nested political relations 
surrounding individual NGOs. I give detailed descriptions and interpretations of these 
NGOs, including their history in China, and illustrative examples of their interaction 
with Chinese governmental bodies and social groups.  
I then systematically compare the political relations of the two networks at the 
aggregate level, and provide explanations of the commonality and variances in 
Chapter 5. In both cases, transnational networks gradually developed over the past 15 
years. While the conservation case took off and blossomed around the mid-1990s, the 
AIDS community did not gain such momentum until 2000. Despite this five year 
time-lag, both communities have formed partnerships and interactive relationships 
with Chinese governments and social groups, which supports the double-mobilization 
hypothesis. However, the triangular relationship among the state, society and 
international NGOs is more balanced in the nature conservation case. Moreover, the 
density and character of transnational NGO mobilization varies across the two cases. 
International NGOs in nature conservation have been more able to promote social 
activism, and establish new communication channels between the state and society. 
 Not surprisingly, state structures prove to be relevant to the above variation. 
Three factors stand out—internationalization of the leading state agencies, 
bureaucratic cooperation and competition, and local state autonomy. More importantly, 
societal structural factors also appear to be crucial in these cases. On the one hand, 
transnational networks’ social mobilization is fundamentally affected by the degree of 
networking and collective identity building within domestic civil society. On the other, 
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international NGOs and networks can gain more access to local state, and sometimes 
even central ministries, when domestic NGOs and groups can mobilize a wide range 
of professionals, sympathetic officials, and mass media. 
In the concluding chapter, I summarize the character of transnational activism, 
mobilization, and advocacy networks in contemporary China, and recapitulate the 
importance of domestic micro-level state and society structures to the development 
trajectory of these political matters. I also outline the implications for studies of 
contemporary Chinese and transnational politics from this research. For scholars 
interested in transnational activism and bridging the two sub-fields of political science 
(International Relations and Comparative Politics), I offer a few suggestions for 
further investigation of domestic causal variables and testing alternative explanations. 
For scholars in China studies, many findings in this research offer new material to 
reflect on questions related to state-society relations, local state autonomy and civil 
society development in China. Especially the findings of interconnectivity among 
Chinese NGOs and grassroots voluntary groups  
A Note on the Participatory Action Research Approach 
This is not a history or sociology project. I do not intend to give the readers the 
impression that the organizations and individuals discussed in this research complete 
the list of those who have been involved in improving China’s environment and 
public health. Nor do I assume that all sources have been exhausted to document 
every relevant event. I have made the most effort to study the most important 
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organizations with regard to transnational activism, advocacy and mobilization, and 
events that are the most politically relevant.   
To achieve these goals, I traveled between China and the United States many 
times to follow closely the two cases of transnational networks during the past four 
years. I conducted numerous in-depth interviews with activists, researchers, NGO 
representatives, and governmental officials in both countries, some of whom, 
unfortunately, must remain anonymous in this dissertation.48  I also attended many 
conferences, official meetings, rallies, strategic planning roundtables, brain-storm 
sessions, social events, and “kitchen talks”, without which I would be unable to 
accurately interpret the political relevance and trace the dynamic relations of the two 
networks. 
In April 2001, I assisted the organization of the first Environmental NGO and 
Journalism Forum in Mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, which brought over 60 
environmentalists together to share experiences and reflections on social activism. As 
my research proceeded, I found myself trusted by many activists as part of the 
networks, and occasionally called upon to give a talk, share opinions, and provide 
advice. Invited by a group of local journalists, I facilitated the formation of Shanghai 
Environmental Journalist Salon in 2003. Through me, the Salon became a grantee of 
the Global Greengrants Fund, an international NGO devoted to strengthening local 
capacity in environmental protection in over 70 countries. From January to August, 
                                                 
48  My interpretive analysis of their work is strictly my own, and those I interviewed may not 
necessarily agree. Nevertheless, I am very grateful to their generosity in sharing their time and 
opinions.  
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2004, I spent eight consecutive months in China, during which I was a part-time 
research fellow of a Chinese environmental NGO in Beijing (the Global 
Environmental Institute). I also served as an in-country advisor for the AIDS Relief 
Fund for China, a small American proactive charity based in San Francisco, searching 
for grassroots Chinese NGOs working in HIV/AIDS prevention and care. Both 
experiences allowed me to travel extensively in China, and observe transnational 
activism and NGO linkages as an insider.  
The subject matter of this research sits at the intersection of IR and CP fields 
in politics science, and its contribution to theory-building is based upon in-depth 
comparative case studies. I applied classic comparative methods, and endeavored to 
form a “thick description” of the networks studied.49 During the research years, I was 
conscious about and constantly reflected upon the extent to which I should be 
involved in the actual activism and networking. As I finished writing this dissertation, 
I had the opportunity to have some exchanges with a group of scholars/scholar-
activists in the field of transnational social movements at International Studies 
Association 2005 conference roundtables “Transnational Social Movements and 
Scholar Activism”, including Jackie Smith, and Teivo Teivainen—leading figures in 
both the movement of World Social Forum and the research of the movement.50 
                                                 
49 “Thick description” became a terminology in political science methodology after Clifford Geertz’s 
works on political culture, religion, and society in Southeast Asia and Northern Africa. Geertz, 
Clifford. 1968. Islam observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1973. An Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
50 Jackie Smith, professor in sociology, University of Notre Dame, editor of Transnational Social 
Movements and Global Politics (1997, Syracuse University Press), Globalizing Resistance: 
Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements (2002, Rowman & Littlefield), and Coalitions across 
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During the panel, scholars and researchers from Europe, Latin America, and United 
States engaged in a heated discussion of not only the ethical, but also methodological 
justifications and criticisms of the Participatory Action Approach in studying 
transnational activism and social movements. My own thoughts on the 
methodological questions in this research were thereby further clarified. 
The Participatory Action Approach emerged from “engagement on the part of 
activists and scholars in various emancipatory struggles and social transformation in 
the Third World, having its roots in liberation theology, Paulo Freire’s theories of 
education, neo-Marxist theories of development, Frankfurt School Critical scholarship, 
feminism, and liberal human rights activism”. 51 Scholar-activists working in this 
tradition are not only committed to participatory observation, but also feel responsive 
to the actual needs of local people. The research project then becomes one of self-
discovery and of learning together from action as well as history, a process 
undertaken within activism and history, in the form of accompaniment. The researcher 
is no longer a mere recorder, outside critic, controller, or conductor from above, but 
                                                                                                                                            
Borders: Transnational Protest against the Neoliberal Order (2005, Rowman & Littlefield), and 
author of many journal articles and books chapters on the topic. Teivo Teivainen, Director of Global 
Democratic Transformation Program, Universidad Nacional Mayor de san Marcos, Peru, founding 
member of the World Social Forum—a transnational social movement against the Neoliberal 
International Order. World Social Forum, first held in the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 
2001, is a “peoples’ movement” to “provide an open platform to discuss strategies of resistance to the 
model for globalisation formulated at the annual World Economic Forum by large multinational 
corporations, national governments, IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.” 
[http://www.wsfindia.org/whoweare.php] 
51 Reitan, Ruth. 2005. “The Personal is Methodological (as Well as Political): The Co-Constitution of 
Normative Commitments and Methodology”. Paper prepared for ISA Annual Convention roundtable 
“Transnational Social Movements and Scholar Activism II: World Social Forum”, Honolulu, 1-5 
March.  
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an insider.52 Those who have applied this approach argue that the benefits of being a 
“committed insider” outweigh the disadvantages of being a supposedly “objective 
outsider”, specifically noting the access to resources and informants, the trust and 
rapport gained, and the ability to support and accompany this activist network in its 
efforts for social change.53
 Political scientists who follow the footsteps of Clifford Geertz and James C. 
Scott, and apply anthropological methods in their field work would fully appreciate 
the necessity of long-term, in-depth, personal involvement in the political matters 
under investigation.54 A solid comparative research design requires both external 
validity (i.e., the measurements hold consistent across cases) and internal reliability 
(i.e., the measuring values correspond to the actual meanings within a case).55 To 
ensure the latter, or in other words, to form “scientific inferences”, one needs to be 
well versed with the symbolic meanings of focused political matters/measurements in 
                                                 
52 Kemmis, Stephen, and Robin McTaggart, “Participatory Action Research,” in Norman K. Denzin 
and Yvonna S. Lincoln eds. 2000. Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, 
London, New Delhi: Sage. pp575-7. Whitmore, Elizabeth and Maureen Wilson. 1999. “Research and 
Popular Movements: Igniting Seeds of Fire,” Social Development Issues, 21: 19-28. McTaggart, Robin 
ed. 1997. Participatory Action Research: International Contexts and Consequences. Albany: SUNY 
Press. Borda, O. Fals, and M. A. Rahman, eds. 1991. Action and Knowledge: Breaking the Monopoly 
with Participatory Action-Research. New York: Apex. 
53  Desmarais, Annette A. 2003. The Via Campesina: Peasants Resisting Globalization. Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. (quoted in Ruth 
Reitan, 2005.) 
54 Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast 
Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
55 Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. Ragin, Charles C., and Howard S. Becker, eds. 1992. What Is A Case? Exploring 
the Foundations of Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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the particular context.56 My own research experience strongly confirmed the value of 
participatory work. The process of applying existing theoretical frames to the 
empirical studies in China in this research was not completed at once, but gradually 
formulated after field observations took place. 
This research approach would not particularly cause controversies within the 
academic community except for the “action” part. The “action” part refers to not only 
one’s awareness of the normative commitments attached to the research project, but 
also the willingness of putting such commitments into action as affirmation. I do 
agree with the first half of this point of view. Even though Weberian positivism still 
dominates the contemporary social science enterprise, the theme of moral neutrality is 
constantly contested. Political philosophers have warned us that extreme positivism 
would inevitably lead to nihilism.57 I have come to see social science research as 
reflexive and dialectical processes. To study political matters is to grasp the meanings 
of them, and also to be enlightened by what is seen and experienced. My commitment 
to my research subjects reflects my normative belief in the legitimacy of civic 
engagement. I am now able to articulate and defend these commitments with a greater 
clarity and certainty than I would have at the start of the research.  
However, on the second part of the “action” principle, which requires a 
researcher to be not only an inside observer, but also an active participant of the 
                                                 
56 King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
57 Strauss, Leo. 1959. What Is Political Philosophy and Other Studies. New York: The Free Press. 
“What is Political Philosophy?” pp9-55; “Political Philosophy and History,” pp56-77; “On Classical 
Political Philosophy,” pp78-94. 
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movement, campaign, or other political actions that are under investigation, I have my 
reservations. I appreciate Ruth Reitan’s reflections on her three-year long dissertation 
research on the World Social Forum and transnational social movement against the 
Neoliberal World Order: “This insider perspective, however, is strengthened by being 
able to shift between the inside and outside, the individual and collective.”58 She 
noted the danger of researchers over-identifying with certain groups, and being blind 
to their own prejudice. During my own research, I remained mostly as a friend with 
the activist groups and activist-minded professionals, sometimes a peer researcher to 
share thoughts and reflections, but never an igniter, leader, or backbone of political 
action. It was important for me to resist the temptation of being “pro-active”, which 
might have caused me to miss the correct interpretation of the political dynamics. 
Needless to say, there were many emotionally conflicting moments. But, by the end, 
this approach suited me well. 
                                                 
58 Reitan, 2005.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN THEORY 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I clarify relevant theoretical questions by four steps. First, in order to 
bring the focus of my research back into the broader theoretical context, I will introduce 
the school of transnationalism, and particularly, theories of non-state actors (NSAs) and 
transnational activism in International Relations field. Different from earlier work on 
transnationalism, scholarship on transnational activism appreciates many concepts from 
the contentious politics literature in Comparative Politics, and highlights the effects of 
information, norms and ideational factors.  
In the second part, I discuss Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink’s theory of 
transnational advocacy networks in greater detail. I challenge their assumptions about the 
contentious nature of transnational advocacy politics and the type of political power that 
international NSAs possess. I propose a Double-mobilization model to understand 
transnational advocacy networks, which by contrast emphasizes the activities such 
networks conduct when aiming at more gradual and sustainable effects on domestic 
societies, as well as the type of power they exercise over governmental authorities 
through persuasion, demonstration, and consensus building. The Double-mobilization 
model also underlines the dynamic triangular relationship among the state, society, and 
international NSAs, and the complexity of this triangle marked by the co-existence of 
various forms of engagement or confrontation between the state and individual 
international NSAs. 
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In the third part, I discuss potential causal variables for the emergence and 
evolution of transnational advocacy networks. In the existing literature, Khagram’s 
cross-country historical comparative study of anti-dam movements provides the best 
existing example of how to systematically search for domestic explanatory factors on the 
topic. Drawing upon both Thomas Risse’s work on domestic structures and preliminary 
findings from my field work, I suggest a cross-sectoral comparative approach, focusing 
on one country, to distinguish micro-level variables that would offer a better 
understanding of the impact of domestic political context on the form of transnational 
networks.   
The case of China offers rich theoretical potential. China first exhibits a very 
different, yet not entirely unique, situation from what has been depicted in most of the 
existing literature on transnational advocacy networks, where the state is not easily 
susceptible to external pressures and moral criticisms. More importantly, China is in the 
midst of a grand transformation, where both its state and society are undergoing 
fundamental and rapid changes, and Maoist uniformity is fading away rapidly. Sectoral 
variations are present due to the fact that different new problems are emerging, new 
political actors and alliances are in formation, and new political ideas and institutions are 
being tried in each issue area. Based on both comparative and Chinese politics literature, 
I identify a set of indicators to examine main domestic state and society structures 
defined by an issue area, and how these structural factors have influenced transnational 
networks. 
 
 
 
 42
NON-STATE ACTORS IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
The concept of transnational advocacy networks was first defined by those scholars who 
are interested in non-state actors in world affairs, and linkages between domestic and 
international politics. Hence, a review of related literature, especially transnationalism in 
IR theory, helps to better understand what is special and essential about the term 
“advocacy networks” in interpreting transnational relations.  
Transnationalism in International Relations Theory 
Theories of non-state actors and transnational activism have their intellectual roots in the 
tradition of linkage politics—the linkage between domestic and international politics.1 
Most IR scholars used to focus on interactions among states, regardless their 
disagreement on whether the system is composed of an international society2 or a group 
of individual states, and whether the states are survival-seekers or utility-maximizers.3 
The sole unit of analysis was for them the sovereign state. Those who were interested in 
international-domestic linkages, instead, attempted to understand domestic sources of 
                                                 
1 Rosenau, James N. 1969. Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems. New York: Free Press.  
2 This tradition in IR field is known as the English School (Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. 
New York: Columbia University Press), and more recently has been enriched by IR constructivism: 
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics. 
Edited by J. G. Ruggie, New Directions in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Wendt, 
Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
3 The term “survival-seeker” is often used to refer to neo-realist perspective, and “utility-maximizer” to 
Neoliberal-institutionalist perspective. Baldwin, David A., ed. 1993. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, Robert O., ed. 1986. Neorealism 
and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.  
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international affairs, or international environmental causes of domestic politics. On the 
one hand, the unit of the state is disaggregated, and non-state actors (e.g., supra-national 
organizations and sub-national groups) are taken into serious consideration as both agents 
and structures of changes. On the other hand, the transnationalism literature does not 
suggest the total retreat of national governments. Unlike the globalist perspective, which 
tends to entirely replace political boundaries with ecological, technological, economical, 
or sociological fault lines, transnationalism still sees the state as a main political actor and 
political arena in world politics.4 Summarized nicely by Peter Gourevitch, the rationale 
for transnational relations inquiries is to better understand state behavior by studying 
“international and domestic politics simultaneously”.5  
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye first conceptualized the complexity of 
transnational relations with their theory of interdependence, capturing the multi-level 
interactions among multiple actors in multiple issue areas.6 They pointed out that classic 
IR literature overlooked the great amount of interactions either between one state and 
societal actors in another state, or between inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and 
societal forces within a state. James Rosenau, in his writings on “turbulence” in world 
                                                 
4 This way of classifying the three branches of the IR field (i.e., international, transnational, and global) is 
more ontological than epistemological. Representative scholarship taking a globalist approach includes: 
Held, David et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. Pirages, Dennis. 1989. Global Technopolitics: The International Politics of Technology 
and Resources. Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole. Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion 
of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Boli, John, and George M. 
Thomas, eds. 1999. Constructing World Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
5 Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” 
International Organization, 32 (4): 881-912. 
6 Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1972. “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An 
Introduction.” In Transnational Relations in World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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politics, underlined and summarized the importance of international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) in transnational relations.7  
Apart from the point that transnational relations scholars conceive of the world in 
a way different from state-centric and globalist IR perspectives, they also relax the 
urgency to develop a parsimonious grand theory of the field. Instead, they have pursued 
many alternative middle-ground explanatory theories. These theories are less aimed at a 
metaphor of transnational relations than at processes of interactions, and nuances of the 
causal mechanisms, for example, transnational bureaucratic connections, political party 
coalitions across countries, and double-edged diplomatic negotiations.8
In this tradition, Peter Haas first outlined the concept of epistemic community 
based on his research of the Mediterranean Sea multilateral pollution control treaty.9 This 
concept portrayed a particular group of political actors linking domestic and international 
                                                 
7 Rosenau, James N. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1997. Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in A 
Turbulent World. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
8 For a review on this point see Robert Keohane, and Helen Milner eds. 1996. Internationalization and 
Domestic Politics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Robert Putnam’s work on 
double-edged diplomacy in international negotiations provided a provocative framework to understand the 
state’s decision based on the comparison and calculation between both domestic and international 
bargaining outcomes. This institution-based framework has been enriched by various empirical 
applications, such as Elizabeth Economy’s studies on China’s environmental diplomacy in global climate 
change negotiations. (Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games”. International Organization, 42, 3:427-460. Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. 
Putnam eds. 1993. Double-edged diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. Economy, Elizabeth. 1997. “Chinese Policy-making and Global Climate 
Change: Two-Front Diplomacy and the International Community.” In The Internationalization of 
Environmental Protection. Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy eds. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.) 
9 Haas, Peter. 1989. “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control”. 
International Organization, 43, 3:377-403. 
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politics—those who have the authority over knowledge—scientists and policy experts, 
and has since inspired a large body of empirical research across various topics and 
geographic regions.10 IR scholars’ attention was called to re-examine the leverage of 
science and knowledge in international politics, and the respect, mobilizing capacity, and 
persuasive power that scientists and experts possess, in contrast with traditional political 
actors. More importantly, the epistemic community theory pointed out the importance of 
loose yet semi-institutionalized networks among those scientists and experts, formed 
through their official activities as representatives of their own governments, as well as 
their personal communications based on shared professional knowledge. Such networks 
usually play a central role in setting both domestic and international agenda for science 
based international negotiations and regime building, e.g., global warming.11  
I specifically bring up the epistemic community concept here not only because it 
raised many relevant questions which provided inspiration for further research on 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and advocacy networks in transnational 
relations, but also because of the confusion over the differences between epistemic 
communities and transnational advocacy networks. Both of them emphasize 
non-traditional agents in international relations, and share an appreciation of the networks 
perspective. Nevertheless, the two are qualitative different from each other. Even though 
the epistemic community theory illustrates how non-state actors can form connections 
                                                 
10  Haas, Peter ed.1992. Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. International 
Organization (Special Issue), No. 46. 
11 Karen Liftin’s critique on the epistemic community model led to some re-assessment of structural 
constrains on the political leverage that the scientist community can possess. (Litfin, Karen. 1995. 
“Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and Ozone Treaties,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies. 24, 2: 251-277.) 
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and networks outside/beyond formal political settings which, in turn, modify state and 
international decision-making processes, its explanatory power is limited to those 
political actors that have direct access to state decision-making processes. The very 
reason that an epistemic community can be effective is that the policy experts and 
scientists are either officially or partially inside the state apparatus. The genesis of 
linkage politics, crossing the domestic and international arenas, seems to be from within 
the state and the state-system. International NGOs and advocacy networks infused with 
voluntarism and bottom-up activism, however, generate a different kind of political 
dynamic as they intend to change state behavior from outside in. In addition, the 
transnational activism and advocacy literature emphasizes the power not of scientific 
knowledge, but of information and principled ideas.12 Participants of an advocacy 
network are not necessarily scientists or experts, but committed individuals and 
organizations for a specific cause.13 In brief, epistemic communities are persuasive and 
capable of changing a state’s political agenda because they are considered to know better 
about what is more efficient and beneficial. Transnational advocates, on the other hand, 
are capable of mobilizing for political changes, because they are committed to what is 
more just and better for the public. 
 
International NGOs and Transnational Activism 
                                                 
12 The boundary between pure scientific evidence and normative principles often gets blurred in practice. 
Activists and advocacy groups care about scientific research and findings for different reasons, but they do 
so for different reasons than researchers. Or, at least, they care more about the social justice implications of 
such findings. And, they are more involved in the translating of scientific findings into common languages 
and accessible information for the general public than the actual discovery of the findings. 
13 Advocates can include activist-minded scientists and experts. 
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NGOs are distinguished from other non-state actors (e.g., corporations, research 
institutions) in that they are organized, private, voluntary based, and autonomous.14 
International NGOs are those independent organizations that mobilize resources, deliver 
services, and conduct projects across country borders. In reality, international NGOs can 
take on various outlooks, and sometimes are described as being Janus-faced in that their 
private, non-state character is not as clear-cut as in theory. Scholars have pointed out that 
international NGOs’ autonomy and accountability is constantly challenged by their 
donors, such as international development agencies, governmental foreign assistance 
agencies, and corporate foundations.15 Moreover, many but not all international NGOs 
are advocacy-focused and committed to social activism. Nevertheless, they are the most 
important transnational actors in confronting sovereign states’ violation of human rights 
and problems embedded in the neo-liberal international economic order. In this section, I 
will review the merging of the scholarship on international NGOs and that on domestic 
social movements. This synthesis of research approaches from different sub-fields in 
political science has greatly improved the understanding of new dynamics in world 
affairs. 
Since the early 1990s, international NGOs have drawn increasing attention from 
IR scholars. This is due, first, to international NGOs’ growing involvement in 
international negotiations and conferences. In the fields of human rights, women’s rights, 
                                                 
14 See footnote 14 in Chapter 1 for more discussion on the definition of NGO. 
15 Salamon, Lester M., ed. 1999. Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies. Stiles, Kendall, ed. 2000. Global Institutions and Local 
Empowerment: Competing Theoretical Perspectives. New York: St. Martin's Press. Fox, Jonathan, and 
L.David Brown, eds. 1998. The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots 
Movements. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. 
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and environmental protection, international NGOs’ influence on agenda setting, 
negotiation procedures, and final agreement drafting became evident.16 One of the most 
studied examples is the International Committee to Ban Landmines and international 
regime building to ban the use of landmines.17 In 1992, a half dozen concerned 
international NGOs founded ICBL with the hope to ban the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of landmines.18 Within four years over 1,400 religious, humanitarian and 
development NGOs joined ICBL in the course against landmines. Activists and NGOs 
lobbied, mobilized, and campaigned at the international level, as well as targeted 
individual governments. The speed and momentum of the movement was unprecedented, 
culminating in December 1997 in the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On their Destruction. 
The ICBL, as well as key individuals involved in the movement were rewarded with the 
1997 Nobel Peace Prize. By October 2004, 143 states have acceded to the Ottawa 
Convention worldwide. 
                                                 
16 Spector, B., G. Sjostedt and I. Zartman ed. 1994. Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons learned 
from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). London: Graham & 
Trotham/Martinus Nijhoff. Jennifer Clapp. 1994. “Africa, NGOs, and the International Toxic Waste Trade”, 
Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2. Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and 
Kathryn Hochstetler. 1998. “The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO 
Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women.” World Politics, 
51.  
17 Motoko Mekata. 2000. Chapter Six in Ann Florini eds. The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil 
Society. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Edwards, Michael, and John 
Gaventa, eds. 2001. Global Citizen Action. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
18 The six NGOs that formed the initial steering committee of the ICBL were Handicap International, 
Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and the 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. 
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Equipped with advanced information, specialized expertise, and professional 
mobilization skills, international NGOs also gradually become important public 
educators, facilitators, and norm and policy entrepreneurs in the development and 
implementation of global governance.19 Some recognize them as the “third force”—next 
to states and corporations—in the complex system of the global governing structures.20 
Despite shortcomings, international NGOs have taken major roles in nurturing 
democratic principles, supporting democratic consolidation, and preventing sub-national 
conflicts.21 Scholars pointed out three trends in the expanding scope of the international 
                                                 
19 The idea of a “norm entrepreneur” was raised by Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink in 
"International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." International Organization. 52, 4: 887-917. (1998) 
For the role of international NGOs in global governance, see: Princen, Thomas, and Matthias Finger. 1994. 
Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global. New York: Routledge. Weiss, 
Thomas, and Leon Gordenker, eds. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. Series. London: Lynne 
Rienner. Lipschutz, Ronnie and Ken Conca eds. 1993. The State and Social Power in Global 
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"Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on International Society." Journal of International 
Affairs. 48, 2: 507-26. Murphy, Craig N. 1994. International Organization and Industrial Change: Global 
Governance Since 1850. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
20 Florini, Ann M. ed. 2000. The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
21 Kumar, Chetan.2000. Chapter Five in The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Florini, 
Ann M. ed. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mendelson, Sarah, and John 
Glenn. 2000. "Democracy Assistance and NGO Strategies in Post-Communist Societies". Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. Quigley, Kevin. 1997. For Democracy's Sake: Foundations 
and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Lasota, 
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NGO community. First, the total number of international NGOs has exploded since the 
1970s—from 2173 in 1972, 4518 in 1988, and over 6000 by the end of 1990s—covering 
a wide range of social political issues, e.g., human rights, environment, development, 
indigenous peoples’ rights, North-South divide, anti-war, and global public health.22 
Second, the number of international NGOs representing transnational social movements 
has increased from 1983 to 1993 by 73 per cent (from 319 to 533), which indicates that 
the local populations and constituencies that international NGOs are accountable to have 
grown considerably.23 Third, the development of international NGOs took place in 
parallel to, yet recently surpassed the establishment of IGOs. From the 1950s to 1970s, 
the ratio of international NGOs to IGOs grew very slowly, from less than 5 international 
NGOs per IGO to 7-9 international NGOs per IGO, while in 1988, the UN counted 4518 
international NGOs and 309 IGOs, a ratio of over 14 to 1.24
In contrast to the above more international regime formation focused perspective, 
the second generation of scholarship on international NGOs incorporated more concepts 
and frameworks from comparative studies of domestic social mobilization and political 
changes. This body of literature, which I summarize as “transnational activism”, shares at 
                                                 
22 Rosenau, James N. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press: p409. (quoted in Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ed. 1995. Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: p10) Also see: Boli, John, and George M. Thomas, eds. 1999. 
Constructing World Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Princen, Thomas, and Matthias 
Finger. 1994. Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global. New York: 
Routledge. Keck, Sikkink, and Jackie Smith’s account of the numbers, however, is 183 in 1973, and 631 in 
1993, covering human rights, world order, international law, peace, women’s rights, environment, 
development, ethnic group rights, Esperanto and other fields. (Keck and Sikkink, 1998. p11) 
23 Risse-Kappen, ed. 1995. p11.  
24 Rosenau, 1990. p409 (quoted in Risse-Kappen, ed. 1995. p11) 
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least three major arguments: first, transnational societal linkages, represented by NGO 
connections, networks, and coalitions across borders, are emerging and having significant 
impacts on local, national, and world politics; second, these linkages are most crucial 
when the aim is to empower local people and to overcome domestic policy blockages in 
order to change state behavior; and third, information, normative principles, and 
ideational factors are crucial for these NGOs and advocates to substantiate their pressure 
and leverage over targeted political authorities. These three principal points differentiate 
the transnational activism literature from other studies of non-state actors in transnational 
politics. As Keck and Sikkink point out, this body of literature highlights “a subset of 
international issues, characterized by the prominence of principled ideas and a central 
role for NGOs.” 25 In this subset of issues, non-state actors form coalitions to carry out 
and articulate specific principles, translate them into policy debates on the ground, and 
lobby for external pressure for domestic enforcement of these norms and rules. They also 
try to change the balance of power in domestic political struggles to make states change 
existing policies by mobilizating large-scale demonstrations and campaigns across 
country borders. 
The main types of transnational activism are transnational advocacy networks, 
transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements. Transnational advocacy 
networks and transnational coalitions have much in common in that both are 
configurations of individual activists, NGOs, movements, and grassroots groups, 
promoting changes in a clearly identified policy issue area. The notion of transnational 
advocacy networks, first constructed by Keck and Sikkink’s in Activists beyond Borders, 
                                                 
25 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p199. 
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stresses “fluid and open relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in 
specialized issue areas.”26 In contrast, Sanjeev Khagram, James Riker, and Kathryn 
Sikkink argued that a transnational coalition involves a greater level of coordination and 
requires shared strategies and tactics.27 The transnational networks around violence 
against women, for example, became a transnational coalition in early 1990s when 
women’s groups developed two strategies transnationally: an international petition drive 
and the “sixteen-day” campaign—coordinating activism in different countries in the same 
sixteen-day period.28
The notion and discussion of transnational social movements was popularized by 
Sidney Tarrow’s book Power in Movement.29 Built upon analysis of and conclusions 
about domestic social movements, Tarrow pointed out that changes in political 
opportunities and constraints (both domestic and international) will trigger episodes of 
social contention. By strategically employing a repertoire of collective action and 
constructing dense social networks and mobilization structures, social movement 
organizations frame contention and mobilize people across borders. He also differentiated 
                                                 
26 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p8. 
27 Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, 2002. pp7. 
28 Thompson, Karen B. 2002. "Women's Rights are Human Rights." In Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, edited by Sanjeev Khagram, James Riker and 
Kathryn Sikkink, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp 96-123. 
29 Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, Sidney. 2002. "The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, 
Coalitions, Mechanisms." Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Boston, August 29 September 1. 
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transnational social movements from other types of transnational activism by 
emphasizing the massive scale and temporal continuity of the former.30
The above three types of transnational activism can be briefly differentiated as 
ascending levels of transnational collective action.31 In short, they ascend is in both 
senses of scope and depth of contention and mobilization.32  Hence, transnational 
advocacy networks, transnational coalitions and transnational social movements together 
have provided a new account for the role of NSAs in world affairs, by underlining the 
transnationalization of domestic contention and specifying the various mechanisms 
employed by domestic and international NGOs and advocates to advance this 
transnaitionalizing process. This approach is distinctive from other works on international 
relations and NSAs due to its emphasis on the meaning of purposeful individuals coming 
                                                 
30 Drawing upon multiple cases in Latin America, Jackie Smith improved transnational social movement 
theory by emphasizing that transnational social movement organizations will provide new and ongoing 
opportunities for marginalized groups to seek to influence local, national, global political changes. 
Transnational social movement organizations help bring together local constituencies to national level 
politics, and guide a transnational public discourse and debate around global problems. (Smith, Jackie. 
2000. "Social Movements, International Institutions, and Local Empowerment." In Global Institutions and 
Local Empowerment, edited by Stiles, K. New York: St. Martin's Press.) Donatella della Porta et al built 
upon Tarrow and Smith’s studies and argued that transnational social movement is a multi-level game, 
where international political opportunity and constraint, diffusion of norms and discourses, and 
mobilization structures are all relevant. (della Porta, Donatella , Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht. 1999. 
Social Movements in A Globalizing World. New York: St. Martin's Press.) 
31 Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, 2002. pp9. 
32 It is difficult to imagine and to find empirical evidence that a transnational movement will emerge 
without prior networking or campaigning. As to the level of contention, however, it is challenging to ask 
whether the assassination of an activist is less contentious than the massive protests organized by 
international NGOs. Thick description and accurate interpretation are needed to compare these cases. Thus, 
to differentiate the three types of transnational activism from each other and to identify a particular 
transnational activism case more accurately, one still needs to look into the specific context and details of 
each case.  
 
 54
together across geographic boundaries, forming consolidated networks and shared 
solidarity, and disseminating and putting into action principled ideas through intensive 
and continuous media campaigns, petitions, public demonstrations, and lobbying for 
international pressure. 
Transnational vs. Global Civil Society 
To better understand transnational activism in theory, it is worth pointing out the 
distinction between two related concepts: transnational civil society and global civil 
society. Despite the common appreciation of the political relevance of non-state actors in 
world affairs, these two terms differ in many ways, thus shedding light on theories of 
transnational activism.  
The ontological division between the two terms— transnational vs. global civil 
society— is rooted in the transnationalist vs. globalist debate in the IR field. The global 
civil society framework blurs the political boundaries of societies, and assumes that civil 
society in each country shares the same characteristics, such as autonomous NGOs, 
commitment to the market economy, civic engagement in political decision-making, and 
a voluntary spirit.33 Scholars who prefer this framework argue that besides lobbying 
governments and playing a role in international regime formation, NGOs have other 
power derived from diffusing normative principles, changing local practices, and creating 
                                                 
33 For example, since 2001, the Center for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science has published issues of the Global Civil Society Yearbook. (London: LSE 
Press) Based on some uniform definitions and measurements, the Yearbook is intended to offer a statistical 
overview, via tables, maps and diagrams, of global civil society’s dimensions and contours. It is now 
frequented referred by the researchers who are interested in the topic.  
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a global civic political culture.34 Paul Wapner attempted to illustrate the politics of global 
civil society by showing how international environmental NGOs and multi-national 
corporations introduce social behavior changes via day-to-day communications and 
interactions. Such communications and interactions do not take place in the forms of 
protest, strike, boycott or other confrontational means. 35
Keck and Sikkink are not satisfied with the concept of global civil society, yet 
“much more comfortable with a conception of transnational civil society as an arena of 
struggle, a fragmented and contested area where ‘the politics of transnational civil society 
is centrally about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized’.”36 They 
argue that international non-state actors are not purely enactors of new norms. On the 
contrary, preferences and identities of actors engaged in transnational civil society are 
mutually transformed through their interactions with each other, and resistance against 
pre-existing political authorities. 37 Where those actors come from, and against whom 
                                                 
34 Edwards, Michael and John Gaventa, eds. 2001. Salamon, Lester M., ed. 1999. Smith, Jackie. 1998. 
"Global Civil Society." American Behavioral Scientist. 42: 93-108. Lipschutz, Ronnie. 1996. Global Civil 
Society and Global Environmental Governance. Albany: SUNY Press.  
35 Wapner, Paul. 1996. Environmental Activism and World Politics. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
36 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. p33. Jackie Smith’s study of transnational social movements came closer to the 
global civil society notion in that she points out the importance of a global public discourse, e.g., 
environmental protection and its power to inspire and mobilize grassroots resistance, demonstration and 
protests. (Smith, 1998) The normative and ideational dimensions of transnational factors are put forward. 
However, what differentiates Smith from Wapner is that the former brings back the question of the leverage 
of social movements on political changes, in addition to social changes. Neither transnational advocacy 
networks nor transnational social movement scholars suspend the consideration of political changes 
resulting from social mobilizations. On the contrary, the state-society interaction and balancing are among 
the topics that interest them most. 
37 Price, Richard M. 2003. “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics Review.” World 
Politics, 55, 4: 579-606. 
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they stand, always matter. In other words, activists can go beyond borders, but cannot go 
without a target of struggle (e.g., a specific policy, a government or an international 
organization). Transnational civil society is an arena for committed individuals to form 
new collective identities so to debate and articulate the implications of certain normative 
principles, exemplify the practical embodiment of such principles, and build up 
institutions to ensure the execution of these principles. The causal chain for political 
changes is much clear and shorter in the transnational civil society framework than in the 
global civil society framework.  
I contend that the transnational civil society perspective provides a trenchant 
response to a central puzzle in IR concerning the relationship between civil society and 
contemporary nation states in an era of globalization. It constitutes a powerful theoretical 
alternative not only to state-centric theories, but also to variants of neo-liberal IR theories, 
such as those privileging market forces and interdependence. My own research shares 
with the scholars of transnational activism their vision of a “tightly knit” globalization 
process,38 which is not an inevitable “steamroller” but the composite of thousands of 
decisions and actions made by groups of purposeful individuals and organizations.39 
However, I also draw upon the scholarship on globalism and stress NSAs’ 
non-contentious activities to change state behavior and domestic politics. In other words, 
international NSAs and transnational networks are situated in complex political struggles 
and contention cross country borders; however, their ways of solving problems and 
modifying existing political alliances and balances are not uniformly contentious. 
 
                                                 
38 Tarrow, 1998. Chapter 11. 
39 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. Conclusion chapter, p213. 
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DOUBLE-MOBILIZATION:  
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS THEORY REVISITED 
 
Among various theories on non-state actors in transnational relations, Keck and Sikkink’s 
conceptualization of transnational advocacy networks is best suited to analyze the 
empirical questions in my research. In this section, I will first explicate the meaning and 
implications of the concept of transnational advocacy networks, and particularly the 
causal mechanism of these networks—the Boomerang model, offered by Keck and 
Sikkink. I then argue that there is a contentious politics bias embedded in the Boomerang 
model which leads to a partial description of the political dynamics involved in 
transnational advocacy networks. I further propose a complementary model—Double- 
mobilization—in order to draw attention to the direct and various interactions between 
external advocacy actors and targeted governments that are missing in the Boomerang 
model. The Double-mobilization model builds upon the discursive theory of political 
power in international relations, and emphasizes that domestic state-society relations are 
not static but evolve along with the development of transnational advocacy politics. 
The contribution of Keck and Sikkink’s work Activists beyond Borders is that it 
first clarified what are advocacy networks, and how, why, among whom, and to what end 
transnational advocacy networks emerge. It created a new research vocabulary for the IR 
field. Based on a range of historical in-depth case studies covering human rights 
advocacy networks in China and Africa at the beginning of the 20th century, 
environmental networks in tropical forestry regions in current Brazil and Malaysia, and 
transnational networks against domestic violence and women’s rights, Keck and Sikkink 
argued that transnational advocacy networks are fluid, open, voluntary-based, and loosely 
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coordinated groups of committed individuals and NGOs for a specific course. Each 
network is identified by a specific issue area. International and grassroots NGOs are 
essential participants of transnational advocacy networks. Individuals from different 
backgrounds (not formally affiliated with NGOs) can sometimes play a critical role in 
facilitating the development of a network. They include professional activists, officials at 
multilateral institutions, scientists or policy experts. NGOs and advocates of a network 
are loosely coordinated and connected under one umbrella of a general principled idea or 
an agenda to dealing with a particular social justice problem. What is novel in these 
networks is the ability of non-traditional political actors to assemble first-hand 
information and to use such information strategically at different levels to help create new 
issues and categories, to mobilize resources transnationally to lobby other powerful actors, 
and to gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. They are 
not always successful in their efforts, but they are increasingly important players in 
policy debates at national, regional and international levels.  
Keck and Sikkink pointed out that advocacy networks are particularly common in 
value-laden issue areas, such as human rights, the environment, women, and indigenous 
peoples. It is implied that these are also the issues that are situated in or can be framed 
within a transnational context. It can be a local issue yet with noticeable transnational 
consequences, e.g., coal burning in city X and its effects on regional acid-rain rate. It can 
also be related to an internationally recognized problem or norm, which is expected to be 
internalized by individual governments and implemented at local levels, e.g., equal 
access to treatment for AIDS patients. And sometimes, these two scenarios can overlap in 
one case, e.g., conservation of the sources of transboundary rivers, which also happen to 
 
 59
be the land of ethnic minority peoples. Furthermore, Keck and Sikkink argued that issue 
characteristics (i.e. whether the issue is directly linked with human bodily damage) as one 
of the most important factors that decide the emergence of transnational advocacy 
networks.40  
Their theory also identified four main strategies through which transnational 
advocacy networks can effectively mobilize for political changes: 1) information 
politics—to quickly and credibly generate and disseminate politically usable information; 
2) symbolic politics—to make sense of a political situation to a large audience by calling 
upon symbols, or sensational stories; 3) leverage politics—to strategically identify and 
call upon more powerful actors to affect a political situation;41 and 4) accountability 
politics—to hold targeted actors to their previously state policies or international 
commitments.42 Information, repeatedly noted by the two authors, is essential to all these 
strategies. Keck and Sikkink consider transnational advocacy networks to be unique 
political actors particularly in that groups and individuals in a network share values and 
frequently exchange information. In fact, the sense of solidarity and a dense web of 
connection shared within these networks are revealed in frequent and continuous flows of 
information. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Another crucial factor is actor characteristics, i.e. leadership within the networks. 
41 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. pp16-25. Particularly, moral leverage which is played out in the form of 
“mobilization of shame”, holding up targeted political actors to the light of international scrutiny.  
42 Ibid. Such a targeted actor is usually a repressive or corrupted governments which violates or refuses to 
recognize rights, and where individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic 
political or judicial arenas.  
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The Boomerang Pattern and Its Limitations 
Based on empirical findings, Keck and Sikkink constructed the analogy of Boomerang to 
crystallize the causal mechanism through which transnational advocacy networks affect 
state decisions and actions. Figure 2.1 illustrates this mechanism: State A blocks redress 
to its domestic social groups and NGOs in a particular issue area. Domestic NGOs and 
activists, therefore, look for assistance through networking with overseas NGOs and 
other international NSAs. International NSAs lobby their own state (State B), or, if 
relevant, a third-party organization (usually an IGO), which in turn pressures State A to 
lift political obstacles or compensate domestic victimized groups.  
Figure 2.1. The Boomerang Model (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) 
       
State A    pressure  State B/IGO        
                        
xxxxxx         lobbying     
blockage           
         
Domestic   networking  International  
Civil Society solidarity  NSAs 
         
IGO: Inter-governmental organization; NSA: non-state actors 
 
Recognizing transnational advocacy networks as agents enmeshed in existing 
social-political structures, this Boomerang model assumes three things: the zero-sum 
nature of the state-society relation in domestic politics, the cooperation and solidarity 
among local civil society groups and international NSAs, and the pressure-compliance 
relationship between a sovereign state and transnational advocacy networks (through a 
powerful third party). The model implies that if an advocacy network emerges, it will 
inevitably strengthen local social forces and get involved in some form of confrontation 
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with the state. Building up local capacity and providing solutions to local injustice will 
automatically put transnational advocates into conflict with the state.  
However, recent empirical studies have shown that there are qualitatively 
different causes and forms of transnational advocacy networks. Transnational advocacy 
networks do present a Boomerang pattern in some cases—the Algerian women’s rights 
movement and the establishment of the Ivory Trade Ban, for instance—but not always.43 
Some start from outside, such as the labor rights movement in Latin America initiated by 
American NGOs;44 while, some start by some initiatives taken by the developmental 
states in East Asia.45 In some other cases, networking and mobilization do not work out 
or cannot be sustained, and this cannot be seen as irrelevant to the assessment of the 
nature of transnational advocacy networks.46  
                                                 
43 Lloyd, Catherine. 1999. “Organizing Across Borders: Algerian Women’s Associations in A Period of 
Conflict.” Review of African Political Economy. 82, 26.  
44 Ricker, Tom. "Boomerang, Battering-Rams, and Sustainable Solidarity: Transnational Advocacy and the 
Struggle for Workers Rights in Nicaragua's Maquila Industry." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 
College Park, 2001. 
45 Lee, Yok-Shiu F., and Alvin Y. So. e ds.Asia's Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives, 
edited by New York: M. E. Sharp. Reimann, Kim D. 1999. “Building Networks form the Outside In: 
International Movements, Japanese NGOs and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference.” Winner of the Fred 
Hartmann Award for the Best International Studies Paper Delivered by a Graduate Student at the 1999 
Annual Meeting of the ISA-NE. In the case of Japan, it was not until the Japanese government engaged in 
global environmental affairs and started promoting and supporting domestic NGOs that there emerged 
active interactions among green NGOs transnationally. Therefore, the Japanese government actually played 
the role of facilitator in transnational activism. 
46 Different forms of transnational advocacy networks will be discussed in the following section. Here, I 
offer two examples: McMahon pointed out that local NGOs became detached with their constituencies after 
excessive intervention by international NGOs. (McMahon, Patrice C. 2000. “Building Civil Societies in 
East Central Europe: The Effect of American NGOs on Women's Groups.” Paper prepared for delivery at 
the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 
31-September 3.) Khagram documented that the transnational anti-dam movement could not be sustained in 
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Manifested in the above empirical discrepancies, the Boomerang model has 
explanatory limitations due to its biased theoretical assumptions, which have their roots 
in the research tradition of social movements and contentious politics. Keck and Sikkink 
conceive the political context of transnational advocacy networks as “an arena of 
struggle”. Even though Keck and Sikkink specifically pointed out that “the advocacy 
network concept cannot be subsumed under notions of transnational social movements” 
since the network framework blurs the boundaries among individuals, organizations, and 
movements, their theories drew upon the concepts of “framing” and “political 
opportunity structures” in the social movement literature constructed by sociologists and 
comparativists. More particularly, they concurred with Sidney Tarrow his view of 
dynamic contention and opportunity structures involved in transnational social 
struggles.47  
However, the complexity of the form of contention among the state, local societal 
groups and transnational networks needs to be reconsidered. First, studies on 
transnational advocacy politics need to re-visit the theories on domestic state-society 
relations.48 For example, based on excellent comparative studies of nine countries in 
                                                                                                                                                 
China due to the lack of domestic social mobilization. (Khagram, Sanjeev. 2004. Dams and Development: 
Transnational Struggles for Water and Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.) 
47 Ibid, p7, 33. On a theme panel of the 2002 American Political Science Association meeting, Keck, 
Tarrow and Robert Keohane debated and agreed on the need to bridge comparative studies of domestic 
social mobilization, and political opportunity structure with IR studies of transnational relations. August 
31-September 3, Boston, U.S. 
48 Examples of alternative perspectives on state-society relations include “corporatism” (Schmitter, Philippe, 
et al eds. 1979. Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation. Beverly Hills: SAGE.), “embedded autonomy” 
(Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), and “developmental state” (White, Gordon, ed. 1988. Developmental States in East Asia. 
New York: St. Martin's Press. Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell 
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Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America and across historical periods, Joel Migdal, 
Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue argued that the tie between state and society is not 
zero-sum, but potentially mutually empowering.49 Social forces limit states, yet are 
themselves altered by the confrontations to which they necessarily find themselves 
influenced by their political environments. The state must be viewed as one more 
organization within society rather than as some omnipotent agent standing apart from it, 
and the boundaries joining the two are often blurred. My research also shows that, even 
in a non-democratic regime, domestic state-society relations are dynamic and always 
evolve. Furthermore, external actors can even create favorable conditions that facilitate 
and strengthen the communication and mutual-influence between the state and society.50
Secondly, the relationship between the state and international advocates is not as 
uniformly contentious as assumed in the Boomerang model. In their book, Keck and 
Sikkink noted that the targeted governments in their studies of effective transnational 
advocacy networks are usually susceptible to external moral pressures or material 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press). For reviews of theories of state-society relations see: Wiarda, Howard J., ed. 1991. New 
Directions in Comparative Politics. 2 ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Migdal, Joel. 1988. Strong Societies 
and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. Introduction chapter. 
49 Migdal, Joel, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds. 1994. State Power and Social Forces: Domination and 
Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
50 This argument draws insights from literature on the effectiveness of international regime, which 
explicates how international actors can play the role of re-arranging domestic political alliances and 
facilitates the learning and socialization of new norms and principles. (Young, Oran, ed. 1999. The 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavior Mechanisms. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy’s work on the internationalization 
of domestic environmental political also illustrated how external actors can contribute the creation of new 
domestic institutions which bypass the old political hindrances and introduce changes. (Schreurs, Miranda, 
and Elizabeth Economy, eds. 1997. The Internationalization of Environmental Protection. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.) 
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sanctions.51 Therefore, on the one hand, the Boomerang does not include the situation 
where the targeted governments are not vulnerable to international interference and 
pressures. On the other hand, there is a large body of literature on the non-contentious 
interactions between governments and international advocacy groups. The Boomerang 
analogy seems to be a snapshot of transnational advocacy networks at one historical 
moment. Scholarship on the human rights movement actually documented that there is a 
long-term process of domestic norm socialization paralleling with transnational 
campaigns in each targeted country.52 Kathryn Hochstetler suggested investigating what 
happens after the Boomerang, based on her empirical work on transnational 
environmental activism in Brazil.53
The third main point of the Boomerang model is the dense information flows and 
exchanges of ideas among domestic and international activist groups and NGOs. There 
are two kinds of critiques of this point. First, authors who are critical of the international 
NGOs’ accountability to local communities have pointed out that there seem to be power 
hierarchies within the networks, between indigenous and external groups.54 International 
or local NGOs are not always trusting and accountable to each other. Second, even 
among international groups and NGOs, the strategic alliances involve more complex 
                                                 
51 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. p29.  
52 Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Chan-Tiberghien, Jennifer. 2004. Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan: Global Norms and 
Domestic Networks. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
53 Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2002. "After the Boomerang: Environmental Movements and Politics in the La 
Plata River Basin." Global Environmental Politics. 2, 4. 
54 Fox, Jonathan, and L.David Brown, eds. 1998. Chapin, Mac. 2004. “A Challenge to Conservationists”. 
Worldwatch Magazine, November/December Issue. pp17-30. 
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interest overlap and conflict, rather than ideological uniformity. Actually, international 
NGOs and advocates are often caught in between conflicting values and principles.55 
Tom Ricker found in his lengthy study of transnational networks supporting workers in 
Nicaragua’s maquila industry that even among the international NGOs, it is too early to 
claim that they are allied under one common principle: “While interests (of the 
organizations involved) intersected over the struggle for workers’ rights, the underlying 
motivations differed across each of these groups”.56  
A Double-mobilization Model 
Hence, I propose a differential yet complementary model—Double-mobilization—to 
better explain the dynamics of transnational advocacy networks, by relaxing the 
assumptions on state-society relations, and the contentious nature of transnational 
advocacy politics. (Figure 2.2) In this model, international non-state actors directly 
interact with the targeted repressive regime (State A), as well as respond to the outcry of 
domestic civil society groups. The role of a third party (either a powerful State B or an 
IGO) is not as crucial as in the Boomerang pattern.57 Transnational advocacy networks 
                                                 
55 Avant, Deborah. 2003. "Conserving Nature in the State of Nature: Tragic Choices for INGO Policy 
Implementers". Paper presented at American Political Science Association annual meeting. Philodelphia, 
29-31 August.  
56 Ricker, Tom. "Boomerang, Battering-Rams, and Sustainable Solidarity: Transnational Advocacy and the 
Struggle for Workers Rights in Nicaragua's Maquila Industry." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 
College Park, 2001. p298. 
57 The Double-mobilization model, however, doesn’t deny the potential influence State B/IGO could have 
over State A, and the networking activities between international NSAs and State B/IGOs. The point rather 
is that regardless of State B/IGO’s stances, external advocates will strive to modify State A’s perceptions 
and practices. The formation and meaning of transnational advocacy networks does not solely depend on 
the success of leverage politics through a third party. More will be discussed in the following sections. 
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exert their influence to change domestic politics through a more gradual and sustainable 
way by engaging, educating, and mobilizing both domestic governments and civil society 
groups—therefore, it is called “double-mobilization”.  
Figure 2.2. The Double-mobilization model 
State A     influence State B/IGO 
 
xxxxxx    persuasion  networking 
evolving blockage 
 
Domestic       International  
Civil Society networking  NSAs 
 
IGO: Inter-governmental organization; NSA: non-state actors 
   main Double-mobilization political dynamics        related political dynamics 
This Double-mobilization model emphasizes that international NSAs form 
networks to engage, educate and mobilize both the state and the public at once. In 
addition to seeking material and normative leverage through a third party (a foreign 
government or IGO), international advocates also strategize to translate their normative 
principles into practical practices, and implement demonstration projects in order to 
persuade the targeted state. They often prefer to negotiate with the state rather than to 
pressure it to comply with their visions and plans of solution. They also care about the 
sustainability of their activism. Besides contentious means, they employ training, public 
education and capacity building strategies to deepen norm socialization in both 
governmental and non-governmental domains. (Table 2.1) 
Table 2.1. Comparing main strategies applied by transnational advocacy networks 
Causal mechanisms of  
transnational advocacy networks 
Strategies 
Boomerang Information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics, 
and leverage politics 
Double-mobilization Mobilizing the state: persuasion, demonstration, collaboration, 
and negotiation 
Mobilizing the society: raising public awareness, capacity 
building, and promoting social activism  
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The most distinctive feature of the Double-mobilization model, in contrast with 
the Boomerang, is that external NSAs conduct extensive activities to persuade and build 
up consensus with the targeted state. (Table 2.2) Such activities can take the form of 
project partnership, research collaboration, and policy recommendation, as well as open 
criticism and protest. The relationship between the targeted state and international NSAs 
are not necessarily uniform, but diverse. This model indicates that besides networking 
with domestic activists and activist-minded IGO officials, international NSAs also 
endeavor to directly influence targeted states for attitude, conceptual and policy changes. 
Furthermore, while it does not challenge the solidarity between domestic and 
international advocacy groups, it calls for a more careful assessment of the intricate 
overlap and conflict of interest among them. It also points out that domestic state-society 
relations may evolve while transnational advocacy networks are emerging, which would 
potentially add complexity to the politics involved. 
Table 2.2. Comparing theoretical assumptions of the Boomerang and Double-mobilization models 
Transnational 
advocacy networks 
State- 
international 
NGO relations 
International- 
domestic NGO 
relations 
State- 
society relations 
Political power 
Boomerang contentious high level of 
solidarity 
zero-sum, static hierarchical (both 
material and 
normative) 
Double-mobilization vary from 
collaborative to 
contentious 
collaborative,  
varying level of 
solidarity 
mutually 
empowering, 
dynamic 
hierarchical 
(material and 
normative) and 
consensual 
(normative) 
 
The last major distinction in theoretical assumptions between the two models lies 
in that the Double-mobilization model adopts a communicative approach to 
understanding power in transnational relations. The philosophical foundation of this 
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approach was developed by Jürgen Habermas.58 The Habermasian view of power, 
summarized by Karen Litfin, is more the ability to act in concert through consensual 
communication than the ability to obtain goals by coercion or strategic means.59 In the IR 
field, scholars have long accepted the idea that power has many “faces”60, e.g., soft vs. 
hard power,61 Hegel-Gramscian hegemonic vs. Rosenau-Grotian legitimizing power,62 
material structural vs. ideational structural power.63 The communicative view on power is 
                                                 
58 Main books on the topic include: Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. On the Pragmatics of Communication. Edited 
by Cooke, Maeve. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1978. Communication and the Evolution of Society. 
Translated by McCarthy, T. Boston: Beacon. Other authors, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, have 
also contributed to the communicative/discursive approach. 
59 In her studies of international negotiations for preventing ozone depletion, Karen Litfin gave a good 
summary of the communicative approach on power in international relations. (Litfin, Karen. 1994. Ozone 
Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University 
Press.)  
60 Boulding, Kenneth E. 1989. Three Faces of Power. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. For reviews 
of different approaches to studying the notion of power in international relations, see: Barnett, Michael, and 
Raymond Duvall, eds. 2005. Power in Global Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Baldwin, David A. 1979. "Power Analysis and World Politics." World Politics. 31: 162-63. 
61 Traditionally in IR, “hard” power is calculated in military terms; while, sources of “soft” power can 
come from the market (e.g., Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), knowledge (e.g., Haas, Ernst. 1990. When 
Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organization. Berkeley: University of 
California Press), ideology/ideas (e.g., Hall, Peter, ed. 1989. The Political Power of Economic Ideas: 
Keynesianism across Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press), and normative principles (e.g., 
Burgerman, Susan. 2001. Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. Clark, Ann Marie. 2001. Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing 
Human Rights Norms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
62 Femia, Joseph V.. 1981. Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary 
Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Piccone, Paul. 1974. “Gramsci’s Hegelian Marxism”. Political 
Theory, 2, 1:32-45. Frank, Thomas M. 1990. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford 
University Press. Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. "Socialization and Hegemonic 
Power." International Organization. 44, 4: 283-315. 
63 Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia 
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thought-provoking because it fundamentally challenges the intuitive understanding of 
power as hierarchical in essence. It offers a new way to look at non-materialistic, “soft” 
power, and the process of power generation and execution. Power can be generated 
through a process of consensus building rather than confrontation, rebellion, or even 
resistance.64 Applying this approach, I argue that NSAs are able to modify state behavior 
particularly because of their ability to make the state agree on and accept new ideas.65 
Unlike states and IGOs, NSAs do not possess materialist or structural power in the 
international system. In addition, their seemingly authority over moral issues does not 
always give them the ability to force states to change.66 Their real specialty is to form 
broad networks to translate normative principles into negotiations, collaborations, 
demonstration projects, and practices so that the targeted state will eventually consent to 
change. 
                                                                                                                                                 
University. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
64 On small-scale and continuous resistance as a way for the “powerless” to generate power, see 
scholarships on peasants’ everyday resistance and intellectual dissident movement in Eastern Europe: Scott, 
James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University. Havel, Václav, and et al. 1985. The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in 
Central-eastern Europe. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 1993. Reinventing Politics: Eastern 
Europe from Stalin to Havel. 2 ed. New York: The Free Press.  
65 Thomas Risse first applied the Habermasian view of consensual power in studying norm socialization in 
IR. Risse, Thomas. 1999. "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative 
Behavior in The Human Rights Area." Politics & Society. 27, 4. 
66 To push this point further: If we assume that activists and advocacy organizations are the ones that have 
the authoritative interpretation of human rights and are entitled to defend good courses, and therefore it is 
right to pressure governments and make them conform, we are refuting the premise of the power of 
knowing and being enlightened. The underlining iron here is that what we assume for non-state actors is not 
applicable for state actors. The accusation of governments’ monopoly of moral discourses in domestic 
context, therefore, backfires onto the accusers. 
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Furthermore, the Boomerang and Double-mobilization models differ in their 
demonstration of the temporal dimension of transnational advocacy networks. They 
underline different key factors in each phase of networks formation. (Figure 2.3) While 
the Boomerang starts with a repressive regime, yet susceptible to external pressures, the 
Double-mobilization model stresses the situation where the targeted state has little history 
and contact with international agencies, and its domestic political alliances are not easily 
affected by external factors.67 In addition, domestic social forces are not as activised and 
organized in the Double-mobilization model as in Boomerang. (Phase I)  
Because of this relative weakness of civil society in domestic political context, the 
Double-mobilization model highlights the proactive character of external advocacy actors 
in initiating contacts with domestic social groups. The level of mutuality in information 
sharing between external and local activists in Double-mobilization is not as high as that 
in Boomerang model. In addition, while the Boomerang model projects activists (local 
and international) quickly form dense webs of communication, the Double-mobilization 
                                                 
67 Even though some may argue that the case study in this dissertation (i.e., China) represents a country, 
whose structural position in the world system allows it to bear/reject international pressures, the relative 
isolation from the outside world can be caused by various reasons (e.g., geographic distance, history of 
isolation). On the one hand, many seemingly small, weak countries, in fact, have exhibited the ability to 
resist outside pressures, even during extremely turbulent times, e.g., Cuba, North Korea, Iraq before 2003, 
and Rwanda in 1994. On the other, the states that appear to be greatly influenced by international 
organizations and foreign governments are not necessarily structurally disadvantaged, e.g., Ukraine after 
1989. This argument on states’ vulnerability in face of external leverage is drawn upon the literature of 
international dimensions of domestic regime change: Whitehead, Laurence, ed. 2001. The International 
Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dawisha, 
Karen, ed. 1997. The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States 
of Eurasia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Pridman, Geoffrey et al, eds. 1994. Building Democracy? The 
International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin's. O'Donnell, 
Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
(vol. 4) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. 
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model points out that external advocates make significant effort in engaging the targeted 
government during the same period of time. (Phase II) 
Figure 2.3. Comparing the temporal dimension of the Boomerang and Double-mobilization models 
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2.3.1. Double-mobilization model 
Phase I         Phase II 
 
State A    State B/IGO   State A   influence  State B/IGO
 
 
 
  xxxxxxxxxxx         xxxxxxx    persuasion  
  evolving blockage          evolving blockage 
 
Domestic     International   Domestic  information International
civil society    NSAs         civil society    NSAs
 
 
1) Domestic political blockage       1) Domestic activists/victim groups reach out  
2) Strong non-democratic regime A, not susceptible   for international attention and support 
to international forces         2) International NSAs respond to domestic  
3) Weak/lack of domestic civil society     problems by direct delivery of service and  
     information to both governmental and  
     non-governmental actors 
         3) IGO and foreign governments start engaging 
         State A 
         4) Domestic state-society contention evolves 
 
Phase III 
 
    State A influence State B/IGO
 
 
   xxxx       persuasion    information 
  evolving 
blockage  dialogue           
 
Domestic      information  International         
civil society     NSAs 
 
1) International NSAs and advocates influence  
domestic changes by mobilizing both State A and  
local civil society groups 
2) Transnational networks among international and  
domestic advocacy actors are strengthened 
3) Domestic state-society contention evolves with  
new communication channels 
4) State A become more connected and familiar  
with international actors and principles 
 
In the final phase, the Boomerang model shows that international NSAs develop 
solidarity with local activist groups, and successfully lobby a third party with significant 
political leverage to place pressure onto the targeted regime—thus, the Boomerang is 
completed. By contrast, the Double-mobilization model rather stresses the effects of 
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direct mobilization and persuasion of the targeted state by external advocates. The ideal 
outcome of effective Double-mobilization is that through transnational networks, local 
and external advocates and NSAs can translate principled ideas into the languages 
suitable for domestic application, and combine them into practical demonstrations to 
persuade both the state and general public. Domestic changes are introduced based on 
congruent opinions among various governmental and non-governmental actors. (Phase 
III) 
Even though the main actors are similar, the relationship among these actors and 
the development path of transnational networks are differently depicted by the two 
models. The Double-mobilization model further underlines three features of transnational 
advocacy politics. First, political relations of transnational advocacy networks are 
complex and dynamic. Both the level and form of contention undertaken by individual 
actors involved in the networks vary across cases and over time. Second, the Boomerang 
and Double-mobilization models are complementary in explaining the complexity of 
transnational advocacy politics. Third, while domestic repression and social control can 
trigger transnational activism and networking, international NGOs can also, in turn, 
contribute innovative thinking and institution building to resolve social resentment and 
improve public participation in an issue area. Domestic state-society relations are not 
static, and transnational actors can introduce new dynamics by bridging the two.  
The Double-mobilization model highlights the complex and dynamic political 
relations transnational advocacy networks generate, marked by the evolving triangular 
relationship among sovereign states, domestic civil societies, and international non-state 
actors. While we tend to be attracted by the most sensational and contentious episodes 
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related to transnational activism, NGOs and networks conduct much more work largely 
unnoticed, such as fostering norms in the general public, winning the support of key 
contacts within the government, and coordinating strategies with local partners. In fact, 
these activities mostly take place at the same time as the networks organize protests, 
symbolic demonstration, and leverage politics through a powerful foreign government. 
Once we desegregate the networks, such complexity becomes more obvious. Different 
participants of the networks employ a basket of strategies and norms to interact with 
states or peer organizations. Even for an individual organization, its partnerships and 
political relations may vary at different times.  
This point does not mean that there are no rationalized common goals and mutual 
understanding within the networks, but it emphasizes the multiple layers and facets of 
advocacy activities and political relations generated by the networks. Jennifer 
Chan-Tiberghien’s case study of normative changes in domestic violence, child 
prostitution, racism, and other human rights related issues in Japan documented that 
advocacy networks initiated and conducted human rights education at the grassroots level 
on a regular basis, while they were also building political coalitions, organizing NGO 
rallies at international conferences, and seeking external pressure through a third party.68 
In Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink’s model of norm socialization driven by 
transnational activism actors, moral consciousness-raising parallel with strategic 
bargaining, persuasion with mobilization of shame, and habitualization with 
institutionalization. There are many stages, rounds, and components involved in the 
                                                 
68 Chan-Tiberghien, 2004. 
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whole process of making changes.69 Findings from my own research evidence that when 
coming together under general principles (e.g., protection of biodiversity and preventing 
AIDS in China), individual NGOs naturally understand that each organization plays a 
different role to contribute to the entire network and final goals. While they respect other 
organizations’ strategies and efforts, they maintain their own working style and believe in 
what they are good at. Some may focus on norm socialization and public education at the 
grassroots level, e.g., fighting stigma against AIDS patients, and raising public awareness 
of the value of wetlands. Others may see their strength lying in the ability to get access to 
key governmental officials, to “erode” the political impediment, and to provide direct 
input to policy-making. Changes in particular conservation and AIDS prevention 
problems did not happen overnight, but after long-term, continuous, and various efforts 
by international NGOs communities. 
Secondly, the Double-mobilization argument does not refute but completes the 
Boomerang model in explaining transnational advocacy networks. (Figure 2.4) My 
research suggests that both patterns often co-exist in transnational networks.  
Figure 2.4. A synthesis of the Boomerang and Double-mobilization models 
State A   pressure    State B/IGO 
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    typical Boomerang relations      typical Double-mobilization relations 
    common features to both models 
 
                                                 
69 Risse, et al eds. 1999. pp6-17. 
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The Boomerang model captures advocacy networks’ ability to confront states’ 
wrong-doings, and utilize leverage politics to pressure states to change existing policies. 
The Double-mobilization model instead emphasizes the more cumulative, and 
non-contentious work that international NSAs do to prepare for or maintain the results of 
more eye-catching and symbolic campaigns and protests, build up trust with domestic 
activists and indigenous groups, and create channels to exert influence on the state 
bodies. 
Different networks situated in different political context may exhibit the two 
patterns to varying degrees. Some might appear to be more confrontational, targeting the 
state more directly and publicly. Yet, without the consolidation of norm socialization 
within both governmental and social arenas, the effects of advocacy work cannot be 
sustained. Other networks may seem to be dormant, yet still involved in political 
struggles with high level of contention. Under authoritarian regimes, for non-state actors 
to remain in existence—even in silent existence—can mean to resist political authority, 
and continuing advocacy education at grassroots levels can be the most effective way to 
mobilizing for changes. 
Finally, I argue that state-society relations evolve along the way with the 
formation and development of transnational activism. Transnational advocacy networks 
can contribute to the bridging and trust building between the state and society, as well as 
elevate the disagreement between the state and society. The Amazon anti-deforestation 
movement is an important example.  
A word of caution: On the one hand, I do not claim that transnational advocacy 
networks determine domestic state-society relations, but I point out that, with favorable 
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circumstances, they are able to re-shape or modify the way state agencies interact with 
social groups by acting as the third-party moderator, sponsoring communication events, 
and introducing public participation mechanisms. On the other hand, I am aware of the 
criticism of over-praising international NGOs and the merit of their work in collaborating 
with governments to establish local democratic practices. There are usually two kinds of 
criticism here, one on the cooptation of international NGOs, and the other on the lack of 
accountability of international-domestic NGO networks. The first point is concerned that 
too much collaboration with governmental agencies will cost international NGOs 
organizational autonomy. The latter questions the deep impact of international NGOs on 
domestic democratization of only relying on building new domestic NGOs or supporting 
civil society development. With excessive financial support and little monitoring and 
evaluation, international NGOs could create an environment where their domestic 
partners and grantees become solely accountable to donors, but detached from the general 
public and local society.70 Both kinds of criticism are valid, to a certain extent. However, 
deficits in the actual effects cannot be used to refute the arguments on political relations. 
The Double-mobilization model is not an evaluation tool-kit, but a conceptual framework 
to map the triangular relationship among the state, domestic society and international 
non-state actors. 
 
                                                 
70 McMahon, Patrice C. 2000. Carothers, Thomas. 1999. "Western Civil-Society Aid to Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union." East European Constitutional Review.  International Social Science Journal, 
Special issue “NGOs in the Governance of Biodiversity”, 2003, 55, 178: 593-616. Note that this criticism 
on international NGOs’ assistance to build domestic democracy is different from the one on official 
democracy assistance sponsored by governmental agencies, e.g., USAID, or inter-governmental 
organizations, e.g., Organization of American States. (Carothers, Thomas. 1996. Assessing Democracy 
Assistance: The case of Romania. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment Book.) 
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DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS 
 
The proposed Double-mobilization model and many empirical studies quoted suggest that 
there are qualitative different forms of political dynamics involved in transnational 
advocacy politics. While both international and domestic structures matter to the 
variation of transnational networks in the big picture, the former is the focus of this 
research.71  
From Two-level Opportunity Structures to Domestic Structures 
Keck and Sikkink concurred with Tarrow that both domestic and international structures 
matter to transnational advocacy networks.72 Tarrow particularly pointed out that rather 
than being the antipodes of transnational contention and activism, inter-governmental 
institutions offer resources, opportunities, and incentives for the formation of 
transnational actors.73 Sanjeev Khagram, James Riker and Kathryn Sikkink in their recent 
edited volume proposed to look into the domestic and international political opportunity 
structures as a two-level interacting synergy.74 This argument appears to be an important 
breakthrough from previous literature. They highlight the relative openness of 
                                                 
71 However, this is not to underestimate the relevance of leadership, choices of strategy, organizational 
characteristics and particular timing to the success of each advocacy network. Whether there is a leading 
NGO, a well-known expert, or a charismatic activist within the network sometimes does matter. However, 
in order to evaluate the meaning of transnational advocacy networks as a whole, as a coherent agent in 
international affairs, we ought to search for the patterns of existing domestic and international structures 
and probe the impacts they have on the networks. 
72 Keck and Sikkink, 1998. p7. 
73 Tarrow, Sidney. 2001. "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics." 
Annual Review of Political Science. 4: 1-20. 
74 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002. pp19. 
 
 79
international opportunity structures, yet cautiously challenge the assumption of the close 
or conflicting nature in domestic state-society relations. David Meyer’s empirical study 
of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand demonstrates this two-level interactive 
perspective. He argues that political institutions are nested in a larger international 
context, and that the tightness or looseness of such nesting affects the range of possible 
alliance and policy options available for political actors.75  
While such a synthetic perspective seems to be very helpful to analyzing 
individual cases, scholars are still searching for cross-system variables which can 
effectively explain the striking variations in the actual local forms of transnational 
activism and advocacy. In other words, transnational networks and coalitions share most 
of the international dimensions of their activities (e.g., lobbying inter-governmental 
institutions), yet once they land in individual countries, they diverge dramatically in their 
outlooks and substances. The idealized view of transnational advocacy networks seems to 
overlook the salience of societal cleavages and domestic political institutions. On the 
contrary, Laura MacDonanld’s study on international NGOs in Central America, 
particularly in Guatemala and Nicaragua, suggests that because of class-divisions within 
these countries, transnational NGO networks are heavily polarized, influenced by existing 
structures of power in both public and private sectors.76 In his study of cultural politics of 
the successful 1999 Khomani San land claim in the Northern Cape Province of South 
Africa, Steven Robins shows how strategic narratives of community solidarity, social 
                                                 
75 Meyer, David S. 2003. "Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions." Social Movement Studies. 2, 1: 
17-35. 
76  MacDonald, Laura. 1997. Supporting Civil Society: The Political Role of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in Central America. London: MacMillan Press. 
 
 80
cohesion and cultural continuity were produced by claimants and their lawyers, stalwartly 
supported by international donors and NGOs during the process. In the post-settlement 
period, however, social fragmentation and intra-community conflict between San people 
and “western bushmen” rebounded and became increasingly evident. Robins insightfully 
highlights that the external community’s double vision of the San people—as both “First 
Peoples” and modern citizens-in-the-making—contributed to rather than alleviated these 
intra-community divisions and conflicts. 77  Both studies essentially challenged the 
assumed power, form, and sustainability of transnational networks and solidarity across 
cases. 
Findings in Lisa Aubrey’s research on the women’s organization Maendeleo Ya 
Wanawake (MYWO) in Kenya (1952-1996) demonstrates that the more financial, 
technical and other direct assistance MYWO received from international NGOs, the less 
autonomy it enjoyed to formulate and implement its indigenous agenda, and hence the 
less successful its development projects would be.78 Even though the women’s rights 
movement did successfully forge alliances to change states’ policies in many other 
countries, as documented by Keck and Sikkink, it appears as though the intimacy 
between domestic and international non-state actors was detrimental to local political 
processes in Kenya. The triangle-game played among external NGOs, the Kenya 
government and MYWO is more complicated and dynamic than what theory has 
predicted. This point of view is also shared by scholarship on western NGOs’ support to 
                                                 
77 Robins, Steven. 2001. "NGOs, 'Bushmen' and Double Vision: The Khomani San Land Claim and the 
Cultural Politics of 'Community' and 'Development' in the Kalahari." Journal of Southern African Studies. 
27, 4: 833-53. 
78 Aubrey, Lisa. 1997. The Politics of Development Cooperation: NGOs, Gender and Participation. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
 
 81
women’s rights movement in Eastern Europe after 1989. 79  Grassroots women’s 
organizations in these countries are becoming more accountable to international NGOs 
than their own people, which in the long run weakens rather than fosters the strength of 
civil society. Thus similar international institutional frameworks, issue characteristics, 
and non-state actors, different stories of transnational advocacy happen in different 
societies.  
Domestic Regime Type and Level of Social Mobilization 
By focusing on one single issue—the anti-dam movement—Sanjeev Khagram conducted 
a historical comparative study to solve the above puzzle.80 Holding other factors constant, 
Khagram first used a periodization strategy81 to demonstrate how changes in domestic 
social mobilization affect the development trajectory of transnational networks and 
movements against large dams on the Narmada River in India from 1940s to 1990s. 
Based upon in-depth, ethnographic, and process-tracing research, he found that domestic 
social mobilization almost did not exist before the 1970s, and was inefficient in 
independently challenging the proposed dam projects. It was only after a transnational 
coalition of international NGOs and grassroots tribal peoples’ groups was forged in 
1980s, and conducted a five-year campaign, that the Indian government and the World 
Bank reformed their policies and practices on resettlement related to the dam project.  
Khagram further conducted a comparative cross-country analysis of anti-dam 
movements in Brazil, China, Indonesia and South-Africa/Lesotho, and developed a 
                                                 
79 McMahon, Patrice C. 2000.  
80 Khagram, Sanjeev. 2004.  
81 Lieberman, Evan. 2001. "Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of 
Periodization Strategies." Comparative Political Studies. 34, 9: 1011-35. 
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two-by-two typology of the relationship between domestic structures and transnational 
advocacy politics. (Figure 2.5)  
Figure 2.5. Impact of domestic democracy and social mobilization on transnational advocacy 
networks (Khagram, 2004) 
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In short, for Khagram, transnational advocacy networks are more likely to 
emerge, form domestic coalitions, and change existing policies, if a country is more 
democratic and domestic social mobilization has reached a higher level. This typology is 
helpful in that it narrows down the complexity of the research question by grouping 
countries into four categories. The two-by-two typology can potentially be used to 
conduct a first round of case selection. However, the weakness of this approach is 
considerable due to its exclusive reliance on macro-level variables (i.e., level of 
democracy and social mobilization). Applying such variables entails the risk of 
overlooking the complexity of transnational advocacy networks. In addition, it does not 
capture the dynamic nature of advocacy networks, the variations across issue areas, and 
the co-evolution of transnational networks and domestic politics. For example, Khagram 
attributes the non-existence and failure of transnational anti-dam advocacy networks in 
China (specifically, the Three Gorges Dam) to its non-democratic regime. However, 
despite the non-democratic macro-structural constraint, transnational advocacy networks 
are actually emerging in the fields of women’s rights and environmental protection. In 
recent years, a network of domestic and international activists successfully lobbied the 
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Chinese government to put a halt on the proposed Nu River Dam project. Khagram’s 
theory fails to explain such variations and changes by only looking at macro-level 
domestic factors. 
Domestic State and Society Structures Re-examined 
To re-examine the idea of domestic structural variables, my research draws insights from 
Thomas Risse’s works on domestic structures and transnational relations in general, as 
well as from scholarship on state and society structures in China.82 Findings from Risse 
and colleagues strongly suggested that there is not either a continuum or a dichotomy of 
domestic structures. What the concept of domestic structures indicates is not merely the 
strength of a state or civil society in a country, but the combined nature of the two. Hence, 
the key is not whether a regime is democratic or repressive, but whether it is consensual 
or fragmented; not whether domestic social forces are strong or weak, but whether the 
society is organized or polarized; and, not whether the state or society hold more 
influence over a policy issue, but whether they are closely linked and there are channels 
of communication between them. 
In the book Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, Risse argues that under 
similar international conditions, differences in domestic structures determine the variation 
in the policy impact of transnational actors. Domestic structures here refer to political 
institutions, societal structures, and the policy networks linking the two. In a situation 
where decentralized political institutions, politicize civil society and institutional 
channels linking the two are found, transnational policy networks seem to be most 
                                                 
82 Risse-Kappen, ed. 1995. 
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effective. So, if transnational actors want to have leverage on domestic politics, the key is 
not only networking, but also gaining access to the political system, and to generate 
and/or contribute to “winning” policy coalitions in order to change decisions in the 
desired direction. 
It should be noted here that the transnational coalitions and networks studied in 
this edited volume emphasize “regularized contacts among specific transnational actors” 
in interacting with the state—“from exchanges between human rights and peace groups, 
between U.S. and Soviet intellectuals and scholars, to transgovernmental coalitions, 
international NGOs, and multi-national corporations.”83 Even though these regularized 
contacts are similar to those focused on this dissertation, the central effort was devoted to 
evaluate the policy input of transnational actors. This dissertation, however, pays more 
attention to political relations rather than the actual policy impact of transnational 
networks. The central puzzle raised in my research is not how effective transnational 
actors are in term of changing state decisions; but the triangular political relations among 
the state, local society, and transnational advocacy actors, and the various forms of 
mobilization activities transnational actors are able to employ to introduce changes in 
both formal political and social arenas. 
With this note, despite the underlying differences in research agendas, many of 
the hypotheses and suggestions raised by Risse and other contributors to the book are 
very useful to examine domestic structures and their effects on transnational advocacy 
networks. Risse and his collaborators analyze the structures of the state—formal political 
institutions—in terms of the level of centralization and fragmentation. This approach to 
                                                 
83 Ibid. p281. 
 
 85
examining the state is probably not more useful than Khagram’s when we have both 
clearly democratic and non-democratic states in our research, since division of power and 
decentralization of policy making are among the defining features of democratic regimes. 
Yet, in political reality, a lot more countries do not fall into the either of the above two 
categories and can instead be described as “mixed regimes”, than the ones that do. 
Further, it is as important and theoretically challenging for political scientists to discern 
the differences between the British and the Japanese state structures as between the Cuba 
and the U.S. The centralization/fragmentation concept suggested by Risse and colleague 
better reflects the continuous character of state structures. Political access provided by 
each state system, in this sense, vary on a continual scale rather than in between two 
options (i.e., democratic vs. non-democratic). I find this approach suitable to understand 
why transnational advocacy networks are able to locate opportunities to interact with and 
convey new ideas to relatively close and strong states. It also sheds light on why 
networks can mobilize the state more in some cases than the others. 
Following this approach, society structures are examined in Risse’s edited volume 
with regard to the internal polarization in terms of ideological cleavages. “Strong” 
societies are then characterized by a comparative lack of ideological cleavage, by 
comparatively “politicized” civil societies, and by centralized social organizations such as 
business, labor, or churches, which can be easily mobilized for political causes. I found 
this concept of social structures particularly relevant when examining the relationship 
between domestic and international NGOs and activist groups. Regardless of policy 
outcome, the stronger a society is, the easier for transnational actors to connect with 
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domestic social groups, and such connection is determined by the way in which the 
society is “politicized.” 
The nature and strength of policy networks is depicted as either consensual 
(characterized by strong intermediate organizations operating in a compromise-oriented 
decision-making culture) or polarized (characterized by distributive bargaining which 
often leads to decision stalemates). This concept, in a way, recalls the problematic 
assumption of static and zero-sum state-society relations. It suggests that state-society 
relations are not uniform, but vary across political systems.84  
Micro-structures and Cross-sectoral Comparison 
When concluding on how domestic structures constrain or facilitate transnational 
networks, Risse hints that even within a country domestic structures seem to vary 
depending on the issue-area. “In sum, one should not expect the same TNA [transnational 
non-state actors] impact on state policies across issue-areas in a given country.”85 My 
research explains why networks of advocacy actors vary even within a single county. I 
use a cross-sectoral comparative method to explore state and society structural factors at 
micro-levels, and trace how these factors condition the political relations surrounding 
non-state actors and advocacy networks.  
                                                 
84 Even though I do not include this variable as one of the major causal factors when addressing the 
empirical questions related to transnational networks in China due to little variation across cases, I do 
explain that in cases where state-society linkages are significantly lacking, transnational networks can 
actually contribute to building up new channels rather than simply aggravate the disconnection by 
exclusively allying with either state or civil society actors. 
85 Risse-Kappen, ed. 1995. p307. 
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The sectoral perspective is often applied in comparative political economy to 
study various industries.86 In the field of Chinese politics, the vertical-functional division, 
tiao, is in fact considered a defining characteristic of the Chinese state apparatus.87 
Recent research in China’s economic development and industries even push the argument 
further to the local level. Adam Segal and Eric Thun argue that even at the local level 
there is no “one size fits all” development policy: different industrial sectors have 
different developmental needs, and policies that work for one sector will not necessarily 
work for another.88 I, however, use the terms “sector” and “issue area” interchangeably in 
this dissertation referring to the whole domain of governing structures, institutions, and 
actors related to a specific social problem (e.g., nature conservation, HIV/AIDS 
prevention). 
Drawing upon Risse’s notion of domestic structures, my analysis of the individual 
sector and issue areas includes not only state-related variables (e.g., bureaucratic and 
local-central relations), but also the emerging distinctive qualities in the civil society 
communities within each sector. This inclusion of social factors is not new to the 
transnational activism literature, which always underlines the importance of domestic 
civil society organizations and level of social mobilization. However, it has not been 
widely applied in the study Chinese politics.  
                                                 
86 Kitschelt, Herbert. 1991. "Industrial Governance Structures, Innovation Strategies, and the Case of 
Japan: Sectoral or Cross-National Comparative Analysis?" International Organization. 45, 4: 453-93. 
Atkinson, Michael M., and William D. Coleman. 1989. "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy 
Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies." British Journal of Political Science. 19, 1: 47-67. 
87 See note 39 in the Introduction Chapter.  
88 Segal, Adam, and Eric Thun. 2001. “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Local Governments, Industrial 
Sectors, and Development in China”. Politics & Society, Vol. 29, No.4: 557-588. 
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Though some are still skeptical of the status of civil society and political 
relevance of voluntary associations in current China, many have noted that the state’s 
social control mechanisms are undergoing changes and civil society in China is 
emerging.89 Moreover, scholars have identified how civil society actors interact with the 
state and are able to achieve changes with limited resources under the regime. Kenneth 
Foster’s recent empirical research of business associations has demonstrated that many 
independent social associations are capable of seeking the state’s recognition and support, 
or to be “co-opted”, to achieve organizational goals.90 In other words, such associations 
are not merely subjected to state control, but are able to maneuver in between existing 
institutional structures and make the surrounding political milieu more favorable for 
them. Particularly in the fields of poverty relief, women’s rights, and environmental 
protection, Tony Saich argue that civil society in China is not only emerging, but has also 
learned how to negotiate with the state, and gained bargaining power via various means 
of resource mobilization.91 Social organizations are able to minimize state penetration, 
and reconfigure the relationship with the state in more beneficial terms that can allow for 
policy input or pursuit of members’ interests and organizational goals. Many 
practitioners/researchers, with first-hand experiences from China, have begun to realize 
                                                 
89 The debate has gone beyond whether civil society exists in China or not, and is more of what are the key 
causes of the emergence of civil society: market (e.g., Goldman et al eds, 1996), consequences of state 
reforms (e.g., Frolic, 1997), and genuinely bottom-up citizen actions (e.g., Perry, 2003). Some have also 
pointed out the importance of taking a middle-group approach, and exploring the grey area in between the 
state and society for the origins of civil society development. (e.g., Ding, 1994; Wu, 2003) 
90 Foster, Kenneth W. 2001. "Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State: State Domination of 
Society?" Studies in Comparative International Development. 35, 4: 84-109. 
91 Saich, Tony. 2000. "Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China." The 
China Quarterly. 161: 125-41. 
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that due to the Chinese state’s lack of capacity in coping with the growing social 
inequality and other problems after 20 years of economic reform, civil society 
organizations have found a niche to influence new policy formation and policy 
implementation.92  
In my research, I push the argument on civil society in China further, arguing that 
as civil society has developed in China, noticeable variations are emerging. Civil society 
structures in China, therefore, cannot be uniformly portrayed. Instead, I suggest 
identifying more indicators to examine the increasingly diversifying civil society sector 
across issue areas in China, with special attention to whether it is fragmented or 
coordinated. Civil society defined by an issue area is fragmented if there is a high level of 
internal friction and lack of inter-organizational exchange; it is coordinated if it manifests 
dense inter-organizational networks, repeated collective actions, and a sense of common 
identity. I argue that it is important to examine whether civil society actors within an 
issue area are closely connected or scattered about and disengaged when speaking about 
the differential qualities of civil society sector across cases. The strength of civil society 
is built up by increasing interconnectivity, social networks, and the rise of a shared group 
identity.93
 
                                                 
92 Young, Nick. 2001. Introduction in Searching for Civil Society: 250 NGOs in China. Hong Kong: China 
Development Brief. Kwong, Julia. 2004. "Educating Migrant Children: Negotiations between the State and 
Civil Society." The China Quarterly. 180: 1073-88. Turner, Jennifer. 2004. "Small Government, Big and 
Green Society: Emerging Partnership to Solve China's Environmental Problems." Harvard Asia Quarterly. 
VIII, 2. 
93 This view in particularly draws upon Russell Hardin’s notion of “coordinated political action”, which, he 
argues, is the defining factor to examine collective political actors. Hardin, Russell. 1995. All for One: The 
Logics of Group Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
 
 90
STUDYING TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN CHINA 
 
To systematically examine how transnational advocacy networks are conditioned by 
domestic structures, I suggest two steps. The first step is to identify relevant structural 
factors with in-depth, small-n cases studies to explicate the causal linkages between the 
independent and dependent variables. The second is to validate the co-variation between 
the variables through multiple comparative studies. This dissertation research is devoted 
to the first step of theory building. I select two seemingly similar cases of transnational 
networks, and explore all related intra-state, central-local, and society structural variables 
specific to each individual case, while holding international and national macro-level 
factors mostly constant. I then juxtapose the two cases to examine the disparities between 
them, and to sort out the key factors that can explain the divergence between the cases. In 
this section, I clarify which micro-level structural variables are focused on, and which 
specific indicators are used to assess these variables. I will also provide a list of working 
hypotheses on the impact of domestic state and society structures on the emergence and 
development of transnational advocacy networks. 
The China Case 
In addition to fill the empirical knowledge gaps, I focus on China to study how domestic 
politics affects transnational advocacy networks for two main theoretical reasons. First, 
most case studies of transnational advocacy networks have covered semi-democratic or 
transitional countries, where state and societal forces are or are becoming equally strong 
(e.g., Central European countries). Other works have selected countries where 
autonomous organizations have been sustained throughout the history, in spite of a 
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temporarily repressive political regimes (e.g., Latin American countries). In both cases, 
the targeted state is relatively more subject to pressures and influences from IGOs or 
regional powers, and development of domestic civil society has reached the degree that it 
can endure the long-term, open confrontation with its government. However, the China 
case presents a different situation, where the state still has dominant power over both 
domestic and international politics. As Hongying Wang accurately noted in spite of a 
strong desire in the international arena to socialize China with neo-liberal norms, such as 
multilateralism, there is little evidence that the Chinese state is internalizing these 
norms.94 In the wake of the extensive crack-down on the Falung Gong group in 1998, 
there is no evidence of nation-wide and lasting social movement organizations, in spite of 
increasing incidents of civil disobedience, demonstrations, protests, and political riots at 
the local level.95 While existing literature predicts little possibility for transnational 
networks to emerge in China, I have found evidence that transnational NGO linkages and 
activist networks are emerging in the environmental and public health fields. Hence, the 
China case provides opportunity to bring in new theoretical puzzles and understandings 
of transnational advocacy politics.     
Second, the Chinese polity is undergoing fundamental changes, and increasingly 
diversifying, which offers great theoretical potential to explore the variance in 
micro-level domestic political factors. Despite the fact that the state is still in control of 
most aspects of politics, state control in China is in fact losing its uniformity as a result of 
                                                 
94 Wang, Hongying. 2000. “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization”. Asian 
Survey, Vol. 40, No.3: 475-491. 
95 For example, Jim Yardley’s report “Rural Chinese Riot as Police Try to Halt Pollution Protest”, New York 
Times, 14 April 2005. 
 
 92
the grand-scale reforms started two decades ago. Many scholars argue that the state is 
becoming fragmented and disjointed, and this trend is enhanced by bureaucratic 
bargaining and fiscal decentralization.96 Inter-departmental relations at the center and 
central-local relations vary across sectors. How the politics of air pollution control in 
China operates is not the same as that of water pollution.97 Political economy of IT 
                                                 
96 “Fragmented authoritarianism” is a model developed by scholars to describe the status of the state in 
China: First, authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed; 
Second, the fragmentation is structurally based, and; Third, it has been enhanced by reform policies 
regarding procedures. While this model has since been challenged, including by the authors who first 
conceptualized it (e.g., Lieberthal, Kenneth, and David Lampton), and more recently by the “regulatory 
state” model, it fleshed out the trend of weakening uniformity within the Chinese state apparatus. The 
fragmented authoritarianism is beyond merely bureaucratic politics analysis. It stresses the presence and 
impact of the interactive and dynamic processes among the constituent elements within the Chinese polity.  
Some representative works applying the fragmented authoritarianism model include: Chung, Jae Ho. 
1995. "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal." 
China Quarterly. 142: 487-508. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. 1988. Policy Making in 
China. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lampton, David, ed. 1987. Policy Implementation: Post-Mao 
China. Berkeley: University of California. Perry, Elizabeth J., and Christine Wong, eds. 1985. The Political 
Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard 
University. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and David Lampton, eds. 1992. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision 
Making in Post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press 
Main works on China’s regulatory state: Yang, Dali. 2004. Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market 
Transition and the Politics of Governance in China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pearson, 
Margaret. 2003. "Mapping the Rise of China's Regulatory State: Economic Regulation and Network and 
Insurance Industries". Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, New 
York, March 27. Yang, Dali. 2003. “State Capacity on the Rebound.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 14, No.1. 
Lu, Xiaobo. 2002. “From Players to Referees: The Changing Role of the State and Bureaucracy in China.” 
Paper prepared for the annual conference of the Association of Asian Studies. Washington, D.C., April, 7.  
97 Air pollution control is very centralized, with SEPA being the highest and major governing body. Water 
pollution control, however, is much more decentralized, and fragmented. Not SEPA but the National Water 
Resource Bureau is the main player. However, there are several regional inter-provincial water 
commissions, which are in charge of particular water basin governance. For more on environmental 
governance and pollution control in China, see: Ross, Lester. 1988. Environmental Policy in China. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Lieberthal, Kenneth. 1997. “China’s Governing 
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(information technology) industry in Shanghai differs considerably from that in 
Guangdong.98  
On the society side, societal structures in China should not be uniformly portrayed 
as minimal and penetrated by state power. Numerous voluntary, self-organized, or 
professionalized social associations are emerging in some issue areas (e.g., migrant 
workers’ rights, environmental protection and disabled/marginalized people’s welfare).99 
In other fields (e.g., HIV/AIDS prevention, land tenure, water pollution), various victim 
and dissent social groups are emerging and have tried to organize collective actions 
protesting governmental politics. For example, protest is becoming a common means for 
farmers and urbanites to protect their own properties and wellbeing from industrial 
pollution. Government sponsored research recorded that 88 and 47 environmental 
disputes took place before the mid-1990s.100  
                                                                                                                                                 
System and its Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation”. China Environmental Series, Issue 1. 
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. pp3-8. Nickum, James. 1998. "Is China Living on the Water 
Margin?" The China Quarterly (Special Issue: China's Environment), 156: 880-98. He, Kebin et al. 2002. 
“Urban Air Pollution in China: Current Status, Characteristics, and Progress.” Annual Review of Energy 
and the Environment. Vol. 27, Issue 1: 397-431. Dudek, Dan et al. 2001. “Total Emission Control of Major 
Pollutants in China”. China Environmental Series, Issue 4. Chen, Sulan, and Juha I. Uitto. 2003. 
"Governing Marine and Coastal Environment in China: Building Local Government Capacity through 
International Cooperation." China Environment Series, 6: 67-80. 
98 Segal, Adam, and Eric Thun. 2001. “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Local Governments, Industrial 
Sectors, and Development in China”. Politics & Society, Vol. 29, No.4: 557-588. 
99 According to China Development Brief 2001 report "Searching for Civil Society: 250 NGOs in China", 
civil society groups are most active in these fields. 
100 Shanghai Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau. 1994. Huanjing Wuran Changqun Maodun Yu 
Chuli Duice (Environmental Pollution, Conflict between Factories and Residents, and Resolution 
Measures). Shanghai: East-China Politics and Law College Press. Zhao, Yongkang, ed. 1989. Huanjing 
Jiufen Anli (Selected Cases of Environmental Disputes). Beijing: China Environmental Science Press. Xie, 
Zhenhua, ed. 1994. Zhongguo Huanjing Dianxing Anli Yu Zhifa Tiyao (Typical Cases of Environmental 
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In sum, both state and society structures in China are going through deepening 
changes, and becoming more diversified.101 This dynamic situation provides research 
potential to explore the theoretical puzzle related to transnational activism and advocacy 
networks.  
Mapping and Measuring Transnational Advocacy Networks 
The Double-mobilization model suggests that transnational advocacy networks are 
complex amalgamations of individual actors who while allying with each for a specific 
course, maintain their own working style and strategies to achieve organizational goals. 
Therefore, I apply three steps to map the networks: I start with a few most visible and 
core advocacy organizations, and then I locate other key participants of the networks. I do 
not decide over which group is in, and which is out. These organizations decide 
themselves whether they are part of the networks. My selection of cases is based on the 
connections present in between them and the core groups. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Violations and Guidelines of Environmental Law Enforcement in China). Beijing: China Environmental 
Science Press. Quoted in: Jing, Jun. 2000. "Environmental Protests in Rural China." In Chinese Society: 
Change, Conflict and Resistance, edited by Perry, Elizabeth and Mark Selden, 143-60. New York: 
Routledge. 
101 A more comprehensive overview of domestic structures in China shall also include the interactive 
channels in between the state and society. However, the variation in this aspect has not emerged yet, and 
institutionalized mechanisms for public participation are still lacking across issue areas. For state-society 
relations in China, see: Unger, Jonathan, and Anita Chan. 1996. "Corporatism in China: A Developmental 
State in an East Asian Context?" In China After Socialism: In the Footsteps of East Europe or East Asia?, 
edited by Barret McCormick and Jonathan Unger, 95-129. Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe. Zhang, 
Yunqiu. 1997. Pearson, Margaret. 1997. China's New Business Elite. Berkeley: University of Califonia 
Press. "From State Corporatism to Social Representation." In Civil Society in China, edited by Timothy 
Brook and Michael Frolic. Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe. Yep, Ray. 2000. "The Limitation of 
Corporatism for Understanding Reforming China: An Empirical Analysis in A Rural County." Journal of 
Contemporary China. Vol. 9, No. 2.  
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I then disaggregate the networks and trace individual organizations’ political 
relations and the content of their engagement with both governmental and societal forces 
for two purposes: 1) to provide a rich account of the political dynamics of the networks, 
which otherwise would be overlooked by compacting different organizations into one 
agent, and overlapping their political relations; 2) to form an accurate interpretation of 
individual international NSAs’ work, their relationship with local communities and 
governmental agencies, as well as the causal chains among different political events, in 
order to give further explanations of the patterns at the aggregate level. 
Lastly, I examine the combination of organizations, their activities, and political 
relations as a whole again. I offer an in-depth narrative about the main features of the two 
networks (in terms of the political relations among the state, local society, external NSAs) 
and the political context they are situated in. 
To sort out the key variables that condition transnational networks at the 
aggregate level, I compare the two networks in terms of the patterned relations that they 
are characterized by, and the relative strength and scope of such patterned relations. In 
addition to qualitative inference, I also develop a set of crude quantitative indicators that 
can give snapshot-type illustrations of these questions. A word of caution: What is to be 
measured is not the actual impact, but the political features of transnational networks 
marked by the triangular relationship among the state, local society, and external NSAs. I 
compile a dataset of the working partnership of international NGOs (as main 
representatives of the external advocacy groups) to capture the triangular relationship I 
focus on.  
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To better illustrate and compare international NSAs’ mobilization work and their 
interactions, at the aggregate level, with domestic governmental and societal actors, I 
further construct three sets of indicators.102 (Table 2.3)  
Table 2.3. Measuring state and social mobilization of transnational advocacy networks 
Double-mobilization Indicators 
Information dissemination  
(Information sharing; research collaboration; training) 
Policy implementation 
Policy-making input 
State mobilization 
Institution building 
Public education 
Local capacity building 
Social mobilization 
Promoting social activism  
(Technical & financial support; Creating new local NGOs & networks) 
Informal channels 
Non-institutionalized public participation 
Bridging  
state & society 
Institutionalized public participation 
 
I identify four types of work that international NGOs perform to mobilize the 
state: information dissemination, policy implementation, policy input, and institution 
building: 
1) Information sharing. By providing higher quality information to the government, 
advocates can entice the state to re-consider and modify its existing perceptions and 
policies. Besides establishing new understanding and knowledge at the fundamental level 
through research, advocacy actors can also organize and provide targeted policy-making 
officials and state affiliated professionals with specific learning opportunities and 
practical training courses.  
                                                 
102 I identify these variables based upon both literature on international NSAs and domestic effects of 
international regimes. Particularly: Young, Oran, ed. 1999. The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavior Mechanisms. Global Environmental Accord: 
Strategies for Sustainability and Institutional Innovation, Choucri, Nazli. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
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2) Policy implementation. Advocacy actors can introduce to governmental agencies new 
ideas and methods for solving problems by taking part in the policy implementation 
process. (“Learning by doing”.) By demonstrating the difference between new and old 
practices, advocates may change policy-makers’ perceptions and attitudes. 
3) Policy input. Providing policy recommendation to decision-makers, or being involved 
in policy-making processes present a much shorter causal chain than the previous two 
indicators in explaining how advocacy actors can mobilize the state and introduce 
changes. 
4) Institution building. Through institution building, advocacy actors can maintain the 
effects of their advocacy work in the long-run, and push for deepening of norm 
socialization within the state apparatus. 
To measure the relationship between external advocacy actors and local civil 
society groups and communities, I identify three main types of activities that international 
NGOs perform in social mobilization: public education, local capacity building, and 
promoting social activism:103
1) Public education. One of the most common ways for activists and NGOs to 
disseminate information related to a principled idea is through public education. In most 
cases where transnational networks emerge, domestic social groups are completely cut 
                                                 
103 I develop these variables based upon the body of literature on international NGOs in general, and 
particularly in China: Knight, Denise, Robert Taylor, and Pam Baldinger. 2002. "Powering Up the Dragon: 
World Bank and NGO Energy Efficiency Projects in China." Paper presented at the China Environment 
Forum Meeting, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1. U.S.-China 
Environmental Working Group. 1998. "Financing Environmental Protection in China: The Role of 
Foundations and NGOs (Working Group Summaries)." China Environment Series, 2. Young, Nick. 2004. 
"NGOs: The Diverse Origins, Changing Nature and Growing Internationalization of the Species." China 
Development Brief. 
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off from access to information. Providing direct access to accurate information is 
important and necessary for any further social mobilization by external NSAs.  
2) Local capacity building. External advocacy actors often provide training, funds, and 
technologies to strengthen local people’s self-capacity. Advocates create opportunities for 
them to coordinate among themselves, and help them to obtain and mobilize more 
resources to defend their own interests and voice their own opinions. 
3) Promoting social activism. When civil society organizations are lacking and level of 
social activism is low, external advocacy groups support individuals with vision and 
social entrepreneur skills as key local linkages of transnational networks. Through these 
individuals, external advocates promote the rise of local activism that can sustain norm 
socialization and behavior changes in the long-term. A strong local activist community, 
in turn, strengthens the whole advocacy network. 
To explore whether external advocacy actors aggravate or alleviate domestic 
contention, I develop three deepening indicators: creating communication channels, 
experimenting with project-based public participation, and institutionalizing public 
participation. Despite political blockage and policy barriers, external advocates and 
NGOs can create ice-breaking opportunities for governmental authorities and social 
groups by organizing informal or semi-formal gatherings and meetings. They can 
introduce partnering and collaborating mechanisms for governmental and 
non-governmental actors in their own projects. Through small-scale, short-term projects, 
the two sides can have the chance to better know each others’ intentions and be familiar 
with different ways to negotiate and reach agreement. If external advocacy groups can 
facilitate the process of institutionalizing state-society communication and public 
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participation channels, they are actually lessening rather than intensifying domestic 
contention to bring about changes in state behavior.  
Domestic Micro-level Structures Defined by Issue Area 
Drawing upon both Chinese and comparative scholarship, I identify five main domestic 
factors that potentially constrain or facilitate the emergence and development of 
transnational advocacy networks in China. (Table 2.4) The first three factors are related to 
the Chinese state: 1) the level of internationalization of a governing system defined by the 
policy issue; 2) horizontal inter-departmental relations at the central level; and 3) vertical 
central-local relations within the governing system defined by the focused issue area. The 
final two factors are related to civil society structures defined by issue area, level of 
interconnection among civil society groups and level of social identity building.  
Table 2.4. Domestic micro-level structures  
Domestic structures Micro-level variables 
Level of internationalization 
Bureaucratic relations  
Governing structures defined by an issue area 
Local state autonomy 
Level of interconnectedness Civil society structures defined by an issue area 
Group identity building 
 
 
Internationalization of governing structures. I use this variable to assess whether 
the governing bodies defined by an issue area are acquainted with international 
discourses, standards and practices, whether they are, to some extent, involved in 
international collaborations and regime building, and whether they are used to deal with 
criticism, advice, and conditioned assistance from the international community. Many 
factors contribute to the internationalization of governing structures (e.g., party of 
international treaties and organizations, receiving official development assistance), and I 
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pay particular attention to governmental agencies’ knowledge of and attitudes towards 
external actors, and the frequency and density of the interactions between domestic 
governmental and international agencies (multilateral and bilateral only).  
Horizontal bureaucratic relations. This variable is intended to describe various 
characteristics of inter-departmental relations within the state. Such relations can be 
centralized vs. fragmented, depending on the number of key bureaucratic agencies 
involved and the fact whether the political power is concentrated within one or few 
agencies. Inter-departmental tension can be caused by over-lapping interests and 
functions of multiple governmental departments. Bureaucratic agencies in an issue area 
can form collaborative or competitive relations due to the lack or presence of such 
tension. 
Local state autonomy. Central-local relationship is a common variable in 
comparative political studies, and particularly relevant to the study of Chinese politics.104 
In theory, under the current political regime in China, the central government endeavors 
to maintain its overall control of provincial and even local affairs. However, in reality, on 
the one hand, the center is giving up its control by reforming fiscal systems;105 and, on 
                                                 
104 In the field of China studies, there is a tradition of studying “locality of authority”, “local stateness”, and 
“local variance”. e.g., Remick, Elizabeth. 2004. Building Local States: China during the Republican and 
Post-Mao Eras. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Oi, Jean C. 1999. Rural China Takes Off. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. Oi, Jean C. 1995. “The role of the local state in China's 
transitional economy,” The China Quarterly, 144: 1132–49. Shue, Vivienne. 1988. The Reach of the State: 
Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
105 Wang, Shaoguang. 1995. "The Rise of the Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State 
Capacity in China." In The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China 
and Hungary, edited by Walder, Andrew, 87-113. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wong, 
Christine. 1991. "Central-local Relations in An Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal 
Decentralization in Post-Mao China." China Quarterly. No. 128: 1-32.  
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the other, with new social, environmental, and health problems emerging, the central 
government cannot afford maintaining a comprehensive social welfare system, and has 
began to rely on provincial and local authorities to mobilize more resources.106 I include 
this variable to make the research design more suitable to examine the empirical 
materials from China. Moreover, this is precisely the type of domestic micro-structures 
that vary greatly under a seemingly constant political regime. Local governments enjoy 
differential levels of autonomy over its own constituencies across issue areas due to 
central-local regulatory, fiscal and personnel relations.  
Civil society structures defined by an issue area describe not only the aggregate 
scope of civil society groups (esp. local NGOs) and their activities, but more importantly, 
the characteristics of patterned relations among them.107 Once civil society groups have 
emerged, they can move on in very different directions, with rare interactions among each 
other. Therefore, the sheer number of NGOs and data of their work cannot give accurate 
picture of the nature of the whole community. The key is to identify whether individual 
activists and NGOs are webbed together, whether they are converging towards similar 
ideas and coordinating their work to reach common goals, and whether there is some 
level of solidarity and group identity emerging within the community. 
Level of interconnectedness. Civil society actors are usually connected through 
informal forums, salons and social gathering. The level of interconnectedness among 
                                                 
106 Sargeson, Sally, and Jian Zhang. 1999. “Reassessing the Role of the Local State: A Case Study of Local 
Government Interventions in Property Rights Reform in a Hangzhou District,” China Journal, 42: 77–99. 
Unger, Jonathan, and Anita Chan. 1999. “Inheritors of the Boom: Private Enterprise and the Role of Local 
Government in a Rural South China Township,” China Journal, 42: 45–74. 
107 NGOs are important actors in civil society. See Appendix 2.1 for a lengthy discussion on NGOs in 
China. 
 
 102
them rises significantly if they take some kind of collective actions and collaborate in 
projects.  
Group identity formation.108 This is the defining factor to discern whether a 
community is somehow united, conscious about its role in the society, and able to 
rationalize a common goal for practical and policy changes. Group identity formation 
takes time, and requires organizing symbolic events, leadership, common experiences of 
actions, and repeated self-reflections within the community.  
Working Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Domestic structures and the emergence of transnational advocacy 
networks 
1.1. A higher level of internationalization of the governing structures in an issue area 
facilitates the emergence of transnational advocacy networks. 
Transnational advocacy networks are more likely to emerge in a relatively more 
internationalized issue area. International NSAs need some minimal entry points to form 
networks under a non-democratic regime. Domestic activists and NGOs also need some 
opportunities to reach out to external advocacy networks. Transnational networks are 
more likely to emerge if the governing structures in an issue area have becoming more 
                                                 
108 For this variable, I draw upon literature on national, social, and interest group identity building. e.g., 
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Community. London: Verso. Migdal, Joel S., ed. 2004. Boundaries 
and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Dunleavy, Patrick. 1988. “Group Identities and Individual Influence: 
Reconstructing the Theory of Interest Groups,” British Journal of Political Science, 18, 1: 21-49. 
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open to external influences, and policy makers are more familiar with international actors 
and discourses.109
 
1.2. A higher level of civil society development in an issue area facilitates the emergence 
of transnational advocacy networks. 
The formation of transnational networks requires some minimal level of domestic social 
mobilization and development of civil society organizations. International NSAs need 
local contacts for first-hand information and to get access to local communities. With 
local advocacy partners, international NSAs can translate normative principles into 
suitable practical solutions and form advocacy strategies.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Domestic structures and the development of transnational advocacy 
networks (marked by the evolving triangular relationship among the state, local society, 
and external advocacy actors) 
2.1 A higher level of bureaucratic decentralization in an issue area enables transnational 
advocacy networks to mobilize governmental agencies.  
Advocacy actors are more able to locate contacts inside the governing body, and form 
mobilization connections, in an issue area where power is not monopolized by one state 
ministry, but shared by multiple state agencies, and where decision-making processes 
involves multiple players. Decentralization within the governing structures does not 
guarantee that advocacy networks will be effective, but creates favorable conditions for 
                                                 
109 They do not necessarily agree with international norms, but they are acquainted with what these norms 
are about and which organizations are involved. 
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advocacy actors to expand and deepen their interactions with and mobilization of the 
state.  
 
2.2 A higher level of local state autonomy in an issue area enables advocacy actors to 
consolidate and expand their networks. 
Local governmental authorities are crucial for advocacy actors to maintain and strengthen 
their mobilization work with local communities, as well as to bring to fruition their 
advocacy work. Particularly under a non-democratic regime where state-society linkages 
are greatly curtailed, local governmental autonomy offers opportunities for advocacy 
actors to strengthen their social mobilization work at the grassroots level, and use their 
connections with local governmental bodies to communicate with and mobilize higher 
level authorities. 
 
2.3 A higher level of interconnections among civil society groups in an issue area 
facilitates to the mobilization of domestic society through transnational advocacy 
networks. 
Transnational networks’ social mobilization depends not only on the sheer scope of 
domestic advocacy groups but on the interconnections among them. Internal friction 
among civil society groups within an issue area not only constrain the development of 
solidarity within advocacy networks, but also prevent the deep integration of 
transnational networks into local politics. 
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CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I explained the meaning of Double-mobilization of transnational 
advocacy networks and why it is a useful conceptual framework to understand the 
political dynamics involving the state, domestic civil society groups, and external 
activists and NGOs. This Double-mobilization model underlines the extensive 
interactions between advocacy groups and targeted governmental authority aiming at 
consensus building. It completes the Boomerang model to capture the deepening 
interaction between transnational networks and domestic political actors. I also pointed 
out the need to assess micro-level domestic structural variables to better understand the 
variance in transnational networks across cases. Drawing insights from both Chinese and 
comparative politics literature, I developed sets of variables and indicators that are 
suitable for examining state and society structures defined by an issue area which are 
most relevant to the emergence and development of transnational advocacy networks.  
This chapter emphasizes the deductive logic of my research design. However, the 
process of generating conceptual terms, measurements, and working hypotheses in this 
research also involved numerous inductive reflections. For example, I interviewed Zhang 
Ye, Director of the Asia Foundation China Programs (since 1994), in April 2003, when 
she was spending a summer at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. and writing a 
policy analysis paper on the development of civil society in China for the international 
policy think-tank community. Zhang is among the few chief representatives of 
international non-profit foundations operating in China who have published multiple 
articles to explain to the Western world the meaning of civil society in today’s China, and 
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what kind of influence international foundations have had on the development of civil 
society in China.110 She answered my question regarding the politics surrounding 
international NGOs and advocacy groups in China as follows:  
To examine international foundations and NGOs’ impacts in China, one 
should not only look at the projects implemented by them, but also at the 
whole process of their interaction with the governments. We try to bring 
out some changes in the government’s general attitudes towards 
non-governmental activism and voluntary actions during our collaboration 
at different levels…There are certainly mutual influences between Chinese 
NGOs and international organizations working in China. Meanwhile, we 
also have to recognize the potential double marginalization of Chinese 
NGOs—gaps between local populations and these NGOs, and that 
between them and international NGOs.  
 
Many of my other interviewees in this research concurred with Zhang’s observations. In a 
way, these practitioners’ comments manifested the theoretical frameworks and conceptual 
terms that I touched upon here.  
This chapter does not seek to constrain thinking but to provide some benchmarks 
for the reader of the dissertation. When presenting each case of transnational advocacy 
networks, I make the best effort to give the reader a comprehensive picture with rich 
nuances. I include materials related to possible alternative explanations and intervening 
factors, such as issue characteristics, leadership, and opportunity structures at the 
international level. Indeed, in the following two chapters, we will see that the processes 
and political relations of transnational advocacy networks are actually “messy”, and do 
not fit theory perfectly. I include many incidental factors that are relevant for fully 
understanding the complex webs of advocacy groups in China, for my first purpose is to 
                                                 
110 Zhang, Ye. 2003. "China's Emerging Civil Society". Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute. 2002. 
“Migrant Women Workers and The Emerging Civil Society in China.” Beijing: Asia Foundation China 
Programs. 1995. "Chinese NGOs: A Survey Report." In Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific 
Community: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, JCIE and The Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium. 
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call scholarly attention to this newly emerging community and specify the political 
context it is situated in. In Chapter 5, I then apply a more systematic comparative 
approach to crystallize the linkages between my theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TRANSNATIONAL NATURE CONSERVATION ADVOCACY NETWORKS  
IN CHINA 
 
 
 
 There is a great deal of coordination among international and Chinese NGOs, 
and these international groups are mostly staffed with Chinese people. They 
(international NGOs) are Chinese groups at heart. 
— Wen Bo 
Coordinator in China, Global Greengrants Fund,  
and Pacific Environment Resource and Center 1
 
 
 
According to the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, the Hengduan Mountain 
region in southwest China is one of the world’s most important ecological hotspots.2  
Three Chinese provinces, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region intersect here, and many great rivers flow through the region, including the 
Yangtze and the Mekong. With its extremely rugged terrain, varied climates and rich 
biodiversity, it occupies 1.5% of the world’s surface, yet is home to more than 12,000 
species of higher plants, of which 29 percent are unique to this hotspot. The region is 
also economically disadvantaged. Within the areas in Yunnan alone, more than three 
million people are living under the national poverty level. The natural resources in the 
region have been increasingly degraded as a result of poverty, low education, and the 
continued practice of some environmentally harmful traditional resource use 
                                                 
1 Interviewed in San Francisco, May 2003. 
2 The Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund is a joint initiative of the Conservation International, the 
Global Environment Facility, the Government of Japan, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation and the World Bank, focusing on providing strategic assistance to nongovernmental 
organizations, community groups and other civil society partners to help safeguard Earth’s biodiversity 
hotspots. 
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methods.3 The integrity of major rivers flowing into Myanmar, Laos and Thailand is 
dependent on the stability of the region’s natural resources. Thus, the conservation 
strategies adopted in northwestern Yunnan will shape the environmental quality and 
well-being of not only the populations within the region, but also millions more in 
mainland Southeast Asia. 
As of 2004, dozens of international NGOs have entered this region. They 
mobilized substantial support from various multilateral and bilateral agencies, and 
launched various types of conservation projects, partnering with both local 
governments and social groups. One of such projects is the Yunnan Great Rivers 
project, a multi-million project initiated by The Nature Conservation (TNC) and 
Yunnan provincial government. Conservation International (CI) and World Wide Fund 
for Nature’s China Program (WWF China) have also arrived at agreements with the 
Sichuan government to launch community based conservation projects in the province. 
Oxfam America developed a watershed conservation project in Northeast Yunnan to 
strengthen the capacity of local NGOs and to promote transparency in local 
conservation policy-making. Some have used these projects as examples to point out 
that transnational advocacy networks are not only emerging, but also have been able 
to effectively change local practices in nature conservation in China.4  Wen Bo—a 
                                                 
3 Such as using original woods for building houses, cooking and heating. 
4 Istenič, Saša. 2004. "Politics of Wildlife Protection in China." Leeds East Asia Papers (University of 
Leeds). 64. Yang, Guobin. 2004. "Global Environmentalism Hits China: International and Domestic 
Groups Join Forces to Combat Environmental Woes." Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. 
Turner, Jennifer. 2004. "Small Government, Big and Green Society: Emerging Partnership to Solve 
China's Environmental Problems." Harvard Asia Quarterly. VIII, 2. Litzinger, Ralph. 2004. "The 
 109
veteran Chinese environmentalist and Coordinator in China of Global Greengrants 
Fund and the Pacific Environment Resource and Center has commented that a few 
international conservation groups are interconnected with local NGOs and 
communities. “There is a great deal of coordination among international and Chinese NGOs, 
and these international groups are mostly staffed with Chinese people. They (international 
NGOs) are Chinese groups at heart.”  This observation sheds light on how much external 
advocacy groups have localized their activities and the level of integration within the 
networks. 
This chapter maps the international advocacy groups in nature conservation in 
China, and examines the triangular relationship among them, the Chinese government, 
and local environmental groups. I trace how individual international NGOs and 
advocacy actors form partnerships and connections with various organizations in 
China. I also explain the governing bodies, international factors and civil society 
structures related to the issue of nature conservation in order to pinpoint the causal 
linkages between these factors and the development of transnational networks. 
Since the early 1980s, the emergence of transnational advocacy networks has 
undergone three stages. First, a handful of major international NGOs and foundations 
focused on persuading and engaging the Chinese government to recognize the 
importance of nature conservation. Second, more international conservation groups 
entered China and expanded their networks with more local authorities and social 
groups. Third, in recent years, not only the number of international NGOs has 
                                                                                                                                            
Mobilization of 'Nature': Perspectives from North-west Yunnan." The China Quarterly. 178. pp 488-
504. 
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mounted considerably, but also the density of transnational advocacy networks has 
increased embodied in more transnationalized social campaigns and more 
participation in institutional building in nature conservation. The rise of grassroots 
environmentalism the greening progress within a few key governmental agencies have 
created a relatively favorable environment for international advocacy actors to build 
up their networks, in spite of many other political and practical obstacles. 
 
THE NATURE CONSERVATION CRISIS 
The Development-Conservation Conflict 
China is home to approximately 10% of the world’s biodiversity, and ranks first in 
biodiversity in the northern hemisphere.5 It has at least 30,000 species of vascular 
plants, and its Fauna Sinica Catalogue stretches to 150 volumes.6  With one-fourth of 
China’s total species endangered, this richness is diminishing at an alarming rate. 
China has 156 out of the 640 species listed as endangered under the Convention on 
the International Trade of Endangered Flora and Fauna (CITES), and The World 
Conservation Union 2002 Red List places China among the countries with the most 
threatened birds and mammals. At least eight large mammal species are thought to 
have been extirpated from China in the last century alone, and it is predicted that 33 
will become extinct during this century. 7  Ecosystems in China have degraded 
                                                 
5 Liu, Jianguo. 2003. “Protecting China’s Biodiversity.” Science. Vol. 300, Issue 5623: 1240-1241. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Harkness, James. 1998. "Recent Trends in Forestry and Conservation of Biodiversity in China." The 
China Quarterly. 156, Special Issue: China's Environment: 912. 
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drastically in the past 50 years due to rapid population growth, urbanization, and 
large-scale government sponsored development projects such as dam constructions.8 
90 percent of China’s grasslands are withdrawing to varying degrees, and glaciers in 
parts of the Tibetan plateau are retreating almost 20 meters every year. 9  In the 
Sanjiang Plane (in northeastern China) and the Poyang Lake regions (in central 
China), some of the largest wetlands on the earth are disappearing due to excessive 
land reclamation since the 1950s. 10  Every year, northern provinces suffer from 
multiple dust storms because of the severe desertification in the region.11 China has 
now at least 85,000 dams (22,000 are large and medium)—only two rivers in the 
country are still dam-free.12
Conserving wildlife and biodiversity in China is related to interrelated 
problems that affect not only species and their habitats, but also the well-being of 
millions of people and thousands of communities. Recall the above accounts of the 
Hengduan Mountain region. Protected areas and nature reserves in China usually are 
populated and impoverished, with local communities maintain that maintain 
                                                 
8  Edmonds, Richard. 1994. Patterns of China’s Lost Harmony: A Survey of the Country’s 
Environmental Degradation and Protection. New York: Routledge. 
9 Yang, Xin, (Sichuan GreenRiver Environmental Conservation Promotion Society). 2001. "NGO 
Conservation Work in Tibet and Western Sichuan." Talk at the China Environment Forum Meeting, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5. 
10 WWF China project report on Central Yangtze watershed conservation. I also thank Professor Ma 
Zhong for sharing his research of wetlands in the Sanjiang Plane. 
11 “Dangerous Asian dust storms increase fivefold from Chinese desert”, Associated Press, 31 March 
2004. “Dusty weather to linger in north China in coming days”, Xinhua News, 29 March 2004. “Dust: 
prime pollutants in Chinese cities”, Xinhua News, 17 September 2003. [Accessed through LexisNexis, 
10 December 2004] 
12 World Commission on Dams report. [Available at: http://www.dams.org/kbase/consultations/esea/
stats.htm, last accessed on 15 March 2005] 
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traditional economies and depend on raw natural resources. The incidence of rural 
poverty in the most forested areas in China (esp. Northeast and Southwest) where 
biodiversity is also rich is in between 17.7 – 22.9%.13 (Maps 3.1, 3.2) The need for 
rural development and poverty relief in protected and forested areas adds pressure to 
local ecosystems. Chinese scientists and biodiversity experts have pointed out 
“[China’s] biodiversity suffers from the explosive increase in the intensity and extent 
of human activities.”14 For instance, the human-elephant and human-bird conflicts in 
various parts of Yunnan.15  
Map 3.1. Forested areas in China (1997)             Map 3.2. Poverty in China (1996) 
         
Source: Chinese Ministry of Forestry            Note: Darker color indicates worse poverty situation  
          Data is not available for Inner Mongolia  
          Source: World Bank Poverty Assessment 2000 
                                                 
13 World Bank. 2000. “China: Overcoming Rural Poverty”. [Available online: 
http://www.worldbank.org, last accessed 15 March 2005] 
14 Liu, Jianguo, and Ouyang, Zhiyun, et al. 2003. “Protecting China's Biodiversity”. Science, 300, 
5623: 1240-2.
15 Zhang, Aster and Wang Ning. 2003. “An Initial study on Habitat Conservation of Asian Elephant 
(Elephas maximus), with a Focus on Human Elephant Conflict in Simao, China.” Biological 
Conservation, 112, 3: 453-60. Lan, Daoying and Robin Dunbar. 2000. “Bird and Mammal 
Conservation in Gaoligongshan Region and Jingdong County, Yunnan, China: Patterns of Species 
Richness and Nature Reserves”. Oryx, 34, 4: 275-87.
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Even though the central government has made some steps in protecting 
biodiversity in recent years (e.g., expansion of the nature reserve system and 
ratification of the national “logging ban”), conservationists are not optimistic. With 
over a decade experience of working in China’s nature conservation, Jim Harkness 
(Director of WWF China) warned that there is “a deepening crisis in biodiversity and 
forest management”. 16  In addition to the lack of public participation and local 
capacity which is common across sectors in China, disjointed governing institutions 
and contradictory policies related to nature conservation have exacerbated human-
nature conflicts and local resistance of nature reserves in various parts of the country. 
In this section, I present evidence from China’s forestry and nature reserve systems to 
illustrate the political obstacles faced by both Chinese and international 
conservationists and advocacy groups as they work to alleviate the nature 
conservation crisis in the country. 
Fragmented Governance in Nature Conservation 
The most significant obstacle to conserving China’s biodiversity is the lack of a 
synthesized and substantiated governing system. Though China’s environmental 
governance has been substantially enhanced since Mao’s times with the creation of 
National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA, and now SEPA) and 
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) at all levels, there is a sharp gap between 
                                                 
16 Harkness, 1998. 
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the state’s responses to pollution control and that to ecological degradation.17 Under 
the leadership of SEPA, China has formulated prompt policy measures to curb down 
industrial pollution control (e.g., creating two national acid rain monitoring and 
control zones). 18  In contrast, the governing system in nature conservation is 
fragmented, and there is a lack of suitable policies to cope with China’s ecological 
distress. Such fragmentation in governance is marked by three features: bureaucratic 
deadlock at the central level, lack of institutionalized coordination among nature 
reserves at local levels, and a parallel administrative system within the forestry sector.  
The SEPA vs. SFB stalemate 
The total number of national-level nature reserves in China has increased rapidly in 
recent years from around 590 in 1992 to 980 in 1998, and almost doubled to 1757 in 
                                                 
17  This distinction in environmental policy is common across countries, and usually referred as 
“brown” versus “green” issues. On the developments in China’s environmental governance in general, 
see: Economy, Elizabeth. 2004. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapter 4: 91-128. Edmonds, Richard L., ed. 1998. Managing 
China's Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Palmer, Michael. 1998. "Environmental 
Regulation in the People's Republic of China: The Face of Domestic Law." The China Quarterly. 156, 
Special Issue: China's Environment.  Ross, Lester. 1998. "China: Environmental Protection, Domestic 
Policy Trends, Patterns of Participation in Regimes and Compliance with International Norms." In 
Managing China's Environment, edited by Edmonds, Richard L. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ross, Lester. 1988. Environmental Policy in China. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press. Jahiel, Abigail. 1998. "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." The China 
Quarterly. 156, Special Issue: China's Environment: 757-87. Beach, Marilyn. 2001. "Local 
Environmental Management in China." China Environmental Series, 4. Smil, Vaclav. 2004. China’s 
Past, China’s Future: Energy, Food, Environment. New York: Routledge Curzon.  
18 He, Kebin et al. 2002. “Urban Air Pollution in China: Current Status, Characteristics, and Progress.” 
Annual Review of Energy and the Environment. Vol. 27, Issue 1: 397-431. He, Kebin, and Chang 
Cheng. 1999. “Present and Future Pollution from Urban Transport in China”. China Environmental 
Series, Issue 3. Dudek, Dan et al. 2001. “Total Emission Control of Major Pollutants in China”. China 
Environmental Series, Issue 4. Vermeer, Eduard. 1998. "Industrial Pollution in China and Remedial 
Policies." The China Quarterly. 156, Special Issue: China's Environment: 952-85. Lu, Yingzhong. 1997. 
“The Role of Nuclear Energy in the CO2 Mitigation Strategy of the People’s Republic of China”. China 
Environmental Series, Issue 1. 
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2003, covering 16% of the country’s land area.19 However, the governing authority 
over nature reserves is not clearly defined at the national level. Even though the 1998 
State Council Notification on Strengthening Nature Reserve Management sanctioned 
SEPA as the sole supervisory body over the reform of the nature reserve system, it has 
limited power and resources to oversee national-level reserves, not to mention 
provincial and county level reserves. Of the existing national level nature reserves 
(around 2000),  over 1200 in fact belong to the forestry sector, and the rest are 
individually governed by State Bureaus of Oceanic Affairs, Geology, Tourism, Water 
Resources, and SEPA. 20 (Figure 3.1)  
  
Figure 3.1. Governing bodies related to nature conservation in China 
Legislative body     Administrative body
 
National People’s Congress  SFB          national-level            SEPA & other 
Comm. on Environmental &            nature reserves           state agencies 
Natural Resources Protection   
                 provincial FBs         provincial-level 
  State-owned                   nature reserves  
   forestry enterprises   
  
                local FBs          local-level 
local forestry           nature reserves 
enterprise bureaus 
 
      supervisory relationship        virtual boundaries of the nature reserve system 
 
Because of the importance of forests to biodiversity conservation, and the 
traditional status of the forestry authority within the Chinese state, the Ministry of 
Forestry (now the State Forestry Bureau or SFB) was once the leading state agency in 
                                                 
19 Harkness, 1998. Cyranoski, David. 2003. “Biodiversity Schemes Take Foot in China”. Nature, 425: 
890. 
20 SEPA directly governs around 80 national nature reserves.  
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charge of issues related to nature conservation.21 In the 1994 State Council Regulation 
on Nature Reserves, SFB and other state agencies, but not SEPA, were sanctioned to 
enforce the Regulation in the reserves belonging to their own systems. SEPA did not 
(and still does not) have the administrative channels to manage nature reserves at 
different levels. Since the central administrative reform in 1998, the power balance 
between SEPA and SFB has shifted, and SEPA has been given more authority to 
monitor nature reserves.22 However, no coordinating mechanism has been established 
among the various state agencies related to nature conservation, or between SEPA and 
SFB. According to some insiders the situation between the two agencies over the issue 
of nature reserve management reform has nearly been a stalemate between since 1998. 
For instance, the Committee on Environmental and Natural Resources Protection of 
the National People’s Congress is currently drafting a national law on biodiversity 
conservation. Both SEPA and SFB are lobbying for their own interests and have 
drafted two versions of the new law.23  
Bottom-up nature reserve establishment mechanism 
Provincial and county-level governmental authorities can for the most part plan and 
establish provincial and lower level reserves with approval by upper echelon 
                                                 
21 Even though Ministry of Forestry (now SFB) was first created as a supplier of raw materials for 
national economic development, it has always been, and expanded its role in nature conservation in 
China. In October 1956, the MoF issue the “Draft Plan for the Designation of Areas for National 
Forestry Reserve”, and over the next years, the first group of total 19 reserves in China were set up. In 
the early 1980s, China’s National Wildlife Protection Association is established with SFB. Currently, 
wildlife protection agencies at all local levels are usually affiliated with local forestry bureaus.  
22 In 1998, while NEPA was promoted to the full-ministry ranking as SEPA, MoF was demoted to the 
deputy-ministry ranking as SFB. 
23 Interview with Chen Qing, expert consultant for force-coming law on nature reserve management, in 
Beijing, April 2004. 
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governmental authorities. This bottom-up mechanism has given local officials 
incentives to propose nature reserve plans for the purpose of attracting tourism and 
income-generation, instead of ecological protection and recovery. After visiting a 
number of nature reserves in China, Lawrence Glacy observed that “local government 
prioritizing of economic growth has allowed for the proliferation of commercial 
activities within nature reserves and hindered effective implementation of pollution 
control and natural resources protection policies.”24 Many nature reserves in China are 
also located in the poorest areas, where local farmers and ethnic minorities live with 
traditional agricultural and hunting methods and directly extract raw materials from 
the surrounding ecosystems. Conservation experts point out that the boundaries of 
nature reserves do not coincide with that of ecological districts, and nature reserves in 
China are designed primarily in order to reduce conflict with humans rather than to 
maximize conservation of biodiversity. 25  In some cases, establishment of nature 
reserves has even intensified the competition for natural resources (e.g., timber, fish, 
and arable land) and triggered local resistance and political crises.26
Moreover, under the existing nature reserve governing structures, neither 
central nor provincial governments provide sufficient funds or human resources for 
                                                 
24 Glacy, Lawrence. 2002. "China's Nature Reserves: Protecting Species or Generating Profits?" China 
Environment Series. 5: 69-73.  
25 For the spread of 3 eco-domains, 13 eco-regions and 57 eco-districts in China, see: Fu, Bo-Jie et al. 
2004. ‘‘Ecoregions and Ecosystem Management in China”. International Journal for Sustainable 
Development & World Ecology, 11, 4: 397-410.   
26 Emily Yet documented how community-based ownership, rights, and social distribution systems 
complicates the issue of nature conservation, which lead to local conflicts. Yeh, Emily T. 2000. "Forest 
Claims, Conflicts and Commodification: The Political Ecology of Tibetan Mushroom-Harvesting 
Villages in Yunnan Province." The China Quarterly. 161: 264-78. 
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newly created nature reserves. Nature reserve staff are poorly paid. When I visited the 
Xinkai Lake Nature Reserve in Heilongjiang province in May 2004, I was told that 
reserve staff had not been paid for six months. In addition, no national systematic and 
enforceable standards exist regarding eco-tourism, eco-research, or agroforestry 
within the reserves. At least 40 percent of the reserves have not performed baseline 
assessments due to the lack of financial, technical and human resources.27 There are 
few connections and no professional associations established among different the 
local reserve staff. Individual nature reserves in China are virtually operated in a state 
of nature. 
Parallel system within the forestry sector 
Besides the above factors, a dual system of state-own forestry enterprises and forestry 
bureaus within the forestry sector worsens the disjunction in the governing structures 
of nature conservation. China’s forests are governed by two functionally similar yet 
administrative systems—one, state-owned forestry enterprises, the other, forestry 
bureaus.28 Forestry bureaus operate as other bureaucracies, and manage 4446 forestry 
units (lin chang) and reserves through administrative measures. Like other state-
owned industrial enterprises, state-owned forestry enterprises manage forests and 
wood processing industries in a quasi-corporate fashion. There are 135 of them across 
the country, and most of them are gigantic in terms of the size of their forests and the 
                                                 
27 Harkness, 1998. p920. 
28 Sources in Chinese: 50 Years of China’s Forestry. State Forestry Bureau. Jia, Qian et al. “Studies of 
Forestry Production: State Forests in the Northeast and Collectively-owned Forests in the South”, in 
China’s Forestry Enterprise. 2002 (6), pp3-8. “Production Structural Changes in Daxing’anling 
Forested Region”, in China Green Times, 26 July 2004. 
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number of their employees.29 A single forestry enterprise usually controls multiple 
forests, and sometimes covers an even larger territory and possesses more assets than 
a provincial forestry bureau. In general, the quality of the forests belonging to forestry 
enterprises is the highest in the country. Thus, in the provinces that are rich in forests 
(esp. in the northeast), forestry enterprises can be more powerful than forestry bureaus 
in local politics.30  
Both forestry enterprises and bureaus govern forestry reserves, yet they 
function separately, even when their reserves are geographically contiguous to each 
other. For example, the Heilongjiang Provincial Forestry Bureau has no authority over 
the forests and reserves under the Longjiang Forestry Group—a forestry enterprise, 
located inside the Heilongjiang province. The Longjiang Forestry Group is only 
accountable to the SFB and State Council. Even though the central government is 
transforming the forestry sector’s mandate from production to conservation, the 
mandate of state-owned forestry enterprises is still geared toward generating market 
revenue. Therefore, the SFB is not able to enforce conservation-related regulations in 
the forestry reserves that are managed by state-owned forestry enterprises. The 
parallel operation of the forestry bureaus and forestry enterprises within the forestry 
                                                 
29 Most state-owned forestry enterprises were established during 1950s for the purpose of intensive 
exploitation of original forests in China. Such forestry enterprises are forest communes in reality. 
Residents of the whole community (sometimes as large as a county) became employed loggers and 
service personnel for the enterprise. The enterprise is the center of social life within the community, 
and bears all kinds of social welfare burdens. The governing body of the enterprise is also de facto 
political authority of the community.   
30 The 10 southern provinces have privatized all forested areas by 2003, so there is so gigantic state-
owned forestry enterprises in the south. 
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sector has created more barriers to the establishment of a coordinated governing 
system over forests and nature reserves in China. 31  
Discrepancies in Recent Policies Related to Nature Conservation 
The lack of a coordinated governing structure over the issue of nature conservation 
from central to local levels has led to the lack of an effective regulation making and 
implementation mechanism. Despite the 1994 China Biodiversity Conservation Plan 
and other State Council notifications related to nature reserves, nature reserves are 
poorly managed and short of staff, funds, and conservation expertise. Moreover, 
because no state ministry is directly responsible for conservation policy-making and 
implementation, other policies often get prioritized by the state which overlook or 
contradict the purpose of land protection and biodiversity conservation. An example is 
the land tenure reform in forested areas in the 1980s. Even when the state made new 
policies to protect biodiversity such as the 1998 national “logging ban” and recent 
reforestation policies, the results were not as positive as intended due to a lack of 
consistency and the neglect of the needs of local people. 
Land tenure reforms in the 1980s have led to increased prosperity in rural 
China, particularly in the eastern provinces. In the Southwest where topography is 
rugged yet forestry coverage is relatively high, provincial governments privatized and 
distributed the right of use of all forested areas and wastelands (huan shan huan di), 
as well as arable lands to individual families. However, the type of land tenure 
                                                 
31 Wu, Fengshi et al. 2005. “Prospectus of Innovative Financing in China’s Forestry Sector”. Working 
paper series of Global Environmental Institute, Beijing, China. 
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arrangements that worked for arable lands have proved to be unsuitable for non-arable, 
forested lands, or wastelands. The life-cycle of forests is much longer than 
agricultural products, and each patch of divided forested land is usually too small for 
local people to profit from forest management and timber sales. Therefore, villagers 
with access to forested or wasted land had little incentive to re-cultivate or maintain 
forests.32 According to a comprehensive study conducted by the Center of Community 
Studies, the land tenure reforms in the 1980s and the early 1990s contributed to 
considerable land conversion and forest and biodiversity loss in the southwestern 
provinces.33  
To avert the dire degradation trend in the forestry sector, the central 
government led by then-Premier Zhong Rongji enacted a callous forestry conservation 
policy in 1998, known as the national “logging ban.”34 While the Logging Ban has put 
a halt on commercial logging, it has created new dilemmas for the communities that 
are situated inside or nearby forested areas. Local people of these communities, many 
of whom are ethnic minorities, still depend on wood for domestic heating, cooking, 
and energy use, and therefore, the logging ban has created tension between local 
people and forestry bureaus.35  
                                                 
32 Also, harvesting, transport, logging permit and sale all entail taxes and fees that could add up to 90 
per cent of the market value of the timer. By comparison, farmers’ property rights over agricultural 
products and crops are much more clear and with few taxes and fees. (Harkness, 1998. p929) 
33 Zheng, Baohua eds. 2003. Studies of Non-arable Land Tenure in Southern China. Sponsored by the 
Community Development Center (Yunnan). Beijing: China Books Press. 
34 State Council Notification on Strengthening Forestry Management, 5 August 1998. 
35 Many activists have voiced this point. I also observed such tension during my field trips to forestry 
reserves in Heilongjiang in May 2004. Local forestry bureaucrats now see themselves as forest police, 
and they have the power to imprison individuals who log without a legal permit. In addition, logging 
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Since 1999, reforestation programs have been sponsored by the central 
government and implemented by SFB across the country. The total scale of 
reforestation per year has increased rapidly from around 447,000 ha in 1999 to 
7133,000 in 2003. (Figure 3.2) Almost half of the newly forested areas were 
converted from arable lands, and this has caused increasing resentment from local 
farmers who were forced to give up crop harvesting. At the beginning of 2004, in 
order to lessen local resentment, the central government suddenly changed the plan of 
reforestation for the year and dropped the targeted total to 400,000 ha, significantly 
reducing the ratio of arable land conversion to total forestation was also reduced 
significantly from 47% in 2003 to 17% in 2004.  
 
Figure 3.2. Data on reforestation (total size and the part converted from arable lands, 1999-2004) 
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   Source: Office of Reforestation, State Forestry Bureau, 2004. 
Though this policy response took local people’s interests serious, it still 
showed the inconsistency in central government’s long-term plan of forestry 
conservation and management. In addition, such a top-down measure of reforestation 
still downplays local needs and repeats the mistake of “one size fits all”. Hundreds of 
local farmers in Gansu province who had already prepared their land for seedlings 
                                                                                                                                            
permit has become a new source of “rent-seeking” for wood processing businesses, and corruption 
within local forestry authories. 
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were devastated when the news came that they would have to go back to planting crop 
that year, reported by the Caijing magazine.36
 On top of ecological causes, the challenge of nature conservation in China is 
notably aggravated by the lack of political will at the top and disjointed governing 
structures over nature reserves and biodiversity protection-related issues, as well as 
low levels of public awareness and participation. The government prioritizes 
development and pollution control over wildlife and ecosystem protection, and has 
not clearly defined the governing authority of these issues at the central level. Overlap 
of functions and conflict of interests among related bureaucracies has delayed the 
reforms of nature reserves and the enforcement of nature conservation policies.  
 
Multilateral and Bilateral Responses to China’s Nature Conservation 
Multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies have mobilized considerable resources 
to assist the Chinese government in coping with the domestic environmental 
degradation crisis.37 It is estimated that 1.2 billion USD worth of foreign capital was 
invested in environmental protection between 1991 and 1995. However, official 
environmental assistance is skewed towards energy efficiency and pollution control 
rather than nature conservation. 38
                                                 
36 Caijing, 24 July 2004. 
37 However, Turner pointed out that international recognition of the problem that pollution and natural 
resource degradation in China would severely impact the global environment had been “belated”. 
(Turner, 2004) 
38 In fact, official assistance to China always prioritized development over environmental issues. 
During the period of 1993-1996, two-thirds of a total 9 billion USD of IBRD loans to China spent on 
infrastructural projects and 11% was spent on the environment; of an approximate total of 3 billion 
USD of IDA loans, 22% was spent on the environment; while, less than 7% of 4.5 billion ADB loans 
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Since the 1980s, the World Bank, together with the Asia Development Bank, 
has provided some 800 million USD in environmental loans to China annually. China 
in fact is the World Bank’s largest recipient of environmental reconstruction and 
pollution prevention project loans. 39  Nevertheless, among the 130 existing and 
completed Bank loan projects in China, only 12 are related to water, forestry and eco-
system conservation. 
In the mid-1990s, the G7 governments agreed to assist in environmental areas 
in China. Since then, bilateral aids to China’s environmental sector have also grown 
noticeably. Similar to the pattern of multilateral environmental assistance, individual 
governments gave more to China for infrastructure building and energy and pollution 
control than to nature conservation related issues. Between 1993 and 1998, Japan 
alone gave nearly 353 million USD to set up 30 projects in China to demonstrate 
clean production and energy efficiency technologies.40 There are bilateral cooperation 
agreements with aid organizations from the U.S., Korea, Canada, Japan, Germany, 
Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Estimates of bilateral environmental aids to 
China reached about 4 billion USD during 1996-2000, while China’s own expenditure 
was 6.3 billion USD in 1996. However, only a small portion of bilateral funds were 
designated for nature conservation related issues, with the exception of Korea’s and 
Japan’s large grants for preventing desertification in northern China.    
                                                                                                                                            
was spent in environment-related areas. (Vermeer, Eduard. 1998. "Industrial Pollution in China and 
Remedial Policies." The China Quarterly. 156, Special Issue: China's Environment: 952-85.) 
39 Turner, Jennifer. 2004. "Emerging Partnership to Solve China's Environmental Problems." Harvard 
Asia Quarterly. VIII, 2. 
40 Evans, Peter. 2001. “Japan-U.S. Environmental Cooperation: Promoting Sustainable Development in 
China”. Paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., November 21.  
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Since 2004, new trends in official environmental assistance have emerged due 
to China’s policies related to Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). On 30 June 
2004, the State Council established a National CDM Committee and enacted the 
National CDM Provisional Measures in order to take advantage of international funds 
that became available after the Kyoto Protocol for reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
was established.41 In the following February, the National CDM Committee added 
afforestation and reforestation to the list of the prioritized areas for international 
collaboration in CDM in China. This policy change has propped a group of official 
assistance agencies, including the World Bank, to adjust their funding policies related 
to forestry and land use in China. For example, the Australian international aid agency 
has initiated an Inner Mongolia Grassland Management Project with SFB. This and 
other programs provide evidence of an increase in inter-governmental collaborative 
efforts to support nature conservation in China in the next few years.42
  
                                                 
41 Brief history on CDM and China: In 1992, U.N. adopted the Convention on Climate Change and 
international negotiations on stabilizing GHG like carbon dioxide in the atmosphere began. In 1997, 
the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which commits industrialized country signatories (Annex I countries) 
to reduce their carbon emissions by an average of 5.2 percent compared with 1990 emissions in the 
period 2008-2012. Three market-based mechanisms were proposed to implement the Protocol: joint 
implementation between Annex I and transition economies, emission trading among Annex I countries, 
and CDM between Annex I and development countries. In 2001, Marrakesh Accords explicated the 
procedures of land-related CDM projects. China rectified Kyoto Protocol in 2003, and thereby started 
institution building for international cooperation in CDM. The State Council first only included energy 
efficiency related categories in the national list of prioritized CDM project types. SFB lobbied the State 
Council to add land-related projects into the list.  
42 Wu, 2005. During June to July 2004, I was part of the expert team invited by SFB to give advice on 
CDM and later training courses for forestry officials from all provinces. 
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 In summary, the challenge of nature conservation in China can be 
characterized as follows:  
1) Over the past two decades, economic development has been a national 
priority. Both governmental and public awareness of biodiversity conservation is very 
low in spite of dreadful environmental degradation across the country. Bottom-up 
initiatives are emerging, as I will explain in the following section, but public 
participation in this area in general is lacking; 
2) Nature conservation is made increasingly complex at local levels by the 
issues of land tenure, subsistence farming, the rights of ethnic minorities, and local 
state-society relations. In many cases, nature conservation is a highly sensitive issue, 
and has the potential of causing local political contention; 
3) Although the total number of nature reserves has grown considerably, the 
governing structures responsible for nature reserves in China are highly fragmented. 
This disjointed governing system has led to discrepancies and inconsistencies in 
recent state policies related to nature conservation;  
4) Nature reserve staff in China lack the capacity to effectively implement 
conservation policies. Individual reserves are in great need of financial, technical, and 
human resources support.  
5) Even though official environmental assistance as a whole has grown 
significantly and inter-governmental collaboration has played a role in China’s 
environmental governance since the 1990s, multilateral and bilateral agencies have 
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only recently began paying more attention to China’s biodiversity and ecosystem 
protection,. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA 
 
Unlike the environmental NGOs in developed countries which are highly specialized, 
majority of Chinese environmental NGOs and social groups only focus on either 
urban pollution, or nature conservation issues, or both. 43  The rise of grassroots 
activism in response to conservation problems is linked directly to the rise of 
environmentalism in general in China.44  
Despite the lack of institutional channels for public participation in China, 
bottom-up environmentalism has gradually matured in the past decade. Pioneer 
Chinese environmental activists called for public environmental awareness during the 
movement against the Three Gorges Dam in the 1980s.45 While the phenomenon of 
NGO and social activism is not unique to the environmental field, it is one of the most 
                                                 
43 Economy, 2004. Yang, 2005. Economy also pointed out that a small number of NGOs, in fact, 
promote democratic principles. I argue that more and more Chinese environmental NGOs are informed 
and become conscious about the political implications of being non-governmental actors under the 
Chinese political context. Democracy is gradually becoming an un-said underlining principled idea for 
Chinese environmental NGOs. I thus only divide them by their main activities, i.e., urban pollution 
(including air, drinking water, and industrial pollution), and nature conservation (including species, 
habitats, watersheds, wetlands, and forests). 
44 This point is important for comparing the two civil society groups studied in this dissertation. 
Theoretically, Chinese AIDS-related NGOs are also part of the whole civil society sector in public 
health. However, because these NGOs in HIV/AIDS prevention are in fact pioneers of civil society 
actors in the field of health, they are not just part of, but significant majority part of the whole 
community at the current stage.  
45 Economy, Elizabeth. 2004. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapter 5: 138-145.  
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vibrant fields in China in terms of the growth, outreach, and political recognition of 
NGOs and their activities. When former U.S. president Bill Clinton requested to meet 
with Chinese NGO leaders during his 1998 state visit, the Chinese central government 
arranged a meeting of four NGO representatives, two of which were from the 
environmental field. The emergence of environmentalism in China is also evidenced 
by the substantial volume of scholarly work conducted on the topic. Environmental 
NGOs are probably the most studied Chinese NGOs by Western researchers.46
There is also evidence that a “green” civil society is emerging in China, and 
some argue that environmental activists and NGOs are political avant-gardes who 
push the envelope of grassroots citizen actions and challenge existing governing 
norms.47 To support this view, I assert that as environmental activists and NGOs 
increasingly reflect upon their role in civil society and share their experiences, a new 
                                                 
46 Environmental NGOs were highlighted in the three earliest field reports and empirical research done 
on the topic of civil society and NGO development in China. (National Committee on U.S.-China 
Relations. 1994. “The Rise of Nongovernmental Organizations in China: Implications for Americans”. 
New York; Zhang, Ye. 1995. "Chinese NGOs: A Survey Report." In Emerging Civil Society in the Asia 
Pacific Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, JCIE and The Asia Pacific Philanthropy 
Consortium; Raab, Michaela. 1996. "Social Development NGOs in China". New York: Ford 
Foundation.) In two important scholarly works which identified the new dynamics of civil society 
development in China beyond the traditional focus on intellectual elites and democratic movements, 
environmental NGOs and protests were used as important illustrative cases. (Jing, Jun. 2000. 
“Environmental Protests in Rural China.” In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, edited 
by Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, 143-60. New York: Routledge. Saich, Tony. 2000. "Negotiating 
the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China." The China Quarterly. 161: 125-41.) For 
more recent and comprehensive review of Chinese environmental NGOs, see: Yang, Guobin. 2005. 
"Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China." The China Quarterly. 182: 46-66. 
Schwartz, Jonathan. 2004. "Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits." Pacific Affairs. 77, 1: 
28-49. Turner, Jennifer, and Fengshi Wu, eds. 2001. Green NGO and Environmental Journalist Forum: 
A Meeting of Environmentalists from Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
47 Turner, Jennifer. 2004. "Small Government, Big and Green Society: Emerging Partnership to Solve 
China's Environmental Problems." Harvard Asia Quarterly. VIII, 2. 
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group identity is emerging. This feature is crucial for grasping the political meanings 
of environmental NGOs in China, and examining variances in civil society structures 
across issue areas. 
 In this section, I give a brief review of the rise of environmentalism in China, 
and then focus on elaborating the dense and vibrant connections and networks among 
Chinese environmental NGOs and activists. I show that Chinese environmental NGOs 
have learned how to negotiate and reach common ground with governmental 
authorities through continual trial and error. Moreover, I point out that a shared group 
identity is in formation among these NGOs and environmentalists, and is enhanced by 
condensed networks, shared experiences in political actions, and self-reflections on 
the role of civil society in Chinese politics by key activist leaders. 
The Rise of Environmentalism 
Since the 1980s, environmental activism has risen and gone through two main phases. 
There was relatively slow growth driven by a few leading activists interspersed with 
governmental crackdowns throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. From 
the mid-1990s to date, there has been significant development in terms of the number 
of institutionalized NGOs, the geographic spread of activist groups, and the building 
of networks and the formation of a collective identity within the community.  
“Men conquer nature” was a core idea of Maoist ideology. Shapiro’s research 
has shown that Mao was able to convey this idea to the masses through waves of 
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political and social campaigns throughout the 1950s and the 1960s.48 The Culture 
Revolution generation internalized Mao’s view of the world and progress. Even 
though many of the generation ultimately became disillusioned with Maoism, they 
still retain Marxist dialectics and historic materialism. This partially explains why it 
was not difficult for Deng Xiaoping, when he returned to power in 1978, to use the 
slogans “to be rich is glorious”, “four modernizations”, and “development is the hard 
truth” to mobilize for his master plan of economic development in China. Marxist and 
Maoist ideologies did not leave any ethical doubts to prevent pragmatism and the 
spirit of modernization to flourish in post-Mao China. The 1980s for China was a 
decade of progress, characterized by large-scale, top-down economic re-structuring, 
the introduction of modern technologies and machineries, and the rapid increase of 
foreign capital investment. Public awareness of environmental protection remained 
low. 49  Materialistic views even prevailed among environmental protection 
bureaucrats.50 When Dai Qing, a well known environmental and democracy activist, 
attended a meeting with the new generation of environmental activists to prepare for 
the establishment of China Rivers Network in the summer of 2004, she reflected on 
environmental activism and the Three Gorges Anti-Dam movement in the 1980s. She 
                                                 
48 Shapiro, 2001. 
49 Edmonds, Richard L. 1998. "Studies on China's Environment." The China Quarterly. 156, Special 
Issue: China's Environment: 725. 
50 Wong, Koon-Kwai, and Hon S. Chan. 1996. "The Environmental Awareness of Environmental 
Protection Bureaucrats in the People's Republic of China." The Environmentalist, 16. This situation, 
however, has changed drastically since then. Among the provincial and local EPB officials I have met 
and interviewed during the period of 2001-2004, majority conceived themselves as countering forces 
against the administrative sectors associated with production and industrial development.  
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commented that the timing for an anti-dam campaign is better now than before 
because the public is better informed with environmental problems and ideas.51  
 The Three Gorges Anti-Dam movement, led by elite activists such as Dai Qing 
and hundreds of Chinese scientists, alerted for the first time the general public to 
environmental problems in China.52 Chinese society was, however, to a large extent, 
silenced for a few years after the Tian’anmen movement. Activists, public 
intellectuals, and other social entrepreneurs were not able to reenergize the public 
sphere and civic life in China until the mid-1990s. In the early 1990s, many 
individuals took initiative in promoting environmental awareness independently. In 
1993, Tang Xiyang, a former Beijing Daily reporter, published A Green World Tour—
a personal account of eight-month travels through nature reserves in Europe, the 
former Soviet Union, and North America. This book elevated Tang become a spiritual 
and philosophical leader among the young generation of Chinese environmentalists.53 
Yang Xin, a national hero who canoed along the Yangtze river in the late 1980s, 
                                                 
51 The Green Earth Volunteers (GEV, a small NGO in Beijing) and other environmental activists 
successfully lobbied some open-minded SEPA officials to fight together against the dam plans on the 
Nu River, and Premier Wen Jiabao issued a note in Feburary 2004 to temporarily halt the dam 
construction. In the summer, several meetings were called by Wang Yongchen (founder of the GEV) to 
rally environmental activists, NGOs, journalists, concerned professional, and some officials to establish 
a China Rivers Network to sustain the activism surrounding dam issues, inspired by the International 
Rivers Network, and supported by other international conservation NGOs. The author sat in on most of 
these meetings and informal gathering as well. Both Dai Qing and Liang Xiaoyan, leading 
environmental and democracy activists in China, were frequently present and giving advice at these 
meetings. (see Appendix 3.2) 
52 On Three Gorges anti-dam movement, see: Economy, 2004. p142-145. Khagram, 2004. p170-176. 
International Rivers Network. 2003. “Human Rights Dammed off at Three Gorges,” [Available online: 
http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg/3gcolor.pdf. Accessed in January 2003] 
53 Economy, 2004. p138-141. Yang, 2005. 
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became a full-time advocate for nature conservation.54 Both Tang and Yang remain 
very influential and active in the environmental NGO community today. Many 
common citizens also started to promote environmental awareness on their own. Ma 
Fangkui, an old farmer from Gansu, started planting trees in the degraded land around 
his home village in 1990. To call public attention to environmental protection, Yang 
Jingui, a Shanxi farmer, bicycled solo for ten thousands kilometers in 1995. Wang 
Minghai, a senior business manager, quit his job and became a volunteer tree planter 
in the deserts of Inner Mongolia.55 Meanwhile, the central government began to 
organize large-scale public campaigns to promote environmental awareness.56
The establishment of the NGO the Friends of Nature (FoN) in 1994 is a 
milestone in the history of environmental activism in China.57 Around the same time, 
a dozen other environmental groups also obtained formal status in Beijing and various 
parts of the country. Examples include: the Global Village of Beijing, the Chongqing 
Green Volunteers, the Green Civil Association of Weihai City (Shandong), and the 
Farmers’ Association for the Protection of Biodiversity of the Gaoligong Mountains in 
                                                 
54 Interview with Yang Xin in Hong Kong, April 2001.  
55 Turner, Jennifer, and Fengshi Wu, eds. 2001. Green NGO and Environmental Journalist Forum: A 
Meeting of Environmentalists from Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Xiao, Guangling, and Xiumei Zhao. 2002. Beijing 
Huanjing Feizhengfu Zuzhi Yanjiu (Beijing Environmental NGOs Studies). Beijing: Beijing Publishing 
House: 17-21. 
56 For example, the annual “China Environmental Protection Millennia Journey” started in 1993. Each 
year, over 3000 journalists participated in this event by reporting bad examples, and praising good ones 
in environmental protection in 28 provinces.  
57  The historical importance of Friends of Natures is mentioned in almost all works related to 
environmental NGOs in China. e.g., Economy, 2004. Ho, 2001. Knup, 1997. Schwartz, 2004. Tunner, 
2004. Yang, 2005. 
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Yunnan.58 The next few years saw a rapid growth in the number of environmental 
social groups, alone with increased interaction and networking among these groups., 
The number of formally registered environmental social organizations in Beijing 
alone doubled from nine to 18 in the period from 1995 to 1996.59 Despite mixed 
signals from the central government in terms of tolerating NGOs, particularly the 
nationwide crackdown of Falung Gong exercisers and sympathizers in 1998, the 
environmental community has not only survived but also has grown steadily for the 
past decade.60 Guobing Yang documented that at least 69 grassroots environmental 
groups (43 of which  are university student associations) were formed between 1997 
and 1999. 61  Based on first hand experience in leading university student 
environmental activism in China, Lu Hongyan’s research showed that the number of 
student environmental groups grew from 10 in 1996 to 182 in 2002.62 In a March 
2000 report, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing identified over a dozen “genuine” 
environmental NGOs across the country.63 In November 2002, as the designated 
coordinator for the NGO Forum of the Global Environmental Facility’s bi-annual 
                                                 
58  Documented by Xiumei Zhao, and quoted in Peter Ho’s "Greening Without Conflict? 
Environmentalism, NGOs, and Civil Society in China." Development & Change. 2001. 32, 5: 907. 
59 Quoted in Ho, 2001. p901. 
60 SEPA has always been supportive to Chinese environmental NGOs. Senior SEPA officials have 
attended NGO events. e.g., Qu Geping used to attend Global Village of Beijing’s TV environmental 
education programs. However, the general regulations for NGOs are still strict. It was very difficult for 
any organization to register from 1998 to 2004. There were many incidents of governmental 
censorship. e.g., in 2003, one of FoN’s Board member was forced to leave for his political opinions.  
61 Yang, 2005. p50.  
62  Lu, Hongyan. 2003. "Bamboo Sprouts After the Rain: The History of University Student 
Environmental Associations in China." China Environment Series, 6: 55-66. 
63 U.S. Embassy Beijing. 2000. “Birth of An NGO? Development of Grassroots Organizations in the 
Land of Big Brother”. [Available online: http://www.usembassy-china.org. Last time accessed Oct. 
2000] 
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conference in Beijing, FoN identified and invited over 60 grassroots environmental 
NGOs. 
Besides FoN, four other environmental NGOs, Beijing’s Global Village of 
Beijing, and Green Earth Volunteers, and Sichuan’s Green Rivers and Chongqing 
Green Volunteers have also made important contributions to promoting 
environmentalist values and advocating policy changes at local and national levels. 
They have organized numerous public education activities at grassroots levels and 
petitions and media campaigns against polluting factories. Furthermore, they have 
promoted citizen awareness of environmental rights and justice and established 
conservation projects in various parts of the country. 64 While many governmental 
agencies organized public education campaigns during the same time, environmental 
NGOs’ education programs were more focused and better designed for local 
communities, and have therefore had more lasting influence. 
From Forums to Campaign Networks: 
Interconnections within the Green Civil Society 
                                                 
64 Jane Sayers studied mass tree-planting campaigns in China, and pointed out participants of such 
campaigns (e.g., high school teachers and students) usually lack of motivations. (Sayers, Jane. 2003. 
"Environmental Action as Mass Campaign." China Environment Series, 5: 77-79.) Examples of 
government organized public environmental education campaigns during in the 1990s included: NEPA 
organized “Zero Point Action” in 1997. Over 60 CCTV journalists spend two months in the riparian 
provinces of the Huai River interviewing factories and communities, and they published volumes of 
articles on pollution incidents, and local industries’ compliances with environmental regulations. All 
China Women’s Federation started promoting recycling program since 1996. Sponsored by UNDP, it 
also collaborated with NEPA to establish a nation-wide Women and Environment Network. The 
Communist Youth League organizes mass campaign each year on World Environment Day (June 5). In 
1995, 210,000 youth volunteers participated in the “free of white pollution” campaign along major four 
railways.  
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Chinese environmentalists have been able to form and strengthen the connections 
within the activist community through creating salons and gatherings. Through these 
channels, they share information on regular basis, organize thematic roundtables and 
brain-storm sessions for new collaborative plans, and create regional hot-hubs for 
environmental activism. They also provide support to each other through project 
implementation (e.g., public education, feasibility research, pilot conservation project) 
and have coordinated a number of collective actions (e.g., media campaign, policy 
advocacy, internet petition). More importantly, some leading environmental activists 
are consciously making efforts to expand grassroots social activism and promote the 
spirit of democratic political engagement within the green community. 
In addition to numerous conferences organized by international NGOs, there 
are a number of regular mechanisms established by Chinese environmentalists for 
NGOs, concerned individuals, researchers, and journalists to meet, exchange 
information, and integrate resources. In Beijing, for example, there are Green Island 
(a journalist salon), Beijing NGO Salon (maintained by a group of young NGO 
leaders), and BINGO (Beijing Integrated NGO). In Shanghai, the Grassroots 
Community (a registered NGO) holds monthly public talks on environmental topics 
and hosts social events for activists and professionals from and beyond the city. 
Environmental NGOs in Kunming (e.g., Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous 
Knowledge, Community Development Studies Center) maintain an NGO Forum to 
support social activism in a variety of issues in the province. 
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Three regional clusters have emerged among student environmental 
associations, and several college groups have taken up leadership within each region. 
This has greatly accelerated the development of student activism in the environmental 
field. The China Green Student Forum, initiated by a group of Beijing-based college 
student activists at the end of the 1990s, was intended to be the umbrella organization 
for all college student environmental groups and has been influential in the northern 
part of China. The Nanjing University Green Stone group has been the center of 
student environmental activism in southeastern China. In 2004, it became the executor 
of a mini-grant program for the Finnish Embassy in China, and has since then 
expanded its outreach among college groups in more provinces. Through a seed fund 
mechanism (Green SOS Fund), the Environmental Volunteers Association of Sichuan 
University, created in 1994, has become the focal student organization in the western 
Region. It has administrated small environmental protection grants to dozens of 
college student groups in the past three years. 
New environmental NGOs and networks are sprouting out in recent years 
because a few leading NGOs and activists have made a particular effort to encourage 
bottom-up initiatives. The importance of FoN is not limited to its symbolic status as 
the first officially registered Chinese environmental NGO. To some extent, FoN 
became the boot-camp of Chinese environmental activists and the cradle of 
environmental NGOs. Partially due to the leadership of its founder—Professor Liang 
Congjie, FoN has attracted thousands of concerned citizens across the country to be 
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its registered members since its foundation. 65  Among FoN members, many are 
university professors, scientists, governmental officials, journalists and social 
entrepreneurs. A dozen FoN members have moved and established their own 
organizations such as the Green Earth Volunteers (Beijing), the Green Plateau 
Institution (Yunnan), the Brookings Institute (Beijing), and the Green Island (Beijing).  
Like the FoN for other environmental NGOs, the Green Camp has been the 
incubator of the younger generation of environmental activists and college student 
environmental groups in China. Established in 1994 by Tang Xiyang and his wife Ma 
Xia, the Green Camp gathers a group of devoted young environmentalists each year to 
conduct a field trip to some of the most polluted or degraded areas of China. Among 
the most famous young environmentalists and leaders of college green groups in 
China, the majority are alumni of the Green Camp, including Wen Bo, Hu Jia, Yan 
Jiong and Yan Baohua. 
Networks among Chinese green NGOs mature most by taking collective 
actions. In the late 1990s, Chinese environmentalists successfully organized two 
cross-regional campaigns for saving wildlife and habitats—the Golden Monkey and 
Tibetan Antelope movements.66 The frequency of such wide-spread campaigns and 
                                                 
65 Liang Congjie, a former professor in history, has a legendary family background. His grand-father, 
Liang Qichao, was a leading intellectual and reformist politician in late Qing Dynasty. His father, 
Liang Sicheng, became a leading architect of the People’s Republic of China, and designed many 
major monumental public buildings in the country, including the Tian’an Square and the People’s 
Congress Hall. What is also unique about the Friends of Nature is that two of its founding members 
were main actors involved in the Tian’an Men movement in 1989. This factor also makes FoN 
appealing to public intellectuals, concerned citizen, young activists, and social entrepreneurs. 
66 Economy, Elizabeth. 2004. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 149-156. 
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movements has noticeably increased in recent years. During the time when Beijing 
was bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games, environmental NGOs rallied together and 
organized many public meetings to voice their opinions and criticisms. In 2003, with 
support from Beijing-based green NGOs, a group of environmentalists in Shanghai 
launched a demonstration against a construction of golf courses sponsored by the 
municipal government. In the summer of 2004, over a dozen Beijing-based green 
NGOs stood by each and launched the “26°C Campaign”.67 Since August 2003, 
environmental activists from both Beijing and Yunnan, together with international 
NGOs, have successfully mobilized a large number of Chinese media, NGOs, and 
professionals to join the campaign against the plan for dam construction on the Nu 
River in northeastern Yunnan.68
 
Political Learning and Group Identity Building  
I make two main arguments based on the evidence of the expanding networks and 
increasing number of collective actions within the environmental civil society. First, 
activists have learned how to promote their agenda through frequent exchanges of 
information, and multiple trials of actions. Second, a shared social identity is 
emerging in this community through recurrent experience of collective actions and 
frequent reflection on their own activities and the political relevance of NGO 
community as a whole.  
                                                 
67 This campaign mobilized local media to monitor air-condition use and conserve electricity in all 
public facilities in the Beijing city. 
68 Appendix 3.2 gives a chronology of the anti-dam movement on the Nu River. I will discuss this 
movement again in other parts in the dissertation, particularly the part on international conservation 
NGOs, since external advocates also played important role is the entire movement.  
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Though there is consensus that the scope of the environmental NGO 
community is growing fast in China, scholars disagree sharply on the interpretation of 
the political relevance of this community. On the one hand, some argue that grassroots 
environmentalism in China is fragmented and highly localized, and therefore unable 
to mobilize enduring demonstrations opposing governmental policies. Peter Ho points 
out that because the Chinese government has become greener, “environmentalism was 
also robbed of the opportunity and urgency to openly confront the Chinese 
government”.69 On the other hand, some observe that Chinese environmental NGOs 
and activists are delicately dealing with political constraints, and in fact have been 
able to achieve their goals, overcome policy obstacles, and convince the government 
of their intentions through non-contentious means. Tony Saich summarizes this type 
of micro-politics as “negotiating with the state”, Jennifer Turner calls this as “pushing 
the envelope”, and Kevin O’Brien interprets this as “boundary-spanning 
contention”.70
I agree with the latter argument that environmentalists in China are aware of 
the government’s concern about social activism, and that, in a way, remaining non-
                                                 
69  Ho, Peter. 2001. “Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs, and Civil Society in 
China.” Development & Change. Vol. 32, Issue 5: 893-921. In the paper, Ho even calls Chinese 
environmentalism have a “female mildness”—a greening without conflict, and environmentalism with 
a safe distance from direct political action. (p916) Lo and Leung’s research on environmental politics 
in Guangzhou arrived at similar conclusions. They argue that the regime’s lack of a democratic 
tradition imposes tremendous institutional constraints on the further pursuit of a popular approach to 
environmental governance. There is no independent non-government green group for organizing 
fragmented public opinion into a powerful political force. (Lo, Carlos W., and Sai Wing Leung. 2000. 
"Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to 
Environmental Governance." The China Quarterly. 163: 677-704.) 
70 Saich, 2001. Jennifer, 2004. O’Brien, Kevin J. 2003 “Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: 
Boundary-spanning Contention in China,” Mobilization, 8, 1: 51. 
 140
confrontational is the best way for them to survive and make changes sustainably. I 
share with Guobing Yang’s point that the use of non-confrontational methods is a 
strategic choice for environmental NGOs at a fledgling stage of growth. 71  Ho’s 
interpretation of Chinese environmental NGOs’ lack of boldness is not accurate, and 
this results from both the error in his selection of cases and a mis-understanding of the 
nature of social activism in China. Instead of focusing on self-organized grassroots 
NGOs, Ho included government-organized quasi-NGOs in his research. Under the 
current political context, taking noncontentious actions does not mean NGOs are 
“courting” the government.72 Environmentalists make their conscious decisions to 
keep their presence in the local communities, thereby maintaining their autonomy 
from governmental control and reaching their goals gradually. The essential question 
is not whether environmental NGOs should or should not take contentious actions, but 
whether they are able to achieve their own goals by persuading local authorities and 
communities to change attitudes towards environmental degradation.  
I further argue that environmentalists are pioneers of experimenting with many 
collective actions to voice their opinions and advocate for policy change in China. 
They have learned from their experiences and have become increasingly effective in 
employing various strategies to coordinate large-scale campaigns. 73  This is 
particularly relevant to studying changes in current Chinese politics. Having lived in 
                                                 
71 Yang, 2005. p55. 
72 Ho, 2001. “Green social organizations are increasingly courting government approval and influence 
in policy-making, rather than seeking a potentially dangerous confrontation with the national state.” 
(p916, emphasis added) 
73 Yang, 2005. p52. Yang summarized such feature as “mixed-repertoires”. 
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China and observed the rise of environmentalism first hand, development expert Nick 
Young stresses that “environmental activists have an important role of exploring the 
boundaries of advocacy in China.”74 Jennifer Turner, a long-time observer of the 
Chinese green civil society, also points out that Chinese environmentalists are 
conscious about their inevitable involvement in politics. “Regardless of whether an 
NGO is only focusing on educating local farmers about black-necked cranes, or 
advocating the stop of a dam project, such a bottom-up action and direct participation 
approach is a new phenomenon in Chinese politics.”75  
Environmentalists have explored the boundaries of advocacy through multiple 
trials of mobilization strategies. In April 2001, a group of Beijing-based 
environmentalists and NGOs, led by FoN and GVB, invited a senior level official of 
the Beijing municipal government to “discuss” the plan of paving all river beds in the 
city. Their goal actually was to turn the meeting into a press conference and confront 
the official with critical questions related to this plan. Journalist friends were called up, 
and the meeting was conveyed. Shocked and offended, the official left immediately, 
and reported to the central government the activists’ “scheme”. It was only through 
personal connections of a few sympathetic officials that the environmentalists 
involved in the meeting escaped political repression. 76  The environmental NGO 
community has since taken this incident as a serious lesson in dealing with 
governmental officials. In September 2004, Wang Yongchen, the main activist of the 
                                                 
74 Young, 2001. 
75 Turner, 2004.  
76 Interview with GVB staff in Beijing, August 2002. Specific names are kept anonymous for political 
reasons. 
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anti-dam movement on the Nu river, came to Washington, D.C. and gave a public talk 
on how to organize public campaigns in China. She particularly pointed out the 
importance of cultivating contacts within the government, building alliance with 
sympathetic and activist-minded officials, and developing wide networks with mass 
media before openly putting forward policy criticism.77  
Besides dense webs of connections among NGOs and activists, what also 
distinguishes the civil society sector in environmental protection in comparison with 
other issue areas is that a few leading activists have always promoted open 
discussions and political reflections within the community. Several China scholars 
have noticed that within the environmental community there are a number of 
democracy movement activists or activists who also promote social justice and civic 
engagement.78 Tang Xiyang, a leading environmentalist and founder of the Green 
Camp, puts forward the idea of democracy forcefully when he writes that “without 
real democratic life, there will not be everlasting green rivers and mountains.”79 FoN 
publishes a monthly magazine on topics related to the environment and environmental 
activism, and there are constantly articles related to the role of NGOs in a country’s 
social and political affairs. I have attended dozens of gatherings and meetings of 
environmental activists in China, and “civil society”, “democracy” and “participation” 
are some of the most debated and discussed topics. As Turner noted, environmental 
NGOs in China are not puppets of governmental environmental agencies and they 
                                                 
77 Interview with Wang Yongchen in Washington, D.C., September 2004. 
78 Economy, 2004. Turner, 2004. Yang, 2005. 
79 Quote in Yang, 2005. 
 143
have their own visions, goals and scope of influences.80 They pay intensive attention 
to the government and policy changes; they are aware of the reasons why NGO 
activities could be sensitive under current Chinese system; and, they see themselves 
as a legitimate and necessary social force in China’s environmental politics.  
 
Environmental activism has emerged in China since the mid-1990s, and 
environmental NGOs are becoming important players in China’s environmental 
politics. They are important not only because they have made notable achievements in 
public education and conservation, but also because they are increasingly connected 
with each other and a group identity is forming. As they continue to share experiences 
of policy advocacy and public campaigning, environmentalists identify themselves as 
a part of a green civil society—an independent force in China’s environmental politics.  
 
INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY ACTORS AND NETWORKS  
IN NATURE CONSERVATION IN CHINA 
 
International NSAs’ advocacy and mobilization started in China by collaborating with 
the Chinese government around the beginning of the 1990s. Throughout this decade, 
international advocates carried out pilot projects, supported the government in 
research and state capacity building, and provided policy recommendations in order to 
build up connections and introduce new ideas and solutions.  
                                                 
80 Turner, 2004. 
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As the international environmental NGO community continues to grow, and 
internationalization of the state and the development of civil society deepens in the 
country, more international NGOs have been able to get access to local reserves and 
provide direct support to local conservation works, in addition to providing assistance 
to the governmental agencies in Beijing.  
In the past few years, a third generation of international conservation advocacy 
groups has arrived and formed strong solidarity with Chinese environmentalists. They 
have experimented with transnatinalizing domestic local campaigns and called for 
international pressure for domestic policy changes. Meanwhile, those international 
NGOs with a long history of working with the Chinese government have continued to 
interact with and persuade the government, and have helped to consolidate the 
presence and influence of external advocacy in the environmental field in China. 
International Conservation Advocacy Groups in China 
There are over 50 international NGOs working in China in various fields related to 
environmental protection, including air pollution control, environmental management, 
energy efficiency, and nature conservation. This chapter focuses on 34 international 
environmental NGOs and several private foundations from this group that either focus 
on nature conservation or include conservation as a primary working domain.81 (For a 
full list of international advocacy groups studied in this chapter, see Appendix 3.1.) 
                                                 
81 For this research purpose, I did not include the types of international environmental NGOs that 
specifically identified non-conservation activities as organizational priorities. For example, the Natural 
Resource Defense Council has been working in fuel cell vehicle and green building in China, and 
Environmental Defense in sulfur dioxide emission control. I also did not include universities, scientific 
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Figure 3.3 below first shows the temporary trajectory of the development of 
international conservation NGOs in China from 1979 and 2005. International 
conservation NGOs and other advocacy actors did not emerge in China all at once, 
and the growth of this community was actually slow in the first 15 years. Throughout 
the 1980s, even though the Open Door Policy was speedily implemented in economic 
sectors, a handful of international NGOs and charity foundations were allowed to 
operate in China. Not until the mid-1990s was there a significant growth in the 
numbers of international NGOs conserving China’s biodiversity and ecosystems. This 
momentum continued until 2000. In the past few years, even though the sheer number 
of organizations has remained almost the same, the community has been expanding 
and consolidating its connections and influences in China. Networks among local 
conservationists, international NGOs, and activist-minded governmental officials and 
professionals are growing denser and stronger. Figure 3.3 also reveals a time-lag 
between when international NGOs arrived in China and when they began to establish 
offices in China.82 This confirms the point that the international advocacy community 
in China did not emerge overnight, but has gradually been developed over time. 
                                                                                                                                            
research institutions, or NGOs only focusing on theoretical research (and using China as one of the 
cases) here, for the reasons explicated in Chapter 2. For example, the Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network at Columbia University, and the China Environment Project at Harvard 
University. In general, I do not consider poverty relief and development NGOs as part of the nature 
conservation transnational networks. However, in this case, a couple of non-environment-specific 
NGOs, e.g., Oxfam (U.S.), Trickle Up, and the Bridge Fund, were partnering with other conservation 
organizations and had made crucial contribution to nature conservation in a particular region. 
Therefore, they are included here. 
82 Exceptions do exist. International Crane Foundation, to date, still has not set up an office in China. 
While, it operates multiple conservation projects in almost all of the provinces where cranes are found 
by well-cultivated partnerships with the State Forestry Bureau, the State Environmental Protection 
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Figure 3.3. Growth of international NGOs in nature conservation in China 
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The international NGO community in China is represented by a broad 
spectrum of different types of organizations. Some, such as the International Snow 
Leopard Trust, the International Crane Foundation, and the Wild Camel Protection 
Foundation are single species focused. Others, such as The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
are financially gigantic with comprehensive conservation blueprints. Organizations 
such as the Pacific Environment and Resource Center and the Yunnan Ecology and 
Culture Organization are very low-key and progressive, pursuing goals at grassroots 
level and mostly through personal contact with Chinese civil society organizations. 
Others such as TNC connect primarily with ministry level government agencies. 
As a whole, this is a fairly localized community, with over half of the 
organizations having physical presence in the country. Currently, very few 
organizations included in this study are in China merely because of multilateral or 
bilateral cooperation frameworks. In other words, these international NGOs have 
                                                                                                                                            
Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Bird Banding Center, the China 
Ornithological Society and a number of local community-based groups.  
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independent missions separate from formal commitments with the Chinese 
government.83 Though over half the organizations have a physical presence in China, 
this is also a widely spread community in terms of their project networks and working 
relationships. Only three organizations have limited their work to a fixed geographical 
location. But, even for these NGOs, e.g., the Mountain Institute in southern Tibet, 
Oxfam America in northeast Yunnan, a fixed geographical focus can mean a vast 
space, and they are still engaging with a large number of local populations and 
complex social-political relations. The fact that fewer than half of all international 
NGOs here are conservation specific organizations also indicates that they are nested 
in dense politics across multiple issue areas. Figure 3.4 below shows the general 
characteristics of all international NGOs engaged in nature conservation in China. 
 
Figure 3.4. General characteristics of international NGO community in nature conservation in 
China 
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  In the following, I will introduce a few most visible international NGOs and 
private foundations working in nature conservation in China with particular attention 
to their role in the historic development of transnational activism in this field and the 
                                                 
83 Some international NGOs first came to China as invited foreign experts by the Chinese government, 
especially those early ones, but later on expanded their work and outreach in the country 
independently.  
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complexity of the political relations in which they are involved. I give an in-depth 
account of how individual external advocacy actors interact with Chinese 
governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, and how advocacy 
groups as a community have grown and evolved in the nature conservation field in 
China.  
 
Saving Cranes, Pandas and Trees:  
The First Encounter of International Conservationists and NGOs 
International Crane Foundation (ICF)84
In November 1979, International Crane Foundation Co-founder George Archibald 
traveled to China for the first time after 1949 as a guest of the Chinese Academy of 
Science’s Institute of Zoology. During his six-day visit to Beijing, Archibald met with 
prominent Chinese ornithologists and discussed collaboration in crane conservation 
between the ICF and the Institute of Zoology. These initial discussions laid the 
foundations for ICF’s China Program. In the following 25 years, ICF has worked with 
Chinese national and local governments, NGOs, and local community-based 
conservation groups in almost all of the provinces where cranes are found. By 
collaborating with SFB, SEPA, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Bird Banding 
Center, and the China Ornithological Society, ICF has helped to conserve cranes and 
the wetland and grassland ecosystems on which they depend. It also has developed 
measures to enable local populations to survive and thrive without the over 
exploitation of natural resources.  
                                                 
84 Information of ICF is collected through its website and exchanges with staff members. I also thank 
Shaun Dotterer from University of Maryland for sharing his research on Caohai Lake and black-necked 
crane conservation.  
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ICF’s most visible contribution to China’s environment through solving 
development-conservation conflict is the Caohai Lake project. The freshwater Caohai 
Lake, located in western Guizhou province (bordering Yunnan province), is one of the 
most vital winter sites for many migratory birds, including the endangered black-
necked crane. Over 60% of the lake is covered with aquatic plants, explaining the 
name Caohai which means “sea of grass” in Chinese. Of the world’s remaining six 
thousand black-necked cranes, over four hundred currently reside at Caohai from 
October to March each year. The Chinese government has listed this species as 
National-I Endangered Species. Despite its wildness, there are over 25,000 people 
living in the areas around the lake. The struggle between economic development for 
human basic needs and nature conservation has been a long-lasting problem in the 
lake region. This problem has been dramatically exacerbated in the past 50 years.  
The lake was partially drained and converted to farmland during the Great 
Leap Forward period to increase the region’s agricultural productivity. By 1972, this 
45 km2 lake ceased to exist. Ironically, and unfortunately, most lands converted from 
the lakebed were either too dry or too wet for agriculture. David Newbart described 
the environmental condition of the lake region as follows: “What appeared to be a 
fertile basin between the mountain ranges was in fact poor farmland. The land was 
rocky and frequently flooded. Brutal winds swirled, massive soil erosion caused dust 
storms and insects plagued the region.” 85  This massive land reclamation also 
                                                 
85 Newbart, David. 2001. “China’s Crane Experiment”. International Wildlife, 31, 1. 
 150
drastically altered the habitat of the black-necked crane, whose population in the 
Caohai Lake fell to 35.86
Recognizing the ecological consequences, the Guizhou provincial forestry 
authority decided to restore the Caohai Lake in the early 1980s. At the same time, 
however, the county government, implementing land tenure reforms initiated by the 
central government, began to contract the land in the region to individual families. In 
1982, shortly after local farmers had plowed and prepared their “own” fields, the 
provincial government ordered to re-flood 20 km2 of the lake. Between 30 to 70 
percent of the contracted arable land was drenched. The provincial government 
declared the lake and the surrounding areas a nature reserve in 1985, and restricted 
any form of fishing, hunting, or farming inside the reserve.  
Having watched their efforts and agricultural products washed away, local 
farmers responded with protests and open hostility, going so far as to throw reserve 
staff into the lake. They boycotted the idea of the nature reserve by continuing to hunt 
and fish; and, the reserve staff, equally spirited, replied by burning their nets and 
catches.87 Such drama continued until the early 1990s, when the situation finally 
caught the attention of international organizations working in China, including ICF.88
                                                 
86 Bishop, Mary Anne. 1996. “Black-necked Crane”. In Curt D. Meine et al eds. The Cranes: Status 
Survey and Conservation Action Plan. Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center. [Available online:  
http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/birds/cranes/grusnigr.htm] 
87 Newbart, 2001. 
88 Other international organizations that have supported conservation work in Caohai include the Ford 
Foundation, MacArthur Foudation, Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund, Liz Claiborne and Art 
Ortenberg Foundation, and Oxfam International.  
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ICF launched its Caohai Lake project in 1993, with funding from the Ford 
Foundation and partnership with the Trickle Up Program (a U.S. NGO specialized in 
community-based poverty relief). The ICF/Trickle Up team, working with the local 
government, first established a micro-credit system to offer 100 USD grants to groups 
of three to five local villagers to set up or expand small businesses. The essential 
condition of such loans was that they must be used for the businesses that were 
compatible with the conservation goals of the Caohai Reserve. After two years of 
success with micro-loans, ICF scaled up its efforts by introducing the Community 
Trust Fund (CTF) mechanism. Each CTF consists of 10-15 families who develop the 
operational rules of the Fund themselves, consistent with the general guidelines laid 
down by ICF and other donors. The total funding of all CTFs was shared by ICF, 
poverty relief funds from the Chinese central government, and the contributions of 
each CTF member. Local governments were involved in the financial transactions and 
the administration of the funds, but not in the rule-setting and daily operations of each 
CTF. 
At the same time, a series of public education programs, technical training, 
and participatory assessment sessions were organized by ICF and many other 
international NGOs to achieve conservation goals. By 2000, a voluntary-based 
farmers’ association emerged with the endorsement from all parties. According to 
Deng Yi (a former local governmental official and later a consultant for many 
internationally sponsored sustainable conservation programs in Caohai), the reason 
that ICF has successfully promoted its principles among Caohai people and 
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governmental agencies is that ICF staff recognized that unless the people living in 
Caohai are truly mobilized to participate in conservation activities out of their own 
will, all effort would be in vain.89  From micro-loans to the development of the 
farmers’ association, Caohai people have gradually taken over the central role in local 
conservation projects. Even though new issues are still emerging after a decade’s 
effort of a transnationalized group of concerned organizations and individuals, the 
Caohai experience has been well received by the Chinese government and public. It is 
now considered to be a model for other nature reserves to follow. 
ICF has also greatly expanded its reach in China by sponsoring a large number 
of research, public education, and community development projects. Unlike many 
other international NGOs currently work in China, IFC still does not have a 
permanent office in China. Dr. Li Fengshan, coordinator of ICF’s China Program 
(based in Wisconsin, U.S.) explained as the following: ICF needs to be cost-efficient, 
and there are a lot of good and capable people in China that can effectively carry out 
ICF’s projects. He pointed out that there is tremendous human resource potential at 
the grassroots level. ICF finds suitable governmental and non-governmental partners 
to achieve conservation goals together without an office inside the country. More 
importantly, he emphasized that by working with Chinese officials or NGOs, instead 
of hiring them as ICF’s contractors, ICF can actually help them improve their capacity 
at both personal and organizational levels. “We can improve the quality of our 
‘presence’ by strengthening the capacity of our partners”, said Dr. Li. 
                                                 
89 Interview with Deng Yi in Beijing May 2004. 
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Since China’s opened up to the international community at the end of 1970s, 
international exchanges in scientific research have produced a high volume of 
international cooperation initiatives, and many have opened Chinese branches. Some 
of these new Chinese offices have failed, and few have been able to develop effective 
working networks like ICF. ICF achieved its success by maintaining its friendly 
relationships with national level research institutes, and cultivating partnerships with 
local groups. More importantly, ICF facilitated socialization and cooperation at the 
local level by encouraging farmers’ self-organized associations and strengthening the 
capacity of local NGOs. In other words, they do not claim the total ownership of the 
projects, but invite local people and NGOs to be part of the projects. This is how they 
created strong connections with various actors in China. 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
The World Wide Fund for Nature is probably the most important international 
environment NGO in China due to its long history of working in China, in-depth 
connections with the forestry sector and nature reserves across the country, a wide-
range of activities in environmental protection, and close relationships with many 
Chinese environmental NGOs. 
 At the beginning of the 1980s, massive bamboos die-offs in southwest China 
greatly endangered the lives of giant pandas. Dr. George Schaller, WWF staff 
conservationist, was invited to China by the Chinese government during this panda 
crisis. He worked with Chinese scientists to conduct field studies of the behavior and 
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ecology of the giant panda. 90  Since then, WWF has played a growing role in 
conserving China’s wildlife and environment.  
Early on  WWF faced “not only the problems of carrying out field research in 
the panda's rugged, inaccessible mountainous home, but also the cultural and political 
challenges of engaging with Chinese governing bodies in the early days of the 
country’s opening to the outside world”.91 Its main partner at that time was the 
Ministry of Forestry at that time (now the SFB). Throughout the 1980s, WWF 
sponsored panda surveys, satellite imagery analysis, and the establishment of a 
breeding centre for pandas in the Wolong Nature Reserve. The most significant 
outcome of the first decade of cooperation between WWF and China’s Ministry of 
Forestry was the creation of a comprehensive management plan for the species, 
adopted by the State Council in 1992. 
Another important aspect of WWF’s work in China during the 1980s was to 
provide training for China’s first generation of professional nature reserve staff and 
conservation specialists. In addition to receiving classroom and field-based training in 
China, hundreds of Chinese nature reserve staff attended reserve management and 
wildlife management courses at the Mai Po Marsh Education Centre managed by 
WWF Hong Kong. Dr. Lü Zhi, a biologist from Beijing University, and now a world-
                                                 
90 Interview with the China Wildlife Conservation Association (CWCA) staff in Beijing, August 2000. 
CWCA was created by the Ministry of Forestry during the panda crisis to receive international 
assistance and coordinate conservation work. The author also consulted with Mr. Jim Harkness, the 
WWF China Programme Director (1998-2004), about the early history of WWF in China.  
91 WWF China Programme website: http://www.wwfchina.org. Last accessed in March 2005. 
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famous panda specialist, is among the many specialists who also benefited from the 
learning opportunities provided by WWF during that time period. 
In 1996, WWF opened its China office in Beijing. This office has since grown 
from nine staff and four projects, to a team of over 60 specialists and support staff and 
over 30 projects, with regional offices in 15 provinces of the country. Its recognition 
among the Chinese public and influence on local environmentalists has grown 
considerably. By 2003, WWF China had opened a dozen online chatting rooms for 
people concerned with environmental issues in China, and there were more than 300 
registered members from Shanghai alone. People who identify themselves as “friends 
of WWF” in Shanghai have organized field trips and meetings and become regular 
participants of environmental gatherings organized by the Grassroots Community (a 
local environmental NGO) and the Shanghai Environmental Journalist Saloon.92  
Meanwhile, WWF China continued to expand its relations with various 
Chinese governmental agencies.93 The WWF China team considers this relationship 
suitable to the Chinese context in that it “offers the possibility for rapid and 
widespread replication of new approaches in fields where cooperation is 
successful”.94 WWF’s over 20 years collaboration with the SFB system has brought 
about many notable changes in the forestry sector. For example, the Forest 
                                                 
92  I was invited to give a public talk for Shanghai environmentalists organized by Grassroots 
Community in August 2003. Also see Fengshi Wu. 2002. "Shanghai Greenies." China Environment 
Series, 5: 99-100. 
93 However, the discussion on WWF’s relationship with the Chinese government here does not mean to 
overlook its recognition and significant support to Chinese environmental civil society, which will be 
explained in the following parts. 
94 WWF China Programme website: http://www.wwfchina.org. Last accessed in March 2005. 
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Stewardship Council (FSC) certified a state-owned forest in China for the first time in 
April 2005.95 Since the early 2000s, WWF has promoted the concept of forestry 
certification in China. As of2004 they have provided over 300 training sessions to 
forestry officials, managers and other professionals. They also helped three state-
owned forest units go through the procedures required for international-level 
certification.96 To create more incentives for individual state-owned forests to seek 
internationally recognized sustainable forestry certification, WWF China 
recommended these three pilot certification forest units to be the suppliers of IKEA, 
via WWF International’s alliance with major wood products companies. When the 
proposal was accepted, WWF China staff assisted the forest units as they progressed 
through the entire process of certification. 
I interviewed Dong Ke, the current project officer of forestry certification at 
WWF China and a former SFB official, in summer 2004 to get an insider’s view on 
WWF’s role in China’s forestry and wildlife conservation, as she has been involved in 
process of introducing forestry certification to China from the beginning. Dong was 
truly passionate about WWF’s missions, and commented: “Having worked in both 
institutions (i.e., WWF and SFB), I found the Fund’s working style and principles 
refreshing and valuable to China’s situation. I don’t know any other international 
agency working in China’s forestry field as persistent as the Fund. To some extent, the 
                                                 
95 FSC—Forest Steward Council, one of the leading international agencies that certify sustainable 
forests.  
96 All the expenses involved were shared between the forest units and WWF China.  
 157
Fund has contributed (to China’s forestry) in a significant way. Forestry certification 
is only one example.”  
WWF China’s former director, Jim Harkness, once used an anecdotal example 
to explain to me how WWF China, as an NGO, sometimes is able to convince 
Chinese forestry officials about new ideas and ways to solve problems. WWF China 
began working with forestry bureaus in Sichuan province at the beginning of 1990s, 
and intended to introduce participatory approach to forestry management. It was very 
difficult to show the forestry official hard data and to convince them of the benefits of 
this approach within a short period of time. Little progress was achieved. However, 
when a German bank reviewed the local forestry bureau’s loan application, which 
applied many conservation concepts from WWF’s frameworks, e.g., participatory 
approach, they approved the loan immediately. The local forestry officials were 
impressed, and returned to WWF for more advice. 
Ford Foundation (FF) 
The Ford Foundation was founded in the U.S. in 1936, and since its creation has been 
an independent, non-profit, non-governmental philanthropic organization. As Becky 
Shelly hinted by accurately pointing out that its board of trustees includes more 
individuals from non-U.S. countries than some other internationally influential 
charities, FF appears to know how to bring about good governance to very different 
kinds of political regimes across the world. 97  As of the China case, some may 
                                                 
97 Shelley, Becky. 2000. “Political Globalization and the Politics of International Non-governmental 
Organizations: The Case of Village Democracy in China.” Australian Journal of Political Science. 35, 
2: 225-238. 
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suggest that the FF itself deserves a dissertation to fully appreciate its significant 
contribution to the development of state capacity, civil society and other social-
political changes in China. In the past half century, FF has given millions of dollars of 
support to hundreds of Chinese governmental and non-governmental organizations 
and individuals from various disciplines, including environment, health, gender 
equality, education, and foreign relations. I will focus on one consistent method that 
FF has applied to improve environmental conservation in the country—providing 
training and learning opportunities for local nature reserve staff and officials. 
 FF’s relationship with China started long before it was granted the legal status 
to operate in China. In the years between 1952 and 1979, FF donated over 40 million 
U.S. dollars (USD) in many western countries to promote China studies. The U.S. 
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, for example, benefited from FF’s 
support during the Cold War days, and played a role before and after the 1972 U.S.-
China top leader summit. By the end of the 1970s, FF had directly supported research 
projects at the Chinese Academy of Social Science and Chinese Academy of 
Agriculture. In the 1980s, FF was able to expand its assistance to many research 
institutes affiliated with the State Council and state ministries. Between 1979 and 
1988, FF invested over 18 million USD in China related research and assistance work.98 
FF was among the first group of international NGOs that were granted legal 
status to open an office in China by the government in 1988. By 2001, the FF China 
                                                 
98 Guo, Yong. “Case Study of the Ford Foundation’s Poverty Relief Work in China”. From the China 
National Poverty Relief Information, sponsored by the Poverty Relief Office at the State Council. 
[Available online: http://www.help-poverty.org.cn/helpweb2/ngoyj/ngoyj21.htm. Last time accessed 3 
January, 2005.] 
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Office had recruited more than 300 supporting staff and provided support to 
environmental protection, development, education, cultural diversity, gender, 
reproductive health, civil society development, public policy, and many other social 
welfare fields. Its current average budget in China is in between 10-13 million USD 
per year. Among all the international charities or NGOs working in China, FF 
programs address the most issues. 
Solving local poverty problems by improving nature resource management is a 
strategy used by FF in charity work around the world, as well as in China. In the early 
1990s, FF first convinced the forestry sector in Yunnan to explore the possibility of 
improving nature conservation.99 In a way, FF has gone beyond the regular role of a 
donor in supporting Yunnan in the past two decades. It not only provided scholarships 
and learning opportunities for local officials, but also selected certain specialized 
international NGOs and issued grants for them to come to China to demonstrate 
conservation methods for Yunnan forestry authorities. FF was the first to support 
projects in Yunnan through applied micro-loan and participatory conservation 
mechanisms, before similar projects funded by the World Bank other inter-
governmental agencies.100
                                                 
99 Interview with Jim Harkness in Beijing, summer 2004, who was involved in FF’s early nature 
resource management projects. The central government at that time initiated a major effort to 
strengthen the regulation of logging, reduce forest loss due to fire and disease, and prevent erosion by 
large-scale afforestation. This explains why FF decided to support the forestry sector at the very 
beginning of its nature resource management program in China.  
100 For more about FF’s support in community-based forestry management in Yunnan, see a review 
article by Kenji Kitamura and Guangxia Cao: “Community Forestry in Yunnan Province.” In China 
Environment Series, 6: 116-19. 2003. 
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After supporting individual governmental officials to receive graduate degrees 
in Philippino, Thai and American universities for a few years, FF found that China 
still lacked of leadership and the unifying force necessary to create a critical mass 
among these returned officials and environmentalists in Yunnan. 101  Counting on 
Winrock International’s experience in building capacity among local professionals 
and conservationists in the Asia-Pacific region, FF invited Winrock to design and 
manage a regional training program for the Yunnan Upland Management (YUM) 
Project. Winrock designed programs to address the lack of information and the lack of 
qualified nature resource management staff in the region. Since 1993, researchers, 
educators and administrators involved in YUM received various language and 
conservation methods training and scholarships for graduate-level studies overseas. 
Moreover, the program has also established a network of all the trainees—Yunnan 
Rural Participatory Approach (RPA) Network—and organized conferences for them 
to brainstorm and initiate new ideas together. Yunnan RPA Network has soon grown 
into an institutionalized venue for various local NGOs and activists to meet and 
exchange information. Each member organization holds the presidency of the RPA 
Network in turns. Under the framework of this RPA Network, Yunnan local 
environmental NGOs have taken part in various international and domestic rural 
development projects collectively. When we met during the intermission of a Yunnan 
                                                 
101 Though, some FF sponsored environmentalists have emerged as the new generation of NGO leaders 
in Yunnan. Currently, there are two well-established and professionalized Chinese conservation NGOs 
in Yunnan, the Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge, and Center for Community 
Development Studies. The founders of these two NGOs, Xu Jianchu, Zheng baohua, and Zhao Yaqiao, 
are all receivers of Ford Foundation graduate scholarship in early 1990s. 
 161
RPA meeting, August 2004, Ms. Gu from the Winrock Kunming office convinced me 
that a critical mass of young professionals who are well trained in rural development 
and conservation is now present in Yunnan.  
The FF model ushered in a wave of environmental grant-giving by other 
international foundations. Besides FF, other big donors that give significant sums to 
environmental projects in China include: the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the W. Alton 
Jones Foundation (now Blue Moon Fund), and the Mac-Arthur Foundation. 
According to Jennifer Turner, Senior Project Associate of the China Environment 
Forum at the Wilson Center and a keen observer and long-term researcher of China’s 
environment, China lacks a developed philanthropic community. Thus most 
international as well as Chinese NGOs doing environmental work in China depend on 
private international foundations for support. Notably, these foundations, as illustrated 
by the FF case above, often act as partners with their grantees to define and execute 
their projects in China. 102  In other words, international private foundations are 
important actors in the transnational advocacy community in China. 
ICF, WWF, and FF are the three main international advocacy groups that 
started working in China before the 1990s when the government was still relatively 
closed to outside world. Though their earliest efforts were focused on the Chinese 
government, they all have since established extensive networks with non-
governmental actors. I here group them together to highlight how external advocacy 
actors can break the ice and initiate communication channels with a strong and non-
                                                 
102 Jennifer, 2004. 
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democratic regime as the beginning point of further activism and mobilization. These 
three examples have demonstrated that through information sharing, collaboration, 
negotiation, and providing learning opportunities to governmental officials, 
international NSAs are able to build trust with governmental agencies and later 
persuade them to modify their existing practices and principles. Under certain 
situations, especially when the governmental agency is motivated to learn about 
international standards, the advice and policy input of international NSAs is often 
sought after. International NSAs have become an important part of the 
internationalization of China’s environmental governance.103  
International advocacy groups differ in their own approaches in spite of the 
connections and shared norms among them. Even in the early stage of transnational 
activism, diversity and complexity is present within individual advocates’ political 
relations and strategies.  
Moving from the Center to Local, from the State to Society:  
Development of Transnational Conservation Networks in China 
Although ICF, WWF, and FF all have made substantial achievement in the 1980s 
through the early 1990s, it was until the mid-1990s that transnational activism picked 
up the momentum and expanded rapidly in China. Between 1995 and 1997, the 
number of international NGOs working in nature conservation in China jumped from 
12 to 25. In 1998 and 2001, two major conservation NGOs—The Nature Conservancy 
and the Conservation International—opened offices in multiple cities in southwest 
                                                 
103  Chan, Gerald. 2004. “China’s Compliance in Global Environmental Affairs.” Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint. 45, 1: 69-86. 
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China. By 2004, despite the noticeable preference of southwest China (esp. Yunnan), 
international NGOs have left footprints in most provinces across the country. 
Due to the political reality in China, many of this new wave of international 
conservation groups still pursued friendly relationship with the Chinese central 
government. They see this is the only way to secure their presence in China and to 
obtain further access to local communities. Some of them moved on and obtained 
higher level of autonomy by creating an independent office, recruiting Chinese staff, 
building connections with provincial and lower level governments, and getting in 
touch with Chinese environmentalists and activists.  
More recently, quite a few international NGOs decided to start at local levels, 
after reviewing the political constraints and opportunities related to nature 
conservation in China. Among those who preferred to locate a niche at local levels, 
many partnered with local governments and research institutions due to the weakness 
of civil society, yet some persistently searched for civil society groups. When 
international advocates realized the need of capacity building for Chinese NGOs, they 
provided assistance in this aspect and considered it necessary for nature conservation 
in the long-term. Moreover, not only the networks between international and Chinese 
NGOs grew stronger during this period, but connections and alliances among 
international advocates also become more common. Together, Chinese and 
international conservationists and activists successfully organized several cross-
regional, nationwide, or even international public campaigns. In this section, three 
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international NGOs will be discussed in greater details to illustrate the trickling down, 
deepening, and condensing processes involved in transnational advocacy politics.  
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) 104
In 1993, out of curiosity, Jill Robinson (IFAW staff based in Hong Kong at that 
time105) took a trip to Guangdong, southern China, because she happened to hear the 
news about bear farming and bile extraction for traditional medicine use in that region. 
When she eye-witnessed what was said in the news on a bear farm, she was appalled. 
Robinson soon investigated and publicized the fact that over 10,000 Asiatic black 
bears106 were captured in cages under terrible conditions in China. Images of these 
caged bears were projected around the world by international print and television 
media, and kicked off a worldwide campaign. “Dirty infected catheters could clearly 
be seen protruding from the bears’ abdomens, through which bile was being extracted 
for use in Traditional Medicine.”107 This campaign brought mounting pressure from 
outside and within China to solve the problem. In 1995, the Guangdong Provincial 
Forestry Bureau closed down the original farm which Robinson had exposed, and 
handed the bears to her and the bear rescue team. Surgery and rehabilitation followed 
and in December 1996, seven of these bears were released into an IFAW funded 
sanctuary in Pan Yu, Sichuan.  
                                                 
104 Information about IFAW’s work in China is gathered through the interview with Grace Ge Gabriel 
(IFAW China Office Director at that time) in September 2001.  
105 Jill Robinson later founded the Animals Asia Foundation (AAF, registered in Hong Kong) in 1998, 
and carried on the Moon Bear campaign and rescue work.  
106 Also known as Moon Bear. 
107 Rescue Bear Diary, AAF website: http://www.animalsasia.org.  
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Through 1997 and 1998, intensive negotiations proceeded between the 
Chinese forestry authorities and the IFAW/Robinson team. “From that moment, 
negotiations with the Chinese government began and I found myself in the middle of 
a complex, emotional issue which, not only concerned the welfare of the bears but, 
surprisingly that of the people who raised them. As meetings with officials and 
practitioners and consumers of oriental medicine took place, a greater understanding 
was evolving on both sides, with growing recognition that, although bear bile had 
held a significant place in Chinese medicine, there was no doubt that it could now 
easily, and cheaply, be replaced with herbs”, recalled by Robinson.108 IFAW funded 
public opinion polls and surveys on bear bile market in 1998 and 1999. The results of 
these surveys showed that the demand for bear bile in China is limited and that more 
education of consumers is needed to raise the awareness of the mistreatment of bears. 
IFAW was therefore able to use the findings from bear bile alternative research to 
educate consumers, traditional Chinese medicine practitioners, and international 
travelers about CITES 109  regulations and consumer responsibilities. Meanwhile, 
IFAW continued close communication with the State Forestry Bureau, China Wildlife 
Conservation Association, CITES China Office, and Beijing University of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine to promote the herbal alternatives for bear bile in Traditional 
Medicine. All effort finally led to an official agreement signed by the Chinese 
                                                 
108 ibid.  
109 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 
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government to cooperate on a major rescue of 500 bears in Sichuan Province with the 
long-term goal of ending bear farming in China.110   
 If international pressure and negotiation with the government were the key 
factors for the success in the Moon Bear campaign, IFAW soon recognized the limits 
of what it can achieve in China without connections at the grassroots level. Grace Ge 
Gabriel moved to Beijing in 1998 to lead IFAW’s work in China, especially the 
campaign to save the endangered Tibetan antelope. Recalled by Gabriel, the campaign 
progressed very quickly at the beginning. IFAW organized an international 
conference, bringing in experts from Switzerland, Germany, the U.K., the U.S., India 
and Nepal to China to address the issue of Tibetan antelope. This conference resulted 
in increased funding for anti-poaching equipment and other needs.  
However, during the same time, the situation in Kekexili (western Qinghai) 
where most poaching took place continued worsening. Zhawa Dorje, the second 
leader of the Wild Yak Brigade—a self-organized anti-poaching team in Zhiduo 
County, was found dead in winter 1998. His brother-in-law, Gisang Sonam Dorje, the 
founder of the Wild Yak team, a former local forestry official, was killed by poachers 
in 1994.111 A group of Chinese environmentalists, including Liang Congjie (Friends 
of Nature), Yang Xin (Green Rivers), Xi Zhinong, Shi Lihong and Zhi (Shi and Lü 
                                                 
110 This agreement was signed between the Chinese government and AAF. In 1999, AAF investigators 
accepted an invitation from Chinese authorities in Beijing to accompany them to 11 Bear Farms in 
Sichuan Province. Negotiations commenced in relation to a new bear farming agreement and a major 
bear rescue. In June 2000, the agreement was signed in Beijing, Sichuan and Hong Kong between 
Chinese officials and AAF. 
111 Economy, Elizabeth. 2004. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp153-154. 
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both were WWF China staff at that time), started mobilizing resources to assist the 
situation, and formed the Tibetan Antelope Network in the early 2000.112  
Through the activists in Beijing, IFAW got in touch with the Wild Yak Brigade, 
and established a direct support strategy to conserve the antelopes. IFAW provided the 
Wild Yak team patrol equipment, supplies, and funding. Information sharing, moral 
support, and training opportunities were provided as well, as Gabrial recalled in 2001. 
In 2003, local government took over the Wild Yak Brigade. Instead of announcing it 
illegal, local forestry authority granted it official status and funding at the price of 
organizational autonomy. 113  Many team members left afterwards, but IFAW 
maintained its education effort in the region. Through directing providing education 
materials to local forestry policy and anti-poaching offices, IFAW has been able to 
reach the local populations in the habitats of the antelope.  
As part of the Tibetan antelope campaign, IFAW also organized consumer 
awareness campaigns, and supported CITES enforcement at different levels in 
China.114 In May 2001, IFAW and the State Forestry Police jointly held the first 
                                                 
112 The environmentalists chose the word “network” for in Chinese it is also a metaphor of eradicating 
all the bad guys. They established a website to publicize the updates of the Wild Yak Brigade 
(http://www.taic.org.cn), and invited Wild Yak team members to Beijing to give public talks. WWF 
China and GGF provided financial funding to this project.  
113  Interviews with Chinese environmentalists in Beijing summer 2003. There were a bit of 
controversies involved in the treatment of the Wild Yak team. Under some extremely difficult 
situations (i.e., lack of funding and life support), the team decided to slaughter few antelopes for cash. 
They confessed about this to Yang Xin in the documentary film Balance. Local authorities used this as 
one of the justifications to strengthen the regulation of voluntary anti-poaching teams. When IFAW 
staff found about this, they were placed in quandary and felt the pressure due to the accountability to 
hundreds of private donors.  
114 After China joined the CITES internationally, CITES offices are created inside the forestry bureaus 
at all administrative levels in most provinces. 
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intelligence sharing at a CITES training workshop at the Police Academy in Nanjing, 
which brought together 30 officers from Tibet, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.  
 A main lesson learned from the Tibetan Antelope campaign is that Chinese 
environmentalist community and local governments are important partners for IFAW 
to deepen its work in China. With the help of the Chinese activists, IFAW can have 
new access to local communities and better identify implementation partners. The role 
played by the local governments is very tricky. They certainly complicate the politics. 
But, they are much closer to the local communities than the ministries in Beijing. 
When local capacity is extremely underdeveloped, they are the sole potential partners 
left for international NGOs to work with. And, to ensure sustainable conservation 
results, international NGOs cannot simply exacerbate local confrontation. This lesson 
is well taken in IFAW’s new conservation project in southern Yunnan.  
To address the human-elephant conflict in the Simao area of Yunnan, in July 
2000 IFAW initiated the Asian Elephant Project. 115  Instead of the conventional 
compensation mechanism, IFAW provided funding to local governments to develop 
community economic programs in order to ease the pressure on farmers caused by 
elephant activities. The funding, however, was distributed in the form of micro-credit 
loan, and directly to the rural families in Simao. Local governments were in charge of 
the distribution with the guidelines from IFAW, while, local farmers were in charge of 
the spending. By such a mechanism, IFAW introduced a new institution to local 
political dynamics. Meanwhile, IFAW also provided various training for both local 
                                                 
115 2002 Inventory of Environmental Work in China, China Environment Series, Issue 5. Washington, 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
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officials and farmers of farming techniques, human safety awareness, wildlife 
protection and habitat conservation. IFAW was also able to initiate the negotiation of 
creating a new protection area and ecological corridors for elephants in Simao by 
conveying the idea to the local communities that research had proved that 
construction of salt licks in the forest can attract elephants away from crops.  
When delivering a public talk in Washington, D.C. on IFAW’s work in China 
over the past decade, Gabriel particularly noted IFAW’s commitment to partner with 
grassroots organizations.116 Many of IFAW’s small and local education activities, in 
fact, have always been made possible by local Chinese NGOs. In turn, IFAW 
supported Chinese NGOs by offering assistance in fund raising and grant application 
writing. Gabriel saw this relationship mutually beneficial, for Chinese NGOs need 
help with capacity building, and IFAW can gain more access to the Chinese public 
and enhance the sustainability of conservation efforts. 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC)117
The case of IFAW is helpful for tracing the dynamics of international NGO’s 
mobilization in China from central to local, and from the state to society. It also 
happens to be a fairly positive case, in terms of the mutual recognition and trust 
developed gradually over the time between governmental agencies and IFAW, and 
between IFAW and Chinese activist groups. The Nature Conservancy, however, has 
                                                 
116 Grace Ge Gabriel, "NGO Conservation Work in Tibet and Western Sichuan", talk at the China 
Environment Forum Meeting, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., 
Sept. 5, 2001. [Available online: http://wwic.si.edu] 
117 Information about TNC’s work in China is gathered through many interviews with TNC staff 
members in Beijing, Kunming, and Lijiang during July-August 2004.  
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stirred quite much criticism from Chinese conservationists and environmental NGOs. 
Nevertheless, the case of TNC itself is illustrative for understanding the politics of 
NSAs in current China. 
According to Professor Ralph Litzinger’s first-hand investigation, the initiator 
of TNC’s work in China is Vickrom Kromadit, a Bangkok real estate developer who 
first traveled to Yunnan in 1993 in the hope of developing a ski resort on one of the 
upper reaches of the Yulong Mountain. Kromadit provided a six-figure donation to 
launch the project. By November 1997, TNC advisors who included Hank Paulsen, a 
Goldman Sachs executive and the co-chair of TNC’s Asia/Pacific Council were 
introduced to top officials in China. With this high profile introduction, TNC opened 
an office in Kunming, capital of Yunnan, in the following year.118
 For the first five years, TNC concentrated its resources in Yunnan, and the 
result is now known as the Yunnan Great Rivers Project (YGR project).119 This YGR 
project site is huge, encompassing an area of 15 counties and cities in four prefectures, 
about 66,000 km2, approximately the size of Ireland and eight times the size of 
Yellowstone National Park.120 This region also coincides with part of the “ecological 
hot spot” identified by the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, which occupies 1.5% 
                                                 
118 Litzinger, Ralph. 2004. "The Mobilization of 'Nature': Perspectives from North-west Yunnan." The 
China Quarterly. 178. pp 488-504. Litzinger’s article documented in details the origins of TNC’s 
Yunnan program and early politics between TNC and Yunnan local conservationists. 
119 The name, “Yunnan Great Rivers Project,” is derived from the fact that four of the great rivers of 
Asia—the Salween (Nu), Mekong (Lanchang), Yangtze (Jingsha in Chinese), and Irawaddy (Yalong), 
from west to east—flow off the Tibetan Plateau within 75 kilometers of each other into the 
northwestern part of Yunnan. The topographic extremes are immense, with an elevation range that can 
change 3 to 4 km within 10 to 20 km. 
120 Litzinger, 2004. 
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of the world’s surface, yet holds 60% of the world’s biodiversity. About 17 ethnic 
minority peoples, including Tibetan, Yao, Miao, Bai, Dai, Dongba, and Naxi, have 
inhabited here for centuries and produced opulent cultural wonders.  
The Yunnan Great Rivers Project (known as the Northwest Yunnan 
Conservation and Development Action Plan in the Chinese official language) was 
established at the end of 1998 by a joint agreement between the Yunnan provincial 
government and TNC. Both pledged to invest 3 and 2 million USD. Moreover, the 
two parties set up a joint project office in Kunming, which would coordinate over 200 
Chinese and U.S. experts during the initial feasibility and planning studies. By 
December 2000, these studies and reports led to the creation of an extensive 
conservation and development plan. After finishing the master action plan, the 
provincial government held several consultative meetings at various levels to solicit 
input for revising the plan. In May 2001, a provincial-level meeting was held, and 
experts from various research institutions and government agencies not only 
expressed their satisfaction with the YGRP master action plan, but also recommended 
the plan be integrated into the province’s Tenth Five-Year plan.121  
In the following years, the TNC team has not only worked closely with the 
Yunnan provincial government to envisage the overall goals and measures of the YGR 
project, but also opened four other local offices inside the project site. Staff members 
                                                 
121 Ou, Xiaokun. 2003. "The Yunnan Great Rivers Project." China Environment Series, 5: 74-76. Ou, 
an conservation expert affiliated with the Yunnan government, detailed communication problems that 
emerged between TNC staff and Yunnan governments after the project was implemented. In the paper, 
he called the project was first initiated by the provincial government, which, in a way, reflects the 
complex political rhetoric involved. 
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traveled to remote and poor villages to train locals how to install and maintain bio-gas 
facilities as a means to alleviate as well as to conserve the region’s forests.122 TNC has 
also sponsored many international conferences to brainstorm for developing 
sustainable eco-tourism in Yunnan, by which they intended to promote integrating 
local knowledge into policy recommendations.123 By 2003, TNC opened an office in 
Beijing to strengthen its relationship with the central government. In November that 
year, then-President Jiang Zheming met with TNC’s China Program Director. TNC 
soon signed official MoU with State Forestry Bureau. 
Of TNC’s experience in China, the most distinctive aspect appears to be its 
strong partnership with Yunnan provincial government. Rose Niu, TNC China 
Program’s current director, is a Yunnan native and a graduate from the Asian Institute 
of Technology (AIT) in Thailand. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Ford Foundation 
sponsored many local officials and state-affiliated researchers from Yunnan to attend 
graduate courses in AIT. AIT later became a hub of Chinese conservationists. Many 
Chinese graduates from AIT are now senior level officials or researchers back in 
Yunnan, and their shared experience at AIT is valuable for resource mobilization. 
Familiar with local political and social context, Niu effectively made TNC a 
trustworthy partner for Yunnan governmental agencies at different levels. When I 
                                                 
122 Though, the number of biogas plants built by TNC is less than 10% of the number that were built by 
the  local government over the years.  
123 For example, the International Workshop for Meili Snow Mountain Conservation and Development 
held in Deqin, October 2000, which made to the China Daily, the leading national newspaper in 
English. 
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interviewed some Yunnan provincial officials in summer 2004, TNC is obviously the 
most well known and praised international NGO besides the Ford Foundation.124  
Most of TNC’s full-time staff members are locals, some of whom used to 
work within the provincial governmental system, or participated in multilateral or 
bilateral projects in Yunnan. Each local office inside the YGR project site is staffed 
by locals as well. This explains a great deal why TNC can build up an extensive 
network in Yunnan to assist conservation work deep into the mountainous regions. 
With its unrivaled salary offer, prestigious reputation, and ambitious plans in 
Yunnan, TNC attracted many local conservationists and new college graduates. This 
has increasingly caused somewhat a local “brain-drain” effect, and stood out TNC 
against the rest of the conservation community in Yunnan. Even though TNC made 
some effort to provide small grants to local NGOs and invite them to be part of its 
own project implementation, some Yunnan local NGOs, particularly those voluntary-
based small organizations, have complained about how TNC competed for human 
resources with Chinese NGOs.125  
TNC’s intimate relationship with governmental agencies at different levels in 
Yunnan also caught attention from local critical intellectuals. Professor Guo Jing from 
the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences has openly boycotted TNC, because he 
                                                 
124  Interviews conducted with officials from Yunnan provincial forestry bureau, environmental 
protection bureau, and development and planning commission, August 2004. 
125 I was affiliated with a Chinese environmental NGO from January to August 2004, during which 
time I had a number of opportunities to communicate with local NGOs from Yunnan.  
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believed that TNC “failed to acknowledge the ‘intellectual property rights’ of the local 
people and had succumbed to the wishes of some local government officials”.126  
TNC is not unique in terms of its troublesome relationship with local 
conservationists. A senior practitioner of the international conservation NGO 
community, Mac Chapin published an alarming article in the November/December 
2004 Issue of the Worldwatch magazine, “A Challenge to Conservationists”, in which 
he mainly warned the unhealthy power of The Big Three—WWF, TNC, and 
Conservation International. He pointed out that big international conservation NGOs 
tend to not collaborate with local people as much as they should.127 “(Indigenous 
groups) are not—contrary to what many of them have been advertising—suitable 
allies because they, like most other people, are not even good conservationists.”128 At 
current stage, TNC is somehow caught in between its grand conservation plans—
which requires it to form strong relationship with various governmental agencies and 
absorb local experts—and its supposed moral responsibility as an NGO to supporting 
local social forces. 
 TNC’s attempt to be friend with the SFB and other central governmental 
agencies is even more of controversy. An insider shared his insights with me as: “The 
central government does not really have impact in local policy making or 
                                                 
126 Litzinger, 2004. p500. 
127 Chapin, Mac. 2004. “A Challenge to Conservationists”. Worldwatch Magazine, November-
December Issue. pp17-30. Chapin has spent 35 years in the conservation field, and currently is 
affiliated with WWF, and directs a local Native American NGO, Cultural Survival. Dumoulin, David. 
2003. "Local Knowledge in the Hands of Transnational NGO Networks: A Mexican Viewpoint." 
International Social Science Journal. 55, 178: 593-616. 
128 Ibid, p18. 
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implementation. But, good relationship with Beijing ministries certainly helps with 
TNC’s interaction with Yunnan provincial government.”129  Recognition from the 
center is an addition to TNC’s leverage in local politics.  
However, TNC’s recent moves in Beijing are not merely for window dressing 
or leverage politics. In Nov. 2003, TNC, together with other international and Chinese 
NGOs in Beijing, invited SFB officials to attend an international workshop on 
innovative financing mechanisms for sustainable forestry. By July 2004, TNC has 
been able to propose and sponsor informal meetings, roundtable discussions, and a 
book project on forestry and global climate change, partnering with the SFB 
departments and other non-state parties. 130  Negotiations about using state-owned 
forests in Yunnan as pilot project sites for China’s first trial of land-related Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) took off in August.131 At that time, SFB was busy 
communicating with the National CDM Commission to take the potential of carbon-
sink projects, e.g., afforestation, more seriously, and TNC’s expertise and assistance 
                                                 
129 Interview in Beijing July 2004. 
130 Because of my research in global climate change and working affiliation with a Beijing NGO, I was 
invited to participate in many of these meetings, which usually took place in TNC Beijing office and 
SFB building in turns. 
131 CDM is one of the three mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to realize the emission 
reductions goals set by the U.N. Convention on Climate Change. CDM allows Annex I countries 
(usually OECD countries) to invest in developing countries to achieve green-house-gas emission 
reduction, and eventually buy the emission reduction credits from developing countries to fulfill their 
own commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. It is designed as a win-win mechanism for both developed 
and developing countries. By May 2004, a National CDM Commission was created to be in charge of 
all CDM related regulations. In Feb. 2005, the National CDM Commission announced that land-related 
project, i.e., afforestation and reforestation, is one of the prioritized fields the China would explore for 
CDM potentials. 
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in identifying pilot site was very desirable. On the side of TNC, it managed to push 
forward its own blueprint in Yunnan by fully engaging in SFB’s CDM agenda setting. 
Professor Litzinger is perceptive on TNC’s presence in Yunnan by pointing 
out: “The presence of international actors such as TNC does not then signal the retreat 
of the state, nor does it suggest that the central state has turned everything over to 
local cadres. The Chinese Communist Party and the many bureaus of the government 
continue to exercise their authority and manage the everyday affairs of the diverse 
locales and peoples in north-west Yunnan. But this exercise of authority and the 
politics and processes of everyday management—especially when matters of 
conservation and development are at stake—is increasingly carried out in conjunction 
with international organizations and agencies.”132 I would add to his observation that 
international NGOs are even able to maneuver and mobilize at the central level and, 
in turn, boost up its leverage at local levels. This is not unique to the case of TNC. 
With incomparably large amount of resources, TNC certainly is an amplified version 
of the general characteristics of the politics of transnational advocacy, which is meant 
to better illustrate the nuances. 
Conservation International (CI)133
The organizational history of Conservation International can be viewed as a concise 
account of the connections and tensions within the international conservation 
                                                 
132 Litzinger, 2004. p504. 
133 Information about CI’s work in China is gathered through many meetings and exchanges with CI 
Beijing Office staff in summer 2004. Also see Jake Brunner (CI Washington D.C. Office), "NGO 
Conservation Work in Tibet and Western Sichuan." Talk at the China Environment Forum Meeting, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., Sep. 5, 2001. [Available online: 
http://wwic.si.edu, accessed in September 2004.] 
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community. CI began in what Mac Chapin called “dramatic fashion” in 1986: 
Virtually, the entire international program team of TNC bolted and transformed itself 
into CI. In 1989, CI brought in yet another group of defector—this time from WWF, 
and expanded its work dramatically around the world to the extent that it “has become 
the envy of all of its competitors”.134
 Such love-and-hate relations among the three major international conservation 
NGOs—WWF, TNC, and CI—are more or less mirrored in their interactions in China. 
First of all, at individual level, chief leaders and staff members of these three NGOs’ 
China programs know each other well. CI China’s director, Dr. Lü Zhi, for example, 
used to lead WWF China’s panda conservation project for years before she left for a 
year fellowship at Yale. After Yale, she joined CI. WWF opened an office in Yunnan 
by the end of 1990s, and CI has found a specialist to partner with in Yunnan as well. 
All of these local officers of WWF and CI are part of the same professional 
community in Yunnan, which most TNC staff members also belong to. 
Secondly, there is overlap in their conservation work in China, even though 
not necessarily the entire scope of all activities. All of these three NGOs, as well as 
many others (e.g., Wetland International, Winrock, Oxfam America) have emphasized 
the high ecological value of Southwest China—the “eco-hot spot”. To avoid 
redundancy or conflict of interest, geographical fault-lines have been drawn tacitly 
among these NGOs. In March 21-26, 2000, the three NGOs and Sichuan provincial 
government held a conference to identify the most important areas within the hotspot 
                                                 
134 Chapin, 2004. p18.  
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region. 135 The results coincided with the three focused areas of the three NGOs. TNC 
so far only works in northwest Yunnan, CI in Tibetan prefectures of western Sichuan, 
and WWF in the Min mountain region of Sichuan. (Map 3.3) 
Thirdly, they are often competing for the same funding sources, and it 
becomes inevitable for them to communicate and collaborate in China. The Critical 
Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) has allocated 6.5 million USD to assist 
conserving the eco-hotspot in China in 2002. Not only do all the three NGOs become 
grantees of this funding, but also CI is the coordinator of all CEPF funded projects in 
China. 
Map 3.3. WWF, TNC and CI conserving the eco-hotspot in southwest China 
 
Notes: 1. The red line in the two maps is the boundary of the eco-hotspot identified by CEPF; 
2. In the map on the left, the boundaries of WWF (yellow), TNC (brown), and CI (blue)’s conservation 
work are drawn by the author according the information provided by the three organizations. 
 
 Nonetheless, the competitive element in the non-profit world is still much less 
visible or characteristic than that in the business world. The three conservation NGOs 
have co-sponsored a few workshops and shared working experiences in China. For 
example, the TNC-CI conference on Yunnan Snub-nosed monkey conservation, the 
                                                 
135 CI report “CEPF Ecosystem Profile: Mountains of Southwest China Hotspot”, June 12, 2002. 
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CI-WWF conference on giant panda conservation in October 2003, and the TNC-CI-
WWF international conference on eco-tourism in November 2003. The above 
accounts shall be read as a brief introduction of the context of CI’s entry to China, and 
the internal dynamics of the international conservation NGO community in China. 
Such dynamics illustrate the nested relations within the transnational advocacy 
networks, and confirm the point that networks are amalgamations of various actors 
and complex relations among them. 
In October 2000, CI signed an MoU with the Sichuan provincial government, 
which led to the establishment of a principal counterpart agency of CI within the 
Provincial Development and Planning Committee. Like the State Development and 
Reform Committee (formerly the State Development and Planning Committee) as the 
chief decision-making and coordinating agency at the central level, Provincial 
Development and Planning Committee is usually the most powerful among all 
provincial governmental agencies. That the MoU was signed between the Provincial 
Development and Planning Committee, instead of the Provincial Forestry Bureau, is a 
sign of Sichuan government’s strong interest and trust in CI’s proposal, expertise and 
capacity. Moreover, CI initially proposed to the provincial government that 9 to 10 
percent of the Tibetan prefectures in southwest Sichuan be protected; while, the 
Sichuan government eventually committed to increase that level of protection to 25 
percent (about 40,000 km2). 
After feasibility studies and exchanges with local communities, Tibetan 
monasteries, NGOs, governmental bodies and international partners, CI initiated a 
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program that supports the revival of Tibetan cultures and values and engages local 
Tibetan communities in land, forestry and biodiversity conservation. This program 
will be carried out in partnership with TNC, Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous 
Knowledge (a Kunming based Chinese NGO), Snowland Great Rivers (a Qinghai 
based Tibetan-Chinese NGO), and Daji Group Corporation (a Chinese corporation). 
From this list of partners shows that CI has made effort to encourage direct 
participation of Chinese local NGOs in internationally sponsored large-scale 
conservation program.  
At the central level, CI’s main partners are SEPA, SFB, and the Biodiversity 
Working Group of the China Council for International Cooperation in Environment 
and Development. CI endorses the three programs related to nature conservation 
launched by the central government from 1999 to 2001, and frames its work as to 
support the successful implementation of these plans.136 However, these partnerships 
are newly developed, and not the strongest points of CI’s work in China.  
 In many of my meetings with Chinese environmental activists and 
conservation NGOs, I was given the impression that among all the international 
NGOs, CI has done most to support them, and presented least prejudices over them. 
This became not surprising to me after I learnt more about CI’s China team. The team 
is led by Dr. Lü Zhi, a former Beijing University biology professor and WWF China 
officer. She is worldwide known giant panda expert, and used to spend months 
                                                 
136 See CI China program’s mission statements. The three national plans are The Natural Forest 
Protection Program, the Conservation of Sloping Cultivated Land to Forest, and Grassland Program, 
and the Endangered Plant and Wildlife Protection Plan. 
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camping in mountainous panda habitats. She is unconventional and determined in 
what she is pursuing. All her staff members are young and energetic Chinese, who are 
a part of the critical mass of environmental movements in China. They are not only 
environmentally conscious, but more importantly, politically reflective as well. 
Acquainted with the liberal democratic ideas, they see the value of supporting local 
NGOs and community leaders beyond protecting trees and mammals.  
 Compared with other international conservation NGOs working in China, CI 
is probably the most localized. It has been localized not merely in terms of its staff 
composition, since most international NGOs now are run by Chinese: it is the most 
closely connected with the bottom-up environmental activism in China. CI has the 
potential to be the most relevant external NGO to the development of 
environmentalism in China, for it has been engaged in—besides being the main 
financial sponsor—a couple of most recent nation-wide public campaigns initiated by 
Chinese environmentalists, including the anti-dam movement on the Nu River.  
 From individual conservationist celebrities to a group of over 30 organizations, 
international NSAs have gone through a history of from ensuring their own survival 
in China to collaborating with various governmental and non-governmental partners 
at all levels. Clusters of international NGOs have emerged in many provinces, 
especially in Beijing and southwest. Besides the NGOs discussed in this section, the 
Mountain Institute, Bridge Fund, World Resource Institute, Wildlife Conservation 
Society, IUCN, Greenpeace, Winrock and many others all have made visible 
contribute to China’s nature conservation at different levels. Provincial and local 
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governments are becoming more familiar with international NGOs and foundations. 
With the assistance from capable Chinese NGOs partners, external advocates have 
been able to gain more access to local communities and operationalize innovative 
conservation mechanisms. 
Promoting and Transnationalizing Local Conservation Activism  
As the international environmental NGO community continues to grow in China, 
together with the deepening of the internationalization of the state and the 
development of grassroots social activism, more international NGOs have achieved to 
directly support local environmental NGOs and conservation campaigns, in addition 
to their assistance to the governmental agencies in Beijing. In this section, I want to 
highlight the situation that international NGOs persistently try to search for non-
governmental partners in conservation in China, and sometimes even consciously 
support the creation of new activism-oriented conservation groups as a way to 
confront and change existing policies. When opportunity is mature, international 
NGO even achieve to transnationalize local activism and movement, and help local 
groups gain some political strength by pressuring the Chinese government from the 
international arena. This is the closest form of the Boomerang analogy in the politics 
of transnational advocacy in China. 
Pacific Environment and Resource Center (PERC) 
Unlike large organizations such as CI and WWF, the Pacific Environment and 
Resource Center represents many smaller, low-key international NGOs working in 
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China, and very active in supporting grassroots activism emerging in nature 
conservation. PERC started working in the Tumen River basin region, northeast China, 
in 1996. The Tumen Environmental Initiative has four basic components, all of which 
are designed to facilitate the development of bottom-up conservation efforts: to create 
and distribute a comprehensive directory of environmental advocates working in 
Tumen; to provide direct funding for Russian, Chinese, and North Korean individuals 
and environmental organizations working on scientific, policy and education efforts in 
Tumen; to establish a Russian-Chinese-North Korean exchange program for 
environmental advocates; and, to improve public participation in national and 
international agency decision-making.137
In September 2001, PERC officially hired an outstanding Chinese 
environmentalist, Wen Bo, to strengthen its direct support to Chinese grassroots 
conservation groups.138 Since then, PERC has supported the publication of a training 
guide for college student environmentalists, Earth Day activities by student 
environmentalists in the city of Dalian, a youth project to investigate development 
alternatives in Shanghai, conservation and education programs for the endangered 
                                                 
137  Information collected in the Inventory on Environmental Works in China. 1999. In China 
Environmental Series, Issue 2. 
138 Wen Bo, a former journalist for the China Environmental News—China’s authoritative national 
daily environmental newspaper, emerged as one of the leaders of China’s environmental movement in 
the mid-1990s.  As a college student, he was an admirer of the Greenpeace Rainbow eco-activists. And 
in early 1990s, he became the main contact for Greenpeace to start an office in China. Currently, he 
works for both PERC and GGF (coordinator for GGF’s grants to China). He backpacks to remote 
corners of the country to find passionate conservationists, and coordinates dozens of transnationally 
mobilized projects in his Beijing office-home. He was the founding member of many Chinese NGOs, 
including the Green Student Forum, Dalian Bird Liberation Front, and Xinjiang Conservation Fund. 
More about Wen’s early activist work, see Economy, 2004, pp166-167.  
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Saunders’ Gull in Panjin (Liaoning province), and Seberian tiger conservation in Jilin 
province. PERC’s past and current partners include some most respected and effective 
Chinese NGOs, e.g., Friends of the Nature, and Green Plateau Institute. However, 
more importantly, it provides crucial support to many of the emerging independent 
groups, e.g., Green Web of Beijing, Rongchen Swan Protection Association (Fujian 
province), Xinning County Environmental Volunteer Association (Hunan province), 
Zhaotong Volunteers’ Association for Black-necked Crane Protection (Guizhou). 
PERC also sees the value of connecting Chinese environmentalists from different 
regions, and help to create a sense of community. They have supported the nation-
wide umbrella organization for all college student environmental groups—China 
Green Student Forum, center group of student environmental organizations in 
southeast China—Green Stone of Nanjing University, and Guizhou Environmental 
Student Network Initiative Group.  
Most recently, PERC supported the initiative by some Chinese 
environmentalists to form Saving China’s Seas Network (SCSN). SCSN aims at 
information sharing and coordinating outreach campaigns to mobilize a marine 
conservation movement in China. As a top priority, it will develop strategies to 
address the trade in endangered marine species that is rampant in China's coastal 
regions. In addition, SCSn will also address the disconnection between environmental 
research and activism. As many of PERC’s Chinese NGO partners reflected on the 
development of environmentalism in China, they pointed out that grassroots NGOs 
still lack scientific data to back up their conservation campaigns. They felt they had 
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not acquired the necessary credibility to influence government policy. Through SCSN, 
PERC intends to build a bridge between these two sectors.  
The case of PERC exemplifies that, with the help from key Chinese 
environmentalists, international NGOs are able to explore the limited political space 
in China, and facilitate the growth of grassroots environmental activism. On the one 
hand, being non-governmental themselves, international NGOs can transfer the skills 
and “soft” resources they have to Chinese counterparts. Besides conservation effects, 
international NGOs are actually teaching Chinese NGOs how to mobilize resources, 
network with peer organizations, and build up communication channels with other 
social sectors. On the other hand, being outsiders, international NGOs can employ a 
reflective eye on the development of Chinese NGOs, and provide extra opportunities 
for Chinese NGOs to grow mature by organizing conferences, creating new 
conservation projects, and advocating the Chinese government. Because conservation 
NGOs like WWF, CI and PERC all concur on that science, government relations, 
grassroots involvement, and popular understanding are all necessary element for long-
term conservation goals, they are gradually helping to strengthen Chinese NGOs, and 
form coalitions among these historically detached social sectors in China, either 
through their actual work in the field, or their support to Chinese partners.  
Small grants and seed funds 
In this section, I will further specify two mechanisms used by international NSAs to 
support local Chinese environmental activists and their work: innovative funding and 
incubating new local NGOs.  
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Not peculiar to China, funding is an issue for NGOs and other civil society 
groups across the world. Currently, China does not have tax or other policy incentives 
for private philanthropy or corporate social responsibility, fund-raising and fund-
raising in an efficient and transparent way is one of the greatest difficulties faced by 
Chinese NGOs. Both ECOLOGIA and Global Greengrants Fund have applied 
innovative means to help with this problem.139  
ECOLOGIA, just as its full name stands for—Ecologists Linked for 
Organizing Grassroots Initiatives and Action—has always been a close supporter of 
Chinese green NGOs since its entering in China in 1996. ECOLOGIA cooperates with 
a broad range of China’s environmental social organizations, ranging from informal 
volunteer groups, student groups, to some government affiliated organizations. 
Through the Virtual Foundation, ECOLOGIA has been able to locate donors from all 
over the world for volunteer-based environmental projects in China.140 For example, 
ECOLOGIA is currently helping to secure travel grants for the famous Chinese anti-
dam activist, Wang Yongchen, to attend an international peace conference in the U.S. 
in 2005.  
ECOLOGIA first introduced the concept of seeds fund to Chinese 
environmental community. In 1997, a Green SOS Small Grant project was initiated by 
ECOLOGIA. Through this project, ECOLOGIA can transfer financial resources 
overseas, and allocate them to the most needed Chinese groups in a most cost-
                                                 
139 In addition, both WWF (over 200,000 USD) and CI have allocated substantial amount of funding to 
support Chinese NGOs. 
140 Created in 1996, the Virtual Foundation essentially is an online search engine for private donors to 
select the project that they are interested in helping with. http://www.virtualfoundation.org.  
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efficient way. Instead of handing this project idea to the Chinese government, 
ECOLOGIA’s President, Randy Kritkausky, found a very capable environmentalist in 
Sichuan—Lu Hongyan. Lu founded the Environmental Volunteers Association (EVA) 
of Sichuan University during graduate school years, and developed the Association 
into one of the best-established student green groups in the country. EVA has 
gradually become the engine of environmental activism in southwest china. The 
opportunity of administrating the Green SOS project greatly improved EVA’s self-
capacity. During each funding cycle, EVA collects and reviews grant applications 
from dozens of colleges and universities in the western provinces. They have created 
a set of criteria to evaluate the practical effects and organizational credibility to 
allocate the grants. This unique experience has provided EVA members the chance to 
form a broad view over environmental activism among the youth in China. Lu has 
since given many talks and published papers on the topic, and won respect for the new 
generation of Chinese environment activists.141
 Similar as the concept of the Green SOS project, Global Greengrants Fund 
(GGF) has delivered small grants (100-5000 USD) directly to Chinese environmental 
since 1998. Instead of creating a separate project in each country, GGF invited a 
group of leading environmental activists to form an Advisory Board to identify local 
grantees and channel funding from the headquarter to over 70 countries in all 
continents. GGF’s China advisors (2002-2004) included Wen Bo, Hu Kanping (China 
                                                 
141 For example: Lu Hongyan. 2003. "Bamboo Sprouts After the Rain: The History of University 
Student Environmental Associations in China." China Environment Series, 6: 55-66. I have known Lu 
in person since April 2001, and since have kept in touch about the development of Green SOS.  
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Green Times), Li Hao (Beijing Earthview Environmental Education and 
Communication Center), and Lü Zhi (Conservation International China). The number 
of GGF’s Chinese grantees, all of which are non-governmental voluntary groups, has 
grown from five in 1998 to over 40 in 2004. It is not exaggerating to argue that the 
history of China’s environmental movement is, to some extent, reflected in GGF’s 
expanding grantee list over the years.  
Owning to its responsive and efficient grant-making structures and procedures, 
many Chinese activists and NGOs got financial support from GGF at the most crucial 
moments. As we briefly touched in other places previously, in between 1999 to 2000, 
Chinese conservationists successfully campaigned for protecting Tibetan antelopes, 
and established the Tibetan Antelope Information Center, whose first grant was from 
GGF. Within few months at the end of the year 2003, the Nu River anti-dam 
movement was on rise in both Yunnan and Beijing. By early 2004, over 5000 USD 
grant was issued to support Green Watershed and Green Earth Volunteers, two leading 
Chinese NGOs in the movement. Like PERC and ECOLOGIA, GGF consistently 
support Chinese student environmental organizations, and regional umbrella forums 
of these student groups. For example, the China Green Student Forum (since 1998), 
Guizhou Student Network (since 2001), Green Stone Fund for student environmental 
activism (since 2003), and Shanghai Green Student Forum (since 2004).  
 To some extent, GGF plays a role of incubating new Chinese NGOs not only 
by securing the start-up and administrative funding, but also by linking the name of 
GGF to these new NGOs, and provide certain level of credential and publicity for 
 189
them. In 2001 and 2002, GGF China Advisory Board member started visiting and 
identifying grantees in Xinjiang, and eventually came to the decision to form an 
independent organization to focus on conservation issues in Xinjiang, which is now 
known as the Xinjiang Conservation Fund.142 GGF provided the first two years’ 
operational cost of Xinjiang Conservation Fund, and allowed this new-born 
organization to have some time to develop its networks, personnel, and capacity. Two 
of the GGF China advisors were also on the Board of the Xinjiang Conservation Fund. 
By 2004, Xinjiang Conservation Fund has already developed an informative website, 
co-hosted series of meetings on biodiversity conservation in Xinjiang, and 
coordinated field research related to Snow Leopard.143
Similarly, the Blue Moon Foundation (BMF) shares GGF’s passion in 
incubating new Chinese NGOs. 144  However, BMF prefers to support more 
professionalized and research and solution oriented NGOs, which requires more 
financial resources than supporting a student group. BMF (formerly the W. Alton 
Jones Foundation) is a typical American private charity, and it funds biodiversity 
conservation project worldwide. What distinguishes BMF’s grant-making in China 
from other international private foundation is in that BMF emphasizes the importance 
of independent research and professional institutions for China’s future. With an 
insightful grant-making team, BMF has been able to identify a group of professionals, 
                                                 
142 Details about some of these trips can be found in Wen Bo’s commentary “Xinjiang: A Trip to the 
New Territory”, China Environmental Series, Issue 5: 66-68. 
143 I visited the office of Xinjiang Conservation Fund in May 2004. 
144 I first came to know BMF during an interview with a Chinese NGO in summer 2000, when BMF 
grant officer was paying his regular visit to the grantee organization. Since then, I have followed 
BMF’s work in China. 
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former governmental officials, or government affiliated researchers who are bold 
enough to step out of the formal system and form their own NGO. When interviewed 
in 2000, BMF’s Vice President, Dr. Zhang Jiqiang, explained their funding strategies 
in China as followings: 145
 
Local NGOs should dare to raise different opinions from local 
governments in environmental protection. Chinese NGOs should 
recognize their own strength and advantage when applying for 
funding. Our foundation’s partnership with local NGOs does not 
stop at financial terms, or simple contacts. We try to provide local 
NGOs chance to be involved in large-scale project, and encourage 
them to ‘advertise’ themselves and build up self-capacity. During 
the implementation of such projects, local NGOs can obtain the 
opportunity to speak out their own ideas, develop their own 
networks, and establish their own reputation within and beyond 
the local community. 
In the mid-1990s, BMF was part of the initiating team of the South-North 
Institute for Sustainable Development (SNISD); and, in 2003, BMF again 
successfully helped to establish the Global Environmental Institute (GEI) in Beijing. 
Both SNISD and GEI have grown quickly, and gained international recognition. For 
its independent status and expertise, SNISD has been invited by the People’s 
Congress to submit an independent report for the forth-coming legislation of China’s 
biodiversity conservation law. Since its commencement, GEI has been one of the 
active players involved in Chinese government’s policy making on global climate 
change and its implications for forestry reforms. As a donor, BMF has gone beyond 
its role, and became a major supportive force for the emerging environmental civil 
society in China.  
                                                 
145 Interviewed in Beijing, July 2000. 
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Through small grants, NGOs and funding organizations such as ECOLOGIA, 
GGF and BMF have been able to effectively transfer resources to Chinese NGOs; 
through seeds funds, they even have been able to assist the establishment of new local 
NGOs. These examples show the depth of involvement and impact of international 
NSAs on the development on domestic social activism.  
Transnationalizing domestic activism and campaigns 
Through their grantee networks, ECOLOGIA, GGF, and BMF are already creating 
opportunities for information exchanges among Chinese environmentalists and green 
NGOs. This section focuses on the aspect of international advocacy groups that some 
of the international NSAs that organized meetings and conferences in particular for 
Chinese NGOs to network with each as well as with western NGOs, such as the China 
Environmental Forum (CEF) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars. In December 2000, CEF held a one-week workshop on environmental 
advocacy, NGOs and Journalism in Greater China. CEF invited representatives of 
grass-roots NGOs and environment journalists from mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, introduced them to their American counterparts, and organized meetings and 
discussions among them to exchange ideas, information, and experiences. The main 
purposes of this workshop were to provide Chinese NGOs more opportunities to 
network internationally, learn about NGO financing and self-capacity building. In the 
following April, CEF brought together over 60 environmentalists from the mainland, 
HK and Taiwan. The meeting was first of its kind in history and had symbolic 
meanings by presenting Chinese green groups as a whole in an inter-regional setting.  
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Most recently, international NGOs have experimented with organizing public 
campaigns and supporting Chinese environmentalists to expand their campaigns. Such 
work has even more impact on strengthening the connections among various Chinese 
and international advocacy groups, as exemplified by IFAW’s involvement in the 
Tibetan antelope movement and CI and International Rivers Network (IRN)’s support 
to the Nu River movement.  
In September, 2003, after learning about the Nu River dam project, Wang 
Yongchen, a long-time environmental activist and the founder of the Green Earth 
Volunteers, contacted a large number of environmentalists and journalists in Beijing, 
and started the Nu River anti-movement. Local environmentalists and NGOs in 
Yunnan, particularly the Green Watershed led by Yu Xiaogang, organized farmers 
from the Nu River dam site to visit other dam sites and relocated communities in 
order to better inform them about ecological and social consequences of large dams. 
CI and IRN sponsored Wang and other 20 activists, scientists and journalists to 
conduct a comprehensive field investigation of the Nu River dam site during 16-24 
February, 2004. Meanwhile, Wang’s activist and media friends in Beijing have 
managed to submit a policy recommendation letter to the Office of Primer Wen Jiabao. 
Finally, on February 18th, Primer Wen informed SEPA and called for a new round of 
environmental assessment the Nu River dam before the construction starts. To date, 
even though the large energy companies are still backing up the Nu River dam 
proposal, the total scale of the dam has been reduced from 13 to 11-level. More 
Chinese and international NGOs and environmentalists are joining Wang to continue 
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protesting against the proposal. CI, GGF, ECLOGIA and IRN have kept supporting 
Wang and other activists to attend international meetings and strengthen their 
domestic campaign visibility. 
As the anti-dam movement on the Nu River has shown, through these cross-
regional public campaigns, external and Chinese activists combined their resources 
and confronted the Chinese government together. International NSAs supported with 
their wide connections outside the country. Such transnational coalitions are still rare 
across issue areas in China, which indicates the relatively high level maturity of 
transnational advocacy networks in the nature conservation field. 
 
 When ICF and WWF conservation experts were first invited to China in the 
late 1970s, they faced many dilemmas. Neither the government nor local communities 
were receptive to the concept of nature conservation. Economic distress exacerbated 
the human-nature conflict in many biodiversity-rich areas. Nature conservation even 
became a politically sensitive question when it challenged local authorities’ decisions 
over land use, population relocation and natural resource exploitation. Throughout the 
1980s and the early 1990s, international conservation NGOs continuously provided 
learning opportunities to governmental officials at different levels in order to foster 
environmental awareness within the governmental body. Some also helped the 
government to implement many conservation demonstration projects, through which 
new methods and principles were introduced, such as community-based participatory 
forestry conservation. In recent years, more international conservation NGOs have 
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become involved in local, provincial and central governmental policy-making 
processes, such as establishing new nature reserves. International NGOs even created 
programs to train the staff for the new reserves to ensure the sustainability of 
conservation initiatives. In a way, the international advocacy community has formed 
wide networks with the Chinese government from central to local, and walked 
governmental agencies through each step of nature conservation. 
In addition, international NGOs and foundations have also played a crucial 
role in the development of Chinese green civil society. Despite the recent 
development of grassroots environmental NGOs, civil society in China in general is 
still in its nascent stage, and most Chinese NGOs or NGOs-to-be lack resources. 
Moreover, there is a lack of political opportunity for Chinese NGOs to participate in 
conservation. With this background, a few international NSAs (e.g., GGF, PERC) 
have started to focus on transferring financial, technical and human resources from 
the international arena to support the development of Chinese NGOs in recent years. 
Some even applied innovative funding methods to best suit local NGOs’ needs, 
helped to create projects for Chinese NGOs to exercise their muscles, and encouraged 
local activists to form their own organizations and to sustain their activism. Through 
their own project and grantee connections, international NSAs further strengthened 
green civil society in China by facilitating the communication and networking among 
various Chinese activist groups and NGOs. Represented by the Nu River anti-dam 
movement, international NGOs have begun to taking part in and transnationalizing 
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domestic environmental activism, which contributed to the consolidation of the group 
identity among Chinese environmentalists and green NGOs. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have explained that it is an intricate task to promote nature 
conservation in China. Due to the lack political will from the top, China’s governing 
structures in the nature conservation field are still not clearly defined. Official 
environmental assistance, in spite of its large volume, has not particularly pushed for 
the nature conservation agenda. International NSAs, in this case, are taking the lead in 
introducing new ideas and methods to the government and provide assistance to local 
communities. International conservation NGOs have roughly gone through three 
stages in terms of the development of their advocacy and mobilization networks. 
During the early years, they focused on persuading the Chinese government and get 
access to local governments and communities. Secondly, with the rise of bottom-up 
environmentalism and the emergence of Chinese environmental NGOs, they were 
able to consolidate their networks and work at the local level, and meanwhile, 
continue their communication and interaction with the higher levels of authorities.  
 Most recently, more international advocacy groups are able to identify civil 
society partners and provide direct support to promote environmental activism in 
China. They provided essential financial, technical and human resource assistance to 
Chinese NGOs for them to develop self-capacity and lead grassroots movements and 
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conservation projects. Networks among international and domestic conservationists, 
activists and NGO are growing stronger in this case through numerous venues for 
information exchanges, and recurrent collaborative activities. In Sichuan and Yunnan, 
international conservation NGOs have been able to launch large-scale conservation 
projects and partner with a large number of both governmental and non-governmental 
actors. In other cases, international advocates have joined domestic activists to 
confront Chinese government to protect wildlife and biodiversity and help local 
farmers to voice their needs. Transnational advocacy network, therefore, present a 
variety of political dynamics and relations related to nature conservation in China. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TRANSNATIONAL HIV/AIDS PREVENTION ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
CHINA 
  
 
 
Local governments and communities (in rural China) are like young children. 
Outsiders shall not disturb or affect them without full consideration…On the one 
hand, local governments in Henan are not as evil as depicted by some media. 
They, at the end of the day, are part of the community, and have to care about the 
villagers. On the other hand, the local society is not as weak as we might have 
thought. The potential of some types of collective action by the villagers, as a 
matter of fact, has put pressure on the local government.  
— Puisi Chan 
            Country Program Manager, the Salvation Army, Hong Kong & Macau Command 1
 
 
 
Like the case of nature conservation, HIV/AIDS control and prevention in China is 
not a simple matter of medical technology, but involves complex, interrelated politics 
and social problems. It has affected the welfare of over a million patients and their 
families in the country, and is capable of affecting more. The above quotes of the 
Salvation Army officer, to some extent, have alluded to the dilemma, mis-
communication, confusion, and occasionally, hostility among local governments, local 
villages, and international media and advocacy actors. This is the very starting point 
and context for international non-state actors to assisting China’s fight against AIDS. 
The international health community (including both IGOs and NGOs) started 
mobilizing and working on AIDS prevention in China in the mid-1990s. Yet, only 
after a decade of indifference and reluctance did the Chinese government make major 
                                                 
1 Interviewed in Beijing, July 2004.  
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changes in its governing structures and policies on HIV/AIDS control. In the past two 
years, politics surrounding AIDS has evolved dramatically, and the government has 
shown strong political will to solve the problem and has implemented many bold 
measures. On 11 May 2005, the Ministry of Health and Merck & Co., Inc.—one of 
the largest HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical companies in the world—established the 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Cooperation Project. This is the 
first of its kind public-private partnership for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and 
care in China.   
Despite a checkered past of blocking media exposure, detaining of journalists 
and activists, and cracking down on local NGOs, bottom-up activism for HIV/AIDS 
prevention and questioning of ineffective governmental policies has survived in China. 
At the time this research was conducted, a number of college student associations, 
community-based self-help groups, and registered NGOs were emerging in many 
provinces.  
With this background, I introduce a group of international health NGOs and 
private foundations that are actively promoting better practices and principles in 
HIVAIDS prevention in China. Transnational advocacy networks, in this case, are 
evidenced by the increasing number of meetings and collaborative projects among 
international NGOs, Chinese activist groups, and medical professionals. The overall 
scope and depth of the state and society mobilization generated by these networks 
have not reached the level of that in the field of nature conservation. This chapter’s 
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main purpose is to show the complex interactions and specific mechanisms involved 
in individual organizations’ advocacy and mobilization.  
 
CHINA’S AIDS EPIDEMIC 
The “Western Disease” 
Until now, China has gone through three phases of the AIDS epidemic.2 From 1985 to 
1989, relatively few people were tested HIV+, of which cases almost all were in 
major cities and attributed to foreigners traveling and residing in China.3 Both the 
state and the public were indifferent to the disease due to lack of information. The 
government’s ideologically-colored interpretation of the virus further prevented the 
public from being correctly informed. It was reported that official rhetoric and 
editorials referred AIDS as a “Western disease” during that period of time. 4 As an 
                                                 
2 Aixin Foundation. 2004. A Chronology of AIDS Crisis in China. Wu, Zunyou, Rou Keming, and Cui 
Haixia. 2004. “The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in China: History, Current Strategies and Future Challenges” 
(unpublished paper). 
3 China announced its first AIDS-related death on 6 June 1985 at the Peking Union College Hospital. 
The Ministry of Health stated that an Argentine tourist from the United States “died of severe lung 
infection and respiratory failure.” New York Times, 30 July 1985, p. 5. [Accessed through LexisNexis 
on 2 May, 2005] 
4 For example, the China Youth News reported on 22 July 1987 that according to Minister of Health, 
Chen Minzhang, HIV/AIDS in China can be checked because homosexuality and promiscuity, “which 
is how the disease is spread”, are limited in China. Xinhua News Agency, 22 July 1987, “Minister Chen 
acknowledged that illegal importing of blood and the lack of disposable syringes, and Chinese women 
having illegal sex with foreigners could spread the disease in China. Chen urged moral and sex 
education for young people, and the establishment of a reporting system to track AIDS.” Also, reported 
by Donna Anderson, “In a commentary on the ‘decadent’ American society, the Beijing Review stated 
that ‘rampant disastrous drug taking, alcoholism, robbery, homicide, suicide, divorce, prostitution, 
homosexuality, syphilis, AIDS, and other social ills...come from their ideology’, in “Peking Daily 
Cautions Against Western Threats of AIDS, Drugs”, Associated Press, 4 February 1987. [All accessed 
through LexisNexis on 2 May, 2005] 
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immediate policy measure, the central government re-drafted its laws regulating blood 
products importing and instituted HIV tests for foreigners traveling to China.5
The second phase of the epidemic spanned from 1990 to 1995, during which a 
growing number of HIV positive cases were recorded among Chinese nationals, 
especially intravenous drug users (IDUs) and hemophilia patients. The central 
government, for the first time, was alerted about the potential impact of the disease 
when 146 HIV positive cases were discovered among drug users through one 
government organized test in Yunnan province in February 1990.6  A National AIDS 
Prevention and Control Committee was formed in the next month. The state public 
healthy authorities started organizing large scale testing and conferences more 
frequently, and established AIDS hotlines, information centers, research labs and 
treatment clinics.7 The number of total HIV/AIDS cases grew from 446 in 1990 to 
2594 in 1995. The year 1995 alone added about 800 cases. 8
                                                 
5 For example, HIV test were enforced at international airports. Yet, according to many foreigners who 
traveled to China during that time whom I interviewed, the policy did not last for long, and the tests 
were poorly conducted. Daniel Southerland, "China Starts AIDS Tests for Foreign Residents," 
Washington Post, 2 May 1987. [Accessed through LexisNexis on 2 May, 2005] 
6 “Yunnan AIDS Carriers Quarantined”, Xinhua News Agency, 2 March 1990. “China unprepared for 
growth in Aids from drug abuse: Simon Long reports from Kunming on the ‘Western disease’ that is 
baffling authorities”, The Guardian, 5 March, 1990. [Accessed through LexisNexis on 2 May, 2005] 
7 A Sino-American HIV Symposium was hosted in Beijing, reported by Xinhua News Agency, 9 
November, 1991. “China opens first AIDS information center in Beijing”, Agence France Presse, 30 
November, 1991. “First AIDS clinic opens in Beijing”, Agence France Presse, 3 December, 1991. “The 
second AIDS hotline opened in Beijing”, United Press International, 7 March 1995. [Accessed through 
LexisNexis on 2 May, 2005] 
8 There are various versions of HIV/AIDS numbers in China. I am using the official numbers released 
in 2004, quoted in the speech by SHEN Jie, vice director (in charge of AIDS prevention) of the State 
CDC. That there are problems embedded in Chinese official data and statistics on AIDS is a separate 
issue, which won’t be discussed in details here. For reference, see: Kaufman, Joan, and Kathrien 
Meyers. 2004. “Research for AIDS Policy in China and Data Gaps for Planning the Response”. Paper 
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The third phase, 1995-2002, saw an outbreak of the AIDS crisis. An official 
statement in October 2002 said that there are 1 million HIV infections and AIDS 
patients in total, 160,000 of whom were already dead. In the same year, UNAIDS 
China Office estimated that “there could be an expected [increase of] 100,000+ 
patients with AIDS every year”.9  The number of orphans left by AIDS patient could 
reach 100,000 to 300,000 according various estimates.10 The virus has spread to every 
province of the country, via all transmission routes—unsafe sex, maternal infectivity, 
needle sharing, and blood contamination.  
Despite various signs of a potential full-blown epidemic, the Chinese 
government, from central to local, restricted any dissemination of AIDS-related 
information to the public during this period. Media coverage, public awareness 
activity, and independent voluntary relief work were highly restricted. When the U.N. 
General Secretary Kofi Annan’s visited China in 2002, and spent most of his public 
speech on warning that “(f)or the truth is, today, China stands on the brink of an 
explosive AIDS epidemic”, the general Chinese public were greatly bewildered.11  
According to the official records (Figure 4.1), the epidemiological 
development of AIDS in China was stable for 15 years, while, suddenly rocketed 
within a year’s time—the total number of HIV+ patients increased almost by 30 times 
                                                                                                                                            
presented at the conference “Social Policy and HIV/AIDS in China”, Harvard University (Kennedy 
School of Government, Medical School, and Dept. of Anthropology), May 2004. 
9 UNAIDS China. 2002. “HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril (2001 Updates of the AIDS Situation and 
Needs Assessment Report)”. 
10 Jin, Wei. 2004. p43. UNAIDS, 2002, 2004 reports. 
11 Jin, Wei, 2004, pp: 210-214. Secretary Annan made the speech at Zhejiang University on 13 October 
2002. This is the only public speech he made during that visit.  
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in 2001!12 This helps to explain lack of awareness on the part of the Chinese and 
world’s public was not aware of the problem until mid-2003. What could cause such a 
dramatic change in the AIDS situation in a country like China, where poverty prevails 
in most parts and drug use and commercial and extra-marital sex were morally 
condemned and harshly punished until very recent years? The official numbers 
reveals little about the reality of the AIDS crisis yet much about the government’s 
denial and lack of tracking the epidemic. The Chinese government to date has not 
given a satisfactory explanation of the huge escalation in the scale of the AIDS crisis 
in the late 1990s and beginning of 2000s. This leads us to discuss the blood 
contamination scandal which took place in rural China in the 1990s. 
Figure 4.1. Official accumulative numbers of HIV and AIDS patients 
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Sources: Prof. LI Dun, 2004; Prof. JING Jun, 2004; Aixin Foundation China AIDS Chronicle, 2004; 
SHEN Jie, China CDC, 2004.  
 Geographically and epidemiologically, China faces not one, but two originally 
independent, yet becoming interrelated, AIDS epidemics. 13 (Map 4.1) The earlier 
epidemic started in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mostly restricted within northwest 
                                                 
12 HIV+ 29,857 cases in 2001, and 870,000 in 2002; AIDS patients 1,596 in 2001, and 100,000 in 2002. 
13 Thompson, Andrew. 2004a. "China Faces Challenges in Effort to Contain HIV/AIDS Crisis". CSIS. 
Washington, D.C. Policy report.  
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(esp. Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region) and southwest (esp. bordering areas 
between Yunnan province and the Republic of Myanmar) regions. It initially began 
via needle sharing among drug users, but was quickly accelerated by commercial 
sex.14 The later epidemic was first concentrated in central-north rural China (esp. 
Henan province), but gradually spread to all provinces but Tibet, via blood transfusion. 
Earliest records of people infected through contaminated blood were dated 1994. The 
UNAIDS 2004 Report shows that at least 24% of the current HIV+ cases were 
infected through blood contamination.15 (Figure 4.2)  
Map 4.1. Geographic distribution of HIV      Figure 4.2. Modes of transmission among  
infection cases (2003 estimates)    HIV/AIDS cases (2003 estimates) 
Source: Shen Jie, China CDC, 2004.   
 
Currently, the two epidemics are 
general public via unsafe sex (including c
CSW, and men have sex with men or M
                                                 
14 Researches and my field work have both found 
users and commercial sex workers.  
15 According to activists and non-governmental sourc
   Source: UNAIDS-China CDC 2004 Joint Report 
merging, and rapidly expanding to the 
ommercial heterosexual sex workers or 
SM), needle sharing among IDUs, and 
there is significant overlap between female drug 
es, this figure is too low to be true. See note 17. 
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mother-child transmission (MTCT).16 In this regard, China shares many of the same 
challenges as other developing countries. However, what distinguishes the AIDS 
situation in China from that in the rest of the world is the significant portion of 
patients infected through commercial blood selling. No other country has been 
affected by the problem of illegal, mobile, and unclean blood stations (some of which 
are still operating in remote areas) as extensively and severely as China. 
The key issue is not only for the government to acknowledge that blood 
contamination is one of the major causes for the current crisis, but also to admit that 
certain politicians are responsible for it.17 Because private blood buying/selling was 
officially prohibited in 1995, the government is able to refute the accusation that a 
few governmental officials should be responsible for the policy failure in regulating 
unsanitary blood stations in Henan in the 1990s. When the issue came to light in 2001, 
hundreds of those infected by selling blood had already died. The government 
downplayed the significance of the blood scandal or the current composition of the 
HIV/AIDS demography, and repeatedly announcing that over 90% of HIV+ cases in 
China are among drug users. The official number dropped to 67% only at the end of 
                                                 
16  Thompson, Andrew. 2004d. "Injecting Drug Use Fueling Spread of HIV in China". CSIS. 
Washington, D.C. Policy report. 
17 AIDS activists disagree with the Chinese government or UNAIDS on the interpretation of the data on 
the different modes of transmission given by the 2004 joint report. In Figure 4.2, it looks like blood 
contamination is not the weightiest cause of the spread of HIV/AIDS. This is because a) many patients 
infected by blood selling have already died, b) many patients inflected by blood selling do not 
participate in government organized testing, and c) many IDU, CSW, and MTCT cases are originally 
caused by commercial blood selling. Activists argue that the impact of the blood scandal is lessened by 
such data on current HIV+ patients. 
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2003.18 The changing official numbers of the percentage of HIV patients infected 
through needle sharing is only one example of how the government has been covering 
the blood scandal. 
The Blood Scandal 
In the late years of the 1980s, some state ministries and provincial governments, 
seeking economic profits from manufacturing blood products, gradually started 
establishing blood stations and businesses in rural China.19 Illegal blood stations run 
by individual blood venders (xue tou) quickly mushroomed due to the high revenues 
in the market. Because of their population density, a few provinces (e.g., Henan, 
Anhui, and Sichuan) became centers of this industry at that time.20 Local peasants and 
farmers, already devastated by the declining agricultural economy, saw this as a 
                                                 
18 The number was always higher than 90% until 2002. It dropped to 70% in 2003, and less than 45% 
in September 2004.  
19 My narration of the blood contamination scandal is based on numerous interviews with activists and 
rural patients, Chinese newspaper articles, documents compiled by the Beijing Aizhixing Institute, and 
publications by Jing Jun, Jin Wei, and Wu Zhuyou. (Jing et al, 2003; Jin ed, 2004; Wu et al, 2001; Wu, 
et al 2004) 
20 At the beginning, the blood industry was just another example of the typical top-down mobilization 
in China from the central to local governments. For example, Shanghai was among the first where 
blood donation was promoted by the government in the end of the 1980s. Situation in Henan gradually 
became the worst, partially because of its large population supplied many blood sellers, yet more 
importantly, because of the ineffective control over illegal blood stations. The Ministry of Health 
tightened the regulation of government-run blood station in 1993 by passing the National Regulation of 
Blood Supply and Management. After that most government sponsored blood stations were gradually 
closed down. Henan provincial government official banned commercial blood donation in 1995. 
However, because one of the chief provincial leaders (Liu) and his wife were involved in and continued 
benefiting from the blood businesses, a large number of “blood hunting networks” survived in Henan. 
Blood hunters even went to other neighboring provinces to recruit blood sellers. In some cases, blood 
sellers were grouped together and transported via buses to sell blood in Henan.  
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crucial source of household income.21 Many adult males and females then began to 
sell their blood at these stations on regular basis. Some blood sellers sold their blood 
more than 30 times per month.22 Usually 800 milliliters of peripheral blood was 
drawn for each plasma donation. After the plasma was separated from the whole 
blood, the red blood cells were re-injected back into the donor intravenously (usually 
10-12 people per group). Thereby, such problematic methods soon turned these blood 
stations into an efficient mechanism to spread all kinds of blood related diseases, 
including HIV/AIDS, TB, and Hepatitis B. 
When I visited some villages in Henan in the spring of 2004, I was told that in 
the early 1990s, local governments motivated local people to sell blood by painting 
large slogans on the walls, such as “To Donate Blood is To Grow Wealthy” (xian xue 
zhi fu), and “To Donate Blood is To Be Glorious” (xian xue guang rong).23 In between 
1991 and 1995, even the major newspaper in Henan province, Henan Daily, promoted 
blood donation a few times.24 The Henan provincial People’s Congress declared that 
in 1994, true voluntary blood donation—without payment—only counted for 2-3% of 
all blood donated in the province, while 50% was through commercial blood selling.25 
When interviewed by the Southern Weekend—a major critical newspaper in China—
in 2001, a few Henan provincial health officials confessed that Henan had became the 
                                                 
21 Individual blood sellers could earn around 50 RMB (6USD) for each plasma sale, and 200 RMB for 
each whole blood sale. 
22 Extreme cases were as frequent as three times a day. According to the national regulation, the 
shortest interval allowed between each donation was 15 days for plasma and 3 months for whole blood.  
23 These slogans are imitations of the famous Deng Xiaping’s line: “To be rich is glorious.” 
24 Archival research of Henan Daily from 1991 to 1995 by an activist in Beijing.  
25 Henan Daily, 24 June, 1994. Information collected by an activist from archives in Beijing Library. 
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center of the blood products industry by 1993, and many governmental bureaus and 
sectors were involved in setting up countless blood stations.26 All of this evidence 
serves as testimony that the blood industry thrived in central China, particularly 
Henan province, both legally and illegally. 
Since 1994, HIV infection cases have been occasionally recorded in local 
hospitals across rural China. At that time, the Ministry of Health (MoH) toughened 
regulations over unclean blood stations and businesses, and many provincial 
governments quietly shut down both legal and illegal blood selling networks.27 Even 
the Henan provincial government officially banned and condemned blood venders.28 
However, no information on HIV infection due to blood contamination was released 
by any governmental agencies or hospitals at that time.29 By contrast, governmental 
authorities intimidated Chinese media not to touch the topic. A young journalist, 
Zhang Jicheng, first uncovered the story of AIDS villages in Henan in 2000. But his 
editor, sensing the potential troubles the article could cause, decided not to publish his 
article. When he finally found an outlet to get the story published in another province, 
his home newspaper was immediately ordered by provincial authorities to fire him.30 
                                                 
26 Jin, Wei ed. 2003. Handbook for Party Leaders on AIDS Prevention and Policies. Beijing: China 
Central Party School Press. pp 240-247. 
27 National Regulation of Blood Supply and Management, enacted on 1 July, 1993; National Regulation 
of Blood Stations, enacted 1 October, 1998. 
28 Same as note 21. 
29 At first there was a lack of knowledge on the linkage between poor plasma collection methods 
applied by all blood stations at that time and the spread HIV infection. But when a local doctor, Wang 
Shuping, discovered the problem in 1994, she was blocked from doing more research and even fired 
from her job by provincial health official. For more details see the section on Wang Shuping below. 
30 Jon Cohen, interview with Zhang Jicheng, Science magazine, Special Issue on HIV/AIDS in Asia, 
Vol. 304, June 25, 2004. For further information see the section on Zhang below. 
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Even though a few academics and foreign journalists were able to “get the story out”, 
the taboo of criticizing the blood management policies in the 1990s has not been 
officially lifted inside China until now.31 The exact number and locations of unclean 
blood stations opened in rural China during the 1980s and 1990s remain unknown to 
the public. 
The Turning Point 
In 2001, the silence on China’s AIDS epidemic and the blood scandal was finally 
fully broken due to the continuous effort of Chinese activists, foreign news media, 
and international organizations. During his official visit to China in January 2001, 
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the need for intensified AIDS 
prevention in China during a meeting with China’s then-President Jiang Zemin.32 
Also in that year, Dr. Gao Yaojie, a courageously activist/doctor who has been 
providing care and support for HIV/AIDS patients among poor farmers in Henan, was 
given the Global Health Council’s Jonathan Mann Award. 33   The State Council 
                                                 
31 As early as 6 June 1998, the South China Morning Post published an article on the spread of HIV via 
massive blood selling. The most important foreign media coverage on the issue was done by Elizabeth 
Rosenthau, New York Times correspondent in China in the 1990s through the early 2000s. She 
published a series of articles in American and Canadian newspapers in late October 2000, which first 
uncovered the increasing deaths of AIDS patients in Henan, and caught a wave of international 
attention. (e.g., “In Rural China, a Steep Price of Poverty: Dying of AIDS”, New York Times, 28 
October, 2000.) In 2001, China’s chief scientist in the AIDS field, Wu Zhunyou published a paper on 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in eastern rural China via blood selling in a professional journal in English. (Wu, 
Zunyou et al. 2001. “Prevalence of HIV Infection among Former Commercial Plasma Donors in Rural 
Eastern China”. Health Policy and Planning, 16, 1: 41-46.) 
32 UNAIDS China 2001 Yearly Report. “2001: The Year of Breaking the Silence on AIDS in China”. 
33 Unfortunately, Dr. Gao was denied of a passport from local authorities, and did not receive the award 
in person from the hands of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the award ceremony in Washington, 
D.C.  
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promulgated the “China Plan of Action to Contain, Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS 
(2001-2005)" in May, and the “Control the HIV/AIDS Epidemic through the 
Implementation of a Five-year Action Plan in China” in August. In addition, the First 
China National AIDS/STD Conference was held from 13-16 November in Beijing.  
However, 2001 was followed by a quite contentious 2002. In June, UNAIDS 
China Office published an assessment report on the AIDS epidemic in China, 
“HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril”, also known as the “Titanic Report”. In this report, 
UNAIDS estimated the total HIV/AIDS infections in China in between 800,000-
1,500,000.34 Given that the official number of HIV/AIDS was always below 300,000, 
this UNAIDS estimate caused uneasiness on the part of the Chinese government. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a special press conference to criticize the 
“inaccuracy” of the Titanic Report, and demanded a formal apology.35  On July 1, the 
Aizhixing Institute in Beijing, the most active NGO in the AIDS field at that time, 
was shut down by the state. The founder of Aizhixing Institute, Wan Yanhai, 
“disappeared” on August 24th for about a month. The reason provided by the public 
security agency was that he “illegally” forwarded an email to a large number of 
people including all those on the Aizhixing mailing list, in which a leaked 
governmental document on the AIDS situation in China was attached. In this leaked 
                                                 
34 UNAIDS China 2001 Assessment Report. “HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril”. Published in June 
2002.  
35 Ang, Audra. "China Rejects U.N. Report Warning of AIDS Epidemic." Associated Press, 28 June 
2002. [Accessed through LexisNexis on 20 November 2003] 
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document, for the first time, the government declared that there were 840,000 
HIV/AIDS infections in China.36  
SARS and Recent Changes in State’s Responses to AIDS 
The world’s memory of China in 2003 will always be marked by SARS. There were 
important effects of the SARS crisis on AIDS prevention governance:  
1) The health authorities at various levels became more familiar with 
interacting with international health organizations (e.g., World Health Organization, 
UNAIDS), and more open to external inspections and policy recommendations;  
2) The appointment of the Vice Premier Wu Yi as the Health Minister, in the 
Chinese political context, elevated the political power of the health sector within the 
state apparatus;37  
3) During the SARS crisis, the Chinese disease control system completed its 
structural reform begun in 1998, and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) at all levels 
obtained considerable financial and political resources from the central government.38 
However, the newly established CDC system is not entitled independent status, but is 
a part of the existing health system. In a way, the status and power of the health 
                                                 
36 Personal exchanges with the Mr. Hu Jia, Executive Director of the Aizhixing Institute of 2003. Also, 
“Chinese AIDS activist freed after confessing to ‘leaking secrets’”, Agence France Presse, 20 
September 2002. [Accessed through LexisNexis on 30 March 2005] 
37 Wu Yi stepped down as Health Minister in May 2005. 
38 The current disease control system in China is based on a system of preventive medicine research 
institutions at different levels. The newly created Centers of Disease Control (CDCs) combine the 
functions of academic research, clinical trial, and policy implementation. This reform was initiated in 
1998.  
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system is elevated by combining the research capacity and human resources from 
CDCs.  
4) By the end of SARS, China had reconstituted central control of the public 
health system. The 1998 central administrative reform resulted in a decentralized 
budgetary relationship within the health sector. Funding for provincial and lower-level 
health bureaus are only from corresponding governments, not the central budget; to a 
large extent, the MoH ceded much power over health issues to local governments.39 
With consecutive health crises—SARS, bird flu, and AIDS—the central government 
increased the financial resources for MoH. Therefore, the MoH was given the 
opportunity to toughen policy implementation by directly providing funds to local 
AIDS offices.40  
 In the wake of the SARS crisis, a fundamental shift took place in the Chinese 
state’s reaction to the AIDS epidemic, manifested by changes in the attitudes of the 
highest level politicians, governing structures, and policies. On the World AIDS Day 
that year, the news of Premier Wen Jiabao’s shaking hands with AIDS patients was 
broadcasted by all major national news media. In December 2003, Vice Premier and 
Minster of Health, Mdm. Wu Yi, paid a visit to the most famous AIDS village—
Wenlou village in Henan province—and held a private meeting with the famous 
                                                 
39 Interview with Gao Weizhong, Deputy Director, Department of Policy and Regulation, MoH, 4 
August 2004. 
40 Such funds are called “designated funds” (zhuan kuan zhuan yong).  In general, the general health 
budget at local levels is mostly financed by local governments after 1998. Currently, MoH is in charge 
of large funds for AIDS prevention and control, and distributes them directly to AIDS offices at each 
level. Therefore, the AIDS offices at local levels are more accountable to central AIDS policies than to 
local governments or health bureaus. 
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outspoken activist, Dr. Gao Yaojie. In early 2004, Mdm. Wu Yi restructured the 
highest authority over the AIDS issue, and set up the State Committee of AIDS 
Control and Prevention (State AIDS Committee).41 (see Box 4.1) With the completion 
of CDC reform and the centralization of health governance, the state has formed a 
tightened governing body over AIDS issues. (Figure 4.3) Meanwhile, the rapidly 
increased central budgetary commitment (from 15 million RMB in 2000 to over 600 
million RMB in 2004) and international assistance in AIDS prevention made such 
structural changes possible. (Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3). 
 
   Box 4.1. Structure of the State Committee of AIDS Control and Prevention (2004) 
   Director:   Wu Yi (Vice Premier, Minister of Health) 
   Deputy Directors:  Gao Qiang (Executive Vice Minister of Health)  
Xu Shaoshi (Deputy Secretary-General, State Council） 
   Members:   23 Vice Ministers from relevant ministries and organizations;  
     7 provincial governors 
   The Council Office is located in the Ministry of Health  
   Director of the Office:     Wang Longde (Vice Health Minister) 
   Deputy Directors of the Office:  Qi Xiaoqiu (MoH); SHEN Jie (China CDC) 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Governing structures in HIV/AIDS prevention in China 
  State Council 
State Committee of AIDS Control and Prevention 
 
      MoH 
 
MoH AIDS Office   State CDC  
 
Local health bureau AIDS offices  local CDCs 
 
 supervisory relation 
 
                                                 
41 Compared with the former National AIDS Committee, the new State AIDS Committee has an actual 
office and staff situated within the MoH to coordinate policy-making across 23 administrative sectors 
and all provinces on a regular basis.  
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Table 4.1. China’s Central Budgetary Commitment on HIV/AIDS Control and Prevention 
Year Budget  
(million, RMB) 
Increase Rate Year Budget  
(million, RMB) 
Increase Rate 
2000 15  n/a 2003 390 220% 
2001 100 567% 2004 600 54% 
2002 122 22% Total 1227  
Source: Yu Dongbao, State CDC. 2004.  
By the end of 2003, the State CDC launched the China CARES Program 
(Comprehensive AIDS RESponse) to cover 51 counties worst hit by AIDS in 11 
provinces. In 2004, the second phase of this Program expanded to cover 128 counties 
in 28 provinces. Health bureaus in these counties received extra-budgetary funds 
designated for AIDS treatment and care.42 A national condom promotion strategy was 
jointly issued in July 2004 by six ministries and departments to encourage 100% 
condom use among high-risk behavior populations. There was a dramatic change in 
policy and response strategies for the prevention of HIV transmission through IDUs, 
covering methadone maintenance treatment of drug users and free needle exchange 
programmes. A range of interventions aimed at MSM, migrant workers, and CSW 
have also been initiated in several provinces. With more international assistance, the 
Chinese government is mobilizing from within to cope with every aspect of the AIDS 
epidemic, and to ensure the effectiveness of policy implementation. 
Multilateral and Bilateral Responses to China’s AIDS Crisis 
Similar to the situation in the field of environmental protection explained in the 
previous chapter, the international community responded to the AIDS situation before 
                                                 
42 Free antiretroviral therapy (ARV) drugs to all rural AIDS patients and urban residents who are in 
financial distress; Free voluntary counseling testing (VCT) services in high prevalence areas; Free 
education to children orphaned by AIDS; Free prevention of mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) 
services for pregnant female patients; and, Care to AIDS patients who are in financial distress. 
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the Chinese government fully committed to it. Many multilateral and bilateral 
organizations have transferred funds and expertise to prevent the spread of AIDS in 
China since the late 1980s. Inter-governmental assistance in AIDS increased more 
rapidly after the Chinese high-ranking officials showed political will in recognizing 
and solving the problem.43 Budgeted international support coordinated by UNAIDS 
alone jumped from 256 million RMB in 2003 to 421 million RMB in 2004.44  
Total multilateral assistance to China for AIDS prevention exceeded 300 
million USD by 2004. (Table 4.2) Through its loans to China’s health sector, the 
World Bank became involved in HIV/AIDS education and prevention. In the 1990s, 
the World Bank’s health sector activities grew substantially, and its health loans far 
exceeded World Health Organization’s (WHO) total budget. The Bank has become the 
largest external financier of health projects in low and middle-income countries.45 In 
the case of China, Bank funds for HIV related issues have grown considerably during 
the past decade.46  
Besides the World Bank, China is becoming a popular recipient for main 
international health organizations. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (the Global Fund), founded in 2000 under the U.N. framework to accelerate 
                                                 
43 The Hu Jingtao-Wen Jiabao regime. 
44 UNAIDS report 2004. 
45 Poku, Nana and Alan Whiteside. 2002. “The Global AIDS Fund: Context and Opportunity”. Third 
World Quarterly -Journal of Emerging Areas. Vol. 23, No. 2: 283-298. Yamey, Gavin. 2002. “Why 
Does the World Still Need WHO?” British Medical Journal. Vol. 325, No. 7375. 
46 While the actual size of health related loans has decreased due to the Bank’s general policy of trying 
to fund greater number of smaller projects, the percentage of spending on prevention of HIV or other 
sexually transmitted diseases (STD) has grown from less than one percent to more than one third of the 
total project budget. Appendix 4.1 gives more details of World Bank’s lending to China’s health and 
AIDS-related fields. 
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the response to these deadly infectious diseases at the global level, has been consistent 
in supporting the Chinese government in AIDS prevention since Round Three (2003). 
Before the UNAIDS China office opened in 1996, various U.N. agencies had already 
been involved in China’s reproductive health governance. Currently, UNAIDS China 
coordinates a large number of AIDS-related projects implemented by U.N. agencies, 
including WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, and UNFPA.47  
Entering the 2000s, many OECD governments added HIV/AIDS prevention 
into their official development assistance priorities. The 20 million UKP China-UK 
HIV and AIDS Prevention and Care Project, launched in 2000, is so far the earliest 
and largest bilateral initiative to combat the AIDS epidemic in China. Since 2002, the 
U.S., Canadian and Australian governments also made major commitments to assist 
the Chinese government in AIDS prevention. (Table 4.3)  
Table 4.2. Multilateral funding for China’s AIDS control and prevention. 
Multilateral agencies Funding programs Amount (million USD) 
Round Three  98  Global Fund  
Round Four  64 
World Bank Multiple projects since 1991 > 55  (up until 2004) 
Other U.N. agencies Various projects coordinated by UNAIDS  30 (year 2003), 50 (year 2004) 
Total  > 300 (up until 2004) 
Sources: Global Fund, World Bank, and UNAIDS data. 
Table 4.3. Bilateral funding for China’s AIDS control and prevention 
Country Program Schedule Total budget 
(million) 
Focused region 
U.K. China-UK HIV and AIDS Prevention and 
Care Project  
2000-2006 20 UKP Sichuan, Yunnan 
Global AIDS Program  2003-2007 15 USD general U.S.A. 
Greater Mekong Initiative 2003-2008 5 USD Guangxi, Yunnan 
Canada  Capacity Development in HIV/AIDS 
Prevention 
2005-2010 5 CAD Sichuan 
Australia Xinjiang HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care 
Project 
2002-2007 15 AUD Xinjiang 
Sources: Bilateral assistance agencies’ websites, and multiple interviews in China in 2004.  
                                                 
47 Appendix 4.2 gives information on U.N. agencies’ AIDS-related work in China. 
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Even though the total volume of assistance from multilateral and bilateral 
assistance agencies is substantial (almost triple China’s total national budget on AIDS 
prevention from 2000 to 2004), these agencies were limited in terms of choosing 
project implementing agencies, exerting their own principles into the implementation 
plans, and monitoring the implementation process. The Chinese government has set 
up a seamless system to deal with inter-governmental assistance. All funds from the 
World Bank and UNDP (historically the two major multilateral agencies sponsoring 
public health projects in China) have to go through the Ministry of Commerce (MoC). 
When interviewed, Wang Jing, the division director in charge of UNDP AIDS related 
projects at the China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange 
(under MoC) commented: “UNDP officials do not know the particular context in 
China. They need us to find them the perfect location and governmental partners for 
their projects…Their goals sometimes are too idealistic, which can hardly be accepted 
by local governments. We are the middlemen in between UNDP and the local 
implementing agencies, and help with the communication between the two. We help 
UNDP to modify their objectives attached to the funded projects to better suit the 
local sistuation.”48 She also explained to me that UNDP sponsored some AIDS related 
poverty relief projects in Henan around the time of mid-1990s, but the provincial 
government later rejected any further funding. And it was the MoC who found the 
Shanxi provincial government, who had a more open attitude, for UNDP to continue 
its projects. The MoC official intended to use this case to illustrate to me how 
                                                 
48 Interviewed in Beijing, 18 March 2004.  
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important her own agency is in the process of a multilateral project. I would add that 
it also exemplifies how little power multilateral agencies ultimately have over their 
own projects in China.  
Both World Bank health projects implemented after 1995, with HIV/AIDS 
control as one of their main objectives, failed to touch the blood scandal or situation 
in Henan, which implicitly reveals the political sensitivity surrounding these issues 
and the limitation of the Bank’s leverage in China.49 The Disease Prevention Project 
(1995-2004), an eight-year special project was created to deal particularly with 
STD/HIV control; it had a budget of 13 million USD. However, it was only 
implemented in Yunnan Province. 50 Similarly, the Health Nine Project (1999-2006) 
documents explicitly stated that the project would tackle the problem of commercial 
blood and plasma transactions. However, Henan was skipped among the four 
provinces identified as the most affected regions. 51  
Other U.N. agencies, besides the Bank and UNDP, all have designated 
Chinese governmental agencies as their partners in China. For example, UNESCO’s 
counterpart is China’s National Commission for UNESCO. The State Council formed 
                                                 
49 No specific information on HIV/AIDS control and prevention is available for the newest TB Control 
Project passed by the Bank in 2002. 
50 Project document assessment reports. [Available online at: http://www.worldbank.org, last accessed 
August 2003.] 
51 Ibid. “In addition to those already infected with HIV/AIDS/STDs and other blood borne infections, 
many people are at risk of infection, especially those who engage in high risk behavior such as 
intravenous drug use, or provide commercial sex. Commercial blood and plasma donors have also 
infected or placed at risk patients, through unsafe blood or plasma collection practices. This population 
size varies from province to province as the modes of transmission differ in each place, but it is likely 
that, at a minimum, one to two percent of the population in these four provinces (note: Fujian, Guangxi, 
Shanxi, and Xinjiang) are at risk of HIV/AIDS, amounting to 1.3 to 2.6 million persons.” 
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a Country Coordinating Group since China’s application for the Global Fund was 
accepted. Such a counterpart system is meant to keep all multilateral collaborations in 
line with the central government’s own policies. Incidents such as the “Titanic 
Report”, therefore, are not common. In fact, to recover the relationship with the 
Chinese government after the “Titanic Report”, UNAIDS China Office made an effort 
to invite the Chinese MoH and CDC to conduct a joint assessment on AIDS situation 
in China.  
Bilateral collaborations in AIDS prevention are mainly conducted through 
MoH system. Compared with multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies may have more 
leeway in designing and implementing the projects, either via direct access to local 
authorities, or the opportunity to implement some parts of the program independently. 
For example, the China-UK Program allocated 30% of the budget for international 
NGO contractors to promote public participation in AIDS prevention. But, even such 
flexibility is limited, for the Program was only implemented in Sichuan and Yunnan, 
where provincial governments are much more open to international assistance than in 
Henan. Since China’s central authority loosened its control over the question of blood 
scandal issue in Henan recently, more and more inter-governmental assistance is 
allowed to be implemented in the province. For example, U.S. Global AIDS Program 
(GAP) Beijing Office has started working with drug rehabilitation centers and the 
local CDCs in Henan.52
 
                                                 
52 Interview with Mr. Ray Yip, director of the GAP Program Office in Beijing, August 2004.  
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In summary, the AIDS epidemic in China can be framed as a policy failure, 
which was first caused by a lack of information and proper medical technology in 
China, and was soon accelerated by the blood condemnation scandal and the 
government’s belated response to the problem. A full-blown epidemic could have 
been prevented had the state not responded to bottom-up and external criticism by 
blocking media coverage, limiting public access to information, repressing grassroots 
activism, and delaying an official investigation of the blood scandal. Since 2002, the 
state has introduced fundamental changes in AIDS prevention policies, and 
established a governing system of AIDS control led by the newly strengthened 
Ministry of Health.  
 Multilateral and bilateral assistance have played a role during this process of 
changes in AIDS prevention practices, but their projects are also limited in terms of 
reaching to the most needed populations and addressing the most politically sensitive 
issues. The crisis of SARS had both direct and indirect effects on AIDS governance, 
and in particular has made Chinese health officials more comfortable in the face of 
international pressure and policy criticism. SARS also triggered a wave of 
centralization of the health system, and enhancement of the political status of the 
disease control system in the country. With this background, I will introduce two other 
groups of political actors in the politics of AIDS who are not usually as visible as 
UNAIDS or other IGOs; nevertheless, they have had a unique influence in the 
evolving politics of AIDS in China.  
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SOCIAL ACTIVISM IN HIV/AIDS PREVENTION IN CHINA 
 
Even though AIDS is a young disease in China, and the Chinese government was 
reluctant to face it for a long time, a recognizable societal and activist community 
surrounding this issue is emerging. Like the conservation case, this community is 
composed of a variety of actors, ranging from individual activists, professionals, 
NGOs, organizations led by people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), rural 
community-based groups, to university student associations.  
Key individual activists in this field include Dr. Gao Yaojie, Dr. Gui Xi’en, 
and Wan Yanhai, who became symbolic faces of China’s bottom-up activism against 
AIDS. It is simply impossible to include every expert who has contributed to the rise 
of AIDS activism, especially some leading medical professionals (e.g., Dr. Zeng Yi, 
on the Board of the State AIDS Committee), who many times sheltered or spoke up 
for AIDS activists. Nevertheless, this research does its best to point out those who 
have played a crucial role in linking the activist group with the public, the government, 
or the international community. As of the end of 2004, and in spite of political 
obstacles and social stigma, there are about 17 registered (or engaged in the 
registration process) independent voluntary organizations (including six PLWHA 
groups) that are actively working on AIDS related issues. They implement relief, 
public education, and prevention projects, and advocate for policy changes. In 
addition, with support from international and Chinese NGOs, many voluntary villager 
associations and university student associations are being formed. A few 
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environmental NGOs and religious philanthropic organizations are also expanding 
their working plan to include AIDS prevention and advocacy activities. Due to the 
central government’s attitude and policy change on AIDS prevention, a number of 
AIDS Care Centers and AIDS Patients Associations have been established by local 
CDCs, especially in the 128 focused counties. 53 And, these centers and associations 
are becoming new seeds and potential sources of inspiration for local activism 
surrounding AIDS. They are alike the newly established environmental GONGOs in 
the previous case of nature conservation. Their impact could be significant in the 
future, but it is still too early to make conclusion about. Table 4.4 below gives an 
overview of the various social groups and individuals that will be discussed in detail 
as the essential components of the AIDS prevention civil society. 54  
Table 4.4. An overview of AIDS activists and social groups 
Type Main actors 
Individual activists and 
professionals 
doctors, professors, journalists and other professionals 
Institutionalized NGOs 
(and NGOs-to-be) 
PLWHA groups, exclusively AIDS NGOs, gay community 
groups, hemophilia associations, women’s groups, and a few 
non-AIDS focused NGOs 
Rural community-based groups Voluntarily established in some villages of rural China 
University student groups Most are in Beijing, and others are spreading in 10 provinces 
 
                                                 
53 Actual names of these centers and associations vary across locations, e.g., Home of Care and Love, 
but, in general, they are meant to provide some type of counseling, assistance, and training to AIDS 
affected population. They are physically situated within the local CDC office building, and formally 
operated by CDC staff. It is not unusual now for these centers to implement peer-training, and invite 
PLWHAs to be part of the regular staff team. They are usually formally staffed by doctors, medical 
professionals, and local governmental officials, and informally operated by local HIV+ patients and 
activists. 
54 Special thanks to Mr. Odilon Couzin, founder of the China AIDS Info. for sharing valuable data from 
the forthcoming Directory of Groups Working on HIV/AIDS in China, a project funded by the Ford 
Foundation.  
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Pioneers of AIDS Activism 
Dr. Gao Yaojie 
Dr. Gao, a retired leading gynecologist in Henan, was drawn into AIDS work at the 
age of 70. A female patient was brought to her for her expert opinion on the 
uncommonly colored infections in her in early 1996. She had a suspicion of HIV 
related illness, and a blood test was ordered afterwards. After the case was confirmed, 
she was very puzzled by why this normal rural woman could ever be infected with 
HIV, and later found out that she got the infected via blood transmission during a 
surgery one year before. This incident of blood contamination struck Dr. Gao, and she 
decided to learn more about HIV and AIDS. When she realized that public education 
of AIDS had been skewed by only emphasizing sexual transmission, and completely 
omitting the possibility of direct blood contamination, she felt compelled to 
disseminate the correct information as soon as possible. By November that year, she 
had edited and printed 12,000 copies of AIDS education handouts. On the World 
AIDS Day, 1996, she and some helpers set off to public transportation centers. In 
three days, they went to all five long-distance bus stations in Zhengzhou city, and 
distributed over 800 handouts in person. At that time, Dr. Gao’s sole intention was to 
increase public awareness of AIDS prevention. Never could she have imagined the 
death toll of AIDS patients in rural Henan that she would learn of one year later. 
When I met her in April 2004, she told me that: “I ran into this politics of AIDS 
totally by chance. I am a doctor, and all I knew at the beginning was that there were 
lots of patients in need of my help.”  
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Since 1997, this elderly lady, with bonded feet, has visited thousands of 
HIV/AIDS patients from hundreds of villages in rural Henan. She sometimes goes 
under the cover of giving free medical check-ups of women’s health, yet hands out 
basic medicines (e.g., antibiotics, cold medicines) to alleviate patient’s pain and 
illness. In more recent years, because the issue became more politically sensitive, 
many times she had to sneak into the villages to speak to patients, and “escape” from 
local police or authority’s harassment. She is supporting over 160 children orphaned 
by AIDS patients, and is in close contact with many of them. In 2004, she finished a 
new book, called “Ten Thousand Letters”, which selected 200 out of the 10,000 
private letters from HIV/AIDS patients who seek counseling, anonymous people who 
are at high risk, students who are curious, and activists who are willing to help. 
It is really because of her continuous writing and speaking frankly about the 
patients she has seen that the story of the blood scandal and AIDS villages in Henan 
finally appeared in newspapers, websites, TV programs, and later caught the attention 
of foreign media and international organizations.55 By the end of 2004, she has edited, 
printed and distributed 19 issues of the AIDS Basics and Prevention Newsletter, 
around 10,000 copies of each issue. She has also written two books on AIDS and 
STDs, and over 300,000 copies of them have been distributed to various education 
institutions, hospitals, and more impressively, individual readers—all from her 
                                                 
55 Many overseas Chinese first paid attention to China’s AIDS epidemic by reading Rosenthau’s reports 
in New York Times in October 2000. In fact, it was through Dr. Gao that Rosenthau got chance to see 
some patients in person.  
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apartment. 56  More recently, at the age of almost 80, she has not only accepted 
numerous newspapers and TV programs to her home for interviews, but has also 
taken trains and traveled to Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing to give public talks.57 As 
the AIDS epidemic in Henan has become more exposed, it has attracted numerous 
activists, journalists, researchers, and NGOs coming to Henan to collect information, 
distribute relief goods, and coordinate AIDS support work. Dr. Gao’s two-bedroom 
apartment in Zhengzhou has literally turned into a transit-station for all of these 
people who want to learn about and help with the AIDS situation in Henan. 
In a way, Dr. Gao became the face of AIDS activism in China and the voice 
outside the government. Within the international AIDS community, Dr. Gao’s 
impressive work has won wide recognition and much respect. She was awarded the 
Jonathan Mann Award of Health and Human Rights from the Global Health Council 
in 2001, and the Lameng Magasasa Prize for Public Service (known as the Nobel 
Prize of Asia) in 2003. News of these awards greatly inspired and encouraged other 
Chinese AIDS activists and groups. On Dec. 18th, the Vice Premier, and Minister of 
Heath, Mdm. Wu Yi and Dr. Gao had a private meeting in Henan. Chinese AIDS 
activists took this event as a significant signal of central government’s attitude change. 
The Chinese Central TV (known as CCTV), the main propaganda instrument of the 
                                                 
56 Gao, Yaojie. 1997. AIDS/HIV/STDs Prevention and Treatment. 1st ed. Zhengzhou: Henan Science 
and Technology Press. 2003. Unknown Stories: Popular Edition for AIDS and STDs Prevention and 
Treatment. China Farmers Press. 
57 On 2003 World AIDS Day, Dr. Gao gave a speech at Tsinghua University, Beijing. In Feb. 2004, Dr. 
Gao was invited to Nanjing University. She spent a week in Shanghai in late March 2004. During that 
week, she gave four public speeches at universities and at Shanghai AIDS Legal Research Center, in 
addition to multiple media interviews. During these few months, she alone, in a way, generated a 
momentum of AIDS awareness in China.  
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central government, named her as one of the “Figures who Moved China” for 2003, 
together with Dr. Zhong Nanshan, who became nationally known during the SARS 
crisis. After this “public promotion” of Dr. Gao by CCTV, most activists felt a 
fundamental relief of political pressure on AIDS related voluntary work.  
Dr. Gui Xi’en 
Like Dr. Gao, Dr. Gui Xi’en from Wuhan Central-South Hospital, Hubei province, is 
another pioneer in AIDS prevention in China, who started helping Henan AIDS 
patients in the late 1990s. 58  Unlike Dr. Gao, he has always been low-key, and 
remained silent with regard to governmental policies. But, it is because of this 
cautiousness that he has been able to offer hundreds of HIV+ patients from Henan and 
neighboring provinces the access to testing and treatment. When I visited several 
villages in central and southern Henan in 2004, I met many HIV+ patients who 
referred to Dr. Gui as their life-saver. 
Because blood tests for AIDS patients (e.g., CT4 cell level) are still not 
available in every hospital in China, Dr. Gui has also became the help-line for other 
medical professionals who see HIV+ patients. For example, the Xiangfan Clinic of 
                                                 
58 In November 1999, Dr. Gui took a trip with one of his medical students to a village in central Henan, 
because many farmers had died within a short period of time of “a strange disease” in this village. They 
took 155 people’s blood samples back to the hospital laboratory, and found 96 of them were HIV 
positive. It is said that Dr. Gui, in his late 50s, burst into tears over the results. On that night, Dr. Gui 
decided to do his best to help these desperate farmers. Over the years, he has collected many villagers’ 
blood samples for testing in person, and encouraged more to go to hospitals for VCT. (Interview with 
one of the patients treated by Dr. Gui in Henan, 22 April 2004.) 
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MSF-Belgium has treated over 120 patients within 2 years, and all their blood 
samples were tested at Dr. Gui’s lab.59  
Dr. Gui has also conducted many research based on the cases he treated, the 
results of which, particularly those on mother-child transmission, and the vulnerability 
of women to HIV, have provided useful data and evidence for the AIDS activist 
community.60 Particularly noteworthy as well is the actual number of farmers who 
were infected with HIV directly via blood transmission from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s. The official number is 260,000, but Dr. Gui’s estimate is 700,000. His 
field research has shown that about 1.4 million people participated in blood 
selling/donation practices during this time period, and the HIV infection rate among 
them was as high as 50%.61
Even though they have adopted very different ways to raise public awareness 
of AIDS and to offer their generous help to the patients in rural Henan, Dr. Gao and 
Dr. Gui are aware of and pay great respect to each other’s work. They often refer to 
each other in their public talks and writings. They are the leading figures of AIDS 
activism in the eyes of the public, and the state praises them to convince the public it 
supports such voluntary work. In Dec. 2003, Vice Premier, Mdm. Wu met with Dr. 
Gao in Henan, and in the following May, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Dr. Gui in Hubei.  
                                                 
59 Interviews with Xiangfan Clinic staff, 1 June 2004.  
60 Gui, Xi’en. 2003. “A Survey of Children with HIV/AIDS in Highly Affected Villages”. Chinese 
Journal of Pediatrics, 41(8): 586-589. 2003. “A Study on HIV Transmission within Family”. Chinese 
Journal of Epidemic, 24 (5): 396. 2004. “A Survey on Mother-Child Transmission of HIV and TTV”. 
China Public Health, 20 (5): 583-584. 
61 Round-table on “AIDS in China”, hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 16th, 2004. 
 
 228
Wan Yanhai 
In contrast to Drs. Gao and Gui, Mr. Wan Yanhai has always been a very controversial 
figure inside and outside of the AIDS activist community because of his working style. 
He certainly is more of a professional activist than the two doctors. A graduate from a 
leading medical school in Beijing, Wan worked for the Institute for Health Education, 
part of the MoH system in early 1990s. His former colleague recalled that he was very 
vocal about gay rights, legalization of prostitution, and other progressive ideas related 
to sexual and reproductive health. He advocated for changes in China’s public health 
education within the Institute, and was able to mobilize the entertainment community 
and participated in the opening of the first gay bar in Beijing. Such acts were 
unorthodox and unacceptable at that time, and Wan was ordered to stop any further 
involvement on May 10th, 1993. The director of the Institute at that time was forced to 
retire in the following August because of his sympathy of Wan’s activist work.62
Wan established the Aizhi Action Project (later registered as the Aizhixing 
Institute for Health Education) in March 1994, and in August he was forced to resign 
from his work. Wan then became a full-time activist advocating for policy changes 
(e.g., equal rights for gay, legalization of commercial sex) and public education of 
AIDS prevention. Aizhi organized discussions, public meetings, and street exhibitions, 
and became a center for information exchange and a gathering spot for concerned 
researchers. Professor Zhang Beichuan, one of the most known and respected Chinese 
scholars on gay issues in China, recalled Wan as the first one who “extended his help 
                                                 
62 Interview with Wan’s former colleagues, Beijing, July 8, 2004.  
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to my research from Beijing”, and “introduced me to the gay community at that 
time”. 63  Wan also followed individual cases of discrimination against gays, and 
provided moral support. He published Aizhi Newsletters to disseminate information 
among the gay community, and co-organized conferences with professors from the 
Social Science Academy to promote new laws to protect basic rights for gay people 
and commercial sex workers.  
Since 1999, Wan started his investigation of the blood contamination scandal, 
and support to AIDS patients in Henan and other rural parts of China. Since 2001, his 
activism has became more focused on AIDS, blood security, medical ethics, and 
patients’ rights issues. In early summer of 2002, a confidential report on the status of 
AIDS in Henan by the Henan provincial government was leaked to Wan, and he 
further distributed it to people concerned through a personal email. This was after the 
release of the UNAIDS “Titanic Report”, which for the first time challenged the 
official data on HIV/AIDS infections and the denial of blood contamination scandal. 
The report Wan distributed was the first time the Henan provincial government 
admitted to severe AIDS problems in the province, and documented the highly hit 
regions and estimated the number of people who participated in paid blood donation 
and the infection rate among them. Therefore, Wan was accused of leaking 
confidential governmental documents, and arrested on August 23, just three days 
before that year’s Barcelona World AIDS Conference. This incident immediately drew 
a wide range of criticism, petitions and demonstrations against the Chinese 
                                                 
63 Prof. Zhang Beichuan’s congratulation letter to Aizhixing’s 10th anniversary in April 2004. 
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government from the international community.64 For example, about 60 people from 
groups like Human Rights in China (overseas Chinese group), Health GAP (AIDS 
lobbyist group) and ACT UP (gay activist group) took part in the peaceful protest in 
front of the Chinese consulate in New York on 19 September 2002. 65 The Canadian 
HIV/AIDS Legal Network and Human Rights Watch selected Wan as the recipient of 
their annual award for 2002.66  
After Wan was released in October, Yale University granted him the World 
Fellowship to study in the U.S. During this time period, Wan met with a number of 
international organizations and media. Since 2003, substantial amount of assistance 
has became available to Wan, which made it possible for him to build up the new 
Aizhixing office in Beijing and to recruit full-time staff.  
Wang Shuping  
Wang Shuping is probably the first medical professional who became involved in the 
uncovering of the blood scandal in Henan. Dr. Wang used to be the chief physician of 
the Clinical Laboratory in Zhoukou Region Hospital in Henan.67In 1994, she started 
epidemiological research of Hepatitis and AIDS in the Zhoukou Region. In the 
summer of 1995, she found that out of over 400 blood samples, the HIV infection rate 
was 13%. By October, she submitted a report with the findings of her research to the 
                                                 
64 “Amnesty concerned over missing China AIDS activist”, Agence France Presse, 31 August 2002. 
[Accessed through LexisNexis on 30 March 2005] 
65 “Protest in New York against detention of Chinese AIDS activist”, Agence France Presse, 19 
September 2002. [Accessed through LexisNexis on 30 March 2005] 
66 The award ceremony was held on September 13, which Wan was absent. 
67 Region is a level above County as administrative division in China. A Region sometimes can consist 
of as many as half dozen of counties.  
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local health authority.68 Soon after that, Wang was told that she would not publish her 
report anywhere. Incidents of personal harassment followed. In Nov. 1996, a Party 
meeting was called by a provincial health official at the Zhoukou Regional Health 
Bureau, and local health officials were criticized for allowing Wang and her 
colleagues to research on AIDS. Wang’s lab was soon closed down, and she had to 
leave her job. She brought the blood samples to Beijing and pursued support from the 
central health authorities. With the help of Zeng Yi, the leading scientist in HIV/AIDS 
in China and on Board of the National AIDS Commission, her research was preserved 
and acknowledged later. 
Zhang Jicheng  
A native of Henan, by chance Zhang Jicheng encountered two couples from the 
Wenlou village (now known as the most famous “AIDS village”) on a train ride in 
October 1999. After speaking with them about their “illness”, he decided to visit the 
village and conduct a thorough investigation. Shocked, as well as anguished, was 
Zhang; he believed he had found enough evidence to conclude that there were 
contaminated blood collection practices in Henan with dire results. He wrote an 
article based on his results, but it was blocked by his own newspaper; he went on and 
sent it to Huaxi (China-West) Metropolitan News, a daily paper in another province, 
Sichuan. On Jan. 18, 2000 it ran - “Strange Disease in a Henan Village Shocks Top 
Officials”. Only, When Henan officials learned of the Huaxi article they ordered the 
                                                 
68 Wang’s research showed an example of a local village of 1300 people. 900 blood samples were taken, 
excluding the old and the young, 300 of whom had donated blood before for compensation money. The 
HIV infection rate reached close to 50% among those who donated blood, and 20% among all the 900 
samples. 
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immediate firing of Zhang; only thanks to the protection from his editor did Zhang 
keep his job. To Zhang’s surprise, this story made it to the U.S. Embassy website 
within days, though the Chinese government turned a deaf ear to the stories in Henan. 
The Henan provincial government did its best to prevent more coverage of the AIDS 
outrage in the province. Attention from the central government was not called until 
October 2000, when The New York Times began in-depth reporting on Wenlou and 
AIDS villages in Henan.69
Like Liang Congjie, Liao Xiaoyi, and Wang Yongchen in the environmental 
field, Dr. Gao Yaojie, Dr. Gui Xi’en, and Wan Yanhai are the faces of China’s AIDS 
activism. However, the difference is that Dr. Gao and Gui remained working 
independently, instead of creating opportunities for more civil society participation in 
the movement. Both of them were particularly careful about not being affiliated with 
any organization, and had no intension of establishing their own. Despite his strong 
intention to be the leader of the activist community, and much effort made to organize 
networking events and conferences among all social groups, Wan did not become the 
unifying force among all AIDS activists and social organizations. On the contrary, 
sometimes, he is even the source of agony and distrust within the community. Wang 
Shuping and Zhang Jicheng are examples of the professionals that were mis-treated 
by state authorities when choosing to directly confront official lies. However, both 
retreated from the central stage of AIDS activism soon after their personal mischief. 
Compared with the conservation case, the AIDS prevention activism still lacks 
                                                 
69 Cohen, Jon. “A Scoop of International Proportions”, Science (Special Report on HIV/AIDS in Asia), 
Vol. 304, 25 June 2004.  
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charismatic and practical leadership that can strengthen the interconnections within 
the community. 
Professors, Lawyers and Researchers:  
The Second Frontier of AIDS Activism 
In November 2003, 22 members of the National Academy of Science and Academy of 
Engineering submitted a letter to the State Council concerning AIDS and spoke  
against the social stigma toward AIDS patients and encouraged immediate state 
intervention. In the letter, they even quoted a mission statement from the 
environmental movement to support their opinion. 70  As we learned from the 
environmental movement in China(and indeed from many experiences of other non-
democratic regimes), during the process of social mobilization for policy changes 
such collective actions taken by scientific and intellectual communities can alarm the 
state authority.  
In the case of AIDS prevention in China, many scientists and experts have 
virtually joined bottom-up activism by reporting accurate research findings and 
publishing true stories from the field. Additionally, there are many medical 
professionals, journalists, lawyers, and scholars who are activist-minded, and have 
provided support to bottom-up activism. Sometimes, they help to justify the stance of 
AIDS activists by raising similar opinions as the grassroots activists. Other times, they 
document grassroots activism, and convey it to a broader audience by publication, 
teaching, and public speech. They are sometimes the only communication channels 
                                                 
70 Jin, Wei. 2004. pp258-260. 
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between the activist community and the state. Their sympathy has occasionally 
resulted in the political tolerance of AIDS activists. University professors also often 
take part in the rise of social activism. By only publishing in academic journals or 
mobilizing within defined circles, they can sustain their activism a little bit better. 
With moral support from international community, they sometimes even can 
overcome political obstacles and maintain their activism work. 
Professor Zhang Beichuan, chief physician of the Center of Sexual Health, 
Qingdao Medical College Hospital, became concerned with homosexuality related 
health and social issues in the early 1990s, and was among the main researchers and 
activists on the subject at the time. He contributed greatly to AIDS prevention within 
the gay community by publishing extensively on the topic and through direct 
involvement in the initiation of gay hotlines and self-help associations in most major 
cities in China. In 1998, with support from the Ford Foundation and the Berry & 
Martin Trust, Zhang and other colleagues established the Friends project in Qingdao 
to “promote scientific knowledge of sexuality, health and love”. In 2001, he was 
given the first Berry & Martin Award. Zhang’s work and research in gay issues and 
AIDS is now well accepted by the Chinese government and often used in forming 
policies.  
Like Professor Zhang, Professor Pan Suiming, Director of the Institute of 
Sexuality and Gender Research at Renmin University, first created an electronic 
magazine Miss to document the lives of and social problems related to commercial 
sex workers. At one point he had to change the magazine’s name to Private Letters to 
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keep it in existence because of pressure from the government.71 With financial and 
moral support from the Ford Foundation, the magazine has survived and been 
distributed among a wide range of readers. Recently, it resumed its original name. 
In current China, university professors, researchers in government sponsored 
institutions, and leading professionals are often invited to be on advisory boards of the 
government. Through such dual status, some professionals have been able to provide 
some support to activists, pass on opinions from the activist community to policy-
making circles, and communicate policy changes better back to activist groups. A 
good example in this case is Professor Jing Jun, Director of Center for AIDS Policy 
Research at the Tsinghua University. Co-sponsored by the Clinton Foundation and 
Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center, Tsinghua University hosted the AIDS and 
SARS International Conference in November 2003. With the particular help by Jing, 
some HIV+ patients and activists had a chance to participate in the conference. 
Jin Wei, a lecturer at China’s Central Party School, started AIDS lectures 
(once every half year) for the Communist Party leaders since the end of 2001. She 
edited the Handbook for Party Leaders on AIDS Prevention and Policies (in Chinese) 
in 2003, which is still the main reference for governmental officials on the topic. She 
also conducted surveys on AIDS awareness among senior party officials from all 
provinces, and found that as many as 40% of the survey participants consider AIDS 
irrelevant to public policy. Since then, she has been very vocal on the urgency of 
AIDS education and the lack of awareness and political will of AIDS prevention 
                                                 
71  When the word “miss” (xiaojie) is used in China, people know that the magazine is about 
commercial sex workers. While, “private letters” is more indirect, therefore less sensitive. 
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among governmental officials. While remaining as a Central Party School lecturer, Jin 
has been in close contact with many AIDS activists including Dr. Gao Yaojie. She has 
accompanied Gao to investigate the AIDS situation and helped AIDS orphans in rural 
Henan and Shangdong.72  
Yang Shaogang, Esq., serves as the leading legal expert for the Council of 
Shanghai Municipal Government. He initiated and became the leader of the AIDS 
Legal Research Center at Shanghai University. Due to his official affiliations and 
professional expertise, he was invited by the State AIDS Committee to provide advice 
on new AIDS related laws in April 2004. Before his meeting with Vice Premier Wu, 
he widely solicited opinions from the activist community.  
There are many other important intellectuals and professionals that are worth 
noting: Xia Guomei, Director of the HIV/AIDS Policy Research Center in the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; Li Dun, professor of law, Tsinghua University; 
Zhang Konglai, professor of medical science, Peking Union Medical College, and 
Director of the AIDS Working Network (a Beijing based NGO); and Li Dongli, 
Associate Research Fellow at the China Population and Development Research Center. 
As I pointed out before, this group of activist-minded professionals is crucial for the 
development of social activism and civil society in that they are involved in activism, 
research and policy consultation at the same time, and consequently become the 
linkages between the state and civil society. They can be extremely helpful for the 
activist community in learning how to negotiate with the state. However, the 
                                                 
72 Interviews in Beijing, summer 2004. 
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journalist circle in the AIDS field is not as mobilized and connected with the activist 
community as in the conservation case. A large number of environmental journalists 
became activists, created their own NGOs, and utilized their communication skills 
and former connections within the media to organize public campaigns. This partially 
explains why activists in the AIDS field have organized very few media campaigns. 
 “Positive” AIDS Activists 
Some people knew of Song Pengfei years ago from reading his tragic story of being 
infected with HIV through a blood transfusion during a surgery when he was still a 
child. But most Chinese people learned about his name and courage more recently, 
when former U. S. president Bill Clinton accepted his challenging question, and 
hugged him at the Beijing AIDS-SARS Conference, Nov. 2003. On that day, Song 
challenged the Conference and its major celebrity speaker, Bill Clinton, with the fact 
that the whole PLWHA community was not represented. Up until today, Song is one 
of the very few faces of HIV/AIDS patients that the public has seen.  
Like the impoverished minority farmers of the anti-dam movement in 
Southwest China, the community of people-living-with-HIV/AIDS has symbolic 
power in the AIDS movement. However, unlike those farmers, they are much more 
constrained in their activist work, public appearance, and even physical mobility due 
to social stigma and their own health condition. Despite such difficulties, some young 
and courageous “positive” people have taken up the task of erasing the mysterious 
and negative public view of HIV/AIDS patient. They have established PLWHA 
support groups in three major cities, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and their 
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work has reached multiple provinces. In rural areas of Henan, Sichuan, Yunnan, and 
Guangxi provinces, where the epidemic has hit worst, some HIV+ farmers have also 
tried to form mutual-help groups, especially to take care of the children left behind by 
HIV/AIDS parents. 
Urban PLWHA activism 
Due to their young age and energetic personality, Song Pengfei and Adam Li are the 
most liked PLWHA figures by the media. Song now has moved to Beijing with his 
father and is the Art Project Director of the Positive Art Workshop created by Jose 
Abad and Diana Valarezo at the hospice of You’an Hospital 73 . They organize 
exhibitions of artworks by PLWHA, design condom packaging for better public 
education of AIDS, and produce documentary films of the AIDS community.  
Among all “positive” AIDS activists, Adam Li (also known as Li Xiang) is 
the one with visible. He travels in between international conferences, and sits on the 
China’s Country Coordinating Team of the Global Fund. And, his story has a little 
heroic flavor. Li is a hemophiliac and received tainted blood in the mid-1990s. After 
recovering from a major life-and-death illness, he quit his well-paid information 
technology job and decided to work for the people with a similar experience. The 
Mangrove Support Group was then created with major support from Beijing Ditan 
Hospital and international organizations (e.g., Ford Foundation, Marie Stopes China). 
The main goal was to set up connections and facilities in the rural areas of four 
provinces, i.e., Henan, Sichuan, Xinjiang and Guangdong, so that traveling medical 
                                                 
73 You’an and Ditan are two leading hospitals specializing in treating infectious disease in China. 
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personnel could provide free medical consultation for HIV+ farmers. Mangrove also 
helps the setting up of AIDS hotlines in various cities, trains HIV patients to do 
voluntary work, and publishes the Hand in Hand newsletter of AIDS education. At its 
peak, Mangrove had six full-time HIV+ staff. However, Li’s health has gone through 
ups and downs, which impacted the sustainability of Mangrove. 
The Chinese government has never publicized personal stories of any PLWHA 
who got infected through unsafe sex. PLWHA activists are fighting against so salient 
stigma that they even keep their activist work unknown to their families. Thomas and 
Li Jiaming are the two famous activists in this group. Thomas started an HIV/AIDS 
support group, China AIDS Care, in Guangzhou city in 2002. Within two years, more 
than 130 participants joined the group, and they expanded their outreach to the 
neighboring Guangxi province. Thomas’ group currently provides generic ARV drugs 
to poor PLWHA, and coordinates home-care voluntary work to help homeless and 
rural PLWHA. In addition, they publish and distribute a monthly newsletter, AIDS 
Care Bulletin, to communicable disease hospitals and other communities of PLWHA 
around China, and maintain a webstie to inform and provide counseling on HIV/AIDS. 
More recently, Thomas has made more public appearances. He has delivered speeches 
to university students and medical professionals, and participated in the Bangkok 
World AIDS Conference and the UNAIDS Theme Group meetings in Beijing.  
Li Jiaming’s online novel The Last Proclamation of War which tells his own 
experience of dealing with HIV alarmed hundreds of urban white-collars of the 
danger of HIV; they are the main consumers of commercial sex in China. However, Li 
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remained unknown except to a limited circle of friends and people concerned until a 
major decline of his health in 2004. He now decided to quit his regular job and start a 
PLWHA support group full-time in Shanghai. He has named this group AIDS 
Sunshine and plans to publish a magazine for the PLWHA community.  
Rural PLWHA activism 
In rural areas, particularly in Henan, Sichuan, and Yunnan, where most internationally 
engaged AIDS programs are located, local farmer patients have been inspired to 
organize their own support groups. For example, in Shangcai county, the most 
“famous” AIDS-hit county in the eyes of the Chinese and world’s public, a few local 
villagers now see it is their responsibility to document the AIDS situation in their 
neighborhood, monitor the implementation of the AIDS compensation policy, keep 
the connection with AIDS activists in Beijing, and assist outside donors and 
volunteers who want to help.74
Zhu Jinzhong is the central figure of the story “52 kids 1 dad” which once 
caught much media attention.75 Zhu was one of the hundreds of thousands of men and 
women who decided to sell blood for some extra money for their families in Henan. 
Both he and his wife tested HIV+ by 2001. He went to Beijing contagious disease 
hospitals for help, and became one of the first HIV patients who participated in 
official AIDS treatment lab tests. He encountered activists in Beijing like Wan Yanhai 
who informed him about AIDS and what he can do to help with other PLWHA. He 
                                                 
74 Interviews in Shangcai, April 2004. 
75 Many Chinese and international news media covered Zhu’s story, including CCTV and South China 
Morning Post. 
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decided to tell his story to newspapers and TV programs. More importantly, he 
decided to break the silence and challenge the discrimination in his village: he turned 
his house into a new home for all the orphans left behind by his neighbors who died 
of AIDS. With the generous help of Yang Jie (Taiwan Harmonious Association), Zhu 
opened his house to 20 children, and became their adopted father. This story soon was 
reported by multiple Chinese and international media, and support arrived from all 
fields of work. Employees of the CCTV alone donated 1 million RMB to him. Zhu 
was excited to expand his Home of Care and Love for more children. However, local 
authorities (county governments) became nervous and agonized with this kind of 
publicity. On Jan. 29, 2004, they shut down Zhu’s Home of Care and Love, and drove 
away all the children. The county government received the donation from CCTV, and 
invested an extra 1.8 million RMB. They built up a special school for children 
orphaned by AIDS within 18 days, and took charge of all those kid who used to live 
with Zhu. Despite such pressure, Zhu continued lobbying for better care of AIDS 
orphans in his home village. After an exhausting trip to Beijing for 20 HIV+ children 
to get treatment, Zhu passed away on Jan. 15, 2005. His death was symbolic and 
caused much reflection within the AIDS community. 
Once informed of AIDS basics, patients in rural areas are as motivated as 
urban activists to increase public awareness of AIDS. They form support groups to 
help each other, advocate for better health services and treatment delivery, and pursue 
other activities to alleviate the impacts of AIDS. Thus, a number of farmers’ AIDS 
support groups have emerged out of bilateral agency or international NGO’s support 
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work, and more recently, local CDC’s AIDS programs. For example, the China-UK 
AIDS Project started working in Zizhong county, Sichuan province in February 2000. 
By the end of 2003, 60 PLWHA came out public, and 20 of them performed a play 
based on their own experiences. They were received by the local society with great 
enthusiasm, and were invited to travel to neighboring province, Yunnan, to perform 
the play.76  
Activism among the “hidden population”: Drug users and sex workers 
PLWHA associations are the least developed among IDUs and CSWs for obvious 
reasons—social stigma and lack of direct support. On top of the discrimination 
against AIDS, drug users and prostitutes are still seen as criminals in most parts of 
China. Rehabilitation centers of drug addiction and commercial sex are operated by 
the public security department with rules similar to prisons. It is hard for AIDS 
programs to reach these two groups without notifying the public security sector. In 
most cases, international assistance cannot go directly to IDUs and CSWs, but to 
governmental agencies for secondary distribution. Despite such obstacles, innovative 
measures (e.g.,peer-education) have been pushed forward by progressive international 
NGOs and bilateral programs. Consequently, activism among IDUs and CSWs is 
emerging.  
In Kunming, Yunnan, a young woman (HIV+ and former IDU) from a rural 
township, Wei Ping, has been recruited as the PLWHA project coordinator at the 
Provincial Red Cross. As early as 1995, Wei was invited to AIDS peer-education 
                                                 
76 Beijing Morning News, Dec. 1, 2003. Also interviews in Yunnan, Aug. 2004. Unfortunately, a few 
patients died before the performance could take place. 
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sessions organized by the Australian Red Cross at Yimen township. She was then 
encouraged to form a support group among all young people with a similar situation 
as her. Wei and her friends now coordinate and help with many PLWHA groups in 
Kunming city and nine counties in Yunnan. Her passion is visual arts, and her dream 
is to teach HIV+ friends how to paint and create just as healthy people. As part of the 
China-UK Project in Liangshan, Sichuan province, peer-education was organized also 
among CSWs. In 2004, the AIDS Relief Fund for China started supporting one of the 
best students of this program to reach more young women and continue the 
momentum. 
The PLWHA community is a potentially important activist group. Because 
they are bearers of the disease or victims of the blood policies, they are genuinely 
passionate about AIDS prevention. However, they are constrained by their own health 
condition and social stigma, and this adds some uncertainty to their social activism in 
the AIDS field.77 Most the HIV+ activists introduced here use pseudo names in public 
and have not allowed any media to take pictures of them.  
NGOs and University Student Groups: 
The New generation of AIDS Activism 
The emergence of institutionalized NGOs is a key indicator of the development of 
social moblization and civil society. After the “Titanic Report” and Wan’s arrest in 
2003, we have witnessed the rise of a new generation of AIDS-related NGOs and 
activists. This new generation includes social organizations from diverse backgrounds, 
                                                 
77 Among all the well-known activists introduced above, Zhu Jingzhong died on 13 January 2005. Both 
Adam Li and Li Jiaming became very ill since the end of 2004.  
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ranging from PLWHA, gay community, women’s rights, environmental justice and 
medical professionals. (Table 4.5) Compared with the environmental civil society in 
China, the AIDS community is still limited in terms of number and geographic spread. 
Among the 21 NGOs surveyed in this study—who are the majority of the most well-
known Chinese NGOs in the field—most are concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Yunnan, where NGO activity in general is more active. (For all the organization 
names, see Appendix 4.3) 
Table 4.5. Breakdown of institutionalized AIDS-related NGOs/NGOs-to-be by organizational 
character (2004) 
Total PLWHA-led AIDS general  Gay Women Non-AIDS specific  
21 6 6 3 3 3 
 
Besides the activists mentioned before, the PLWHA activism community also 
consists of many hemophiliac associations. Many hemophilia patients became 
infected with HIV through contaminated blood and blood products. Activists of the 
Shanghai based Hemophilia Home of China have been advocating for governmental 
compensations for hemophilia-HIV patients. Due to their effort, 50 such patients in 
Shanghai have received compensations from the municipal government. However, in 
2003, a hemophilia-HIV patient from Hunan traveled to Shanghai to pursue 
governmental compensations, but was rejected. According to Xu Zhenjun, an activist 
from Grassroots Community (a Shanghai based NGO), the hemophilia-HIV issue is 
becoming even more sensitive than the Henan blood scandal. Journalists have been 
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banned to report on the issue, and there is little attention from the international 
community. 78
Besides the Aizhixing Institute, a few policy advocacy oriented NGOs have 
emerged. The Beijing Loving Source for Education and Research is an example.79 The 
chief founding member of this NGO, Hu Jia, is a veteran activist in a variety of social 
issues, including human rights. Due to Hu Jia’s outspokenness on sensitive human 
rights and democracy topics, he has been arrested and home arrested multiple times 
since April 2004. However, the organization has survived, and the other main member, 
Zeng Jinyan, has created a Pen Pal Club to connect college students with AIDS 
orphans in Henan. The number of volunteers participating in this Pen Pal Club 
increased from a dozen to over 80 within a year’s time.  
As HIV/AIDS is spreading to the general public, gay and women are 
identified as two most vulnerable populations. With support from the international 
community, particularly the Ford Foundation, the Berry & Martin Trust (UK) and Chi 
Heng Foundation (Hong Kong), gay rights movement activists in China (e.g., Zhang 
Beichuan, Wan Yanhai) have helped to establish hotlines and support-groups in almost 
all provincial capitals and major coastal cities. Recently, more international assistance 
has become available, and the Chinese government is more open to the gay issue. 
Consequently, many gay hotlines and support-groups have expanded and 
institutionalized their activism work. For example, the Beijing Gay Hotline became 
                                                 
78 Interviewed in Shanghai, March 2004 
79 Multiple interviews with Hu Jia and Zeng Jinyan, founders of the Loving Source Institute, in Beijing, 
summer 2004. This organization was registered as a private company in May 2004, but meant to 
operate as a non-profit organization according to the organizational by-laws.  
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the Beijing Gender Institute, which has received many grants from international 
organizations to implement AIDS awareness projects within the gay community.80  
“Women” was the theme for 2004 World AIDS Conference. In China, rural 
women are identified as a high-risk population due to the lack of access to health 
information and services. Women’s rights is one of the most active issue area in civil 
society development in China.  But, there are still not many women’s rights NGOs 
working in health or AIDS. The three women’s rights based NGOs included in this 
study are the earliest bottom-up initiatives in the AIDS field. They also perfectly 
illustrate the important role played by international NGOs in the development of 
Chinese social groups. The Women and Child Development Centre of Ruili was, in 
fact, initiated by Save the Children UK during its own comprehensive AIDS 
prevention project in the region. Both the Legal Assistance Center for Women and 
Children of Xishuangbanna in Yunnan and Qianxi Women’s Health Association in 
Hebei were founded by activist-minded former local Women’s Federations officials 
with substantial support from international foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation and 
the Asia Foundation). During their grassroots, the Xishuangbanna group gradually 
found AIDS imperiling the lives of minority young women in the region. Starting 
from single case investigation, they have helped many individual patients and their 
families.81  The Qianxi group has reached to over 200 villages and 10,000 rural 
women in the county, and provided health trainings for group leaders among these 
                                                 
80 Interview with Zhen Li, founding member of the Beijing Gay Hotline, in July 2004.  
81Interview with Long Sihai, Director of the Legal Assistance Center for Women and Children of 
Xishuangbanna, in Wuhan, 3 June 2004. 
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women since its establishment in 2002. In 2004, the AIDS Relief Fund for China (a 
U.S. private charity) gave the Qianxi a small grant to start their first training in 
HIV/AIDS prevention. With the support, the staff members created educational 
materials suitable for local women and innovative programs to overcome the social 
stigma of AIDS. Another American NGO, the Aixin Foundation, is currently helping 
to publicize their achievement and replicate their work in other parts of rural China.82  
Besides the above NGOs, a few non-AIDS focused NGOs are switching gears 
and joining their colleagues to promote public awareness of AIDS, for they see the 
epidemic is not a simple medical matter, but involves many social justice issues. 
There are three environmental NGOs currently active in the AIDS field, all of which 
have developed a solid societal foundation and relatively a high level of self-capacity.  
The importance of university student groups to China’s civil society 
development was demonstrated by the conservation case in the case of conservation. 
The AIDS field also is undergoing a rapid growth of university student groups since 
2002. According to the survey conducted by the Loving Source Institute, by 2004 
there were 24 university student groups engaged in AIDS awareness and care work. 83 
Among these groups, ten are located in Beijing, and nine outside the three main cities 
(i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing), spreading across Hubei, Jiangxi, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Anhui, Xinjiang, Jiangsu and other seven provinces. 
 
                                                 
82 Interviews and follow-ups with the Qianxi Women’s Association from June 2004 to January 2005. 
83 Special acknowledgement goes to Zeng Jinyan, Renmin University and Loving Source Institute, for 
sharing the information about university student groups working on AIDS related issues. 
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 Social activism in HIV/AIDS prevention and nature conservation presents 
some commonalities. Both started to emerge in the mid-1990s by a group of 
courageous activists, and have undergone political suppression from the government. 
Professionals are crucial to the development of both communities. With the growth of 
university student groups, both are energized and prepared to building on successes of 
the past. International NGOs have provided important support to Chinese activists and 
NGOs in both fields.  
However, social groups as a whole have not developed as many and as strong 
networks among each other in the AIDS field as in the conservation field. Even 
though meetings, social gathering, and exchanges are becoming more frequent among 
AIDS activists and NGOs, major nation-wide coalitions, public campaigns, or 
movements have not occurred in this field yet. There are only some minimal signs of 
collective actions taken by activists in this field.  
In April 2004, Aizhixing Institute received a call for help from some dying 
HIV+ patients in rural Henan. They complained about being cheated into AIDS 
clinical trials by the Beijing Ditan Hospital. Aizhixing first took the lead in 
investigating the issue, and was later joined by many other activists and concerned 
professionals. In May, Lin Gu, an activist-minded journalist for the Xinhua News 
Agency wrote an article uncovering all related parties and politics, and the Southern 
Weekend featured the story on the front page. The Ditan Hospital eventually posted an 
announcement about the clinical trial on their official website. Even though the 
involved patients didn’t get fair compensation, the symbolic success of the activist 
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community was evident. In another case, when a farmer couple in Henan who used to 
help a Beijing based Chinese NGO to deliver relief goods was arrested by local police 
in August 2004, many AIDS activists in Beijing coordinated their resources to help 
them. Activists from No-HIV, a web-based activist group, printed and disseminated 
black postcards in Beijing to protest the incident. In January 2005, Zhu Jinzhong 
passed away, and the Loving Source Institute, who kept in close contact with this 
villager activist received tens of letters/emails of condolence from the AIDS activism 
community. Such incidents did generate momentum for AIDS social groups to 
communicate with each other, and build up mutual-trust. More importantly, like what 
is seen is the conservation field, by going through these emergent or politically 
sensitive events together, AIDS activists are learning together how to interact and 
negotiate with authorities. However, among other things, due to the lack leadership 
and the low level of mobilization of the journalist circles, this learning process in the 
AIDS field has not proceeded as fast and recurrent as in the conservation field.  
 
INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS  
IN HIV/AIDS PREVENTION  
 
International NGOs started working in the field of reproductive health as early as the 
end of 1970s. In 1979, an American NGO, PATH (Program for Appropriate 
Technology in Health), accepted an invitation from the Chinese government to 
provide technical consultation for maternal and reproductive health in the country.84 
                                                 
84 Interview with PATH senior program officer, Ms. GENG Qian, in Beijing, 18 April, 2004. 
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When the news of a large number of Chinese drug users testing HIV+ became known, 
international NGOs responded to the potential AIDS epidemic even earlier than most 
multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies. Red Cross Australia initiated 
negotiations with the Yunnan government on AIDS prevention in 1994, two years 
before UNAIDS was invited to the diplomatic compound in Beijing. To date, tens of 
international organizations and research institutions have implemented health related 
projects of various scales in China. (Figure 4.4) 
Figure 4.4. Growth of international NGOs working in health and AIDS in China 
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 Over the past decade, international NGOs, first recognized as specialists, 
public educators, and friends, have provided considerable moral, technical, and 
financial support to both Chinese governments and social groups. More importantly, 
unlike multilateral and bilateral agencies, international NSAs have been persistently 
advocating and trying to reach the worst hit areas beyond major cities, and more 
marginalized HIV+ or high risk populations rather than the patients who are already 
receiving treatment at state-run infectious disease hospitals. Through continuous 
communication and interaction with local authorities, a few external advocacy groups 
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have gradually overcome various political barriers and reached to the most remote, 
devastated, or discriminated populations. 
Several international NGOs and activists have managed to implement relief, 
prevention, and care projects in Hennan province. Some have sustained close contacts 
with rural HIV/AIDS patients in many remote areas of Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, 
and Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Some are targeting in particular the social groups 
that are normally overlooked by large donor agencies (e.g., rural community based 
groups, PLWHA self-help groups, CSWs, and migrating workers). For example, DKT 
International, a Washington, D.C.-based charitable organization that implements nine 
social marketing programs in nine countries, describes its specific mandate in China 
as supporting migrant workers.  
International NGOs and Advocacy Groups in AIDS Prevention 
This research first focuses on 32 international NGOs that are currently operating in 
China. They have either exclusively focused on AIDS problems, or allocated 
substantial amount of their organizational resources to assist in AIDS prevention. 
Besides these project implementing NGOs, there are also a number of private 
foundations and charities that are providing financial assistance to combat AIDS in 
China. For example, three Christian church based groups recently also expanded their 
humanitarian work in China into the field of AIDS prevention. A few funding 
organizations, particularly the Ford Foundation, and two smaller private foundations, 
the Barry and Martin’s Trust and the AIDS Relief Fund for China, will also be 
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discussed in details. They are included because of their close ties with Chinese NGOs 
and their substantial involvement in transnational advocacy in China.  
 I located these groups by attending UNAIDS Theme Group meetings (a main 
gathering venue for parties concerned with AIDS in China), interviewing leading 
Chinese activist and main international NGOs in the field, and meeting with advocacy 
groups at the Yunnan AIDS NGO Forum. (For the names of all the international 
NGOs and foundations, see Appendix 4.5.) 85
This community of international NGOs is very diverse in terms of their 
organizational structure, personnel composition, financial resources, and working 
philosophies. Some are truly transnationalized, operated by hundreds of professionals 
in all continents of the world (e.g., Save the Children U.K., Médecins sans Frontières, 
and Marie Stopes International). Some are small non-profit philanthropies run by one 
or a few overseas Chinese (e.g., Chi Heng Foundation in Hong Kong and the Aixin 
Foundation in the U.S.). However, as explained in the theoretical chapter,  I am more 
interested in observing the character of this group as a whole, so I will not go into 
details about each organization’s specific features.  
                                                 
85 The main reasons for not including a few other organizations that have also done some work related 
to China’s AIDS epidemic, besides the fact that they are not very much connected with the rest of the 
international NGOs in the field, are as followings: 1) They were invited by specific governmental 
agency to conduct one-time, short-term research or training course, e.g., in 2002, on request of the 
Chinese MoH, the International Center for Reproductive Health collaborated with Shanghai health 
governmental agencies and other research institutions on a AIDS related workshop and pilot course; 2) 
Their AIDS projects are still under planning, e.g., ActionAid, a U.K. NGO, has been working in China 
on rural development issues for years, and are currently designing projects related to AIDS prevention 
NGOs and activists. (Exchanges with ActionAid Beijing Office staff in Oct. 2004)  
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This community has had a shorter history than the conservation one. However, 
even though they started working on AIDS issues relatively recently, many of them 
have been working in health or other fields of social welfare in China since the 1980s. 
The total number of international NGOs in this community has gradually grown over 
the past 25 years.  
Geographically, the international NGOs in this case present a similar tendency 
as in the conservation field. Around 16 NGOs work in the southwestern three 
provinces, and the rest are spread out across the country.  
Also like the nature conservation NGO community, this is a fairly localized 
group. 23 of the 32 organizations have established their base in China, ranging from a 
modern office in Beijing equipped with the most advanced technologies and a dozen 
international experts, to one person performing “shuttle diplomacy” and leading local 
Chinese staff. (Figure 4.5) Among the eight NGOs that have not obtained a physical 
presence in China, some have, at least, formed strong personal relationships with 
Chinese activists and other NGOs. The Aixin Foundation, registered in Maryland, 
U.S., was founded by a group of American Chinese food and drug safety experts, who 
have considerable personal ties and contacts in China in the field of public health and 
AIDS prevention.  
Three of the NGOs started operating in China only due to their involvement in 
large-scale bilateral or multilateral projects. For example, Family Health International 
established its office in China in 2003 as the chief coordinating agency to implement 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Mekong Region Health 
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Project. The vast majority of NGOs, though, came to China with independent 
missions. Some have evolved into independence , even though they came to China as 
technical advisors for U.N. agencies like PATH and Marie Stopes. This is not to say 
that international NGOs have not taken advantage of connections with multilateral or 
bilateral organizations. On the contrary, many of them benefit from their close 
relationship with other AIDS assistance agencies, especiall, the China-UK Programme, 
USAID, and UNAIDS, as they are critical to getting access to the Chinese 
government (this was certainly the case with the International HIV/AIDS Alliance). 
7 organizations limits its work by only targeting a particular group of people 
within a specific geographic location. Most of them aim at either various HIV+ or 
high risk populations, or multiple locations. There is a global trend to link AIDS relief, 
prevention and treatment together and to take a multi-sectoral approach.  
Consequently, NGOs in the AIDS field tend to work in a comprehensive way even 
when dealing with a single problem and assisting a defined group of people. 
Figure 4.5. General characteristics of international NGO community in AIDS prevention in 
China 
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 The following section introduces a few of the most important international 
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NGOs in transnational politics surrounding AIDS prevention in China; it is hoped that 
this will allow readers to better grasp the analysis of the triangular relationship among 
international NGOs, the Chinese state, and Chinese social groups in the next chapter, 
and the nature of this transnational community in general. These NGOs are grouped 
partially according to when they first started working on China’s AIDS problems, and 
partially according to the commonalities they share with each other. Such selections 
are meant to better illustrate individual organizations’ interactions with various 
political happenings in China, as well as the historical dynamics of transnational 
advocacy and mobilization in this field.  
Forerunners: Red Cross Australia and Save the Children U.K. 
Red Cross Australia (RCAus) 86
Red Cross Australia, a member of the international family of Red Cross organizations, 
entered China in 1994, and was the first international NGO that worked in China with 
a specific mandate for AIDS control and prevention. Prior to RCAus’ entrance, a 
major episode of HIV infection along the bordering areas between China’s Yunnan 
province and Burma was exposed. 146 local Yunnan farmers and IDUs tested HIV 
positive. This incident shocked local communities as well as the provincial 
                                                 
86 The explanation of Red Cross Australia’s AIDS prevention work in China is based on publicly 
available materials, and the following interviews: Ms. Audrey Swift, former Red Cross Australia 
technical advisor in Yunnan and Xinjiang (1999-2002) and current Regional Health Delegate and 
HIV/AIDS Coordinator of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, on 30 
April 2004; Ms. Wei Ping, a former PLWHA peer-education participant and trainer, and currently a 
project officer of the Yunan Red Cross HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project, on 25 August 2004; 
and, Mr. WANG Yanbin, former staff of the Australia and Yunnan Red Cross joint office (1998-2003), 
on 26 August 2004.  
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government. Therefore, when the Yunnan health authorities learned about Red Cross 
Australia’s inquiries through China National Red Cross, they welcomed the idea of 
establishing a joint program to prevent a potential AIDS epidemic.87 The Yunnan 
government recognized the expertise that the Red Cross Australia team had, and 
hoped to develop its own capacity in dealing with AIDS through formal bilateral 
programs with them. However, as an NGO, Red Cross Australia preferred to work 
with a Chinese partner that was not a formal governmental agency. The final 
arrangement was to designate the Yunnan Red Cross88 to be the only working partner 
of the Red Cross Australia, and all collaborative work would be implemented within 
the existing Yunnan Red Cross structures.   
Over the years, Red Cross Australia has sent many public health specialists as 
technical advisors for AIDS control and prevention programs formally organized by 
the Yunnan Red Cross. They, for the first time, introduced AIDS peer-education to 
                                                 
87 All overseas Red Cross organizations have to coordinate through the China National Red Cross 
(CNRC) to operate inside China. Usually, CNRC first sends out “invitations” to all provincial Red 
Cross offices to find out who would like to accept “technical assistance” from international Red Cross 
partners. The Yunnan government responded quickest when Red Cross Australia initiated partnership 
search in 1994. 
88 A note on Red Cross offices in China: After 1949, the China National Red Cross was combined into 
the state health administration, and all local Red Cross organizations became affiliated with the health 
authorities at different levels. New Red Cross offices were even created in some provinces and cities to 
meet the uniformity of health governance across the country. Even though the Red Cross organizations 
became part of the health administrative system, there does not exist vertical or horizontal 
administrative ties among them. The National Red Cross Federation is not the central authority of all 
Chinese Red Cross organizations. It can provide professional guidance and technical support to the 
provincial and local Red Cross offices, but it is not responsible for their budget, personnel management 
and regular operations. Provincial Health Bureaus used to fully fund Red Cross offices under its 
jurisdiction. However, this has changed in recent years. And, the legal status of Red Cross offices 
varies. Some Red Cross offices remain as a part of the health administration, while others have 
obtained independent status as public enterprises, like the Yunnan Red Cross. But, in general, Red 
Cross offices across China are still closely tied with the corresponding health authorities. 
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China. Particularly, due to their continuous effort and persuasion, commercial sex 
workers, drug users, and HIV+ patients have been included in peer-education training 
sessions, which is far beyond the imagination and working methods of Chinese Red 
Cross staff. 
The cooperation between these two organizations has led to achievements far 
beyond original expectations. The Yunnan Red Cross now has more than 20 full-time 
staff members, and over 30 contractors and volunteers. The Yunnan government 
expanded the Red Cross office’s mandate and granted it administrative autonomy in 
2004.89 The size and funding of the Yunnan Red Cross is the third largest (after the 
ones in Beijing and Shanghai) among all the Red Cross offices in China. During his 
fifth visit to China, Kofi Annan, Secretary in General of the U.N., twice praised 
Yunnan Red Cross’ work in AIDS prevention. They are now recognized as the 
flagship office among all Red Cross teams in China, and have been invited to various 
provinces to share their experience in AIDS prevention. 
Save the Children U.K. (SC) 90
Founded in 1919, Save the Children U.K. is a part of the International Save the 
Children Alliance, the world’s leading children’s rights advocacy organization. Based 
in London, SC now works in impoverished communities across 70 countries.  SC 
provided relief to Chinese victims of natural disaster and war in the 1930s. After 1949, 
                                                 
89  Since 2004, Yunnan Red Cross is no longer a department of the Yunnan Health Bureau. Its 
administrative ranking is equivalent to the Health Bureau, and its director’s ranks as a deputy 
provincial governor. 
90 Explanation of Save the Children UK’s work in China is based on publicly accessible materials (e.g., 
program quarterly newsletters), and interviews with Ms. Lu Yiyi, former Beijing office representative 
of Save the Children UK China program, in July 2000, and Mr. Wang Yanbin on 26 August 2004. 
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SC worked in Hong Kong, and supported the development of social services. In the 
early 1990s, SC returned to the mainland, working mainly in southwestern China, and 
relocated its China Programme Office from Hong Kong to Kunming in 1995. In 1999, 
a representative office was established in Beijing to enhance advocacy, networking 
and central government partnerships. By 2004, SC’s China Programme has had 
reached over 20 provinces, cooperating with different levels of governmental agencies 
and communities.  
Equitable access to HIV/AIDS prevention, education, care and support for 
children and young people is identified as one of SC’s three strategic issues in China. 
Like the Red Cross Australia, SC also emphasized and promoted AIDS peer-education 
as the fist step to curbing the spread of the disease. What distinguishes SC’s working 
style is that it has also been deeply involved in care, treatment, and policy advocacy in 
the field. Currently, with the success of its Ruili multi-sectoral AIDS prevention 
model, SC is not only replicating this model in two other counties, but is also 
restructuring its internal workings to integrate AIDS prevention work into all projects.  
To some extent, Red Cross Australia and Save the Children UK are not only 
the forerunners among all international organizations—governmental or non-
governmental—that are concerned with AIDS in China. They, for the first time, 
introduced many effective methods of behavior modification and community-based 
care delivery to prevent AIDS. More importantly, they established models of 
communication and interaction with the Chinese health authorities and local 
communities, which were later learned and explored by peer international NGOs. For 
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example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
began its HIV program in China in 2001. Currently, IFRC HIV/AIDS programs are 
operating in Yunnan and Xinjiang with a budget of 1 million USD, and they are 
negotiating with four other provincial Red Cross offices in Henan, Hunan, Shangdong, 
Chongqing. Some of its programs are similar to what Red Cross Australia and Save 
the Children UK have conducted - peer education (among students, CSWs, and IDUs), 
small scale workshop for patients, and training for peer educators and counselors. 
International NGOs as Technical Advisors, and Public Educators 
A few NGOs came to China under U.N. or bilateral cooperation frameworks; for 
example, Family Health International, Population Service International, and Futures 
Group Europe are implementing agencies for DFID and USAID’s AIDS projects in 
Sichuan, Guangxi and Yunnan. These NGOs are granted more flexibility by the 
Chinese government. In other words, their mobility at local levels and access to 
China’s public health system are safeguarded in advance. However, most international 
NGOs, including Red Cross Australia and Save the Children UK, have to garner trust 
from the Chinese government regarding their humanitarian principles. Many NGOs 
first established working relationships with the government in other health fields, and 
later moved into the AIDS prevention field: for example, PATH and Health Unlimited 
in maternal health, Marie Stopes in reproductive health, Daytop in drug addition 
rehabilitation, and Médecins sans Frontières and Medecins du Monde in health 
emergency relief. Regardless of their specialty, in most situations, international NGOs 
have to first convince the Chinese government that they are sympathetic to the AIDS 
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situation in China and that they are willing to join the state to curtail its spread, before 
they can obtain access to the public health system. The Chinese government gradually 
recognizes the technical assistance and expertise that international NGOs are capable 
of bringing to China, and considers them technical advisors and public educators in 
the battle against AIDS. Once communication channels are established, these 
international NGOs have been able to demonstrate new principles and measures to the 
local or central governmental authorities. In many cases, they have succeeded in 
persuading the government to re-visit existing policies and consider changes. 
PATH (Program for Appropriate Technology in Health) is an American NGO, 
headquartered in Seattle. In 1980s and 1990s, PATH collaborated with the State 
Family Planning Commission (now changed to National Population and Family 
Planning Commission - NPFPC) and provided technical assistance in improving 
maternal health. During that time, the U.N. Population Agency also funded PATH to 
conduct trainings for rural doctors (barefoot doctors) in inter-personal communication. 
Through many years’ of collaborations in nutrition rice and vaccines for children, 
mutual understanding and a level of trust have been established between Chinese 
officials and PATH. Currently, PATH’s main work in China is the Youth Productive 
Health program (since 2000), of which AIDS prevention among youth is an important 
component. Usually, PATH does not establish a country office to implement a project. 
But, because its work in China has grown substantially, particularly in HIV/AIDS 
prevention, PATH opened its Beijing office in 2004 with three full-time staff, one of 
which is based at State CDC office. This further indicates the depth of PATH’s 
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connections with health agencies. Because of the trust from governmental authorities, 
PATH has been able to conduct project which can be perceived sensitive under 
normal circumstances: for example, AIDS awareness education for migrant workers 
in entertainment businesses.  
Like PATH with its strong professional background, Health Unlimited (HU) 
started working in eastern China in 1993 organizing maternal and child health training 
and health awareness campaigns in eight provinces with a beneficiary population of 
14 million people. Collaborating with the MoH and Yunnan provincial government, 
HU launched an integrated health care program in Yunnan in 1996, which covered the 
issue of HIV prevention.  
Since 1998, Marie Stopes International (MSI) has been an executing agency 
for UNFPA’s Reproductive Health Project, promoting informed choice and client 
orientated, high quality and integrated reproductive health services. In 2000, MSI 
officially established its local affiliate Marie Stopes China (MSC) in Beijing with a 
Chinese national as its chief director. Even though MSC initially experienced a legal 
dilemma when attempting to register as a non-profit international NGO representative 
office, it now has grown into a team of seven full time professionals, implementing a 
range of innovative programs and delivering sexual health care and education in 
multiple cities across China. 91  MSC’s program incorporates advocacy, behavior 
change and communication, capacity building, partnerships and service provision. 
                                                 
91 Interview with MSC Director, Ms. Lily Liu, April 2004. Because China still has not established laws 
and tax regulations regarding international NGOs, MSC, like many other international NGOs, is 
currently registered as a multi-national corporation but with some tax exemptions.  
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MSC’s partners in China range from central health authorities to individual activists 
and from major cities to villages in Henan. In particularly, its support to HIV+ 
activists has been crucial to connect various HIV+ groups across China and unite their 
voices to be heard by health authorities.  
Daytop Village Foundation (also known as Daytop), an American NGO, has 
been providing drug counseling services since 1963, making it the oldest and largest 
drug-free self-help program in the U.S. It is based on the therapeutic community 
concept: a highly structured, family environment where positive peer interaction is 
emphasized. On 28 Sep. 1998, Daytop opened a rehabilitation center in Kunming, 
Yunnan, which was later formally recognized by a bilateral agreement between the 
U.S. Department of State and the Chinese MoH, which the National Anti-Drug 
Trafficking Committee signed in 2003. Daytop Kunming is the first voluntary 
rehabilitation center in China for those who seek help with problems of substance 
abuse. It has also been involved in the China-UK AIDS Care program, China-
Australia AIDS Care program, and China-U.S. AIDS collaborations to conduct 
specific AIDS peer education for drug users and training for AIDS-care social workers 
and counselors.  
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and Medecins du Monde are among the 
international NGOs that are specialized in directly providing treatment and health 
services to populations in need. Across the world, they set up their own clinics to treat 
patients and victims of war, natural disasters and epidemics. MFS also endeavors to 
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“publicly bear witness to the plight of the populations they serve”. 92  Both 
organizations and their branches started working in China in disaster and emergency 
relief in 1980s. When they realized the potential devastation of an AIDS epidemic, 
they redirected most of their resources to find a niche in this field.  
Medecins du Monde (MdM) was founded in 1980, and works to “treat 
physical and psychological traumas of those generally excluded from mainstream 
health services”.93 MdM first provided emergency assistance to China in 1988. Since 
1993, it has worked with the Shanghai Bureau of Health and the Centre for Disease 
Control, establishing an HIV/STD prevention program. MdM developed in 1999-
2000 a program to prevent the transmission of STDs in six job-sites in the city of 
Chengdu through a mobile unit carrying information and engaging in prevention 
activities. They identified three groups that were particularly affected by STDs and 
HIV - injecting drug users, sex workers and the rural population arriving in the urban 
centers to look for jobs. Through their work, they provided drug users access to 
information regarding prevention of HIV and STD transmission.  
As an international NGO, MSF has a network of subsidiaries in 18 countries. 
Each year, more than 3,000 volunteer doctors, nurses, other medical professionals, 
logistics experts, water/sanitation engineers, and administrators are sent to different 
parts of the world to provide medical aid. Four different MSF country offices have so 
far worked to China. MSF Holland and Switzerland came earlier, and later MSF 
                                                 
92 MSF organizational mission statement. 
93 Information on MdM was collected from its website and the China Development Brief’s description 
of its work in China.  
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Belgium and France followed. MSF Holland and Switzerland had some access to the 
local health system, and implemented some TV educational programs. However, 
unable to deliver health care directly, both organizations left with frustration in 
2002.94
MSF Belgium arrived in China in 1989. In early years, they mostly provided 
relief work for victims of natural disaster, promoted water hygiene, and contributed to 
basic infrastructure building because their requests for access to public health system 
were always denied. They constantly received inquiries from medical technicians and 
doctors for assistance, but not from local or central governmental health agencies. 
Their first chance came with the SARS crisis. The vice mayor of Zhang Jiakou city 
(Hebei province) personally took the political risk to invite MSF Belgium to help with 
SARS.  
During that time, MSF’s reputation and their expertise in AIDS treatment 
gradually became known to central health agencies through various international 
conferences and some UNAIDS events. Finally, in 2003, MSF Belgium received an 
invitation from the local governments in Hubei to establish an AIDS treatment 
program. 95  When I visited the AIDS clinic that resulted from this invitation in 
Xiangfan, 128 HIV+ patients from Hubei and Henan were being treated there. 
                                                 
94 Interview with Mr. Luc Van Leemput, Head of Mission, MSF-Belgium, in Beijing, 27 March 2004. 
95 A senior official from the Hubei provincial CDC learned about MSF’s work in the AIDS field in 
other countries when attending a UNAIDS conference in Yunnan early 2003. After that, he took the 
initiative and contacted MSF Belgium Beijing Office. The local CDC office in Xiangfan, a county in 
northern Hubei province, a few hours away from Henan by train, responded to the provincial CDC’s 
idea most positively.  
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MSF France, another country branch of MSF International, began its aid to 
China in 1996 with a medical service program in Rongshui County, Guangxi province. 
In 2003, it expanded this primary health-care program and set up a medical clinic to 
provide care and treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS. It is reported that, by the 
beginning of 2005, 260 HIV+ patients had been received and treated in the clinic.96 
Up till now, the two AIDS treatment clinics established by MSF teams are the only 
ones of their kind in China—independent clinics which can provide alternative types 
of treatment and care to HIV/AIDS patients (in contrast with state-run AIDS hospitals) 
for free.  
The above examples, especial the experience of MSF Belgium and France, 
represent the majority of international NGOs currently working in the AIDS field in 
China. The examples illustrate that it takes time for international NGOs to convince 
the Chinese government of their missions and noble intensions of working in AIDS 
prevention in China. Many of them have to adopt a dynamic strategy—working in 
another area first, and then switching to AIDS field. They can gain the trust of the 
Chinese government by first attaching their work in China to governmental agencies, 
and then move toward establishing an independent country office (which can, in turn, 
provide more choices in selecting partners and autonomy in deciding implementation 
plans).97 Once the trust and working relationship is established, international NGOs 
                                                 
96 “MSF Gives HIV/AIDS Sufferers Free Help”. China Daily, 19 April 2005. p3.  
97 After 2003, the year when major shift in governmental policy on AIDS prevention took place, the 
Chinese health authorities became more receptive to international NGOs that have a specific agenda of 
AIDS prevention, and have granted more flexibility for them to implement programs either 
independently or together with Chinese governmental agencies. This change parallels with how the 
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are able to facilitate the course of AIDS prevention by sharing their expertise or 
directly providing health services and relief assistance. In many cases, as described 
above, international NGOs are the first ones who operationalize the policy goals, and 
present practical examples for Chinese governments and other international health 
agencies to follow or learn about.  
Working under Pressure: Going to Henan  
Due to the political context of China, as often stated in this research, it is not 
surprising to find out that most international NGOs have had to interact with the 
Chinese government initally to secure their presence in China. Therefore, they are 
known to the government and health authorities, before they are known to local 
communities and general public. Nevertheless, a few NGOs, mostly Hong Kong and 
Taiwan-based, have taken a different approach—going straight to local communities. 
Their familiarity with social, cultural, and geographical contexts in China enabled 
them to do so. In this respect, these NGOs played a distinctive role in supporting and 
mobilizing local HIV+ patients. Particularly in the case of Henan province; 
HIV/AIDS patients were victims of the illegal blood industries and the lack of AIDS 
public education, and political forces historically blocked and refused any 
international assistance to this province. Before 2000, most of the multilateral AIDS 
assistance was used in Yunnan, Sichuan and Xinjiang.98  It was not until 2004 that 
                                                                                                                                            
government has modified its approach in international cooperation in public health in general. 
98 Exceptions include UNICEF’s work related to mother-child HIV transmission in Henan.  
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bilateral assistance agencies were allowed to work in Henan in the AIDS field.99  A 
handful of Hong Kong and Taiwanese NGOs and Marie Stopes China were the only 
outside NGOs that had access and could deliver information, public education and 
financial assistance to AIDS patients in Henan during 2004 when this research was 
conducted.   
Chung To and Chi Heng Foundation 
During the New Year holidays of 2002, Dr. Gao Yaojie received an unusual guest at 
her apartment—who looked like an ordinary Chinese man, but spoke with a unique 
accent. Chung To, a Hong Kong native, San Francisco teenager, Columbia University 
graduate, and Harvard MBA, quit his investment banking job and became a full-time 
activist in AIDS prevention in his early 30s. He formed the Chi Heng Foundation in 
Hong Kong in 1998. Because of his extraordinary contribution to AIDS awareness 
promotion, the Hong Kong government named him one of the “Ten Distinctive Young 
People of Hong Kong” in 2003. In May 2005, the Southern People Weekly magazine 
named him one of the Distinctive Young Leaders of China. 
After he read about the blood scandal in Henan in 2002, he decided to take a 
field trip to these villages. Once he saw with his eyes the patients lying in bed with 
absolutely no medicine, the orphans left with empty houses, and hundreds of new 
tombs in Henan, he lost sleep.100 With the help from local activists, particularly Dr. 
                                                 
99 U.S. GAP Beijing Office is currently working with drug rehabilitation centers in Henan.  
100 To, Chung. 2004. “Help Needed for the Children: Problems Related to the Children Orphaned by 
AIDS in Central China”. Information about Chi Heng Foundation was collected from multiple 
meetings with Chung To in 2004. 
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Gao Yaojie, Chung To quickly got in touch with some villagers. He soon also realized 
how politically sensitive AIDS prevention could be in Henan. To best help the 
children affected by the AIDS epidemic, he signed agreements with local authorities 
that he would never invite media coverage of his work in Henan, and he would keep 
the names of the village that he will support unannounced. In 2002, he found 127 
orphans to support in one county of Henan, and by 2004, he had already expanded his 
work to reach over 2000 orphans in seven counties across four provinces in central 
China. At the end of 2004, Chung To was building two offices, one in Shanghai, and 
one in Henan, and recruiting full-time staff, some of which would be PLWHA.   
 Besides the AIDS orphan issue, Chung To and Chi Heng Foundation have also 
done excellent work in promoting AIDS awareness within the gay community in 
many Chinese cities. His work in Henan is particularly important in China in that he 
worked under extreme political pressure, managed to deliver support to most the 
needy populations, and made the situation in Henan known to the outside world. 
Chung To has been able to communicate with the international AIDS prevention 
community about what is happening in Henan and central rural China, without 
offending the local authorities and risking his relief work. Many international 
organizations like the Center for Strategic and International Studies have invited him 
to give talks about his work in Henan, since first-hand information about the AIDS 
epidemic in this province is still rare. More importantly, he has made efforts to 
strengthen local people’s self-help capacity by recruiting them to work with him. His 
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work serves as an model for other outside NGOs to use as a possible way of reaching 
out to Henan villages without being caught up in complicated politics. 
“Sister Yang” 
Most activists and professionals working in the AIDS field in China had heard about 
the story about Zhu Jingzhong and his 52 adopted children. But very few actually 
knew who supported Zhu. Some said that was an artist from Taiwan, while others 
alluded to a philanthropist “Sister Yang”.  
Yang Jie, owner of a flower shop in Taipei city, Taiwan, is the anonymous 
heroin behind the story. As a matter of fact, she is not a typical philanthropist with a 
large amount of wealth. Seven years ago, Yang opened her shop to host of some 
homeless AIDS patients in Taiwan. Instead of turning the shop into a hospice, she 
preferred to call it a “midway station”, because she hoped that all these patients would 
eventually return to society. When she read the reports on AIDS orphans on the 
mainland, she “heeded a new calling” according to a friend of hers.101 She soon 
started to contact and support AIDS activists working on the mainland, including 
Chung To, and eventually made a trip to Henan on her own. During that trip, Yang 
found Zhu Jingzhong in Shuanmiao village, central Henan. From then on, she has 
supported most of Zhu’s expenses for the orphans, and a few other AIDS families in 
Henan. In 2003, Yang registered an NGO in Taiwan, the Harmony Home Association, 
to sustain and expand her work in mainland and Taiwan. 
                                                 
101 Field report by Humphrey Wou, Program Director of the AIDS Relief Fund for China, August 2004. 
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Like Chung To’s Chi Heng Foundation, Yang’s organization is small-staffed. 
However, exactly because of its small scale and low profile, in addition to personal 
determination and skills, it has achieved what most large international NGOs have not 
been able to do until very recently—helping HIV/AIDS patients in Henan. 
Salvation Army Hong Kong 
The previous chapter introduced Hong Kong based NGOs and their contribution to 
the rise of environmentalism in mainland China. Hong Kong has a longer history of 
NGO development, and both the government and the public have more experience in 
interacting with NGOs. In the field of health, like the case of environmental 
protection, many Hong Kong NGOs as well as many local branches of international 
NGOs have emerged. Many of them have comprehensive agendas that include AIDS 
prevention on the mainland (e.g., Kadoorie Charitable Foundation, World Vision 
Hong Kong, Salvation Army Hong Kong and Oxfam Hong Kong). In 2004, the World 
Vision Hong Kong launched a one million USD, ten-year AIDS prevention related 
program in Yunnan. Prior to that, both Salvation Army Hong Kong and Oxfam Hong 
Kong have operated praise-worthy projects for preventing AIDS in Henan and other 
regions in mainland China. 
The Salvation Army first reached Beijing in 1916 to provide humanitarian 
services for war refugees.102 Services spread rapidly in China and work commenced 
in Hong Kong in 1930. By the 50s, when large numbers of refugees arrived, more 
                                                 
102 Information about the Salvation Army HK is collected from its official website and interview with 
Ms. Puisi Chan. China Country Program Manager, the Salvation Army, Hong Kong and Macau 
Command, Beijing, 29 July 2004. 
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services were developed which formed the base of today’s services that operate in 
Hong Kong. The Army resumed its work on the mainland in 1998, starting with 
earthquake relief. Since then, it has conducted relief work, built basic infrastructure, 
and sponsored community based development projects. 
The Salvation Army HK, with support from the Norwegian Government, has 
provided community-based counseling, health education and care (including AIDS) in 
Guangxi since 1999. Specifically on AIDS, the Army has opened two AIDS 
information and public education centers in Yunnan. One is located in Kunming, and 
the other in the more rural Longshan county. Such centers provide information, 
education materials, and basic training for HIV+ patients and their family members so 
that they will be able to organize mutual-help groups on their own. In Longshan, the 
Army cooperates with the Yunnan Provincial Office of Religious Affairs, and uses 
their networks to reach ethnic minority communities. For the Army’s project officers 
it is important to win the trust of local governments in order to gain access to remote 
and impoverished communities. 
In many ways, Henan is even a harder nut for the Army to crack than 
mountainous areas in the Southwest. Having learned lessons from other international 
NGOs, the Army, determined to get assistance to the devastated patients in Henan, 
started communicating with local authorities in early 2003. Staff members paid 
regular visits to county governmental offices and village committees. Meanwhile, 
they also frequently visited HIV+ patients and families affected by AIDS. “Sometime, 
we just listen to their stories and daily life, and laugh and cry with them. Just like 
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conducting group-counseling,” commented the chief project manager of the Army in 
Beijing. It is through such intensive interactions and mutual-learning processes that 
the local authorities were finally convinced of the “good intensions” of the Army. 
However, an agreement of “no publicity” was still required for the Army to operate 
any projects in the villages. Finally, in November 2003, a micro-loan project was 
launched with a group of six families in the Shuangmiao village. This project has 
grown into eight groups of local families within a year’s time, and local authorities 
have come to Salvation Army for advice of AIDS relief work.  
This is a typical example of how external advocacy actors can persuade local 
authorities, conduct demonstration projects, and achieve the goals of introducing new 
ideas and methods. In addition, they, to some extent, also lessened the tension 
between local governmental officials and farmers.  
Oxfam Hong Kong 
Founded in the city of Oxford, Great Britain, in 1942, Oxfam took its name from the 
words “Oxford” and “famine”. Its early work centered on providing emergency 
famine relief: although this is still a major component of its programs worldwide, a 
large part of Oxfam’s work is now devoted to longer-term development initiatives. 
Oxfam Hong Kong is a member of the Oxfam International and an independent 
development and relief agency based in Hong Kong working with poor and 
disadvantaged people in Asia and Africa. It began supporting work on the mainland in 
1987, even before it was officially registered in 1988.  
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Oxfam HK’s early work in China was centered on integrated rural 
development projects in southwestern China. In 1997, it established its Northwest 
Programme in Gansu and Shaanxi engageed in rural community development. Now 
also it has offices in Beijing and Yunnan. Currently, it has five main objectives in 
China: sustainable livelihoods, basic services, workplace safety, public participation, 
and equity and diversity. Reproductive health and HIV prevention is becoming an 
important focus. It has operated HIV prevention work among drug users in Yunnan, 
and sponsored individual activists to attend international training and conferences. 
 Oxfam HK does not have an office or project team in Henan, so its work has 
been implemented by engaging a few local activists and giving financial support 
directly to them.103 Ms. Liang Jun, a former official affiliated with the local Women’s 
Federation in Henan, is such an activist. In 2002, she and her colleagues started 
visiting and delivering assistance to AIDS patients and families in the worst hit 
villages in central Henan. Despite occasional local government resistance, Xin’s team 
has carried out Oxfam’s mission in Henan, and eventually they formed their own 
organization (Henan Center for Community Education and Research) to expand AIDS 
relief work in more regions in Henan.104  
 The only international NGO not Hong Kong or Taiwan based that was able to 
go into Henan to conduct AIDS relief and prevention work is the Marie Stopes China 
Program (MSC). MSC is probably the most localized international NGO in AIDS 
                                                 
103 Exchanges with Mr. Wai Ming Yiu, Assistant Officer for China Program, Oxfam Hong Kong, March 
2004. 
104 Talks given by DONG Lin and SUN Airong from Henan Center for Community Education and 
Research, at Wuhan ELM International Conference, 1-4 June, 2004. 
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prevention in China in that its chief officer has always been a Chinese national (a 
former official of the National Family Planning Association), and majority of its staff 
members are Chinese. Because of this background, MSC is better in tune with 
Chinese political and social contexts. Since 2003, MSC has been operating 
community-based AIDS education and prevention projects in multiple counties in 
Henan. They designed many innovative programs according to local needs. For 
example, they established “rotating AIDS education libraries” in some villages, 
encouraging local villagers to host meetings and discussion sessions at their homes. 
They supported a local Yu opera writer to write and direct a play on AIDS using a 
local dialectic.105  
I joined one of MSC’s field trips to southern Henan villages in May 2004, 
where the HIV infection rate is not as high as the central part of the province (and 
therefore lacking media exposure). The central government’s “Four-Free One-Care 
Policy” was poorly implemented and public awareness of the disease was shockingly 
low. MSC is currently developing self-help groups among local HIV+ patients and 
distributing education materials to them, and through them to yet more patients. They 
are also communicating with county-level health offices to better provide information 
and necessary funds to local patients.  
  As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the AIDS epidemic, in a way, 
was exacerbated by the blood scandal in Henan and the provincial government’s 
extreme reluctance towards accepting any kind of international assistance (e.g., 
                                                 
105 Special acknowledgements to GAO Qi, HIV Program Officer, Marie Stopes China, for sharing his 
experience and insights in AIDS prevention activism in China. 
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multilateral, bilateral, or non-governmental). Therefore, being able to work in Henan 
and deliver relief and assistance to local patients evidence was a unique contribution 
of international NGOs. In this aspect, they are not just technical advisors and public 
educators who facilitate and accelerate the process, but real risk-takers and hands-on 
practitioners who deal with problems in the field when no other resources are 
available and before the government sends out signals of opening up and addressing 
the issues. 
Innovative and Progressive Giving 
Private foundations and philanthropic organizations, as illustrated by the conservation 
case, are closely connected with the NGO community and provide necessary 
resources to assist NGOs in their missions. In some cases (as with the Ford 
Foundation), funding organizations operate almost like qausi-NGOs because of their 
intimate relationship with their grantees and their well-designed grant-making 
strategies. Some foundations are not as resourceful and prestigious as the Ford 
Foundation, yet their mobilization ability at the grassroots level is considerable. They 
emphasize delivering assistance as directly as possible to AIDS affected populations, 
and see the importance of bottom-up activism. Most of their grantees are Chinese 
NGOs or community-based organizations, and they keep close contact with them. 
These grassroots-oriented donors (e.g., Barry and Martin’s Trust, AIDS Relief Fund 
for China) are of strategic importance to map and examine international NGO 
networks. 
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Ford Foundation  106
General information about the Ford Foundation’s work in China has been provided in 
the previous chapter. In terms of HIV/AIDS, they started supporting projects in the 
mid-1990s. The focus of Ford Foundation’s AIDS grant-making in China has been on 
promoting research and sexual behavior interventions. Both of the two grants made 
before 1998 focused on research, conferences and information dissemination.107 Since 
1998, the Ford Foundation has greatly expanded its funding on gender, reproductive 
health, and HIV/AIDS prevention. It is worth pointing out that the Ford Foundation 
has particularly emphasized supporting research and interventions on sensitive topics 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of HIV intervention strategies, e.g., commercial sex 
workers, intravenous drug users, men who have sex with men (MSM), and vulnerable 
groups such as youth, women and the poor. 
Among all the grantees of the Ford Foundation, the vast majorities are 
university or government-affiliated research centers or GONGOs (e.g., Renming 
University, Institute for Gender and Sexuality Research), local medical science and 
research organizations (e.g., Yunnan Reproductive Health Research Association), 
public education organizations, and local branches of mass social organizations (e.g., 
Women’s Federation, and Family Planning Association in this case). This is the 
typical Ford Foundation approach. However, increasingly, the Foundation has been 
                                                 
106 Information about the Ford Foundation’s work in AIDS is collected from its website, and UNAIDS 
China annual reports from 1998 to 2002. 
107 In 1994: co-funded (with UNDP) a conference in Yunnan on social and economic impacts on the 
epidemic. In 1997: Harm reduction workshop in Yunnan with Don Desjarlais and Theodore Hammett 
introducing the evidence supporting clean needle programs for IV drug users. 
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providing funding to Chinese NGOs and individual activists. For example, Ford 
supported Prof. Zhang Konglai from the Beijing Union Medical College to form the 
China AIDS Working Network (CAWN) in 1993. In 2001, Ford sponsored a member 
of the CAWN to visit the International Center for Research on Women. Like in the 
environment field, the Ford Foundation has always provided necessary support for 
Chinese activists and NGO representatives to participate in regional and international 
AIDS conferences and learning opportunities. 
Ford’s support for the Friends Exchange project is very illustrative of how the 
Foundation strategically builds up connections with grassroots groups in China. In 
1997, a Ford Foundation officer went and visited Prof. Zhang in Qingdao, Shandong, 
and listened to Zhang’s research and concerns on gay and AIDS issues in China. In 
1998, the Foundation began providing support to Prof. Zhang for the publication of 
Friends Exchange—a magazine for gay men which includes HIV prevention 
information. This magazine is widely circulated among communities of gay men 
throughout China. In the following years, Ford continued support Zhang to reach out 
to gay communities beyond major cities. In 2000, the China National Association for 
STD/AIDS Prevention and Control co-hosted with Prof. Zhang the first national 
conference on MSM and HIV, and thus for the first time officially granted legitimacy 
to HIV prevention efforts for this high-risk group.  
Barry and Martin’s Trust (BM Trust) 108
                                                 
108 Information and explanation of Barry and Martin’s Trust’s work in China were gathered from 
several meetings with its founder, Martin Gordon, O.B.E., in San Francisco, December 2004.  
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The Barry and Martin’s Trust is a private British charity registered and founded in 
1996, and it has been operating exclusively on AIDS issues in China ever since.  At 
that time, the British governmental overseas assistance agency—DFID—was not 
interested in funding any AIDS-related projects in China yet. Founder of the BM Trust, 
Martin Gordon, O.B.E., first worked with a principal hospital in London, and 
sponsored exchanges of nurses and doctors in between U.K. and China. Later, BM 
Trust collaborated with the Chinese Preventive Medicine Academy (now transformed 
into the State CDC). Currently, it works primarily with You’an Hospital, one of two 
major infectious disease hospitals in China.  
BM Trust’s working philosophy is: “Small is beautiful, focusing on small 
projects, grassroots groups, integrity, minimum over-charge and transaction cost.” The 
founders first met with Prof. Zhang Beichuan in 1997, and soon co-funded his work 
with the Ford Foundation. With the 5000 UKP from the BM Trust, Prof. Zhang 
established gay hotlines in over 10 major cities. Currently, BM Trust is funding 
numerous citizens’ initiatives in AIDS prevention across the country with an annual 
budget of 100,000 UKP. 
BM Trust’s identification of grantees usually goes through personal networks 
in China. And, knowing the complicated situation with registering an NGO in China, 
the Trust does not require grantee groups have formal registration status. 109 They do 
not even follow large foundations or multilateral agencies in asking Chinese grantees 
to write grant proposal, mid-term evaluation, and project final report (most of the 
                                                 
109 This is allowed under the U.K. charity law.  
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times in English). They want to include as many grassroots groups as possible, and 
provide them with necessary assistance.  
AIDS Relief Fund for China (ARFC) 110
Similar to the BM Trust yet smaller (2004 annual budget: 30,000 USD), the AIDS 
Relief Fund for China adopts the approach of progressive giving. ARFC was initiated 
by a group of concerned citizens, mostly Chinese Americans, in the San Francisco 
Bay Area, and formally established in the fall of 2003. One of the co-founders, 
Humphrey Wou, had previously been involved with international assistance to 
environmental activism in China. So, by the time he decided to take up the AIDS 
prevention cause, he had a fairly clear notion of the importance of supporting bottom-
up initiatives and the potential of the emerging social activism in China.111 Therefore, 
ARFC’s main grant-making strategy was to focus on start-up groups, pilot projects, 
and leadership development, with a particular emphasis on community-based 
solutions. ARFC’s goal is to direct funding to “on-the-ground leadership and 
grassroots efforts”. Members of ARFC believe that the enhancement of grassroots 
capacity is an indispensable component of the larger context of AIDS prevention in 
China.  They also recognize that because of the particular political context in current 
China and the weakness of NGOs and grassroots groups, extra effort has to be made 
to take the risk of supporting emerging bottom-up voluntary initiatives and helping 
                                                 
110 I served as ARFC’s in-country nominating advisor for the year of 2004. 
111  I came to know Humphrey Wuo in 2000 when following the environmental movements and 
advocacy networks in China. Special thanks to Humphrey for sharing his insights on both 
environmental and AIDS prevention issues all these years.  
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them to develop their own capacity. This is exactly the area where most multilateral 
and bilateral assistance agencies, and even the Ford Foundation, do not usually look 
into. Unless a Chinese NGO can get an English speaking staff or volunteer, the chance 
for it to get a grant from an international organization is slim.  
Knowing this sub-culture of the grant-making world by heart, ARFC’s 
leadership decided to only make two types of grants: small grants (1000-5000 USD) 
and micro grants (below 500 USD). In China, these small-scale grants can go a long 
way to help groups that work at the community level and cannot obtain funding from 
international agencies. In Shanghai, Jiaotong University students started their own 
AIDS peer education group. ARFC’s grant of 500 USD enabled them to conduct 22 
workshops in half a year.  
ARFC makes the most effort to search for grantees at the grassroots level, and 
many times their grants served as emergency relief for these groups. For example, 
when ARFC was introduced to the Qianxi Women’s Health Association in summer 
2004, they found out that this women’s group had done excellent work in promoting 
basic health awareness in the past two years, while its only funding (from the Asia 
Foundation) had ended. ARFC passed a small grant (2000 USD) to this group to do 
HIV/AIDS education among the rural population in Qianxi county. Because of the 
success of its HIV education work, the Qianxi group later was able to obtain more 
funding from other international organizations.  
Within its first year of work, due to personal connections with AIDS 
prevention activists, ARFC was able to issue grants to 12 Chinese NGOs and 
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grassroots groups in eight provinces. Moreover, ARFC’s support to local Chinese 
groups often included non-monetary support. Board members often met with activists 
and NGO leaders, and shared information and perspectives on best practices in AIDS 
prevention with them. ARFC organized brainstorm sessions in China, inviting many 
grantees and other AIDS prevention professionals to strategize together for innovative 
approaches.  
The Ford Foundation, BM Trust and ARFC do not encompass all international 
donors that fund Chinese NGOs and grassroots groups working in AIDS. For example, 
the Asia Foundation has also supported AIDS related work among migrant women in 
Guangdong. However, there are certainly obvious differences between all the 
foundations mentioned above and another group of foundations currently interested in 
funding AIDS work in China, particularly the Gates Foundation, and the Clinton 
Foundation. These two large foundations that fight AIDS at the global level so far 
have paid most of their attention to the Chinese central government.  
 
In the past decade, international NGOs and advocacy groups have played a 
unique role in changing domestic practices and politics in the AIDS field. First, they 
reacted to the rise of HIV infection in southwest China and introduced many 
innovative methods (e.g., peer-education, participatory workshops, community-based 
heath care), before the Chinese government openly admitted the problem and 
multilateral and bilateral agencies identified an AIDS crisis in China. Second, taking 
great risk, a few international NSAs directly delivered treatment and health services to 
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the patients resulting from the blood scandal and continuously pushed for changes at 
local levels in Henan, where most external organizations were blocked from entering 
until 2004. Third, international NGOs and private organizations frequently, openly, 
and directly support individual activists and Chinese NGOs in HIV/AIDS prevention, 
which has been crucial to the rise of social activism in this field. In many cases, 
international NSAs provided the opportunity for marginalized groups (e.g., CSW, 
MSM, IDU) to voice their opinions and organize their own groups. Last but not least, 
together with local social groups, international NGOs have been able to design and 
implement effective programs that are suitable for specific high-risk populations with 
which governmental authorities are not familiar.  
International advocacy groups achieved the above because of their ability to 
form broad networks within both the governmental body and local communities. To 
persuade the Chinese government to change existing policies or to adopt new ideas 
and measures, international advocacy groups often first engage the government in 
learning processes, provide assistance to solve specific problems, or implement pilot 
projects as demonstration for the government. They have to acquire the opportunity to 
get access into the governing body and communicate their principles with the 
government. They also have to learn how to sustain their presence and advocacy work 
in China, so that they can win the time to complete operationalizing their own 
principles in AIDS prevention and care, and continue negotiating and interacting with 
the government.  
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To consolidate their advocacy work among local communities and the general 
public, international advocacy groups seek opportunities to support and partner with 
Chinese NGOs. Through innovative grant making and interpersonal interaction, a few 
international NGOs and private foundations have been able to get access to the most 
devastated regions and populations, as well as to strengthen civil society capacity.   
Such are the general features in terms of how individual external advocacy 
actors work and establish alliances in China. However, as a whole group, different 
actors apply different strategies around the same time. Engagement and protesting co-
exist when networks among activists, NGOs, professionals, and open-minded officials 
grow.  
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the Chinese government’s long-time denial and lack of capacity, international 
NSAs have been able to gradually form effective governmental connections, and 
successfully introduce new ideas and solutions in HIV/AIDS prevention at local 
levels since the mid-1990s. With the growth of domestic civil society groups and 
activism against AIDS, there is a great potential for international NSAs to expand 
their advocacy work in local communities. However, with the centralization of the 
governing structures over AIDS-related issues, it is not clear whether local 
governments would enjoy the autonomy of collaborating with international 
organizations, and whether social groups will be incorporated into policy 
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implementations. While the community of Chinese AIDS-related NGOs and activist 
groups has grown substantially since 2002, not enough evidence can show that a 
collective social identity is emerging. Meanwhile, the AIDS situation in China is 
receiving mounting attention from the international arena, and large volumes of 
assistance have been granted to health authorities in China. During his speech at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. in November 2004, UNAID President 
Peter Pior repeatedly mentioned that China, India, and Russia are the major countries 
that compose the “second wave” of global AIDS epidemic. All of this has further 
complicated domestic political context in the AIDS field faced by external advocacy 
groups. 
 By tracing individual international NSAs’ history and working relations, I 
found that while networks are emerging, domestic and external advocacy actors in the 
AIDS fields are not as tightly tied together as those in nature conservation. Despite 
individual international NGOs’ unique and important contribution to alleviate AIDS 
crisis in Henan and many other places, external advocates have not consolidated their 
connections with each other and joined forces to promote changes beyond local levels. 
As a whole, transnational advocacy networks in HIV/AIDS prevention have not 
reached the level of maturity as in nature conservation. In the next chapter, I will 
explicate what and how particular political factors have caused this difference 
between the two cases.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY MOBILIZATION: 
A CROSS-SECTORAL COMPARISON 
 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, I focused on particular context, processes, strategies and 
political relations associated with individual international advocacy actors in China. 
This chapter examines and compares international advocacy actors’ political relations 
in China at the aggregate level. I attempt to capture the patterns of political relations 
that transnational networks have generated and in which they are situated, marked by 
the triangular relationship among the Chinese state, domestic civil society groups, and 
international NGOs and advocates within a specific issue area. Again, for clarification 
purpose, what is to be measured here is not the actual impact of these international 
non-state actors on the decline of HIV infection rate or increase in the number of 
national parks in China, but the relational patterns and forms of interaction developed 
among the Chinese governmental agencies, international NGOs, and Chinese social 
groups.  
To do so, I first examine the formal working relationships (i.e., project 
partnership) international NGOs have established with various state agencies and 
social organizations in order to give a snapshot of the triangular relationship 
addressed in this study. Results from this examination confirm the argument that 
international advocates engage with both the state and society to reach the goals of 
consensus building and policy changes. I focus on working relationships not to 
exclude those international NSAs that are not present in China yet are involved in 
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advocacy work in the international arena, but to highlight the deepening engagement 
of international NSAs in domestic politics. This variable—international NGOs’ 
working partnership—is a crude indicator to depict the general and overall pattern of 
the complex relations surrounding the networks of international and domestic 
advocacy actors. 
The second step is to further explore international NSAs’ relations with the 
Chinese state and civil society sector separately, and the substance of advocacy 
mobilization they have generated targeting various governmental and non-
governmental actors. I in particular explore four aspects of their work related to 
mobilizing the Chinese state (i.e., information dissemination, policy implementation, 
input in policy-making and institution building), and three related to social 
mobilization (i.e., public education, local capacity building and promoting social 
activism). I analyze the similarities and differences in international NSAs’ state and 
social mobilization reflected in the compiled data.  
To measure is to compare; and to compare is to better understand. By 
juxtaposing the similarities and differences arising in international NGOs’ 
mobilization in environment and health in China, I attempt to distinguish the political 
factors that can best explain the triangular relationship among the state, society and 
international NGOs. A higher level of internationalization in environmental 
governance and development of environmental activism best explains why 
transnational advocacy networks emerged earlier in nature conservation than 
HIV/AIDS prevention. Central control within the governing structures and 
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interconnectivity among civil society groups stand out as the main factors that 
determine whether international advocates are able to expand and deepen state and 
social mobilization in China.  
In the last part of this chapter, I use a set of deepening indicators to compare 
international NGOs’ input in bridging the state and society in the two fields—creating 
new communication channels, experimenting with project-based public participation 
methods, and institutionalizing public participation together with the Chinese 
government and civil society groups. Findings from this comparison confirm my 
hypotheses in Chapter 2 that domestic state-society relations are evolving and that 
external advocacy actors can lessen domestic contention as well as elevate it through 
a third party. The double-mobilization concept emphasizes this dynamic aspect 
between transnational networks and domestic politics. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE TWO CASES: 
HISTORIC TRAJECTORY AND THE CURRENT FORM OF THE DUAL PARTNERSHIP 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that transnational advocacy networks are emerging in 
both nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention in China. While both 
international non-state actors (NSA) communities seem to have grown to a similar 
scale, indicated by the total number of international NGOs and geographic spread of 
their work, there are important differences between the two cases. Existing domestic 
governing structures and civil society development have, to some extent, shaped the 
trajectory of transnational advocacy community in the two fields. I will illustrate such 
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effects by three findings from a comparison of the two cases:  
1) There is a time-lag in the development history of the international NGO 
community in the AIDS field. This is due to the relatively late process of 
internationalization in China’s health governing system and a lower level of 
interconnection among domestic civil society groups in the field;  
2) International conservation NGOs present a more balanced double-
mobilization pattern, while international AIDS-related NGOs engage more with the 
Chinese state, reflected in their working partnerships. By the comparison of China’s 
green civil society, domestic health and AIDS-related NGOs and other civil society 
groups are much less connected with each other. Therefore, a more matured domestic 
civil society sector has assisted international NSAs’ social mobilization in the nature 
conservation field; and  
3) Measured by international NGOs’ dual partnership with both Chinese 
governmental and non-governmental actors at different levels, the nature conservation 
case presents evidence of the deepening of transnational double-mobilization. A 
relatively shorter history partially explains why such a deepening process has not yet 
emerged in the HIV/AIDS case. The visible expansion and deepening of transnational 
advocacy networks in the conservation field is mostly due to the bureaucratic relations 
at the central level, local forestry bureau autonomy, and a growing sense of collective 
identity within the Chinese environmental activism groups. In addition, recent 
changes in the health governing system also cast shadows on the development of 
transnational advocacy networks. 
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What Delayed Transnational Advocacy in HIV/AIDS prevention in China? 
Reviewing the historical developments of the two international NGO communities, 
reflected in the total numbers of international NGOs in each field, one will first notice 
that there is a significant difference in the numbers of total international NGOs 
working in the two fields for most of their history. The conservation international 
NGO community seems to have been much larger than that related to AIDS until very 
recent years. (Figure 5.1)  
Figure 5.1. Growth of international NGOs in conservation, health, and HIV/AIDS prevention in 
China 
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 Some may interpret this time-lag in the history of the two cases as simply due 
to the fact that AIDS is a newer issue than nature conservation. However, such an 
explanation is only valid for the period from 1994 to 1996. From 1996 to 2002, both 
international communities grew steadily, but the gap increased in the total number of 
international NGOs of the two sectors. If everything remained the same, and the only 
difference is the starting point, how do we explain this growing gap, and the 
substantial shrinking of it since 2003? 
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Moreover, as I mentioned in Chapter 4, many international NGOs currently 
working in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention actually started working in the area of 
China’s public health system in the late 1970s. If we replace the line of the number of 
international NGOs in the AIDS field with that of international NGOs in reproductive 
and sexual health, the argument that “it is only about time” becomes even more 
problematic. The two international NGO communities, in fact, had a very similar 
history for the first 15 years. The total number of international conservation NGOs 
remained very small (below 10) until the beginning of the 1990s. Significant increase 
took place only after 1995. Many influential conservation NGOs within the 
community (e.g., The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International) did not 
arrive in China until the end of the 1990s. Similarly, the pre-1995 years did not see 
much growth of the international health NGO community, in terms of the total 
number of NGOs. However, during the period from 1995 to 2002, the development 
pattern of the two communities diverged greatly. While the international health NGO 
community mostly maintained its gradual pace, the conservation case exhibited 
noticeable jumps in 1996 and again in 2000, when the total number of international 
conservation NGOs increased by 58% and 27%, respectively. In 2003, the number of 
international health NGOs rocketed from 23 to 31, and by the end of the research 
period, the two communities once again converged in their general profile. Therefore, 
there seems to have been an almost seven-year lag between the two cases of 
conservation and reproductive health in the history of international NGO development 
(1979-2004), independent from the discovery of AIDS in China in 1985. 
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Alternative explanations 
How do we interpret the seemingly delayed arrival international NGOs in the case of 
HIV/AIDS prevention compared with that of conservation? Besides the above 
argument of timing, there are other potential explanations for this puzzle, such as 
resources at the international level, organizational strategies, issue characteristics, and 
leadership in advocacy networks.   
First, some would argue that the cause originates from the international 
arena—there are simply not enough resources and a sufficiently favorable 
environment for international NGOs to mobilize for changing China’s domestic 
policies. While I agree that international resources relevant for assessing transnational 
activism to protecting eco-systems and combating AIDS on a global scale, it does not 
appear to be true for the China case.1 As I particularly pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, 
multilateral and bilateral funding agencies responded to both environmental 
degradation and the AIDS epidemic after the problem was identified. The World Bank 
                                                 
1 Even at the global level, this resource availability/political opportunity argument has its limits. 
According to this view, it is because the history of global environmentalism is about 20 years longer, 
and there are much more inter-governmental agreements, funds and institutions available for 
international NGOs to strategize with than that in the field of HIV/AIDS. However, recent studies have 
shown that global environmentalism is on decline since the early 1990s, while the issue of HIV/AIDS 
is becoming a priority for the U.N. and most bilateral assistance agencies among the developed 
countries since the end of the 1990s. (On the decline of environmentalism: Finger, Matthias, ed. 1992. 
The Green Movement Worldwide. Series “Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change”. 
Greenwich: JAI Press. Bramwell, Anna. 1994. The Fading of the Greens: The Decline of 
Environmental Politics in the West. New Haven: Yale University. On the rise of HIV/AIDS awareness: 
Mann, Jonathan, Daniel Tarantola, and Thomas Netter, eds. 1992. AIDS in the World. Boston: Harvard 
University Press. Mann, Jonathan, and Daniel Tarantola, eds. 1996. AIDS in the World II: Global 
Dimensions, Social Roots, and Responses. (The Global AIDS Policy Coalition). New York: Oxford 
University Press. Barnett, Tony, and Alan Whiteside. 2002. AIDS in the Twenty-First Century. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan. Eberstadt, Nicholas. 2002. "The Future of AIDS." Foreign Affairs. 81, 6.)  
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and U.N. agencies have provided considerable funds and opportunities in both cases. 
In fact, some intergovernmental factors can be interpreted as more favorable for 
international NGOs’ mobilization for HIV/AIDS prevention. For example, the total 
multilateral and bilateral assistance to the Chinese government to control HIV/AIDS 
(by 2004) is more than triple the domestic budget on the issue. The five million USD 
from USAID to focus on AIDS issues in Guangxi and Yunnan is the largest initiative 
of U.S. official bilateral aid to China since 1989.2 These factors could potentially 
allow international advocates to require accountability from and place pressures back 
onto the Chinese government. 
The second alternative explanation is that there is a lack of successful 
strategies within the transnational health/AIDS advocacy community. As Heather 
Heckel’s insightful research reveals, there are many internal coordination hurdles 
within the transnational health/AIDS advocacy community, which is composed of 
activists and professionals promoting diverse causes such as medical research in 
AIDS, human rights for PLWHA, equal access to HIV drug across countries, and 
AIDS orphan issues. Among these internal obstacles, the hierarchical structures 
embedded in and around the World Health Organization have greatly hindered the 
communication and collaboration between international and grassroots health/AIDS 
                                                 
2 After the Tian’anmen movement, USAID stopped any overseas assistance to China, due to its mission  
of “supporting democracy”. Except for a small grant through the American Bar Association to promote 
environmental law education in China in 2002, the ongoing HIV/AIDS project, as part of the Greater 
Mekong Initiative, is the first major, and multi-year grant USAID issued to be implemented inside 
mainland China.  
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organizations. 3  Nevertheless, it is not the case that transnational advocacy on 
HIV/AIDS has failed uniformly because of such internal problems and the lack of 
coordinated strategies. Rachel DeMotts and Lawrence Markowitz’s comparative 
studies of Russia and South Africa showed that the internationally constructed 
discourses on HIV/AIDS diverge substantially once encountering domestic politics. 
The processes of domestic norm socialization are not unidirectional, according to the 
two authors. 4   Recent reports on AIDS in Ukraine, contrary to the criticism of 
transnational AIDS activism, have praised the work of two international NGOs, PATH 
and International HIV/AIDS Alliance.5 Organizational variables at the international 
level seem inadequate to explain the variances across countries. Note that so far we 
are only examining the emergence of transnational advocacy networks, since 
organizational strategies will be discussed again when explaining the further 
development in scope and depth of networks’ activities. 
The third and fourth common explanations for the emergence or non-
emergence of transnational activism and advocacy are the nature of the issue at hand 
and the role of leadership. In their book, Keck and Sikkink particularly highlighted 
these two factors as among the most important ones affecting the origins of 
                                                 
3 Heckel, Heather. 2001. “Limitations of Transnational Advocacy: The Failure of the HIV/AIDS 
Prevention Networks”. Paper presented at American Political Science Association annual meeting in 
San Francisco.  
4 DeMotts, Rachel, and Lawrence Markowitz. 2004. “Framing the Epidemic: The Case of UNAIDS”. 
Paper presented at American Political Science Association annual meeting in Chicago. 
5 Because of the Ukrainian government’s ineffectiveness in executing the grants from the Global Fund, 
the Fund forestalled the processing of the remaining money, and selected PATH and International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance as new grant managing agencies. [Available at: http://www.unaids.org, last 
accessed 15 March 2005.]  
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transnational advocacy networks. They argued that issues involving bodily harm to 
vulnerable individuals would trigger a short and clear causal chain in which case it is 
easier to identify who is responsible, making transnational Boomerang-type advocacy 
more likely to emerge.6 This argument is rooted in the concept of “framing” in the 
contentious politics literature. It seems that if a policy issue is directly related to 
personal welfare, it is easier for norm entrepreneurs and activists to frame, and in turn, 
to mobilize the masses. However, if anything, the two cases studied in this research 
presented opposite findings. Even though both over-exploitation of natural resources 
and ineffective public health policies cause millions of the poor to suffer, the “bodily 
harm” is more visible in the AIDS case. The Chinese government is more culpable for 
the AIDS crisis, particularly because of the blood scandal. Yet, the international NGO 
and advocacy community has not made full use of the “framing” value of the AIDS 
case in China to mobilize the large number of blood contamination victims.  
As to the factor of leadership, after closely following the two networks for 
years, I can identify a number of key individuals in each case, but not particular 
individuals or international NGOs so distinctive that without him/her/it the whole 
advocacy community would fall apart. In fact, contrary to the common impression, I 
find that most so-called activists, or NGO leaders interviewed for this research prefer 
a low-profile working style. I did not find either of the two networks excessively 
depending on a small circle of individuals and their personal capacities, but rather a 
cumulative movement of a group of diverse organizations and actors. 
                                                 
6 Keck and Sikkink, pp26-28. 
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Networks are not like cells, atoms, or computer programs, but complex 
systems of actors, structures, and interactions. While I find none of the above 
explanations satisfactory for understanding the delay of transnational advocacy on 
HIV/AIDS prevention in China, my point is not to completely refute the value of 
these arguments. From my field work, however, two other variables stand out as better 
explanations—internationalization in governing structures, and development of 
domestic social activism—for the emergence of transnational advocacy networks 
within an issue area.   
Internationalization of governing structures  
Internationalization of domestic governance matters to the emergence of transnational 
advocacy networks in that a minimal opportunity window is required for any external 
actors to grasp entry points into a polity. The level of internationalization of the 
governing structures of nature conservation is higher than that of HIV/AIDS 
prevention, because the environmental protection sector is distinctively more open to 
international influence within the Chinese state apparatus. This factor has created a 
more favorable condition for transnational advocacy to emerge in nature conservation. 
 
1) Level of internationalization in forestry and health sectors 
The two main governing bodies in China’s nature conservation and disease control—
the forestry and public health bureaucratic systems—remained relatively closed to the 
international arena until recent years. International relations related to these two 
sectors for a long time were limited to research exchanges, receiving international 
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assistance, and bilateral inter-departmental cooperation. The level of 
internationalization in the forestry sector is slightly higher than that in public health in 
terms of the familiarity with international NSAs during the pre-SARS period. Since 
the early 1990s, WWF China has been working and collaborating with SFB and 
forestry bureaus in various provinces. Health authorities from central to local rejected 
international NGOs direct and independent intervention in HIV/AIDS prevention until 
very recently. The turning point was as recent as the SARS crisis in 2003.7 When I 
conducted interviews at the International Cooperation Office of the MoH in summer 
2004, officials were very familiar with the Global Fund, British DFID, U.S. CDC, and 
Clinton Foundation, but not any international NGOs or private foundations.8  
Though SARS for the first time made the Chinese government open up its 
health system for international delegates and inspections, it also triggered a wave of 
centralizing the health sector within the Chinese state. The latter effect could 
potentially defeat the former to a degree. There is no doubt that the status and 
recognition of MoH at the central level, and health bureaus at all levels of 
governments have been rapidly elevated. It is not certain whether international NGOs 
and advocates can gain advantage in inserting their influence in the midst of the 
gigantic volume of multilateral and bilateral AIDS related assistance. This point will 
be touch upon again when analyzing the development of transnational networks. 
 
                                                 
7 Hu, Angang et al. 2003. SARS in Perspective: Health and Development. Beijing: Tsinghua University 
Press. 
8 Interviews with Li Mingzhu (MoH Bilateral Cooperation Department), Xing Jun (MoH Multilateral 
Cooperation Department) in Beijing, 4 August, 2004. 
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2) Level of internationalization in environmental protection 
Despite a relatively lower level of internationalization within the forestry governing 
system, international NGOs and advocates were able to ally with environmental 
protection bureaus at different levels to raise awareness of nature conservation 
problems. China’s environmental governing body—from SEPA to EPBs at different 
levels—is a relatively new sector compared with forestry and health sectors, which 
did not gain the full-ministry ranking until 1998. China’s environmental protection 
sector is among the most internationalized administrative systems within the state 
apparatus:  
1) It was exposed to international discourses from the every beginning of its 
history. In a sense, the idea of establishing an independent governing body in 
environmental protection was inspired by the national delegates to the Helsinki 
Conference in 1972;9  
2) Since the establishment of SEPA, it has been a frequent participant in 
international environmental meetings and negotiations.10China’s participation in inter-
governmental environmental regime building is significantly higher than in other 
                                                 
9  Economy argued that international factors have always played a role in the emergence and 
evolvement the domestic environmental protection regime in China. After the deep frustration the 
Chinese delegation encountered during the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference, the Prime Minister at that 
time, Zhou Enlai, who headed the Chinese delegation to Stockholm, took the initiative to organize the 
first national environmental meetings after the Conference. A Working Group of Environmental 
Protection was set up in 1974. (Economy, 1998.) 
10 Chan, Gerald. 2004. "China's Compliance in Global Environmental Affairs." Asia Pacific Viewpoint. 
45, 1: 69-86. 
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fields. 11  Currently, China is a party to 16 multilateral environmental treaties 
(including 7 related to nature conservation), and has been particularly active in global 
climate change regime building; and, 
3) More importantly, led by SEPA, the environmental protection sector present 
much more informal channels and epistemic community activities and a higher level 
of internationalization of global environmentalism norms. For example, epistemic 
networks sprouted around the China Committee of International Cooperation in 
Environment and Development, established by both SEPA and the State Council as 
the highest level consultative body for environmental policy-making. In addition, 
SEPA has paid particular attention to providing overseas learning opportunities for its 
officials.  
Therefore, even though there are many political obstacles in both cases for 
international NSAs to get access to China’s governing agencies and go down to local 
levels to implement advocacy work, they found some windows of opportunity in 
nature conservation by connecting with environmental protection officials and 
agencies. 
 
3) Bureaucratic relations: an intervening factor 
One incidental, yet relevant bureaucratic factor also contributing to the disparity 
between the two cases is that during the time when international advocacy actors were 
                                                 
11 Some critics interpreted this as due to the fact that the Chinese government uses the environment as a 
non-politically sensitive outlet to remain engaged in international affairs. However, health also presents 
a non-politically sensitive case. 
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trying to get their hands on China’s conservation problems, the forestry sector—
traditionally the dominant governmental body in nature conservation issues—was 
losing its political power at the central level. During the central administrative reform 
in 1998, the Ministry of Forestry was demoted to the State Forestry Bureau (deputy-
ministry-level), while the National Environmental Protection Administration was 
promoted to SEPA (full-ministry-level). This power shift between the environmental 
protection and forestry sector at the central level, to some extent, secured many 
international NGO and advocates’ status, work, and connections in China. SEPA’s 
rising power within the Chinese state system allowed it to collaborate with more 
international NSAs. The 1998 reform also expanded jurisdictional boundaries of 
SEPA and EPBs. International NSAs, therefore, have got more access to local 
communities because of their formal and informal connections with EPBs at all levels. 
Moreover, the power-shift between SEPA and SFB also generated new incentives for 
the SFB to be more open to international non-state actors so that it can better compete 
with SEPA in overlapping areas (particularly nature conservation). Hence, we see that 
SFB has formed partnerships with TNC and CI since 1998.  
In theory, we could have a situation of parallel administrative bodies in 
HIV/AIDS prevention similar to that in conservation. In China, it is not the health 
bureaus, but the family planning agencies that are in direct charge of reproductive and 
sexual health. However, due to the international health and AIDS community’s 
mistrust of and isolation from China’s family planning and population control sector, 
the health bureaus have become the predominant governmental actors in transnational 
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advocacy politics around AIDS.  
China has probably the most sophisticated family planning administration in 
the world, which has effectively enforced the “One-child Policy” since 1978. 
Currently, there are 4 million professional family planning staff and over 40,000 
reproductive health stations across the country.12 In addition, family planning and 
birth control used to be at the top of the list of China’s national priorities. It was 
common knowledge to Chinese politicians (e.g., provincial, municipal, and county 
governors) that their political career was closely linked with their achievement in 
implementing the one-child policy. 13 So the family planning authorities, from central 
to local, used to possess a significant level of political leverage in Chinese politics. 
During an interview, Chen Jianzhong, a current PATH China officer and a former staff 
member of the China’s National Family Planning Association, gave me a personal 
observation to explain the politics of the family planning system in China: Provincial 
and local chief governmental officials used to pay more respect to staff from the State 
Family Planning Commission (now National Population and Family Planning 
Commission—NPFPC) than to the Ministry of Health.14  
However, China’s “One-child Policy” is notorious internationally and has been 
used as one major piece of evidence for accusing the Chinese government of violating 
                                                 
12 The interpretation of these numbers gets blurred at county or lower levels, because it is very common 
that the deputy township governor is also the director of women’s affairs, ethnic relations, public 
health, and family planning. However, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the family planning 
system is well-established and far-reaching. 
13 It is common knowledge to Chinese bureaucrats and party-cadres that one cannot be promoted if his 
constituency fails in population control requirements during his term. 
14 Interviewed in Beijing, 17 April 2004. 
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human rights by many foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations and 
international NGOs. Therefore, for a long time, the family planning agencies in China 
have been off the radar of most international organizations working in AIDS-related 
fields, except a few U.N. and bilateral agencies. Li Dongli, a leading demographer 
and social scientist affiliated with the NPFPC, told me during an telephone interview 
that during an international population conference in America, she almost felt 
ostracized once her official identity was known.15 Even though NPFPC has launched 
major initiatives in public education on AIDS and in behavioral interventions for 
HIV/AIDS prevention since the early 2004, it has received fewer responses from the 
international community compared with the MoH.16 Due to ideological differences, 
the international AIDS community, more or less, has been refusing to engage with and 
advocate to China’s family planning authorities, which reinforces the degree of 
bureaucratic centralization in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention. 
Domestic bureaucratic relations, hence, are important intervening factors, 
among many of the others, in the emergence of transnational advocacy networks. 
While it does not determine the level of internationalization of the governing 
structures within a sector, it can augment or modify the effects of internationalization 
of an administrative body on the window of opportunity for external advocacy groups. 
                                                 
15 Interviewed in Beijing, 8 April 2004. 
16  Ironically, some of the most recognizable Chinese nationals involved in international NGOs’ 
HIV/AIDS prevention work in China are formerly family planning officers. For example, Liu Liqing, 
Director of Marie Stopes China Office; Liu Yongfeng, UNESCO Beijing Office HIV/AIDS and School 
Health National Officer; and, Chen Jianzhong, PATH China Office. They all proved to be every 
knowledgeable and capable in advocating and implementing AIDS related work at different levels in 
China.  
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Development of civil society sector within an issue area 
The other main contributing factor to the earlier emergence of transnational advocacy 
networks in conservation is the development of China’s green civil society. A vibrant 
domestic civil society sector, according to much existing literature, provides a more 
conductive environment for transnational advocacy networks to emerge. The detailed 
case studies of civil society groups in both fields have revealed that even though 
pioneer activists started their outreach and direct intervention at grassroots levels 
around the same time, in the early and middle 1990s, the conservation community has 
grown substantially faster, in terms of the total numbers of local NGOs and college 
student groups and the geographic spread of the environmental activist community. A 
majority of the NGOs, student associations, and community-based PLWHA groups in 
the AIDS field did not exist until 2002.  
Some may argue that the relation between domestic social activism and 
transnational advocacy networks is like “the chicken and the egg”. This is true in 
terms of the entire development process of the two sides. Support from international 
NGOs and activists has been essential to the formation, survival and flourishing of 
many Chinese grassroots groups in both conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention. 
However, when examining the origins of transnational advocacy networks, I found 
that there are many internal factors which independently shaped the development of 
the green community in China. For example, despite tremendous political pressure 
and policy restrictions, both the Friends of Nature and Global Village of Beijing 
managed to form a nation-wide membership community. In contrast, none of the 
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AIDS activists or NGOs has achieved such wide outreach. On the aggregate level, the 
civil society sector has reached a higher level of development in nature conservation 
than in HIV/AIDS prevention, which has created a more conducive environment for 
international advocacy actors to locate non-governmental partners, and for 
transnational networks to emerge. 
The Current Form of Double-mobilization in the Two Cases 
In general, in both fields of nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention, 
international NGOs and advocates have pursued collaboration and partnership with 
both the Chinese state and social groups, and therefore, have exhibited the character 
of double-mobilization. By comparing international NGOs’ working partnerships 
more carefully, I found that the conservation case presents a more balanced double-
mobilization pattern. The collaborative relationship between Chinese societal groups 
and international NGO in HIV/AIDS prevention has not been developed as much as 
in the field of nature conservation. Moreover, measuring international NGOs’ dual 
working partnership with both governmental and non-governmental entities at 
different levels, I found that transnational advocacy networks exhibit more clearly a 
deepening trend in nature conservation than in HIV/AIDS prevention. 
Balanced vs. tilted double-mobilization 
A crude measurement—international NGOs’ working partnerships (as of the end of 
2004)—is used to get a quick sense of the general pattern of international NGOs’ 
interaction with the state and society. As Table 5.1 shows, it is very common for 
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international NGOs to partner with the Chinese state. Of each international NGO 
community studied here, an overwhelming majority (32 out of 34 in conservation, and 
29 out of 32 in HIV/AIDS prevention) has established various working relationships 
with Chinese governmental agencies and GONGOs. It is also common for 
international NGOs to have working partnership with Chinese NGOs and other social 
groups (29 in conservation, and 18 in HIV/AIDS prevention). For both cases, it is 
very rare that an international NGO would work exclusively with Chinese social 
organizations (2 in conservation, and 3 in HIV/AIDS prevention). In the conservation 
field, it is rare that an international NGO would exclusively partner with state 
agencies (5 out of 34); while, this is much more common in HIV/AIDS prevention 
(14 out of 32). 
Table 5.1. International NGOs’ working partnership in conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention 
in China (2004) 
 Nature Conservation  
HIV/AIDS 
prevention  
Total number of international NGOs 34 32 a
Number of international NGOs partnering w/  
the Chinese state 32 29 
Exclusively w/ the state 5 14 
Number of international NGOs partnering w/  
Chinese social organizations 29 18 
Exclusively w/ social organizations 2 3 
Number of international NGOs partnering w/  
both the Chinese state and social organizations 27 15  
Note: a One international AIDS related NGO has not established any formal partnership yet by the end of 2004. 
The above data not only illustrates that the international NGO community as a 
whole has both state and non-state Chinese partners, but also indicates that individual 
international NGOs have acquired the two types of partners at once. About half of the 
international NGOs in the two fields (27 out of 34 in conservation, and 15 out of 32 in 
HIV/AIDS prevention) partner with both state and non-state partners at the same time. 
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This data on working partnerships confirms the observations based in the case study 
chapters that international NSAs tend to mobilize both the state and society in China 
to achieve their goals.  
A more careful reading of these two sets of numbers (27/34 vs. 15/32) also 
reveals that such dual partnership is more common in the conservation field than in 
HIV/AIDS prevention. In addition, there are significantly more international 
conservation NGOs than AIDS-related NGOs working with Chinese social 
organizations—29 in conservation and 18 in HIV/AIDS prevention. 14 AIDS related 
international NGOs exclusively work with Chinese governments at different levels; 
while, only five international conservation NGOs present this characteristic. All these 
data hints that international NGOs tend to engage more with governmental agencies in 
HIV/AIDS than in conservation. This observation will be further substantiated in later 
sections on the content of international NSAs’ state and social mobilization.  
Development of the dual partnership 
At the early stages of transnational advocacy and double-mobilization, the process is 
quite “messy”, when individual NGOs or activists would apply various strategies to 
locate the best niche for their activities in China. As advocacy networks and coalitions 
mature, we find that advocacy actors emerge at multiple levels involved in a variety of 
activities. Moreover, more individual NGOs expand their working relationship to 
ensure the policy impact of their demonstration projects, or the practical outcome of 
their policy recommendations, or to strengthen public awareness and behavioral 
changes in the specific issue area. Therefore, we see the number of advocacy 
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organizations that engage with both governmental and societal actors increase as 
networks continue to develop. Table 5.2 below presents the number of international 
NGOs that have established working partnerships with both governmental and non-
governmental entities at different levels in conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention in 
China by the end of 2004, which confirms this observation.  
In both issue areas, most connections between international NGOs and 
Chinese governmental and non-governmental actors happen at county and lower 
levels; networks become thinner at the central level. While two thirds of international 
conservation NGOs have engaged both governmental and non-governmental actors at 
the grassroots level (county and lower levels), only one third have built up 
comprehensive partnerships ranging from local to central levels. About half of 
international health NGOs partner with local social and governmental entities, but 
merely three of them have achieved to incorporate both governmental agencies at all 
levels and social groups.  
Table 5.2. International NGOs’ dual partnerships at different levels (2004) 
Number of international NGOs Partnering w/ both governmental 
agencies and social organizations at Nature conservation (34) HIV/AIDS prevention (32) 
all levels 12 3 
provincial and lower levels 14 8 
county and lower levels 22 15 
 Despite the above similarity in their political relations, table 5.2 also hints that 
the international conservation NGO community as a whole has achieved much more 
comprehensive partnerships at all levels. Thus, the HIV/AIDS prevention 
transnational network is not only a belated and unbalanced case in this study, but also 
has not reached the level of depth of the conservation case. More international NGOs 
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have been able to do so in the field of nature conservation rather than HIV/AIDS 
prevention; and, more importantly, international conservation NGOs have been able to 
move across different levels of administration, and build up networks that can 
potentially link social groups with higher authorities. To clarify, international NGOs 
are not all, yet main advocacy actors within transnational networks, therefore the data 
here are only intended to give a snapshot description of the two networks and their 
political relations. I will further strengthen these points by analyzing the content of 
international NSA’s advocacy and mobilization work in later sections. 
What Constrains the Deepening of Transnational Double-Mobilization? 
To mobilize both the Chinese public and policy-making circles, and to consolidate the 
effects of their advocacy work, transnational networks will have to trickle up their on-
ground, pilot projects, or trickle down their input in policy formation at the top level: I 
call these developments a “deepening” process. For transnational HIV/AIDS activism 
was delayed for the many reasons as just explained, it has not been able to catch up 
with the pace of the conservation case. Both issue characteristics and organizational 
factors are intervening factors, whose effects on transnational advocacy politics are 
not constant but vary across cases. In contrast, bureaucratic decentralization and 
interconnectivity within the civil society stand out as more important explanatory 
variables. 
The parallel existence of forestry and environmental protection governing 
bodies, as well as the increasing autonomy local forestry agencies enjoy since the 
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fiscal reforms in the 1990s, have created more entry points for external advocacy 
actors. In contrast, two micro-level state structural factors in the field of HIV/AIDS 
prevention have hindered the deepening of transnational advocacy networks.  
1) MoH over CDC. The current Centers for Disease Control (CDCs) are built 
upon former preventive medical science schools, keeping all the personnel, yet adding 
more physical and financial infrastructures and turning all medical professionals into 
governmental officials.17 The reform of the disease control governance was started 
around 1998, and accelerated and completed during the SARS crisis in 2003. 
However, the new disease control system was created not to be independent, but a 
part of the public health system.18 Therefore, in a way, MoH and health bureaus are 
becoming the only governmental authorities involved in AIDS politics in China. 
2) Central control over the issue of AIDS. Even though the Chinese state 
system in general has been undergoing fundamental decentralization since the fiscal 
reforms in 1992 and 1998, the public health system has actually been re-structured 
and centralized in recent years. With a more centralized health system headed by 
MoH, local health bureaus are given less autonomy in decision-making and policy-
implementation.  
Even though many external advocacy groups have established connections 
with local health bureaus and CDCs until now, it is becoming more sensitive for local 
health officials to collaborate with international organizations in HIV/AIDS 
                                                 
17 Interviews with China State CDC officials in April 2004. [Wei Nanfang, Zhu Libo] 
18 Li, Rui. "Zhongmei Gonggong Weisheng Tixi Bijiao Xia Lun SARS Dui Zhongguo Gonggong 
Weisheng Tixi De Yingxiang (Comparing Public Health Systems in China and the U.S., and The 
Impact of SARS Crisis)." Shi Jiao (Perspective), July 31 2003. 
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prevention in general with the completion of the CDC reform and the centralization of 
the health system. Local health bureau and CDCs have to report to MoH about AIDS-
related issues. For example, provincial and local officials had to take personal risks 
for MSF Belgium and Marie Stopes China to build independent medical clinics.19 In 
2005, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an American think-tank well 
known to the Chinese MoH, was denied access to work at the provincial level in 
AIDS prevention. Provincial officials were not sure whether MoH would interfere or 
not, and they did not want to take the risk.20 Having said this, I am, however, not 
arguing that there is no political sensitivity in the conservation field in China. Because 
nature conservation is related to land use, hydro-power, rural renewable energy and 
other sensitive issues, it could get as tricky as HIV/AIDS prevention. My point here is 
rather that political hindrance in conservation at local levels is less often caused by 
local governments’ fear of the central authorities.   
When external advocacy actors first arrive in China, some start from below by 
collaborating with local activists, and engaging local governments to experimenting 
new solutions, yet others may target the central or provincial governments and 
endeavor to persuade them to make significant changes in existing policies. The 
differences embedded in civil society structures are not reflected in the particular form 
of such initial transnational interactions. However, as transnational advocacy 
networks develop, domestic structural factors become more relevant to the overall 
shape of the relationship among the state, society and external political actors. 
                                                 
19 Interviews with MSF Belgium and Marie Stopies China in summer 2004. 
20 Meetings notes from the Aixin Foundation, May 2005. [for internal circulation only] 
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Whether domestic civil society groups are organized and connected influences the 
overall level of interactions between them and external advocacy actors. External 
advocacy actors, particularly international NGOs, are goal-oriented, and constrained 
by available resources. Therefore, they will have to move on and search for other 
partners and mechanisms to overcome political barriers when they realize that there 
are few Chinese non-governmental entities they can collaborate with. Even though 
many international NGOs emotionally and morally prefer to only work with Chinese 
NGOs or community-based groups, they are currently mostly working local 
governmental agencies. Because of a relatively more connected civil society 
community in the environmental field, external advocacy groups are able to 
strengthen their outreach in the Chinese society: 
1) Chinese environmental NGOs and activists have improved their own 
capacity through networking and organizing campaigns together. Therefore, an 
increasing number of international conservation NGOs have been able to locate 
Chinese non-governmental partners in recent years.  
2) Because of local environmentalists’ mobilization capacity, external 
advocacy groups are able to expand their connections with both governmental and 
non-governmental organizations in China. For example, the partnership with Friends 
of Natures and Global Village of Beijing helped EETPC (an NGO affiliated with the 
international Environmental Television Trust) to build up further connections with 
SEPA. After it was “banned” by the Chinese government in the mid-1990s, 
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Greenpeace continued its connections with a group of Chinese environmentalists.21 In 
2002, Greenpeace opened an unregistered office in Beijing, and hired Chinese 
nationals to start preparing for public campaigns. It has so far not only survived, but 
also established working partnerships in various parts of China due to the alliance, 
solidarity and support with local Chinese NGOs and activists. 
Examined by their working partnerships, the two international NGO 
communities present some similarities on the surface and some noticeable differences 
in terms of the density and quality of their state and social mobilization. International 
NGOs’ mobilization networks are more developed and expanded in the conservation 
field, with more governmental and non-governmental partners involved. Moreover, 
such networks seem to be more balanced incorporating both the Chinese state and 
social forces in the conservation field, while, more tilted towards the state in the 
HIV/AIDS prevention field. However, we have to investigate these networks more 
substantively to better understand these seeming disparities. In the following three 
sections, international NSAs’ mobilization effort will be further examined against sets 
of more contextual-based measurements.  
 
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS MOBILIZING THE CHINESE STATE 
 
There are two main commonalities in transnational advocacy mobilization involving 
the Chinese state across the two issue areas. First, international NGOs and advocates 
have made significant effort to interact with the Chinese state at all levels. Second, 
                                                 
21 Greenpeace has a branch based in Hong Kong, but called Greenpeace China. 
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most international NSAs mobilize the state through consensus-building strategies 
rather than pressure-building.  
Mobilizing the State at All Levels 
In the case study chapters, we have seen patterns of transnational advocacy networks 
engaging state actors from central to local levels. The data presented below further 
confirms this observation. Table 5.3 shows international NGOs’ partnership with 
Chinese governmental agencies at different levels. 19, 19 and 23 conservation NGOs 
have established working relationship with central, provincial and county and lower 
governmental agencies, respectively. The numbers are 14, 14 and 22 in the AIDS field. 
This table briefly indicates that international NGOs interact with governmental 
agencies at all levels. 
 
Table 5.3. International NGOs’ partnerships with the Chinese state at different levels  
Number of international NGOs  Partnership w/ the state at  
Nature conservation   HIV/AIDS prevention  
Central level  23 14 
Provincial level 19 14 
County and lower levels 23 22 
This observation is in line with the data from other research teams. There is no 
other source specifically focusing on international conservation NGOs in China, but 
on international environmental NGOs (environmental INGOs) in general: China 
Environment Series Inventory of Environmental Works in China, and China 
Development Brief data on international NGOs in China. According to the 
information from these two sources, environmental INGOs generally have a variety of 
partners in China, but local government or governmental agencies are most popular 
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ones to cooperate with. (Table 5.4) There is only one other source of data on INGOs 
in the AIDS field generated by the UNAIDS China Office. Even though this data is 
very limited to only 11 INGOs, it presents the similar pattern of INGOs’ governmental 
partnerships as mine. Of the 73 projects implemented by these 11 AIDS-related 
INGOs, 41 are jointly implemented by international NGOs with local governments, 
and 32 are with central-level governmental agencies and GONGOs. (Table 5.5) 
 
Table 5.4. CDB/CES estimates of environmental INGOs’ partnerships with the Chinese state 
Number of INGOs that partner w/ 
central governmental agencies 
Sources Number of 
INGOs  
State agencies  Central GONGOs  
Number of INGOs that 
partner w/ provincial 
and local governments 
CDB 2000 a 15 4 6 8 
CES 2001 b 28 13 17 15 
CES 2002 b 36 12 20 21 
Notes: a China Development Brief. (2000). Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in 
China. Hong Kong: China Development Research Services and author interviews with Chinese 
government, NGO, and GONGO representatives. 
b “The Inventory for Environmental Work in China.” China Environment Series: Issue 4 (2001), and 
Issue 5 (2002). Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. 
Table 5.5. UNAIDS data on INGOs’ governmental partners in HIV/AIDS prevention in China 
(2004) 
Number of governmental partners  (total: 73) 
At central level 
Number of INGOs   
State agencies Central GONGOs 
At provincial  and local 
levels  
11 14 18 41 
Source: UNAIDS China Programme, December 2004. 
Mobilizing the State by Consensus Building 
The idea of double-mobilization underlines stresses that advocates consider the 
targeted government as a negotiable counterpart, and one that is capable of learning 
and being persuaded. Therefore, they form networks not only to perform leverage 
politics to make governments comply, but also to build up consensus to make 
governments agree to change. By examining and categorizing the content of 
international NGOs’ work, I compiled a set of data to illustrate what external 
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advocates do to convey information, ideas, or principles to the Chinese government so 
to gradually reach agreeable terms, and whether contentious or non-contentious 
means are both applied. (Table 5.6) To assess international NGOs’ work in consensus 
building, I used four indicators: information dissemination, involvement in policy 
implementation, direct input in policy-making, and partaking in institution building to 
maintain policy outcomes. I show what are the mechanisms external advocacy actors 
use to wield their influence and make changes to existing policies. For information 
dissemination, I further clarified by three categories: information sharing, research 
collaboration, and training for governmental personnel. To include international 
NSAs’ work in pressure building, I add the information on the number of international 
NGOs that are engaged with public and media campaign to expose policy problems 
and challenge governmental authorities. 
 
Table 5.6. Comparing international NGOs’ mobilization of the Chinese state (2004) 
Number of international NGOs  Content of international NGO activities 
Nature Conservation HIV/AIDS Prevention 
CONSENSUS BUILDING:   
Information dissemination 
Information sharing 
Research collaboration 
Training 
 
28 
18 
17 
 
22 
3 
19 
Policy implementation 15 20 
Direct policy-making input 15 5 
Institution building 6 3 
PRESURE BUILDING:   
Public campaign 5 0 
 
The data in Table 5.6 first shows that non-contentious means are frequently 
applied by international NGOs to interact with the Chinese state. Only a handful of 
international environmental NGOs have organized public campaigns to openly 
criticize governmental policies, and mobilize pressure onto the governments. While 
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much effort has been spent to disseminating information, and demonstrating norms 
and solutions by participating in policy implementation, international NGOs still have 
limited access to directly exert influence in policy-making. In terms of institution 
building which would sustain policy changes in the long-run, very few international 
NGOs have been able get involved in the processes in both cases.  
Table 5.6 also gives a good sense of the difference in international NGOs’ 
mobilization of the Chinese state across the two cases studied. There are two most 
striking dissimilarities between the two: 1) international conservation NGOs have 
been able to exert their influence by direct policy input much more in nature 
conservation than in HIV/AIDS prevention; 2) international health NGOs have not 
employed any openly confrontational means to change state behavior in the AIDS 
field. This more substantive analysis of international NGOs’ deeds confirms the 
observation that transnational advocacy mobilization has reached a deeper degree in 
nature conservation than in HIV/AIDS prevention in China.   
Information dissemination  
As explained in the theoretical chapter, international NGOs and advocacy actors can 
influence state behavior by feeding the state with advanced information, or by 
engaging the state in research projects, so that new knowledge will be generated and 
disseminated. Through these trainings, international NGOs and advocates have helped 
Chinese governmental officials and professionals to digest new information, learn the 
implications of research findings, and more importantly, go through the practical 
methods of AIDS education, care, and treatment, and conservation implementation. In 
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both fields, I have found evidence of international NGOs and advocacy groups 
sharing information with, and providing training opportunities for the Chinese 
government. However, there is a significant gap between the two networks in terms of 
their involvement in sponsoring or engaging the Chinese government in fundamental 
research. In both nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention, how to carry out 
research and interpret research findings matters substantially to the final decision-
making on policy making. International advocacy actors can better defend and 
promote their normative principles if they are involved in research projects, which 
usually take place before actual policy-crafting or law-making. Therefore, the above 
gap suggests that international NSAs have been mobilizing to change the perceptions 
and understandings of the Chinese state to a higher degree by engaging the 
government in fundamental research. 
The majority of the international NGOs studied (28 out of 34 international 
environmental NGOs, and 22 of 32 international health NGOs) voluntarily shared 
information and research findings with the Chinese government. This is a strong 
evidence for double-mobilization, and a challenge to the Boomerang arguments, 
which only emphasizes the information-sharing between domestic and international 
advocates, and the point the advocates use shared information to leverage pressure 
onto the targeted government. Many examples of information sharing were given in 
the previous two chapters, and here I will give another brief reference. After China 
became a member of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) in 1996, with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the formal channel for information exchanges, 
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IUCN pursued multiple technical contact channels with a range of Ministries and 
Departments, notably the SEPA, SFB, the Academy of Sciences and the State Oceanic 
Administration.  
Providing training and learning opportunities to governmental agencies and 
personnel is the field where many international NGOs and advocacy groups find they 
can immediately lend their help so to get into the broader political picture. Moreover, 
this is the area where international health NGOs appear to be more involved than in 
the case of conservation. For example, Helping AIDS in Resource Poor Areas 
(HARPA), an American NGO, has sponsored the Chinese Academy of Medical 
Science to provide AIDS Clinical Training Courses to health officials and state-
affiliated professionals in 11 provinces across the country.  
Some external advocacy groups, either due to limited resources, or their more 
restricted views on engaging the Chinese government, only sponsor key governmental 
officials or state-affiliated professionals to participate in advanced trainings. For 
example, in 2002, the Aixin Foundation sponsored Jin Wei, lecturer of the Central 
Party School, to attend an intensive workshop in women’s leadership and public 
health education in Washington, D.C. Jin acknowledged that she greatly benefited 
from this learning experience, which strengthened her lectures on AIDS-related 
policies back in Beijing, and prepared her to edit the Handbook on AIDS Prevention 
for Party Leaders published in 2003. Members of the Aixin Foundation saw this as an 
effective way to indirectly change the mind-set of thousands of Chinese Party cadres 
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at a low financial expenditure.22
 Even though most international NGOs and advocates are committed to basing 
their work on reliable sources, many are either unwilling or unable to fund 
governmental research projects. In the case of China, because of the close relationship 
between the state and academy, international advocates sometimes sponsor 
fundamental research as a way to establish connections with the state. In fact, it is 
fairly common in the field of conservation, where 18 of the 34 international NGOs 
have conducted research together with Chinese governmental and quasi-governmental 
agencies. However, the HIV/AIDS transnational advocacy case differs dramatically in 
this respect, with only three international NGOs sponsoring the Chinese state in 
fundamental research.  At the central level, the only exception here is the China AIDS 
Initiative (CAI), coordinated by the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center 
(ADARC).  
The New York based ADARC is widely recognized as one of the world’s 
leading institutions in basic science of AIDS and its related research. Since 2003, the 
ADARC has been coordinating the China AIDS Initiative, a transnational effort to 
“produce dramatic and sustained interventions that will greatly reduce the size of what 
could otherwise become a devastating AIDS epidemic, far exceeding the impact of 
SARS”.23 Beside ADARC, CAI coordinates the capacity, resources, and expertise of a 
broad network of NGOs and other implementing organizations, including the AIDS 
                                                 
22 Multiple interviews with Aixin members in Beijing and Maryland, U.S. in 2004. 
23 The China AIDS Initiative reports. [Available online: http://www.adarc.org, last accessed 15 Dec 
2004] 
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Research Center (Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences/Peking Union Medical 
College), William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation, Yale-China Association, Project 
HOPE, Hong Kong AIDS Foundation, Tsinghua University (China), Wuhan 
University (China) and Bureaus of Health in Yunnan, Henan, and Hubei provinces. 
Under this working framework, a series of clinical research and treatment testing have 
been conducted in two cities in Yunnan by the end of 2004.24   
Occasionally, international health NGOs sponsor small-scale clinical or 
laboratory research initiated by or in collaboration with the Chinese health authorities. 
For example, HARPA has supported the Chinese Academy of Medical Science (led by 
Dr. Cao Yunzhen) in clinical trials in Beijing, Guangzhou, Henan, Fujian and Yunnan. 
At the local level, some audacious public health officials have accepted research 
support from foreign NGOs. For example, the Burnet Institute has conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of the AIDS situation in Lhasa City and San Nan and 
Shigatse prefectures in Tibet Autonomous Region. The analysis was meant to inform 
the development of a strategic plan to respond to HIV/AIDS in the Tibetan geographic, 
cultural, and economic context.  
Among many factors, one intervening variable that may explain why 
international NGOs are not the main collaborators with the Chinese government in 
basic research on AIDS is that a large number of medical schools and university 
research teams are currently filling this role from overseas. From the U.S. alone, most 
leading medical, public health and public policy schools, including those from 
                                                 
24 Cao, Yunzhen. 2004 End of Year Report of the AIDS Research Center at Chinese Academy of 
Medical Science and Peking Union Medical College.  
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Harvard, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Southern California, have 
all contacted and been invited to join research projects with the MoH and CDCs at 
various levels. However, this is not necessarily an adequate explanation. As 
documented by the China Environment Series, while a number of American university 
environmental science departments have been implementing research in China for 
years, still many international environmental NGOs collaborate with the government 
and state-affiliated academies in research projects in China.25 My interpretation of the 
lack of research collaboration in the AIDS field is that the central health authority has 
the decisive power over what is to be researched, how, and by whom in the field of 
AIDS, and it has not been familiar with international NGOs or any agencies outside of 
the bilateral and multilateral frameworks to  conduct clinical trials and medical 
research together.  
Involvement in policy implementation 
Adapting to the Chinese political context, many international advocacy actors began 
to realize that in order to change state behavior and introduce new practices at local 
levels, one must not only argue what is not working, but also demonstrate to the 
policy makers and implementers what would work. Many have realized that the 
Chinese government often hangs on to ineffective policies and resist to changes not 
because they don’t want to change, or what are the options, but because they do not 
                                                 
25 Inventory of Environmental Works in China: U.S. Universities and Research Institutions. In China 
Environmental Series, Issue 5 & 6. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. In fact, when 
the Inventory was first created in 1997, there were not many universities implementing environment 
related research and projects in China. As the number of universities grow, the editor of the journal 
added a new category into the Inventory to especially document their research activities in China. 
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know how to operationalize the options. State capacity is extremely lacking at county 
or lower levels. In addition, without local governments, external actors also find 
difficulty in mobilizing local communities. Therefore, in addition to provide training 
and learning opportunities to governmental staff, international NGOs and advocates 
become involved in policy implementation processes, during which they can explain, 
operationalize and demonstrate better solutions to the targeted problems. Because 
international NGOs and advocates are committed and norm-driven, they see their 
participation in policy implementation as a strategy to socialize the principles that 
they endeavor to promote. This feature is present in both of the cases here, but 
particularly common in HIV/AIDS prevention.  
As we read in the sections on TNC, WWF, and CI, these three major 
conservation groups have successfully integrated their missions in China into the 
three main national policies related to reforestation —the Natural Forest Protection, 
the Conversion of Sloping Cultivated Land to Forest and Grassland, and the 
Endangered Plant and Wildlife Protection and Nature Reserves Program—introduced 
between 1999 and 2001. These programs have multi-billion dollar budgets, and as CI 
China stated in its program brochure, they offered international advocacy groups 
“unprecedented opportunity to influence the course of conservation in China”. 
Against the general trend in this comparative study, the international health 
NGO community as a whole has exhibited more vitality than the conservation 
community in assisting the Chinese government in policy implementation. On the one 
hand, because it is still in the early stage of the development of the AIDS networks, 
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participating in policy implementation can get external advocates access to the center 
of the politics. In contrast, the conservation advocacy groups have moved on and 
established other channels to reach their goals. On the other hand, this is also partially 
a result of the recent institutional changes in China’s health system. As the health 
authorities are paying more attention to the AIDS issue, they also have strengthened 
political control over the issue. Therefore, some external advocacy actors have framed 
their work in the way that they can be of assistance to governmental initiatives, so that 
they can win the opportunity to demonstrate their core principle through project 
implementations. For example, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance has opened a 
China Programme focusing on increasing PLWHAs’ access to and involvement in 
effective community-based care and prevention services, and building up community-
base groups’ capacity to deliver health services. The Programme considers effective 
working relationships with the provincial health bureau and AIDS office essential. 
They, thus, have translated their goals as to fill in the gaps in existing policy 
implementation in Yunnan and Sichuan provinces and persuaded local governments to 
support the implementation of their projects. 
Direct policy input and institution building 
The difference between the two networks becomes more evident when comparing 
their activities directly related to policy-making and institutional innovation. As 
explained before, these are two much shorter causal mechanisms for international 
advocates to leave imprints in China’s domestic changes in the specific issue areas. 
Even though it is not common for international non-state actors to be part of the 
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policy-making process, more international environmental NGOs have tunneled 
through into the policy-making circles and made their point heard, as the data show in 
Table 5.6. Six international NGOs in conservation and three in HIV/AIDS prevention 
have also initiated, and essentially assisted in creating new institutions for the Chinese 
government to better deal with governance problems. 
Many have argued that the Chinese state is a deeply fragmented system, and 
policy-making and institutional change within the Chinese state prove to be rather a 
tedious process, filled with inter-bureaucratic bargaining and administrative redress. 
Moreover, the Chinese state is not particularly friendly to external advice, let alone 
advice from NSAs, about whom the state knows very little. When interviewed, Lu De, 
division chief of the International Cooperation Office of SFB, commented that: “It 
(first) takes a long time for us to have trust in international NGOs. Then, they 
(international NGOs) have to also convince all related governmental agencies, and 
make sure that they are not messing up the current (political) balance among these 
agencies.”26 Facing the obstacles described by Lu, some international advocacy actors 
have been able to use informal connections and formal policy recommendations, or 
serve as expert consultants for policy-making committees to exert their influence on 
policy-making. For example, members of the International Fund for China’s 
Environment, a Washington, D.C. based NGO, are mostly environmental specialists, 
so they have the expertise to provide recommendations for many recent national-level 
policy revisions. In 2003, they provided a report to the Chinese People's Political 
                                                 
26 Telephone interview in Beijing, 16 July 2004.  
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Consultative Committee (CPPCC)—Recommendation of Four on One System for 
Vegetation Restoration and Improving Farmers' Living in Western China and 
Implementation of Land Laws in China. As requested by CPPCC, this report was 
submitted to the standing committee meeting of the CPPCC and forwarded to the 
concerned central governmental agencies in China. 
 By institution building, I refer to the establishment of new governing rules, 
mechanisms and agencies, or re-arrangements of existing governing institutions. 
International NGOs and advocates can sustain the policy and project-based changes 
they have introduced by pushing for corresponding institutional changes. In my 
research, international environmental NGOs initiated such changes mostly by 
establishing new nature reserves, or providing substantial support to reform and 
strengthen existing reserves in China. In the AIDS case, international advocates try to 
introduce changes in local health governing structures by assisting in creating 
infectious disease hospitals and disease control centers. But, such efforts still remain 
at a low level in the current stage.  
Since 1995, the Wild Camel Protection Foundation (WCPF) has successfully 
initiated and assisted in the establishment of a 75,000 km2 nature reserve in Xinjiang 
autonomous region, now the last home of the critically endangered wild bactrian 
camel. Appointed by both the Chinese and Mongolian governments as the sole 
international consultant to the new nature reserve, WCPF advises reserve 
management on biodiversity conservation, develops and participates in the 
implementation of scientific studies of the protected area, and leads a multilingual 
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environmental public awareness educational program for schools and communities in 
Xinjiang. The WCPF is currently working with Chinese SEPA and the Mongolian 
Ministry of Nature and the Environment to protect the last wild bactrian camels in the 
wild.  
 Similarly, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has been working with a 
large number of Chinese environmentalists and NGOs, as well as governmental 
agencies, on transboundary conservation projects (e.g., Amur Tiger and Far Eastern 
Leopard) in Northeast China. WCS assisted Jilin provincial government in 
establishing the Hunchun Nature Reserve in December 2001. Since its establishment, 
a total of 56 reserve staff obtained two training courses from WCS in 2002, focusing 
on the issues of tiger monitoring, anti-poaching, and reserve management. With 
financial and technical support from WCS, the reserve undertakes regular anti-
poaching activities. Within a year, a total of about 3,200 wire snares and 110 traps 
were removed, five rifles with over 200 bullets were confiscated, and seven illegal 
hunters were arrested. At the end of 2002, WCS China Program established its own 
office in the Hunchun Nature Reserve to lead local conservation work.27  
In the field of HIV/AIDS prevention, Save the Children UK (SC)’s continuous 
work in Ruili County (Yunnan) has proved to be the most distinctive example in terms 
of institution building. SC was able to able convince the local authority and mobilize 
a large amount of material and human resources to support local governmental 
agencies to adopt a fundamentally new approach in dealing with AIDS. SC signed an 
                                                 
27 Interviews in Shanghai in August 2002 and email exchanges in October 2004. 
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MoU with the Ruili government to implement a comprehensive interference project in 
AIDS from 2001-2006 (two phases), which requires fundamental reform of the local 
public health governance. The Ruili government on accepting the assistance from SC 
established a special Committee of HIV/AIDS Prevention, consisting in 33 chief 
directors from different administrative sectors besides the health bureau, e.g., 
education, public security and ethnic affairs.28 Even though the SC project is reaching 
to its final stage, the governing frameworks they helped to build up in Ruili will stay. 
International health organizations, particularly UNAIDS China, have praised this 
Ruili model, and recommended to the Chinese central health authorities, as well as to 
other international concerned parties who intend to introduce changes to China’s rural 
health system. 
 There are two major findings from comparing the four categories of 
international NGOs’ work in mobilizing the Chinese state through persuasion, 
demonstration, and collaboration in policy-making and implementation: First, 
consensus-building is common and important to transnational advocacy actors to 
influence the Chinese state; Second, there is a higher level of such consensus-building 
in the conservation case than in HIV/AIDS prevention, reflected in international 
NGOs’ more frequent involvement in policy-making process and institution building. 
While international AIDS-related NGOs’ presence in policy implement is relatively 
high, they have not been able to build up access to directly influence the policy 
makers and modify new institutional arrangement. This is not simply to argue that 
                                                 
28 The Committee first consisted of around 20 officials from different sectors, and was gradually 
expanded to 33 to include more administrative branches. 
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external advocacy actors are not making as much impact in the AIDS field as in 
nature conservation, but highlight that interactions and connections between the 
Chinese state and international advocates are deepening in the latter case. 
Mobilizing the State by Building Pressure 
Much existing literature has suggested that external advocacy actors can change a 
state’s behavior by “mobilization of shame” and use leverage politics to make targeted 
governments comply with international norms. While emphasizing the more gradual 
and consent-based dimensions, the double-mobilization argument does not overlook 
this aspect of transnational advocacy politics. In fact, in the field of conservation, I 
have found evidence that international NGOs and activists have successfully 
organized public campaigns to put pressure on the Chinese government to modify 
existing policies, through the help of domestic activist groups, journalists and 
sympathetic governmental officials. 
It is not surprising that the Chinese government is sensitive to open 
encouragement of public protest and campaigns pointing at policy failures. Such 
activities can become more controversial if it is externally initiated and sponsored. 
The Chinese government certainly does not have a good record of accepting 
international criticism. International human rights organizations are not welcomed by 
the government. Foreign news agencies are still under excessive surveillance in the 
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country.29 In the environmental field, Sanjeev Khagram documented the silencing of 
transnational activism against the Three Gorges Dam in the 1980s.30 Because of its 
protest in Tian’an Men square in 1996, Greenpeace was banished from China for half 
a decade.31  
However, not much is known of the successful campaigns to protect wildlife 
and protest against animal cruelty and large hydro-power plants organized or 
sponsored by various international advocacy groups. In the field of HIV/AIDS 
prevention, a few incidents might have provided triggers for transnationally mobilized 
campaigns against existing policies, yet none has been brought to maturity. In fact, 
international NGOs appear to be very careful not to agitate the Chinese authorities. 
During the World AIDS Conference in 2004, a Chinese AIDS activist, joined by 
Amnesty International, distributed fliers at the main convention venue, which 
caricatured the Henan provincial government.32 Because this activist was sponsored 
by a British NGO, the NGO immediately sensed the potential trouble, and announced 
that they were disappointed by what happened, and they were not part of the action.  
The lack of confrontational actions taken by international health NGOs or 
advocates doest not necessarily mean that they care less about changes than their 
peers in the environmental field. Nor can this be attributed solely to the political 
                                                 
29 Interviews with Susan Lawrence and David Murphey, Beijing correspondents of the Far Eastern 
Economics Review, in January 2003; and with Yuen Chen, Pacific Time correspondent and free-lancer 
for BBC World in Shanghai, in May 2004. 
30 Khagram, Sanjeev. 2004. Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp170-176. 
31 Greenpeace came back to China in 2002, and has been expanding its work since then. 
32  The activist compared the way the Henan government dealt with HIV patients to the Nazi 
government. 
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sensitivity factor. For external advocates, it is a learning process to conduct work in 
China, to get to know domestic activists, and to figure out how to push the right 
button at the right time. There is not too much difference in the repressive context 
across the two cases. Yet, the difference is that international environmental advocates 
have made many more failed or semi-successful trials, and as a result, they have 
learned where the “cutting-edge” is. Also, in the environmental field, many Chinese 
activists and NGOs have also tested the political boundaries by organizing petitions, 
open meetings with governmental officials and public rallies, which helped 
tremendously for external advocacy groups to figure out exactly how confrontational 
they can be under different circumstances at different times.  
 
In this section, I analyzed the content of international NSAs’ advocacy and 
mobilization work engaging the Chinese state. The main findings are: 1) More 
international NSAs apply consensus-building than pressure-building strategies across 
the two cases; 2) International NSAs interact and mobilize governmental agencies at 
all levels; 3) More external advocacy groups are able to engage the state by 
information sharing and assisting policy implement rather than providing direct input 
in policy-making and institutional changes; 4) The conservation network presents 
stronger evidence of international NSAs mobilizing the state by being part of the 
policy-making processes, as well as applying confrontational means to build pressure 
onto the government. State mobilization has reached a higher level in the nature 
conservation case.  
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TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS MOBILIZING THE CHINESE SOCIETY 
 
From international NGOs’ formal working partnership, we find some evidence of 
international NGO’s social mobilization through collaborating with registered Chinese 
non-governmental organizations. However, this observation is slightly skewed 
because of the lack of formal laws and regulations regarding NGO registration in 
China. Many Chinese NGOs are invisible in “formal” terms. International NGOs 
sometimes do not list their non-governmental partners to protect their status in China. 
Moreover, international NGOs’ social mobilization can take various forms besides 
formal partnership with local NGOs. In fact, many international NGOs mobilize local 
populations through more general public education and training programs, instead of 
focusing on particular local organizations. Localization of international NGOs is a 
significant way of social mobilization. WWF China has so far established over 15 
regional offices, most of which have become local hubs of Chinese environmentally 
concerned citizens. Even its online chat-rooms have inspired many grassroots actions 
for the environment. For example, WWF friends in Shanghai initiated and 
participated in a campaign against the municipal government’s plan for turning the 
last piece of wetland into a golf course in 2003-2004. 
In this section, I use three indicators (i.e., public education, local societal 
capacity building, and promotion of social activism) to examine the content of 
international NGOs’ social mobilization work. Table 5.7 below presents the findings. 
The first observation is that there is sufficient evidence of international NGOs’ social 
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mobilization work. Recall the findings in Table 5.6 on the content of international 
NGOs’ state mobilization work. In terms of conducting advocacy education for 
information dissemination and norm socialization, almost the same number of 
international NGOs provide public education and training at grassroots levels (county 
and below) to non-governmental participants as the ones providing learning 
opportunities and training to governmental agencies and officials. 25 (of total 34) 
international conservation NGOs conduct public education work, while 28 are 
engaged in some kind of information sharing with the Chinese government; 23 (of 
total 32) international health NGOs conduct public AIDS prevention education work, 
while 22 share information with governmental agencies. Similarly, many international 
NGOs in both cases see providing learning opportunities as a key capacity building 
step for local society as well as to the state. Quite a few international NGOs, 
especially in the field of nature conservation, have overcome political barriers to 
support local activism. 19 international NGOs provide training to non-governmental 
participants in each field, while 17 and 19 provide training to governmental 
participants in conservation and AIDS fields, respectively. Hence, findings from the 
content of international NGOs’ work substantiate the argument of the Double-
mobilization pattern of transnational advocacy networks. 
 
Table 5.7. Measuring international NGOs’ mobilization of Chinese society 
Number of international NGOs Content of international NGO activities Nature conservation HIV/AIDS prevention 
Public education 25 23 
Training and local capacity building 19 19 
Promoting social activism 
Technical and financial support 
Creating new local NGOs and networks 
 
21 
10 
 
12 
3 
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The second interpretation of Table 5.7 is related to the difference between the 
two international NGO communities examined. The two cases showed much in 
common in societal mobilization except in promoting social activism. The AIDS 
international NGO community is catching up, but still not as proactive in supporting 
domestic social activism as the conservation community. There are significantly more 
international NGOs involved in the development of Chinese NGOs and regional 
networks to promote social activism in conservation than in HIV/AIDS prevention. 
Close to two thirds of all the international NGOs within the conservation networks 
managed to provide various technical and financial assistance to their Chinese 
counterparts. 
Public education and Societal Capacity Building 
One aspect of the Communist legacy in China is that its society’s capacity of self-
governance has been continually crushed. Societal self-governance based on family or 
clan based collectivities have largely broken apart since the 1950s. Under Mao’s 
regime, centralized political command was established through a party-administration 
dual system, and secured at the grassroots level through hundreds of thousands of 
production brigades in rural areas and workings units in urban cities. Through these 
collective units, the state has managed to penetrate into all aspects of citizens’ social 
and private lives. Entering the reformist era, new institutions were introduced to 
strengthen grassroots level governance: district governments in cities and self-elected 
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village committees in rural areas.33 However, in both environmental and public health 
fields, international advocacy groups find levels of public awareness and self-capacity 
of Chinese communities are very low. Therefore, they consider it necessary to 
promote public education and assist in capacity building for local populations to 
maintain the effects of short-term projects and solve the problems in a more 
sustainable way. 
The Chinese public is in great need of AIDS-related information, yet still lacks 
access to such information. This is because of the state’s denial at the beginning and 
lack of capacity to fully implement AIDS public awareness policies at the current 
stage. Because China is such a big, diverse and unevenly developed country, it is not 
surprising that international NGOs find a large void in public education about AIDS 
even after the central government changed its policies in 2003. Most of them have 
found a niche to start their social mobilization work in this regard. With the help of 
internet and communication technology, international NGOs and advocates can reach 
a large audience in China. For example, Odilon Couzin, a former foreign news 
correspondent in Beijing, founded the China AIDS Info. in 2003.34 He maintains a 
website to provide the general public latest information related to AIDS in China. 
What is unique about this organization is that it has formed a network of Chinese 
journalists, translators, NGO-workers, and PLWHA across the country, which enables 
                                                 
33 For example, in Shanghai city, district (je dao) governments and residential committees (ju wei hui) 
were set up to be in charge of daily public affairs (e.g., public sanitary), and a large number of military 
veterans and college graduates were recruited as local officials. 
34 China AIDS Info. is registered as an NGO in Hong Kong. Interviews with Odilon Couzin in 
Shanghai and Beijing, July 2004. 
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it to gather, translate, and disseminate the latest information about the China’s AIDS 
policies, international agencies in AIDS in China, domestic AIDS related NGOs, 
updates of treatment, and China’s drug industry.  
The problem of little awareness of AIDS appears worse in the rural areas, 
where majority of the population have lost basic health-care access since the barefoot 
doctor system collapsed at the end of the 1970s. The goal set by the State Committee 
of AIDS Control and Prevention in April 2004 was to raise the rate of AIDS 
awareness to 85% in cities and 65% in rural areas, which indicates the urban-rural gap 
in public health.35 When I visited two villages in southern Henan province in May 
2004, months after the central government has announced the “Four Frees One Care” 
policy for rural HIV+ patients, only a handful of local villagers had heard about these 
policies, where the HIV infection rate is higher than the national average. In these 
villages, handing out a one-page leaflet of where to pick up treatment medicine and 
compensation money can mean significant changes in life. Many international NGOs, 
e.g., Health Unlimited, Marie Stopes China, Chi Heng Foundation, MSF Belgium and 
France, therefore, have realized the importance of maintaining their physical presence 
in rural China to directly provide AIDS related information to the most affected or 
potentially high-risk populations. 
Public education of AIDS is in need in China also because of the social stigma 
related to it. According to many practitioners I interviewed and UNAIDS 2004 
Assessment Report, such stigma is mostly from medical professionals. Professor Jing 
                                                 
35  State Committee of AIDS Control and Prevention information sharing meeting, organized by 
UNAIDS China, 29 April, 2004. 
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Jun, who has written extensively on AIDS in China and personally conducted Henan 
blood scandal, pointed out:  
Chinese AIDS patients, in most instances, are silent sufferers. 
They are even reluctant to reveal their health status to medical 
professionals, as doctors and nurses often suspect that these 
patients have acquired HIV through commercial sex, injection 
drug use, or homosexuality. Even when patients do tell doctors 
and nurses that they have been infected with HIV via other means 
(e.g., transmission through spouses or unsafe blood supplies), the 
cloud of suspicion may never be cleared. 
International NGOs (e.g., MSF Belgium) has conducted peer education work among 
nurses and medical professional to particularly address the stigma issue before the 
government took actions. On top of the stigma against AIDS, CSWs, MSM, and IDUs 
also face a double discrimination. International NGOs are also taking the lead in 
breaking social stigma and promoting AIDS awareness in gay bars and brothels and 
among hidden drug users. In these areas, international NSAs and experts appear to 
have much more experience than Chinese health officials. 
With the collapse of the free health care and barefoot doctor system in the 
middle 1980s, rural China is in great need of health services, facilities and medical 
professionals. 36  As public education campaigns are crucial for promoting AIDS 
awareness at grassroots level, training for local doctors and nurses are essential to 
                                                 
36 Health system in rural China before the end of 1980s was featured by equal access to free health care, 
bare-foot doctors and village-level medical clinics. Since the 1990s, most village clinics have been 
privatized and higher level health authorities could not afford training and sending bare-foot doctors to 
villages. Recent reforms of rural medi-care system emphasize on provincial government, county 
government and individuals share the cost of health insurance. Li, Xiaorou. "Too Poor To Get Sick: 
Medicare System on Trial." Beijing Review, July 24 2003, 14-18. Saich, Tony. 2001. “Health Care in 
Rural China”, in Governance and Politics of China. New York: Palgrave. pp257-61. Wang, Shaoguang. 
2003. "Zhongguo Gonggong Weisheng de Weiji yu Zhuanji (Crisis and Opportunity for China's Public 
Health)." Bi Jiao (Comparison). No. 7. 
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fundamentally improve local capacity in providing basic medical needs for AIDS 
patients. 37 The level of health knowledge is low in rural communities. It is extremely 
common for village doctors to use large amounts of antibiotics and intravenous fluids 
to treat common colds. Many international health NGOs (e.g., Health Unlimited, Yale 
China Association, Volunteers Overseas Services) have been able to convince local 
health authorities and provide training opportunity to rural medical professionals and 
village doctors, who usually do not have chance to participate in government 
sponsored health training for doctors and nurses at county and above level hospitals. 
Having attended trainings provided by Health Unlimited, Li Zheming, a doctor at the 
Heping village clinic (Yunnan province), said that “the project increased his 
knowledge about health and he was impressed by the increased number of local 
villagers who were now more willing to come to his clinic for medical help.”38  
International advocacy groups’ work in public education and local capacity 
building in the field of nature conservation, in many ways, resembles the patterns that 
have emerged in the AIDS case. A low level of environmental awareness has led to 
much resentment from local people against the idea of wildlife and biodiversity 
conservation. Therefore, to promote ideas related to nature conservation and to 
actually implement conservation projects, most external advocacy groups first spent 
time communicating with local farmers and listening to their concerns. The 
differences between the two cases in this respect lie in that there is not as much social 
                                                 
37 China’s hospital system does not go lower than county-level in rural areas. This means that village 
clinics are the only places for farmers to get medi-care. 
38 Health Unlimited 2004 project report. 
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stigma in the conservation field as in the AIDS field, and Chinese environmental 
NGOs now are becoming more effective and important in playing the role of public 
educator. Public awareness in the environmental field has been improved rapidly. A 
2002 National Environmental Protection Foundation survey showed that environment 
ranked among the top five major concerns among the Chinese public.39 Therefore, 
international advocates’ involvement in public education in the nature conservation 
field is becoming stabilized in the recent years. The data listed in Table 5.7 shows that 
almost the same number of international NGOs in both cases are working in public 
education, and this should be interpreted as international conservation NGOs have 
moved on to other areas regarding social mobilization. 
Like the case of health, local capacity in nature conservation is also 
underdeveloped, and many international conservation advocacy groups have provided 
training and technical assistance to local farmers to help them in sustainable 
development without over exploiting the forests, wetlands and lakes around their 
communities.  
The lakes and wetlands in the Central Yangtze region, including the biggest 
freshwater lake in China—Dongting Lake, are of vast importance for international 
biodiversity and local economies.40  Since the Great Leap Forward Movement in 
1950s, lakes and wetlands have been retrieved for economic and agricultural 
                                                 
39 However, changes in public awareness of environmental protection only took place in the recent few 
years. SEPA (1998-1999) National Survey of Public Awareness of Environment Protection still 
revealed the lack of environmental awareness. 
40 They provide habitat for vast flocks of migratory birds, including 95% of the wintering Siberian 
Crane population, and four highly-endangered endemic aquatic animals. 
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purposes. In the government’s Ninth Five Plan (1990-1995), national development 
plan, Dongting Lake area is listed as one of the national agricultural production bases. 
This tension between the nature and economic development was intensified by the 
1998 flood, which destroyed local people’s homes and farms over night. Having 
surveyed hundreds of local farmers, WWF China started a program to introduce 
fishery technologies to the local people and help them build up fishery facilities. With 
the preliminary success, WWF China further convinced local people and 
governmental agencies to establish a new reserve on the flooded lands. Hence, the 
lands within the reserve will not be retrieved to farm lands any more, and local people 
can generate sufficient income from fishery. Such an approach which provides 
necessary technical support to build up local capacity for conservation was applied in 
WWF China’s other species and habitat conservation programs in Shaanxi and 
Sichuan.  
In both cases, international advocacy groups have made substantial effort to 
promote new ideas among local people and provide training and technical support for 
them to digest and practice with new concepts and methods. The data in Table 5.6 
also indicates that slightly different from previous findings, international NGOs do 
not present much more strength in these two aspects in nature conservation than 
HIV/AIDS prevention. This is partially because in the nature conservation field, 
international advocacy groups have moved on to other agenda since the rise of 
grassroots environmentalism in the recent years; in addition, social stigma in the 
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AIDS field is still salient and still requires a lot more effort from both domestic and 
international advocacy communities.  
Supporting and Promoting Social Activism  
The threshold step for international advocates’ to expand their social mobilization is 
to establish contacts and coalitions with Chinese activist groups. In this aspect, I have 
found sufficient evidence to argue that most international advocacy groups are keen to 
build up such connections in both fields. What differentiates the two cases in this 
aspect is that more external advocacy groups have helped to create new local NGOs 
and new networking mechanisms to nurture social activism in the conservation field. 
Supporting Chinese NGOs 
While according to the data in Table 5.7., the number of international NGOs in the 
AIDS field that has engaged in building new Chinese NGOs is substantially lower 
than that in public education and training, this finding does not contradict with the 
argument that support from international NGOs is crucial to Chinese NGOs. On the 
contrary, from a survey of ten main Chinese NGOs working in the field of HIV/AIDS 
prevention, I found that almost all of them received financial and technical support 
from international NGOs. 41 (Table 5.8) In both fields, not only many international 
NGOs, but also a number of private foundations and funding organizations have 
applied a variety of innovative ways to support Chinese NGOs. However, Table 5.7 
reveals that more international NGOs have been engaged in supporting local NGOs in 
                                                 
41 For a comprehensive explanation of the methods related to this survey see Appendix 5.1. 
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nature conservation than in HIV/AIDS prevention. 
Table 5.8. Support to Chinese NGOs from international NSAs  
Number of Chinese NGOs that have received support from 
international NSAs in: 
 Number of 
Chinese NGOs 
interviewed  Formation Funding  Information/technical issues 
conservation  12 4 12 12 
AIDS related  10 3 10 8 
Note: Data presented are based on interviews of Chinese NGOs conducted during the time period 
2002-2004. 
 
In both cases, I have given examples of external groups providing financial 
and technical support to Chinese social groups, such as CI, WWF, IFAW, and PERC 
in nature conservation, and MSC, SC, and ARFC in HIV/AIDS prevention. Moreover, 
a number of international NSAs began to design and organize special programs to 
help Chinese NGOs to build up self-capacity. Invited by the Ford Foundation in the 
late 1990s, Winrock International has provided training for local forestry and nature 
reserve officials in Yunnan since then. More recently, it has shifted its efforts to civil 
society capacity building, particularly focusing on women’s groups and other NGOs. 
Its China NGO Capacity-Building Program (2002 – 2005) is tailored to the specific 
needs of each NGO participants and addresses issues such as accountability, 
governance and management of volunteers. During the pilot phase, the Program 
worked with a small number of NGOs in Beijing and provided training and coaching 
to these local NGOs in strategic planning, leadership, financial management, 
fundraising and local resource mobilization. Starting in the autumn of 2003, Winrock 
worked with a larger number of NGOs across the country to help them address some 
of the most urgent problems they had identified by a participatory organizational 
assessment.  
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International NSAs’ effort in supporting local activist groups is not limited in 
financial and technical terms. Many times, they tactically help Chinese NGOs to voice 
their opinion and fight for their interests. For example, China AIDS Info. was funded 
by UNAIDS China and the Ford Foundation to compile a directory of all AIDS-
related works and organizations in China. By including Chinese NGOs and PLWHA 
groups in the directory, China AIDS Info. has helped to increase the visibility of them. 
Odilon, founder of the China AIDS Info., is also a consultant for the Global Fund in 
China, and has been consistently pushing for more direct funding and opportunities 
for PLWHA and Chinese NGOs. Similarly, by incorporating local groups into its own 
projects in Sichuan, CI have been able to give local NGOs and activists more 
opportunities to expand their networks, meet with outside funding organizations and 
even governmental officials in Beijing.  
Incubating local NGOs and creating linkages 
Besides telling the commonalities in international NSAs’ social mobilization, data in 
table 5.7 also suggests that what fundamentally sets the two cases apart is their 
differential involvement in the development of Chinese NGOs and the networks 
among themselves. In the nature conservation case, 10 of the 34 international NGOs 
focused on have created or helped to establish new local NGOs. Support from a 
number of funding organizations, such as Global Greengrants Fund and Blue Moon 
Foundation, has also been crucial to many newly established Chinese environmental 
NGOs. However, in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention, while small private 
foundations have made effort to support emerging grassroots groups, only three 
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international NGOs (Save the Children UK, Marie Stopes and Oxfam HK) are 
engaging with the similar type of support. 
During the implementation of its comprehensive community health project in 
Ruili, Save the Children UK established a Women and Children Development Center 
in the county. This Center has obtained official registered as a social organization 
form local Department of Civil Affairs, and in April, 2004, it received a grant of 
10,000 RMB from the American Chamber of Commerce in China. Currently, World 
Vision HK is planning to collaborate with the Center and expand its work in AIDS 
orphan care.  
MSF Belgium Xiangfan team was also trying to support a local PLWHA 
activist and create a patient support-group in the city. However, Xiangfan CDC has 
already established an official AIDS Care Center, and they decided to invite the 
activist to join the Center instead of having his own organization. 
Across issue areas, it is still difficult to register independent social 
organizations or NGOs in China. However, through trial and error and expanding 
networks, international NSAs have been able to help local activists to establish their 
own organizations. Moreover, in the nature conservation field, international advocacy 
groups have also been able to create more opportunities for Chinese NGOs to network 
with each other and support the development of regional focal groups which would 
further strengthen local social activism and mobilization. For example, every year 
since 1999, the International Fund for China’s Environment organizes the China-U.S. 
Environmental NGO Conference. ECOLOGIA and GGF have created a web of their 
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NGO grantees in China, which greatly increased information exchanges among these 
on the group conservation groups.  
The three regional hubs of young environmentalists have all received 
important support from international advocacy groups. The Global Greengrants Fund 
(GGF) supported the China Green Student Forum in Beijing, and ECLOGIA helped 
the Environmental Volunteers Association in Sichuan University to grow into a central 
group in the Southwest. Since 2003, the Siemenpuu Foundation (Finnish) has given 
the Green Stone of Nanjing University a grant to support other college student 
environmental groups which further strengthened the networks among student groups 
in the eastern provinces. While the three student groups initiated by Chinese young 
environmentalists were emerging as regional focal groups, support from international 
provided them with additional momentum. 
 
Not surprisingly, both cases present evidence of international NSAs’ social 
mobilization in China. In addition to public education and local capacity building, 
international advocacy actors have been particularly important in supporting and 
promoting social activism in China. Many external advocates see the rise of domestic 
activism and community-based NGOs as a necessary way to sustain their own 
advocacy work at the local level. International NSAs support Chinese NGOs not only 
in financial and technical terms, but also in helping generate more political space and 
opportunities for bottom-up initiatives. In the nature conservation field, a number of 
international NGOs and private foundations are making more effort to incubate new 
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local NGOs and create new channels for Chinese activists and NGOs to network 
domestically and internationally. Therefore, the level of social mobilization of 
transnational networks is relatively higher in nature conservation than HIV/AIDS 
prevention.  
A word of caution here: I do not intend to evaluate international NSAs’ social 
mobilization, but to present the patterns involved in their interactions with social 
groups in China. Promoting social activism is the type of work that should not be too 
hastened. Unless enough public awareness is raised, bottom-up initiatives cannot 
naturally emerge; and, unless such initiatives can grow on their own to some extent, 
too much international influence might lead to organizational dependency, which is 
not necessarily beneficial for local communities.42
 
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS 
 BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN THE STATE AND SOCIETY 
 
In addition to state and social mobilization, transnational advocacy networks also 
introduce new political dynamics by modify the existing state-society relations. The 
                                                 
42 The concern of domestic NGOs depending on international NSAs is common in the field. I do agree 
with this point, but my argument here is rather on the relations between domestic and international 
advocacy groups than the consequences of such relations. On international NGOs’ influences on 
domestic NGOs: Heyzer, Noeleen, James V. Riker, and Antonio B. Quizon, eds. 1995. Government-
NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for People-centered Development. Kuala Lumpur, 
New York: Asian and Pacific Development Centre and St. Martin's Press. Lewis, David J. 1997. 
"NGOs, Donors, and the State in Bangladesh." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science (The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment). 554: 33-45. McMahon, Patrice C. 2000. 
"Building Civil Societies in East Central Europe: The Effect of American NGOs on Women's Groups". 
Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D. C., August 31-September 3. (manuscript). 
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Double-mobilization model highlights that domestic state-society relations are not 
constant, and co-evolve with the development of transnational networks. As 
evidenced in Chapters 3 and 4, international NSAs, together with their local 
governmental and non-governmental partners, can experiment with new mechanisms 
to facilitate the communication between local state and society. In some case, 
advocates introduced the participatory approach into local political context. I have 
compiled the data on international NGOs’ work in building bridges between local 
governments and communities to further illustrate these observations. (Table 5.9) 
Among the international NGO surveyed (34 in nature conservation, 32 in HIV/AIDS 
prevention), many of them have created new communication channels between local 
governments and social groups (18 in nature conservation, 14 in HIV/AIDS 
prevention). Even though still limited, a few international NGOs have established 
public participation mechanisms through their projects, and some even further 
persuaded local government to form new rules, policy frameworks or agencies that 
would further consolidate the idea of public participation in a long run. 
 
Table 5.9. Measuring international NGOs’ promotion of state-society communication 
Number of international NGOs Content of international NGO activities Nature conservation  HIV/AIDS prevention 
Creating communication channels 18 14 
Project-based public participation  12 7 
Institutionalizing public participation 5 2 
 
 
Creating “Dialogues” 
 
The term “dialogue” was quite a popular political expression in China in the second 
half of the 1980s, when the country had an interlude of political liberalization under 
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the leadership of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. It was used to encourage Chinese 
citizens to voice their different opinions, and governmental authorities to listen to 
these opinions. Governments and citizens should be able to solve controversies 
through friendly, open and fair exchanges of ideas. I borrow this expression here to 
refer to the occasions when governmental and non-governmental actors meet and 
communicate as equal parties outside the formal political arena, yet in organized, 
legal, and open settings. This type of communication is beyond informal, personal 
connections. Even though it still lacks formality, and probably will not lead to any 
official records that the state is accountable for, it offers important opportunity for the 
two parties to form some impression of each others’ principles and bottom lines. Such 
communication often takes places in an internationalized setting, e.g., conference, 
forum, roundtable, and ceremony, where both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations are invited as equal participants. Though the “equal status” may be 
nominal, it provides a favorable atmosphere for exchanges of opinions between 
governmental officials and activists, who normally won’t meet fact-to-face at all. In 
both conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention fields, international NSAs have been 
very active in creating such channels of “dialogue”.  
For example, every year since the late 1990s, together with the China 
Environmental Protection Foundation—a GONGO affiliated with SEPA, Friend of the 
Earth Hong Kong gives out the Earth Award to the best practices in environmental 
protection in China. Because nominations for the Award are collected not only 
through both governmental and activist circles, and it is reviewed and recognized by a 
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committee of both governmental and non-governmental representatives, it has 
generated a great deal of exchanges between SEPA affiliated officials and 
environmental activists. On the one hand, SEPA was able to know better about 
bottom-up environmental activism; and, on the other hand, environmental activists 
and NGOs were able to build up networks and alliance with more open-minded 
officials. The Berry and Martin’s Trust annual award to distinctive individuals in 
HIV/AIDS prevention has similar effects, though its nomination and ceremonies have 
not involved as many parties as the Earth Award.  
Since 2001, the International Fund for China’s Environment holds a multi-day 
conference “Sino-U.S. Environmental NGO Forum” either in the United State or 
China. Such a forum is designed to invite both influential NGO representatives and 
governmental officials from both countries to particularly discuss how to perceive and 
maintain a healthy relationship between the state and non-governmental actors in 
environmental protection.43 During the 2004 World AIDS Conference, the U.S.-China 
AIDS Alliance initiated the idea of a celebration party for all Chinese governmental 
and NGO participants. According to Xu Hua, Secretary General of China STD & 
AIDS Foundation, this is the first “family party” of all Chinese NGOs together with 
governmental officials.44
Besides the examples above, which are more visible and require more effort, 
international NGOs and advocates also convey many more small-scale, project 
specific meetings for various governmental and non-governmental actors to 
                                                 
43 Chinese book quote.  
44 Interview in Beijing, August 2004. 
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communicate at local levels.  
Promoting Public Participation 
A distinctive feature of state-society relations in China is that formalized channels for 
public participation is lacking. By introducing and experimenting with the concept of 
public participation, international NSAs can bring in new dynamics to local politics. 
The difference between facilitating public participation and establishing 
institutionalized participation channels lies in that the latter emphasizes the formal 
and sustainable aspect of public participation, while the former is oftenly one-time, 
project specific practice. 
 In both HIV/AIDS prevention and nature conservation cases, international 
advocacy groups have tried various measures to directly involve social actors in 
project implementation, and particularly those projects that also engage local 
governmental agencies or the ones that implement governmental policies. For 
example, Oxfam America created a program in Yunnan province as a part of their 
conservation work of the Mekong River basin with an overarching emphasis on 
securing residents’ right to water, their access to sustainable livelihoods, and 
participatory decision-making processes around development projects. The program 
has helped local governments and communities to develop participatory watershed 
management committees and create micro-financing initiatives to promote economic 
development alternatives to destroying forests and water resources.  
 With repeated experiences of having non-governmental actor in policy 
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implementation, international NSAs, together with their local partners, can further 
persuade the government to develop new policy implementation frameworks or 
institutions which incorporate the norm of public participation. In Suojia Tibetan 
township, western Qinghai province, local governmental bodies used to adopt a top-
down approach in agenda setting of nature conservation which overlooked local 
people’s interests. Local environmentalists, including herders, teachers and retired 
local officials, established an NGO—the Upper Yangtze Organization (UYO), and 
hoped to communicate in between the nomads and governmental officials. Since 1999, 
an international NGO, Floral and Fauna International (FFI), have worked with UYO 
to develop effective local management for the grassland ecosystems and for key 
species. In response to the tension between local governmental authorities and 
nomadic communities, FFI planned a Collaborative Management Plan for 
Conservation of Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods to engage both 
governmental and non-governmental parties in conservation projects. Thereby, UYO 
became to be recognized as an effective force for the communication between 
governmental agencies and local people, as well as for conservation implementation. 
When the new Three Great Rivers Source National Nature Reserve was established by 
the central government in the region in 2003, initial plans included moving the 
nomads out of Suojia and resettling them in other towns. UYO successfully lobbied 
local governmental agencies on behalf of local herdsmen. The master plan for the 
nature reserve was later revised. Moreover, the new plan added provisions to enlist 
local herders as deputized monitors. With the previous experience of FFI’s project, 
 350
local governmental agencies became familiar and convinced of the goodness of local 
participation. 
 Both of the cases show that promoting public participation is desirable for 
international NSAs, yet requires more trial and error and stronger ties between 
international and local advocacy groups than usual social mobilization. Even though 
international NSAs have been able to create many new communication opportunities 
in between governmental agencies and local NGOs, still only few have been engaging 
in formalizing channels for local NGOs and community representatives to participate 
in policy implementation.  
 
While the focus of this chapter is to examine the effects of domestic structures 
on transnational advocacy networks, this section is intended to demonstrate that 
neither domestic context is constant, nor external NSAs merely react to domestic 
state-society contention, and to stress that an interactive, dynamic perspective is 
needed in studying the topic. Domestic state-society contention, which often triggers 
transnational networks, can evolve independently. More importantly, it is also capable 
of being modified by external NSAs. Under particular circumstances, external 
advocates can alleviate domestic contention by creating new opportunities for 
governmental and non-governmental actors to communicate and negotiate. Some even 
see this as a necessary component of advocacy work in a country like China, where 
the level of societal resentment can be extremely high; while legal state-society 
communication channel is nearly in existence. They see that both the state and civil 
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society groups are not familiar with non-contentious means to reach agreement, and 
one way to change the state’s negative attitude and suppression of domestic societal 
and activist groups is to increase face-to-face interactions between them. Yet, this 
section only provides a glimpse of how international NSAs and NGOs influence 
domestic state-society relations, by no means a comprehensive and systematic study 
of the general patterns in this aspect. 
Evidence from my research shows that both of the networks studied have 
made noticeable contribution in linking the state and social forces, by creating 
communication channels and introducing the concept of participatory approach. Some 
even experimented with participatory approach in specific projects, and further 
facilitated the institutionalization of public participation mechanisms at local levels. 
Comparing the two networks in this respect, the international conservation NGO 
community has achieved more in institution build in public participation, which can 
lead to long-term impact on state-society relations in specific regions and issue areas 
in China. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
International advocates and NGOs are capable of educating governments and 
influencing local practices. While both cases of transnational networks present 
evidence of double-mobilization, conservation advocacy networks as a whole exhibit 
more balanced and deeper relations among the state, local society, and external 
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advocacy actors. (Table 5.10) Transnational networks in HIV/AIDS prevention are 
not as mature as those in nature conservation for three main reasons: First, China’s 
health system, before SARS, was relatively closed to international community and 
influences, which delayed the emergence of transnational advocacy networks. 
Therefore, the AIDS case is still in its early stage of double-mobilization, and external 
advocacy groups are making more effort to tunnel through political barriers and 
building networks that can provide them entry point into the governing system. This 
partially explains why the AIDS-related networks are still more centered around 
Chinese governmental agencies than civil society groups.  
Table 5.10. Comparing domestic structures and transnational advocacy networks  
 
 Nature Conservation HIV/AIDS prevention 
Governing 
structures 
Bureaucratic decentralization, 
higher level of local autonomy 
Increasing level of 
internationalization and central 
control 
Social forces A civil society community primed 
with a sense of solidarity 
Emerging NGOs, and activist 
groups, yet lack of interconnectivity 
Emergence: 
early late 
Development: 
Full-fledged and deepening double- 
mobilization  
Double-mobilization tipped towards 
the state, and less deepening 
Mobilizing the state: 
More influence through policy 
input and institution building 
Still less access to provincial and 
central governments 
Social mobilization: 
Transnational 
advocacy networks 
Significant effort in building new 
local NGOs and social activism 
networks 
More in public education and local 
capacity building 
 Second, after the Chinese government openly acknowledged the AIDS crisis, 
it greatly strengthened MoH’s central control over the issue. Local governments and 
health bureaus do not enjoy autonomy in AIDS-related issues at the similar level as in 
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forestry, wetlands, or watersheds. This prevents external advocacy groups to expand 
and consolidate their societal and governmental connections.  
Third, civil society groups in HIV/AIDS prevention field are not as tightly tied 
together as those in the environment and nature conservation field. While a “green” 
social identity is emerging among Chinese environmentalists, activists and newly 
established NGOs in the AIDS field are still waiting for the right moment to organize 
coordinated campaigns or symbolic events.  
No strong evidence from comparing the two cases indicates that either 
individual leadership or international political opportunity structures played a major 
role in the emergence and initial growth of transnational advocacy networks. In fact, 
the AIDS case presents even more favorable international structural factors, 
particularly after main international health organizations identified China is among 
the “Second Wave” countries of worldwide AIDS epidemic.45 While multilateral and 
bilateral assistance agencies have always been keen in supporting energy efficiency, 
environmental management, and pollution control works in China, international 
NGOs are taking the lead in improving China’s nature reserve management, 
community-based habitat protection, and critical eco-system conservation. 
 Issue characteristics do not directly affect transnational networks. Or, at least 
the causal chain is not as clear-cut as existing theory has argued. Public awareness 
was low in both biodiversity conservation and HIV/AIDS fields. HIV patients 
                                                 
45 The other two major countries among this Second Wave are India and Russia. One of the earliest 
expert opinions of the newly developed AIDS epidemic in Asia and Russia is from Nicholas Eberstat, 
American Institute of Enterprise. (Eberstadt, Nicholas. 2002. "The Future of AIDS." Foreign Affairs. 
81, 6.)  
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infected through blood transfusion confronted local authorities and caused contention, 
so did farmers living inside local nature reserves due to either human-animal conflict 
or poorly designed conservation measures. Social stigma against AIDS patients 
(particularly against the CWS and IDU population) is mostly from medical 
professionals and urbanites. In rural communities, where AIDS infection rate is 
relatively higher, stigma problem is not as salient as people usually think. My 
observation is that the lack of public awareness and presence of stigma can be a 
double-edged sword. It certainly creates difficulty for advocacy groups to promote 
new norms, but it also offers a niche for both Chinese and external NGOs and 
activists, because this is exactly where the government proves to be not effective. 
Advocacy groups are more capable of designing and implementing suitable education 
programs at grassroots levels, and committed to change existing beliefs and behaviors 
in a sustainable way. A few international NGOs in fact have successfully implemented 
demonstration projects of free needle exchange among IDUs and peer education 
among CSWs in Yunnan, partnering with multiple governmental agencies including 
public security, health, and education. After seeing the results, state health authorities 
consented to widely promote these practices in the province.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
The last 20 years undoubtedly have witnessed the grand transformation of Maoist China. 
In the context of globalization and the information technology revolution, the trajectory 
of this transformation is increasingly affected by transnational factors and actors. My 
research started with this observation, and introduced to readers of Chinese politics and 
international relations a particular group of non-state political actors in the form of 
transnational advocacy networks who have played a unique role in the changing Chinese 
polity. I explored such networks in the fields of nature conservation and HIV/AIDS 
prevention. I explicated the historical development and the political context of each case, 
and the political processes involved in individual international advocacy actors’ 
interaction with the Chinese state and society. By comparing the two cases, I pointed out 
the key factors that have constrained the emergence and affected the development of 
transnational advocacy networks across issue areas in China.  
Findings in my research offer two pertinent suggestions for theory-building about 
non-state actors (NSAs) in international affairs. First, new theories need to address the 
direct and extensive interactions between advocates and the targeted sovereign state, and 
that of contentious and non-contentious politics involved in transnational advocacy 
networks. In addition to organizing local communities and educating the general public, 
engaging and mobilizing the government is an important feature of transnational 
advocacy politics. The two cases studied here strongly suggest that international 
advocacy actors form broad networks into the state apparatus in order to communicate, 
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negotiate and persuade the Chinese government to change its attitudes and 
policies—presenting a Double-mobilization pattern. They fund or collaborate with the 
Chinese government in basic research to influence the formation of knowledge-building 
among officials and policy makers. Through demonstration projects and participation in 
policy implementation, international NGOs carry out the measures and principles they 
attempt to promote, and therefore, they can show the government not only the necessity 
of policy changes, but also how to implement such changes. Furthermore, international 
advocacy actors are able to directly influence policy-making at different levels by 
partnering with key governmental agencies and providing policy consultations. In short, 
transnational advocacy networks not only target and pressure state agencies, but also 
interact and engage the state in the service of their cause. 
Second, my research suggests looking into the effects of domestic micro-level 
structures on transnational advocacy politics. Case studies have shown that the character 
of transnational advocacy networks varies across countries and even within a single 
county. As transnational networks develop, on the one hand, international advocacy 
actors deepen their connections and consolidate their influences in domestic politics at 
different levels. On the other, political dynamics of transnational networks are becoming 
more affected by existing domestic state and societal structures. Focusing only on 
macro-level political factors cannot provide an adequate explanation of why networks 
emerge, which forms of politics they are engaged in, and why the triangular relationship 
among the state, local society and external advocacy actors vary across cases. In China, 
transnational networks emerged earlier in nature conservation than in preventing AIDS 
due to a relatively high level of internationalization of environmental governance and the 
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rise of domestic environmentalism and green civil society by the end of the 1990s. 
Bureaucratic decentralization and the interconnectivity among Chinese environmental 
groups further provided favorable conditions for transnational networks to mature and 
achieve their goals. Theory-building related to transnational activism should further 
tackle the question of the impact of domestic micro-level structures on transnational 
networks, considering the long-term effects of such networks in national and local 
politics. My study here provides one example of this type of research. Both case studies 
within a country and cross-country are needed to identify more relevant variables, and 
test the conclusions in this research. 
From Boomerang to Double-mobilization 
Central to this dissertation is an understanding of domestic and international politics not 
as separate but as interconnected and mutually constituting domains. I share the view of 
scholars such as Keck, Sikkink, and Tarrow that we live in a transnational civil society, 
where sovereign states are still primary political actors, yet NSAs are rapidly emerging 
and increasingly modifying the state-system and state behavior. State and NSAs should 
be reviewed together to understand new dynamics in national and international politics. 
This is not only evidenced by economic interdependence, but also by growing 
transnational activism, advocacy networks and social movements.  
However, I disagree with these authors’ emphasis on contentious relations among 
political actors (state or non-state) in this transnational civil society, and more importantly, 
the underlining assumption that contentious means are the principle tool of solving 
political problems and establishing new norms. In the conclusion chapter of Activists 
beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink specifically contested the world polity theory: “In 
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essence, world polity theorists eliminate the struggle over power and meaning that for us 
are central to normative change.” 1  To emphasize this point, they quoted Martha 
Finnemore’s argument that “political process, coercion and violence, value conflict and 
normative contestation are our business.”2 Their theory of transnational activism and 
advocacy networks, hence, highlighted that the process of norm emergence is 
characterized by intense domestic and international struggles over discourses, policies 
and practices. The main site of such struggles is the contentious interaction between 
repressive governments and transnational networks composed of both local and 
international advocacy actors.3  
I argue that while political changes are the essential goal for advocacy networks 
and contention is prevalent in a transnational civil society, the processes of making such 
changes are embodied not only in struggles but also in long-term advocacy education, 
norm socialization and consensus building. I challenge the existing literature on 
                                                 
1 p210. Major scholarly works on world polity theory include: Brown, Seyom. 1992. International 
Relations in A Changing Global System: Toward A Theory of the World Polity. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. Boli, John, and George M. Thomas, eds. 1999. Constructing World Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. This perspective highlights diffusion of world culture as the fundamental characteristics 
of international society, and non-state actors (NGOs and IGOs) are enactors of basic principles of the world 
culture. 
2 Finnemore, Martha. 1996. "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's 
Institutionalism." International Organization. 50, 2: 325-47. Quoted in Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p211. 
3 Even though Keck and Sikkink clarified that “transnational change … is not just one of ‘diffusion’ of 
liberal institutions and practices, but one through which the preferences and identities of actors engaged in 
transnational society are sometimes mutually transformed through their interactions with each other” 
(p212), they pointed out earlier that “the logic of transnational advocacy networks, which are often in 
conflict with states over basic principles, is quite different from the logic of other transnational actors” 
(p210). Therefore, they seemed to be saying that the real “struggle” is between states and advocacy actors, 
and the advocates involved (who are not necessarily neo-liberals) can form better understanding of their 
own principles through complex interactions with other transnational actors (e.g., neo-liberal IGOs). 
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transnational activism and advocacy networks for its tendency to overlook the more 
sustainable, yet less contentious, means applied by advocacy groups. To better understand 
the meaning of transnational advocacy politics, one must to look into the preparatory 
work and lasting effects of particular symbolic actions and events. The Boomerang theory 
is useful to capture the more suspenseful stage/aspect of transnational mobilization 
against domestic political obstacles. However, it simplifies the whole process of changes, 
and ignores the complexity of transnational advocacy politics. By highlighting the power 
of contentious means (e.g., leverage politics), it risks a full interpretation of advocacy 
activities and their impacts on the state. As evidenced by my case studies, state behavioral 
change is usually a result of numerous interconnected factors and events which are not all 
related and meant to build up pressures on the targeted state. To better understand what 
kind of political power advocacy actors possess and how they are able to make 
governments change policies, one must investigate what happens before, after, and 
beyond the “Boomerang”.4  
The Double-mobilization model developed in this dissertation provides a 
conceptual framework that is complementary to the Boomerang model to fully capture 
the characteristics of transnational advocacy politics and the mechanisms that are 
employed by advocacy actors to promote policy and local changes: 
1) Besides the alliances of domestic and international advocacy groups, the 
extensive connections and interactions between advocacy actors and governmental 
agencies/officials are also important to the effectiveness of transnational advocacy 
networks. Advocacy actors can modify state perceptions and behavior through 
                                                 
4 Hochstetler, Kathyn. 2002. "After the Boomerang: Environmental Movements and Politics in the La Plata 
River Basin." Global Environmental Politics. 2, 4. 
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negotiation, persuasion, project demonstration, and long-term mutual-learning processes 
in addition to building up international pressures and mobilizing punishing measures 
through a third party. State agencies can consent to make changes as well as comply with 
what is promoted by advocacy actors.5
2) Transnational networks are complex and dynamic amalgamations of agents, 
rules, and structures. Various advocacy actors apply different strategies at the same time 
under a similar set of core principles. While some may focus on transnational campaigns 
to expose domestic policy failures and scandal to hold governmental agencies 
accountable, others conduct grassroots advocacy education to promote public awareness. 
Moreover, some advocacy actors seek out key officials or state-affiliated researchers and 
provide learning opportunities to them in order to persuade them and bring in new ways 
of thinking from inside the state apparatus. In other words, while some advocacy actors 
of the networks perform Boomerang politics, others prepare both the public and the state 
agencies to grasp the new principles and consolidate the effects of transnational advocacy 
through Double-mobilization. 
3) The Boomerang model emphasizes that advocacy networks can be effective, in 
a way, by amplifying and elevating domestic state-society contention. The 
Double-mobilization model, in contrast, points out that external advocates are also able to 
modify domestic politics by building bridges between the state and local communities 
and repressed group, and introducing innovative institutional arrangements. In fact, the 
Boomerang model may seem to be more relevant when speaking of policy changes in the 
                                                 
5 State actors may change their positions on a policy issue because they find that such change is in their 
interest. However, the emphasis here is that the targeted state is capable of conceiving and digesting the 
value of the principles that advocacy actors promote, and agree to make changes. 
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short-term, but the Double-mobilization model explains how such changes can be 
implemented and normative and practical changes can be established at different levels in 
the long-term.  
Recalling Figure 2.4 (reproduced below) in Chapter 2, the Boomerang and 
Double-mobilization models are complementary in that each depicts some essential 
aspects of the most ideal and effective transnational advocacy networks that can both 
pressure the targeted state to quickly change domestic policies through the leverage of a 
third party, and mobilize domestic social groups, public, governmental officials and 
policy implementation agencies to digest new principles and operationalize new solutions. 
In most cases of sustainable and effective transnational advocacy networks, Boomerang 
and Double-mobilization politics are likely co-exist and together make domestic changes 
happen, in spite of the possibility that transnational campaigns and symbolic political 
actions may catch more attention. Double-mobilization becomes even more crucial when 
speaking of the consolidation of policy effects rather than the mere policy outcomes of 
transnational advocacy. 
Figure 2.4. A synthesis of the Boomerang and Double-mobilization models 
State A   pressure    State B/IGO 
 
xxxxxx    persuasion   lobbying 
(evolving) blockage 
 
Domestic  information sharing  International 
civil society       NSAs 
 
IGO: inter-governmental organization; NSA: non-state actor 
    typical Boomerang politics     typical Double-mobilization politics 
    common features to both models 
 362
Despite their complementary nature, each conceptual model may appear to be 
more primary to a specific case, depending on the characteristics of the targeted state and 
local civil society groups. For example, for the Amazon anti-deforestation campaigns in 
Brazil in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the leverage politics played by the networks of 
local rubber tapper activists, international NGOs and World Bank experts was a key 
turning point. 6  In contrast, the findings from my research in China showed that 
transnational advocacy networks can effectively influence governmental agencies in 
policy implementation and policy-making by opening communication channels within 
the Chinese government: Double-mobilization becomes necessary when the Boomerang 
mechanism is not useful because many regimes are still not familiar with international 
NSAs and are not susceptible to international pressures and censures. However, such 
variations should not suggest that the two models are exclusive to each other in 
explaining transnational advocacy politics. In fact, even when conceptualizing the 
Boomerang politics of human rights networks in Mexico, Keck and Sikkink included the 
important transition of domestic state-society contention brought force by the 
collaboration of the Mexican government and local and international NGOs during the 
1985 Mexico City earthquake.7 The nature conservation case studied in this dissertation 
indicated that coalitions of international and Chinese NGOs and activists started to 
employ Boomerang-type strategies (e.g., campaigns and leverage politics through IGOs) 
as the Chinese government became more involved in international environmental 
agreements and programs. The value of the Double-mobilization model lies not only in 
                                                 
6 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, pp135-150. 
7 Ibid, p112. 
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its own explanatory power of transnational advocacy activities and actors, but also that it 
completes what is missing from the Boomerang model.  
I highlighted and illustrated the Double-mobilization model and 
consensus-building politics in this study by the examples of transnational advocacy 
networks in nature conservation and HIV/AIDS prevention in China. I have shown that 
the contentious perspective on transnational NSAs and advocacy networks is not 
sufficient. Future studies should pay attention to both types of political dynamics 
involved in transnational advocacy networks. Important questions then arise: Why is one 
pattern more primary than the other in some cases? Is there any chorological relationship 
between the two models? By comparing my empirical studies with others, I have 
tentative answers to these questions:8 Though Double-mobilization is necessary to 
consolidate the Boomerang effects, it becomes more visible and crucial when the targeted 
regime is not susceptible to international pressures and relatively isolated from global 
discourses. In terms of a chorological relationship, because not every network can mature 
to the same extent, it is not clear whether Double-mobilization occurs consistently before 
or after Boomerang across cases. Some networks diverge after a series of protests and 
campaigns, yet others may be waiting for the right time to negotiate with the state after 
                                                 
8 Examples of case studies of transnational advocacy networks include: Sperling, Valerie, Myra M. Ferree, 
and Barbara Risman. 2001. "Constructing Global Feminism: Transnational Advocacy Networks and 
Russian Women's Activism." Journal of Women in Culture & Society. 26, 4: 1155-86. Ricker, Tom. 
"Boomerang, Battering-Rams, and Sustainable Solidarity: Transnational Advocacy and the Struggle for 
Workers Rights in Nicaragua's Maquila Industry." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 
2001. Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 2002. Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Vol. 14. Social Movements, Protest and 
Contention, Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Khagram, Sanjeev. 2004. 
Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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years of advocacy education and social mobilization. In ideal cases, transnational 
advocacy networks should exhibit both patterns throughout the processes to effectively 
promote new principles, influence both governmental and societal actors, and consolidate 
the diffusion and establishment of new ideas and practices.  
Domestic Structures and Transnational Advocacy Networks: 
Findings and Generalizability 
Existing literature would not predict the rise of transnational networks in China and 
similar regimes. This is due not only to its focus on the contentious aspect of 
transnational advocacy politics, but also to its reliance on macro-level factors for 
prediction. China’s non-democratic regime is thought to block any interference from the 
international community (e.g., IGOs and NSAs). In this dissertation, I instead found 
sufficient evidence for transnational advocacy networks in China, and changes happening 
at the micro-level are most critical to the emergence and development of such networks. 
First, the level of internationalization of governing structures and that of domestic social 
activism determine whether external advocacy actors can obtain the minimum level of 
access to domestic politics required for the initial formation of transnational networks. 
Second, the levels of bureaucratic decentralization and interconnectivity among domestic 
civil society groups affect whether transnational networks will further expand their scope 
and deepen their influence in domestic politics. Here, I give brief accounts of three other 
issue areas in China (besides environment and public health) to illustrate how domestic 
state and society structures may affect transnational advocacy networks:  
1) Transnational advocacy for women’s rights. China’s post-Mao transition has 
undermined the foundations of women’s political participation embodied in 
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state-sponsored mass organizations. Women have to re-organize themselves and engage 
in competition for their political participation without the support of the state.9 Since the 
1995 U.N. Women’s Conference in Beijing, not only has the concept of NGO become 
well received among women’s affairs officials and activists. The officials of the Women’s 
Federation branches across the country are becoming frequent participants in 
international women’s rights conferences and events. Supported by international 
foundations and NGOs, some former Women’s Federation officials actually gave up their 
bureaucratic titles and started a new career in women’s NGOs, such as the founders of the 
Xi Shuang Ban Na Women and Children’s Rights Center in Yunnan. A number of 
women’s hotlines and support groups have been established by university professors, 
journalists and activists in various cities.10 These independent initiatives have caught 
attention from international NSAs, such as the Ford Foundation, and are conceived as the 
seeds of civil society and democratic culture in China. The women’s rights case presents 
very similar patterns to the transnational advocacy networks in nature conservation: A 
relatively high level of internationalization of governing structures and domestic NGOs 
has led to the relatively early emergence of transnational networks in the women’s right 
field; and, decentralized bureaucratic relations and inter-connections among domestic 
NGOs have facilitated the development of such networks.  
2) Transnational advocacy for global climate change-related policies. The Chinese 
government has been involved in international negotiations in the field of global climate 
                                                 
9 Wang, Qi. 1999. "State-Society Relations and Women's Political Participation." In Women of China: 
Economic and Social Transformation, edited by Jackie West, et al. New York: St. Martin's. p20. 
10 Cornue, Virginia. 1999. "Practicing NGOness and Relating Women's Space Publicly: The Women's 
Hotline and the State." In Spaces of Their Own, edited by Mayfair M. Yang, 68-94. Minneapolis, USA: 
Minesota University. 
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change since the late 1980s. It is among the first signatory countries of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987. With the consent from the 
central government, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) has collaborated with 
multiple ministries and established a few inter-departmental working mechanisms to 
further promote new policies related to global climate change.11 International foundations 
(e.g., the Energy Foundation and the Blue Moon Foundation) have mobilized significant 
resources to implement pilot projects in energy efficiency which would bring about 
global climate benefits. Advocacy groups emerged in the global climate change issue area 
due to a relatively high level of internationalization in the governing structures, although 
the domestic non-governmental sector in this field is underdeveloped. Moreover, despite 
the fact that IGOs and NSAs are among the most active in modifying China’s 
policy-making related to global climate change issues, transnational advocacy networks 
in this field are radically tilted towards the government because of the lack of domestic 
civil society groups. Recently, international NGOs and foundations have pulled resources 
together to created new GONGOs in this field (e.g., China Renewable Energy Industry 
Association) with the hope that this might be the first step to strengthen the 
non-governmental sector in the field.12  
3) Transnational advocacy for human rights. This case differs most from the others in 
that little evidence of transnational advocacy networks is present in China. Currently, 
there are a small number of international organizations (e.g., International Labor 
                                                 
11 Yu, Hongyuan. 2004. "Global Environment Regime and Climate Policy Coordination in China." Journal 
of Chinese Political Science. 9, 2: 63-77. 
12 Wu, Fengshi. 2002. “New Partners or Old Brothers? GONGOS in Transnational Environmental 
Advocacy in China.” China Environment Series, 5: 45-58.  
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Organization) implementing projects to promote human rights in China. The Chinese 
government has also established a few official channels to discuss human rights issues 
with intergovernmental agencies (e.g., the China-Australia Human Right Annual 
Meeting). In addition, several foreign governmental embassies and the EU office in 
Beijing have directly supported human rights civil society groups in China with small 
grants (e.g., the Canadian Civil Society Program). Chinese human rights groups have 
emerged, yet are extremely constrained in what they can achieve. This is a least 
developed example of transnational advocacy politics due to the low level of 
internationalization within the governing bodies, the high level of central control, and the 
lack of domestic human rights NGO building. 
While Khagram’s cross-country comparative study of anti-dam movement has 
showed the relevance of domestic politics to transnational advocacy, I argue that with the 
deepening integration of transnational and domestic politics, domestic micro-level state 
and society structures are increasingly important to the development of transnational 
advocacy networks. Evidence in this study suggests that transnational networks vary in 
their emergence and political relations even within a single country, where macro-level 
political and societal factors remain constant. I here provide two frameworks to create a 
conceptual space/spectrum to map various transnational networks and to probe the 
disparities and similarities among them. (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) My studies confirm part of 
Khagram’s thesis that with a stronger domestic civil society, transnational advocacy 
networks are more likely to emerge. I further argue that the level of internationalization 
of the governing structures in an issue area also conditions the origins of the networks. 
Defined by a specific issue area, domestic governing structures, local state autonomy, and 
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the maturity and interconnectivity of civil society all affect the political patterns of 
transnational advocacy networks (i.e. the triangular relationship). 
Figure 6.1. Domestic micro-level structures and the emergence of transnational advocacy networks  
 
Level of internationalization in  +  mixed    more likely  
governing structures     □   ●  ■ 
 
         ♦   ▲ 
         less likely    mixed 
            
         Level of domestic social activism  + 
             
Figure 6.2. Domestic micro-level structures and the political patterns of transnational advocacy 
networks 
 
Level of decentralization in   +  tilted towards the state  balanced, deepening 
governing structures     □     ■● 
   ▲   
         ♦      
        less development   tilted towards civil society 
                  + 
Level of interconnection within domestic civil society   
         
■—nature conservation ▲—HIV/AIDS prevention  
●—women’s rights ♦—human rights □—climate change  
 
Issue Characteristics and International Structures 
Two relevant and popular alternative explanations for the variance in the triangular 
relationship among the state, local civil society groups, and external advocacy actors are 
issue characteristics and international structures. I dismissed them as sufficient 
explanations for the cases explored in this dissertation for different reasons.  
The argument that issue characteristics cause variance in transnational advocacy 
networks, despite of its apparent simplicity, is almost ad hoc. Keck and Sikkink 
concluded that issues related to human bodily harm and the most vulnerable parts of the 
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population resonate with most existing belief systems, and such issues appear most 
prominently in transnational campaigns.13 In a sense, these issues reflect fundamental 
human rights, and therefore, are more “frame-able” and can generate more activist 
momentum than others. However, this cannot explain why many transnational 
environmental protection movements and nature conservation campaigns succeeded, 
which, to a large degree, were driven by the ideas that are critical of ethno-centric values. 
Nor can the argument of issue characteristics justify why many transnational campaigns 
directly related to bodily welfare (e.g., against women’s genital circumcision in Kenya in 
the 1930s, promoting AIDS prevention in South Africa in the 1990s) were not effective. 
Moreover, some of the most remarkable examples of transnational activism and 
movement in history, such as the civil rights movement in America,14 in fact, went 
against the “existing belief systems” at the time.15 The true meaning of “advocacy” rather 
indicates that the difficulty of framing an issue should not prevent activists and advocacy 
networks from mobilizing for change. The causal linkage between the nature of an issue 
                                                 
13 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, pp203-205. 
14 Chabot, Sean. 2001. "Building Transnational Advocacy Networks before 1965: Diffusion from the Indian 
Nationalist Movement to the American Civil Rights Movement." In Non-State Actors in International 
Relations, edited by Arts, Bas, Math Noortmann and Bob Reinalda. Burlington, USA: Ashgate. 
15 When Keck and Sikkink discussed the problem of issue characteristics, they particularly pointed out the 
trend of the diffusion of Western liberal values and ideas in the world. Therefore, it is more likely for 
transnational activism to emerge in the issue areas that are closely associated with liberal values (e.g., 
human rights). They even argued that: “Network campaigns have been most successful in countries that 
have internalized the discourse of liberalism to such a degree that there exists a disjuncture to plumb and 
expose.” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 206) However, historical evidence (e.g., abolition of slavery in America, 
international movement for women’s suffrage in the early 19th century) indicates that liberal values evolved 
over time even within Western democracies, and transnational activism actually played an important role in 
modifying and re-shaping such values during the process. It is probable that current liberal norms will 
continue to change, and it is not necessarily true that those transnational networks who only promote core 
Western liberal principles will be the most effective. 
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and the emergence, development and effectiveness of a transnational advocacy network is 
not as straightforward as what the existing literature has argued (e.g., the more acceptable 
to existing beliefs of human rights, the more likely to be successful).16  
I do not completely dismiss the effects of issue characteristics, but propose a 
different approach to better interpret the linkage between the nature of an issue and the 
politics of transnational advocacy networks. Because it is not realistic to argue that 
certain norms and principles will inevitably prevail across countries, we should not only 
focus on the content of the issue to assess the potential of a transnational network 
committed to promote it. Instead, we need to translate issue characteristics into 
cross-system terms. In other words, rather than dwelling on whether the issue is close to 
or related to a specific ethical view (e.g., individual liberty), we need to ask another set of 
questions: How is the state authority controlling the issue? What are the governing 
structures in the issue area? Is political power over the issue centralized or fragmented? 
Who are the related political actors, and what is the nature of the political relations 
among them? Will social activism in the issue area directly challenge the authority of 
existing governmental agency and the power of political leaders?  
In Chapter 5, I pointed out that no significant evidence was found in the two cases 
studied that could lead to a general proposition on how issue characteristics affect the 
emergence and development of transnational advocacy networks. Despite the vital effect 
                                                 
16 Since the publication of Dynamics of Contention (Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 
2001, Cambridge University), the field of contentious politics has moved from focusing only on repertoire, 
resources and political opportunity structures to explicating interactive processes and causal mechanisms 
involved in social movements and conflicts. Drawn upon this academic shift, I suggest that instead of 
trying to generalize how the content of a principle and an issue affect transnational advocacy, more 
attention should be paid to the actual processes and political relations involved in transnational activism 
and mobilization.  
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of HIV/AIDS on individual well-being, transnational activism and networks appeared 
almost seven years later than the case of nature conservation. Some may argue that the 
delay is because of the political sensitivity of the AIDS topic. However, this is exactly the 
type of ad hoc explanation we want to avoid. The causes of political sensitivity and 
official denial of AIDS in China varied over time.17 It is more useful to investigate the 
particular actors and political dynamics involved in the development of the two originally 
separate AIDS epidemics in China in order to understand why transnational advocacy in 
this field did not emerge as rapidly as in the nature conservation case. Some may also 
argue that the success of nature conservation networks is due to the lack of state 
repression of activists in the issue area. As I repeatedly pointed out, this is a common 
misperception. At both central and local levels, economic development is much more 
prioritized than nature conservation by the Chinese government. Therefore, activism and 
social movements for species protection, watershed conservation, or against 
dam-building usually trigger intensive political struggles in China. While the central 
government may view social activism as a political threat, local politicians and tycoons 
repress bottom-up environmentalism because of the fear of exposure of corruption and 
loss of private interests.  
Neither of the two cases in this research indicates that there is direct linkage 
between issue characteristics and the rise and effectiveness of transnational advocacy. 
Instead, issue characteristics can have effects only if advocacy actors use mobilization 
                                                 
17 As I explicated previously at different parts of the dissertation, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Chinese government’s indifference to AIDS was caused more by ignorance than policy scandal. However, 
in the late 1990s, particularly on the issue of blood contamination and HIV transfusion in Henan province, 
individual politicians have made open investigation impossible. 
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techniques and elaborate/politicize them for the public, or the governing agencies have 
formulated certain institutions surrounding the issue based on misperceptions. Issue 
characteristics are elusive variables, and we need to de-codify them to clarify how they 
are reflected in governing structures and mobilization strategies rather than merely 
focusing on their content. 
I dismissed the argument of international structures not because the causal 
mechanism here is unclear, but because not much variation is found in my case studies. 
Existing literature suggests two main kinds of international structures that are relevant to 
transnational advocacy networks. First, the political opportunity structures embedded in 
international institutions, such as the leverage of international institutions over the 
targeted government, and resources available for NSAs.18 As explained in Chapter 3 and 
4, the international political context surrounding the nature conservation and AIDS 
prevention issues in China is similar: In each case, a number of bilateral and multilateral 
aid agencies are involved yet with a relatively low level of political leverage over the 
Chinese government.  
The second type of international structures refers to the political relations within 
the advocacy network, either among international NSAs or between international and 
domestic advocacy actors. Factors such as conflicting interests among international 
NGOs, and unbalanced power hierarchy between international and local NGOs may 
affect the trajectory of transnational networks.19 Even though I have found various 
                                                 
18 Tarrow, Sidney. 2002. "The New Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms." 
Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 
August 29-September 1. 
19 Ricker, Tom. "Boomerang, Battering-Rams, and Sustainable Solidarity: Transnational Advocacy and the 
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coalitions and competitions among international NGOs in the two cases of transnational 
networks in China, the differences are not so major as to reshape the entire pattern of the 
networks. In terms of the asymmetric power relationship between international and local 
NGOs, there is some evidence emerging in the nature conservation field, in spite of the 
fact that Chinese NGOs are much more developed in environmental protection than in 
public health.20 However, such discord has not reached the degree that would cause 
distrust among the activists and NGOs within the networks in nature conservation. Many 
new transnational coalitions are in formation in nature conservation, which has a positive 
influence in fostering solidarity among international and local environmentalist groups. 
Neither is my empirical research sufficient nor intended to reject the theoretical 
relevance of international structures to transnational advocacy politics. My point based on 
the two cases is simply that even when international structures are constant across cases, 
transnational advocacy networks can diverge given variations in domestic structures.  
State Responses to the Deepening Process of Transnational Advocacy 
The Double-mobilization model stresses the dynamic nature of transnational advocacy 
politics and considers the state as an active political actor that is capable of learning and 
changing perceptions rather than passively reacting to international pressures. Hence, it is 
natural and worthwhile to discuss how and through which means the Chinese state has 
                                                                                                                                                 
Struggle for Workers Rights in Nicaragua's Maquila Industry." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 
College Park, 2001. Dumoulin, David. 2003. "Local Knowledge in the Hands of Transnational NGO 
Networks: A Mexican Viewpoint." International Social Science Journal. 55, 178: 593-616.  
20 This can be partially explained by the fact there are not as many international NGOs that have established 
working relations and connections with local activists groups in public health as in nature conservation. 
Therefore, in a way, the lack of conflict of interests within the transnational networks against AIDS in 
China is currently due to the lower density of interactions among  
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responded to transnational advocacy and activism, even though a full investigation of this 
question would require another dissertation. In different parts of Chapters 3 and 4, I 
pointed out how particular governmental agencies reacted to international NGOs and 
foundation on individual occasions. While more general observation of the Chinese 
government’s responses to international NSAs and transnational activism requires more 
systematic studies, I raise two main points. First, at the central level, there is still a lack of 
recognition and coordinated polices towards international NSAs, and therefore, the state’s 
response highly depends on personal connections and ad hoc opportunities for 
international NSAs to form working relationships with governmental agencies in China. 
The government’s reactions to international NSAs are not consistent across issue areas 
and regions.  
Second, local governments are even less informed about international NGOs and 
foundations. Even though in some cases local governments found the support from 
international NGOs and foundations to be crucial to solve local problems, in general local 
governments are not self-motivated to attract or block international NSAs. As much as 
international advocacy groups would like to mobilize local governments to promote 
certain principles and practices, local governments’ responses to them do not yet appear 
to be uniformly friendly or hostile. 
As David Zweig accurately observed, although the Chinese government is very 
careful about whether to accept and how to channel foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
official development assistance (ODA), it was not very keen on international 
non-governmental assistance throughout the 1990s.21 The supposed only corresponding 
                                                 
21 Zweig, David. 2002. Internationalization China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages. Edited by 
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governmental agency for international NGOs—China Association for Non-Governmental 
Organizations (CANGO)—was created under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) in 1992.22 The state rationale behind CANGO is to 
establish a warehouse of all possible projects for international NGOs to fund and support. 
Facing the mounting poverty and social welfare problems in China, CANGO was 
intended to “sell the projects to international NGOs.”23 In addition, through CANGO, the 
state can channel the funds from international NGOs rather than let them go inside China, 
travel around and design their own projects.24 However, in reality, most international 
NGOs bypass CANGO and find a niche for their work in China through their own 
connections, working directly with grassroots groups. 
As international NGOs are making more progress in solving local problems and 
providing learning opportunities to governmental officials, state ministries are becoming 
more aware of them in recent years. A few ministries have created separate offices and 
GONGOs to interact with international NGOs, e.g., SEPA, SFB, MoH, and Ministry of 
Education.25 As illustrated by the nature conservation case, sometimes ministry-level 
agencies even initiate collaborations with international NGOs and foundations. Becky 
Shelly studied three American NGOs and foundations involvement in China’s village 
election reform, and found that the Ministry of Civil Affairs approached these 
                                                                                                                                                 
Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp249-258. 
22 MOFTEC’s Chinese International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange (CICETE) was the key 
agency that is in charge of any foreign development assistance. Ministry of Commerce (MOC) replaced 
MOFTEC after the 1998 central administrative reform. CANGO was created basically by transforming the 
NGO Division of the CICETE into a semi-autonomous entity. 
23 Ibid, p253. Interview of CANGO staff by Zweig in 1999. 
24 Interview of CICETE staff in Beijing in 2004. 
25 Usually such GONGOs are names as Center for International Cooperation under each ministries. 
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international NSAs to elevate its own status within the state.26 Despite these new changes, 
there is no national-level policy or regulation responding to international NSAs across 
issue areas. All international NGOs and foundations are currently registered as 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in China. On the one hand, governmental agencies’ 
international NGO partnerships vary dramatically across cases. For example, SEPA 
interacts and collaborates with many more international NSAs than any other ministries. 
On the other hand, very few international NGOs have signed formal Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoU) with state ministries, even though many have already participated 
in policy implementation and demonstration projects to different degrees. State control 
and regulation over the issues related to international NSAs are still at a very spontaneous 
stage.   
Compared with state ministries and national-level GONGOs, provincial and local 
governments are even less informed about and acquainted with international NGOs and 
funding organizations. In contrast with the issue of FDI, local governments are not 
handed guidelines to deal with international non-profit organizations from the center. 
They are mostly left alone when deciding upon whether or not to collaborate with 
international NSAs. However, in cases where the central government is directly in charge 
of (e.g., reforestation, dam construction, AIDS prevention), local governments can be 
extremely constrained in working with international NSAs even if they find the 
partnership is in their interest.  
                                                 
26 Shelley, Becky. 2000. “Political Globalization and the Politics of International Non-governmental 
Organizations: The Case of Village Democracy in China.” Australian Journal of Political Science. 35, 2: 
225-238. 
 377
From the local government’s point of view, they are not particularly motivated to 
attract international NSAs, because international NGOs and funding organizations do not 
appear to be able to bring about new jobs or economic benefits. Therefore, the 
relationship between local governments and international NSAs are at a very nascent and 
highly sporadic stage. In addition, international NGOs are usually problem driven, and 
more concerned with marginalized populations than with local economic development. I 
have not found particular patterns of international NGOs’ regional preference in China, 
except for Yunnan province. Due to its ethnic, cultural and ecological diversity, Yunnan 
has attracted dozens of international NGOs specialized in various fields. In turn, the 
provincial and local governments in Yunnan became familiar with the concept and 
working style of international NGOs over time, and therefore, new international NGOs 
have found it relatively easy to implement projects in Yunnan compared to other regions. 
The Ford Foundation has supported a generation of Yunnan local officials since the early 
1990s, some of whom became local NGO leaders after they returned from overseas 
studies. Yunnan is also a popular recipient of multilateral and bilateral development 
grants and loans, which also helped the provincial and local governments to be familiar 
with international norms and working with various partners. However, my research also 
shows that international NGOs are emerging in every province in China, and international 
foundations are also expanding their grantee networks across the country, even though 
local governments may respond very differently. 
As a first step to explore transnational activism in China and introduce the 
concept of Double-mobilization, this dissertation mainly focused on elaborating how 
individual and groups of advocacy actors engage and mobilize governmental agencies 
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and local communities, and how existing domestic structures have affected the political 
relations generated by transnational networks. The next step would be to trace how state 
agencies (as well as domestic civil society actors) interact with transnational advocacy 
networks and whether networks evolve over time due to state responses. We also need 
more comprehensive research to find out whether there are regional patterns of 
transnational activism, and if so, whether there are the factors contingent to provincial 
and local polities that can explain such patterns.  
A Transnational Tocquevillian Transformation?  
Implications for China’s Transitional Polity 
This dissertation offers two main suggestions for the study of contemporary Chinese 
politics. First, civil society structures are becoming more relevant to the transformation of 
the political regime in China. Parallel with the changes from within the state, Chinese 
society is evolving from within led by social entrepreneurs, activists and organized 
citizen associations. Evidence from this research has shown that civil society groups are 
not merely responding to the state, but are exerting their influence on governmental 
agencies and policy-making processes by various means. In addition, they are becoming 
important players in particular issue areas where, together with international NSAs, they 
can mobilize citizens, media, experts and even governmental agencies to reshape policies 
and change local practices.    
Second, this emerging transformation within Chinese society, characterized by the 
rise of civil society organizations and voluntary associations, to a large degree, is a part of 
the wave of transnationalization at the global level. A transnational civil society is 
evidenced by increasing and deepening networks, coalitions and movements formed 
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among NSAs and committed citizens across borders. The development of civil society in 
China is influenced by, and in turn, influencing international NSAs and transnational civil 
society dynamics.  
Besides providing the latter the necessary resources to survive, the most 
politically important aspect of international NSAs’ impact on Chinese civil society is that 
they bring in ideas and lessons related to voluntary associations, one most common form 
of which is an NGO. International NSAs, mostly from western democratic countries, 
carry with them a particular set of norms and methods to run NGOs and social 
organizations, regardless of their professional expertise. This is not to say that Chinese 
people do not know how to organize their own social lives within the community. The 
point is rather that Chinese activists and local NGOs are now inevitably exposed to liberal 
democratic ways of associational life.  
Much of the political science literature on the international dimension of China’s 
transformation has focused on economic factors, even though many scholars are not 
satisfied with the economic explanations of political changes. Transnational civil society 
interactions have so far been largely overlooked. The most common mass-based political 
actions in a democratic regime are public campaigns, interest group lobbying, grassroots 
mobilization and social movements. With the transnationalization of voluntary and 
bottom-up advocacy and social mobilization organizations, the Chinese public and civil 
society are becoming more aware of these methods and ideas.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese government is not able to cope with many new social 
welfare problems caused by the rapid economic development and increasing rural-urban 
divide. Policy victim groups are emerging (e.g., migrant workers, landless farmers). 
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Local governments are becoming more open to independent social organizations and 
NGOs for their help in alleviating social resentment and delivering better social welfare 
services. Chinese NGOs develop their own capacity with support from their international 
counterparts. During this process, Chinese activists and NGO leaders are experiencing 
and learning the ways and principles that NGOs adopt in democratic regimes. With the 
growth of transnational advocacy networks, as this dissertation has shown, Chinese civil 
society groups are better equipped not merely with abstract notions related to democracy, 
but practical ways of democratic action, association and political negotiation. 
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in the early 1830s, he heard of an 
incident in which one hundred thousand men publicly demonstrated against alcoholism. 
He first found it “more amusing than serious”, because “if those hundred thousand men 
had lived in France, each of them would have addressed himself individually to the 
government, begging it to oversee the cabarets all over the realm.”27 But, after his 
journey completed, he reflected upon such actions and groups of common citizens and 
understood why people had to act together to make changes in American society. He 
further pointed out that:28
There is nothing, according to me, that deserves more to attract our 
regard than the intellectual and moral associations of America. We 
easily perceive the political and industrial associations of the Americans, 
but the others escape us; and if we discover them, we understand them 
badly because we have almost never seen anything analogous. One 
ought however to recognize that they are as necessary as the first to the 
American people, and perhaps more so… In democratic countries the 
science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the 
others depends on the progress of that one. 
                                                 
27 de Tocqueville, Alexis. (trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop). 2000. Democracy in 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago. p492. 
28 Ibid. 
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Tocqueville saw that the ability of the people to voluntarily combine their forces and 
engage in social and political affairs together is essential for the whole democratic polity. 
Associational life is what distinguishes a democratic people from those who live under 
other types of political regimes. Therefore, for a people or country to whom democracy is 
appealing, they ought to first grasp the spirit and science of associational life. 
170 year later, Tocqueville’s theory is still inspiring political scientists to explore 
the great value of democracy. Whether the East-West encountering through transnational 
advocacy networks will significantly change the course of civil society development in 
China remains to be seen, yet it is worth pointing out that there is an organic relationship 
between civil society and democracy. Democracy is not only about the rise of civil 
society, but the sustainable engagement of civil society with the formal governing 
apparatus. There are fundamental differences between a massive mobilization led by an 
avant-garde political party or social movement organization and via accumulative 
processes through town hall meetings and citizen associations. The latter offers 
opportunities for each citizen to digest and internalize political ideas voluntary. In the 
post-Tian’an Men Square Movement era, international NGOs and advocacy group may 
have a role in a second trial of democratization by spreading the spirit and science of 
democratic associational life in China. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.1. Civil Society and NGOs in China 
 
The concept of civil society has rich meanings and is conceptualized in distinctive 
ways in political science. 1  I adopted the Tocquevillian perspective in this dissertation, 
in contrast with the Hegel-Marx-Gramsci tradition. From Hegel to Marx, the anatomy 
of civil society is to be sought in political economy. Civil society is viewed as an 
intermediary sphere, the sum of all institutions that exist between the family and the 
state. They both recognized the tension between the self-interested economic activity 
and the macro-level political structure. Yet, Hegel saw a state authority acknowledged 
by citizens’ will, but Marx predicted a state as subordinate instrument for particular 
social class; Hegel pointed out the educational function of civil society where political 
legitimacy is originated, but Marx argued that civil society is the locale of political 
tensions among different social classes.2 Gramsci added a cultural element to this 
approach, and argued that civil society is the “political and cultural hegemony, which 
a social group exercises over the whole society, as the ethical content of the State.”3 It 
comprises not only material relationships, but also ideological, cultural and 
intellectual relationships. In this sense, civil society generates ideational power and 
eventually “reinvents” the political structure.4  
The Tocquevillian perspective on civil society was developed upon the 
American experience in the early 19th century. For Tocqueville, civil society is the 
combination of a variety of “intellectual and moral associations”. Like the previous 
authors, he also saw civil society very important to political life. Unlike them, he 
pointed out that civil society is particularly essential for democratic regimes. “In 
democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of 
all the others depends on the progress of that one.”5 This approach has been widely 
adopted to study the relationship between citizen associations/civil society and 
democracy/democratic tradition since Almond and Verba’s “civil culture” project in 
                                                 
1 Cohen, Jean L., and Andrew Arato. 1992. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
2 Hegel. 1967. The Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Marx. 1975. Collected 
Works. New York: International Publishers.  Ehrenberg. 1999. Civil Society: The Critical History of 
and Idea. New York and London: New York University Press.  
3 Gramsci. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. ed. and trans. by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Smith. New York: International Publishers.  
4 Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 1993. Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel. 2 ed. New 
York: The Free Press. 
5 Tocqueville, A. 2000. Democracy in America. trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. 
Chicago: University of Chicago. p492. 
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the 1960s.6 Putnam’s recent works on social organizations in Italy and “social capital” 
in America re-popularized this tradition.7 Recent scholarship of transitional regimes 
also emphasized the importance of voluntary associations and civic engagement.8
I applied this view of civil society and emphasized voluntary citizen 
organizations for three main reasons: 1) the literature of transnational advocacy 
networks pays great attention to grassroots social organizations and voluntary 
associations; 2) such organizations are emerging in the Chinese context, particularly 
in the form of NGO; and 3) I am interested in the potential linkage between civil 
society and democracy, even though this is not the central point of this dissertation.9  
I particularly highlighted the emerging NGO sector in China’s civil society. 
Though the total number of NGOs is limited, they are becoming more important in a 
few issue areas, particularly in environmental protection. NGOs often represent local 
communities, advocate of particular principles and ideas, mobilize for changes of 
existing policies and organize campaigns to confront the governmental authorities. 
Under the Chinese political context, all these activities led by NGOs have introduced 
new and crucial dynamics in local and national politics.  
The Chinese state, on the one hand, still intends to slow down the pace of 
NGO development by implementing restricted rules. On the other hand, it cannot 
avoid encountering NGOs, as more Chinese NGOs are, in a way, helping local 
authorities in delivering social services and helping marginalized groups. The state is 
uncertain of how to deal with such social organizations rather than blind oppression.10
Since 1989, the government has gradually adopted a policy of “fostering and 
promoting non-profit organizations, while strengthening supervision and regulation 
                                                 
6 Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
7  Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: 
Princeton University. Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Communities. New York: Simon&Schuster. 
8 Howard, Marc Morjé. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Demes, Pavol. 1999. "Civil Society Development in Post-War 
Kosovo and In Post-War Serbia". Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. Carothers, Thomas. 
1999. “Civil Society.” Foreign Policy. Winter 1999-2000, Issue 117. Grugel, Jean, ed. 1999. 
Democracy without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies. London: 
Routledge. Lewis, Peter. 1992. "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa." 
Journal of International Affairs. 46, 1. 
9 O’Brien, Marie. 1998. “Dissent and The Emergence of Civil Society in Post-Totalitarian China.” 
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 7, No. 17, page 153. Kluver, Randy, and John H. Powers, eds. 
1999. Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities. Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex 
Publishing. White, Gordon, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan. 1996. In Search of Civil Society : 
Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. New York: Oxford University Press. 
10 China scholars have noted that the Chinese government is not consistent in its policies over the 
growth of social organizations and NGOs. However, on certain issues (e.g., the Falung Gong religious 
movement), the state still leaves no room for any kind of negotiation.  
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on them”.11 By summer 1996, some 200,000 social organizations were registered with 
the Department of Civil Affairs at different levels. The regulations regarding social 
organization and NGO status in China are currently under revision. Before the 1998, 
the government used the two-step registration process to register NGOs. Application 
for NGO status should be supported by both a state or Party organization sponsor 
(Gua Kao Dan Wei) and a professional supervisory governing body. 12 Registration of 
NGO has been slowed down since 1998.13  
However, Chinese NGOs have found a variety of ways to survive without 
being constrained by this two-step registration. For example, they register as a 
secondary governmental agency or private business. In some cases, activists formed 
volunteer groups to avoid registration redress.14 Applying different strategies, Chinese 
NGOs find ways to build up coalition with governmental officials or agencies, and 
work closely with the state, meanwhile maintaining organizational autonomy.  
Despite the lack of academic consensus on the definition of NGOs in general 
or in China, four specific standards are applied in this research regarding a Chinese 
NGO: 
1) It is individual citizens, not government, that take the initiative of the NGO. 
Founder(s) of the NGOs can still work for state-affiliated agencies (e.g., 
universities, hospitals, research institutions, media), but his (their) work for the 
NGO is not paid by the state, or influenced by his (their) official affiliations. 
2) The NGO is not administratively nor financially constrained by any 
government agencies, even though they may be legally registered under 
certain agencies according to the current regulation. 15 
                                                 
11 Mas, Stephanie. 2000. "The Legal Environment for Non-Profit Organizations in China and Its 
Impact". Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge, Kunming, China. p11. 
12 Two-step registration: register both at civil affairs department and related sectoral administration 
department. For example, an environment NGO has to register with both civil affairs and environment 
protection departments of the government.  
13 This is partially due the Falung Gong Movement. 
14  NGOs registered as secondary organizations: these are the groups that are administratively affiliated 
with a governmental departmental office or a GONGOs. They only need to get the approval from the 
affiliated governmental agency and deposit a file at the civil affairs department. Therefore, such 
secondary groups enjoy relative autonomy. For examples, the Friends of Nature is a secondary 
organization under the Beijing Green Culture Association, a GONGO under Beijing municipal 
government. NGOs registered as private corporations: these are the groups that are registered as 
business corporations, but remain non-profit in operation. The Global Village of Beijing is an example 
in this category. Informal groups: a number of “volunteer associations”, “clubs”, “salons” and “on-line 
communities” have chosen to remain unregistered, which in fact has not prevented them from 
networking. Green Earth Volunteers is an example. They have not registered since 2000, but have 
organized tens of tree-planting. bird-watching and media campaigns.  
15 According to the Contemporary Regulations on Social Organizations, every NGO should meet the 
two-step registration requirement.  
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3) The NGO enjoys the autonomy of naming its own staff and organizing 
activities.16 
4) There should some form of organization of the NGO, regardless whether it is 
officially registered or not. If it is not registered, its organizational structures 
can be reflected in full-time or part-time volunteer networks, regular meetings 
and a core group of regular participants and members. 
 
This paper purposely excluded government organized NGOs (GONGOs) from 
the category of NGOs.17 Among other things, NGOs are different from GONGOs in 
their private, self-governing and voluntary characteristics. For example, the China 
Wildlife Conservation Association was created by the Ministry of Forestry around the 
early 1980s for the purpose of receiving international non-governmental donations for 
wildlife protection in China. Not only all its staff are state bureaucrats and have 
official rankings, but also during the distribution of donations and implementation of 
protection projects, it operates through the existing forestry administrative system.18 
Despite the word “association” in its name, it cannot be treated as an environmental 
NGO. This is, however, not to overlook the role of GONGO in China’s society, but to 
concentrate on non-government and more grassroots organizations.19
Another kind of confusion of NGOs in China is professional associations, 
industry associations and research institutions. For example, in the field of 
environmental protection, Associations of Environmental Protection Industry and 
Societies of Environmental Science at all levels. They are defined as a special type of 
entity in current China—public enterprises (she hui shi ye dan wei). Most of them are 
undergoing fundamental reforms and becoming more independent from the 
government after the national public enterprise reform in 2003. However, they do not 
exhibit the similar characteristics as voluntary citizen associations, and therefore, they 
are not included in this research. 
                                                 
16 The term “autonomy” particularly refers to the freedom of agenda-setting, organizational decision-
making and project implementation. Those local NGOs with a relatively higher level of autonomy do 
not obligated to report their budget, annual plan, or activities to any government agencies. 
17 Some scholars define non-governmental associations in China as both GONGOs and NGOs, while 
other conclude three types: GONGOs (quasi-NGOs), public enterprise (shi ye dan wei), and NGOs. 
GONGOs and public enterprises both are administratively and financially related with the government, 
and are initiated and supervised by the government. All media, education, and research entities fall in 
this group, e.g., China Forestry Association, All China Women’s Federation, and national charity 
organizations, newspapers and presses. 
18 Interview with Zhang Shanning, 21 July, 2000. 
19 For a detailed studies of Chinese environmental GONGOs, see: Wu, Fengshi. 2003. "Environmental 
GONGO Autonomy: Unintended Consequences of State Strategies in China." Journal of the Good 
Society, 12,1. 
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Appendix 3.1. Main Chinese Environmental NGOs with An Focus on Nature 
Conservation 
 
Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (Kunming)  
Center for Community Development Studies (Kunming) 
China Wild Bird Liberation Front (Liaoning) 
Chongqing Green Volunteers Association 
Friends of Nature (Beijing) 
Global Environmental Institute (Beijing) 
Global Village of Beijing 
Grassroots Community (Shanghai) 
Green Earth Volunteers (Beijing) 
Green Plateau Institute (Yunnan)  
Green Rivers (Sichuang)  
Green Watershed (Kunming)  
Green Yanbian (Jilin) 
Greener Bejing 
Institute for Human Ecology (Beijing) 
South-North Institute for Sustainable Development (Beijing) 
Saunders’ Gull Protection Association of Panjin (Liaoning) 
Friends of the Earth Guizhou 
Volunteers’ Association of Environmental Protection of Yueyang City (Hunan) 
Friends of Green Tianjing 
Friends of Green Hebei 
Guizhou PRA Network 
Yunnan PRA Network 
Han-hai-san (anti-desertification) (Beijing) 
Green Island (journalist salon) (Beijing) 
Green Web (Beijing) 
Snowland Great River Environmental Protection Association (Qinghai) 
Xinjiang Conservation Fund 
Yunnan ECO Network 
Zhaotong Black-necked Crane Volunteers Association 
Chongqing Forest Conservation Volunteers 
 
Main University Environmental Student Groups: 
Green Association of Tsinghua University 
The Scientific Exploration and Outdoor Life Society of Beijing Forestry University 
China Green Student Forum (Beijing) 
Environmental Volunteers Association of Sichuan University 
Green Stone of Nanjing University 
Green Association of Beijing Industrial University 
Green Association of Yunnan University 
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Appendix 3.2. A Chronicle of the Nu River Anti-Dam Movement (July 2003-
August 2004) 
 
3 July, 2003. UNESCO included the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas 
in the World’s Heritage List. The three rivers are the Nu, Lanchang, and Jinsha. 
12-14 August, 2003. China State Development and Reform Committee reviewed and 
passed the proposal of building a 13-level dam on the Nu River (21MW). 
16 August, 2003. Environmentalist Wang Yongchen heard about the Nu River dam 
proposal. 
3 September, 2003. SEPA organized a roundtable to collect feedback on the proposed 
Nu River dam. Yunnan environmental scientist, He Dayi, presented his 
disagreement on the issue. He became the first scientist who openly opposed the 
Nu dam proposal, and his arguments were the foundation of Beijing anti-dam 
activists’ reference for public campaigns. Wang Yongchen called many journalist 
friends and sat in the meeting. 
1 October 2003. A Yunnan NGO Green Watershed started investigation of the Nu 
River dam site, and tried to persuade local governments the negative effects of 
large dams. 
15 November, 2003. The 3rd Sino-U.S. Environmental NGO Forum was hold in 
Beijing, sponsored by the International Fund for China’s Environment. Over 200 
Chinese activists and environmental NGO representatives participated the 
meeting. Wang raised the issue of the Nu River dam and caught much attention. 
17-22 November, 2003. World Dam Commission meeting in Thailand. Supported by 
international funding, Wang and other environmental activists from the Friends of 
Nature, Green Island, and Green Watershed attended the meeting, during which 
they organized a petition against the Nu River dam. Around 80 Thai NGOs also 
signed a letter against the dam, and submitted to the Chinese embassy in Bangkok.  
16-24 February, 2004. Conservation International and International Rivers Network 
sponsored Wang and other 20 activists, scientists and journalists to conduct a 
comprehensive field investigation of the Nu River dam site. Meanwhile, Wang’s 
activist and media friends in Beijing have managed to submit a policy 
recommendation letter to the Office of Primer Wen Jiabao. 
18 February, 2004. Primer Wen brought to a temporary halt of the dam proposal and 
called for further environmental assessment. 
14 March, 2004. The website for the Nu River anti-dam movement was up. 
21 March, 2004. Photograph exhibition of the Nu River was launched by the Green 
Earth Volunteers, with the support from CI. 
26-29 March, 2004. Wang and other three anti-dam activists attended the Fifth UN 
Civil Society Forum in Korea, and received moral support from UNEP senior 
official on the issue. 
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3 May 2004. Activists, journalists, and activist-minded governmental officials 
gathered a brainstorm meeting in Beijing. Dai Qing, Liang Xiaoyan, and many 
other leading activists in the Three Gorges Dam movement were present. Before 
the meeting, a SEPA official was criticized for his sympathy and involvement in 
the anti-dam movement. However, he continued his invisible involvement in the 
movement. Another group of environmentalists from Beijing and Yunnan 
organized farmers from the Nu River Dam site to visit Manwai Dam area. About 
50,000 farmers and ethic minorities were forced to relocate during the 
construction of the Manwai Dam completed in 1998. After talking to the farmer 
at Manwai, who lost their lands and have not received promised compensations 
from local governmental authorities, the farmers from Nu River were better 
informed about the consequences of dam project on their livelihoods. 
Environmentalists made a documentary film out of this trip and distributed within 
the activist community. 
16 May 2004. Another gathering of anti-dam activists, during which Wang proposed 
to establish a “China’s River Network”. 
July 2004. Condi Nest awarded Wang Yongchen for her worldwide recognizable 
achievement in environmental protection.  
July 2004. UNESCO issued warning documents on the status of the Three Parallel 
Rivers World Heritage site. Beijing environmentalists invited a UNESCO official 
to give a talk about the details, and discussed with him where and how to submit 
policy advocacy letters. 
August 2004. China’s River Network was formed in Beijing. 
 
To date, the Nu River dam proposal is still undergoing cycles of re-assessment, 
rejection and re-submission.  The total scale has been reduced to 11-level. More 
Chinese and international NGOs and environmentalists are combining their resources 
to continue protesting against the proposal. 
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Appendix 3.3. International NGOs and Foundations Related to Nature 
Conservation in China  
 
International NGOs 
Animals Asia Foundation (Hong Kong) 
Bridge Fund (U.S.) 
Center for International Forestry 
Research 
China Exploration and Research 
Society (Hong Kong) 
Conservancy Association Hong Kong 
Conservation International 
Ecology and Culture Organization 
(France) 
Fauna & Flora International (U.S.) 
Forest Trends (U.S.) 
Friends of the Earth Hong Kong 
Global Communications for 
Conservation  
Greenpeace (U.S.) 
World Agroforestry Center 
International Crane Foundation (U.S.) 
International Fund for Animal Welfare 
(U.S.) 
International Fund for China’s 
Environment (U.S.) 
International Institute for Environment 
and Development  
International Rivers Network (U.S.) 
International Snow Leopard Trust (U.S.) 
IUCN (World Conservation Union) 
Mountain Institute (U.S.) 
Oxfam U.S. 
Pacific Environment and Resource 
Center (U.S.) 
Roots & Shoots  
Rural Development Institute (U.S.) 
Saving the South China Tiger (U.K.) 
The Nature Conservancy (U.S.) 
Trickle Up Program (U.S.) 
TVE (EETPC)  
U.S. China Environmental Fund 
Wetlands International (U.S.) 
Wild Camel Protection Foundation  
Wildlife Conservation Society (U.S.) 
Winrock International  
World Resource Institute (U.S.) 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
 
International Foundations  
Blue Moon Foundation  
ECOLOGIA Virtual Foundation  
Ford Foundation 
Global Greengrants Fund  
MacArthur Foundation 
Rockefeller Brothers Foundation 
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Appendix 4.1.  
World Bank (WB) HIV/AIDS Related Projects in China 
HIV/AIDS Component Project Title Starting 
Year 
Ending 
Year 
Total WB Loan 
(million USD) million 
USD 
% total WB 
loan 
TB Control Project 2002 2010 104 n/a n/a 
Health Nine Project 1999 2006 60 33.3 55.5 
Disease Prevention Project 1995 2004 100 18.76 18.76 
Infectious and Endemic 
Disease Control Project 
1991 2002 129.6 < 2.7 < 1 
total   193.6 > 55  
Source: World Bank online project database.  
 
 
 
Appendix 4.2.   
AIDS Programs Coordinated by UNAIDS China Office (excluding the WB) 
U.N. agencies Main AIDS-related activities 
UNICEF Yunnan component of the regional Mekong project, collaboration with the Ministry of Education, and training of mass media.  
UNESCO Supports the Chinese Government to mainstream HIV/AIDS issues into its education systems (both formal and non-formal). 
UNDP Multisectoral AIDS project in Fujian, Shanxi and other provinces.  
UNFPA  
 
Reproductive Health/Family Planning Project, including base-line surveys of 
STD and HIV/AIDS in over 30 selected counties. 
WHO  
 
Promotes surveillance of STD and HIV, the use of STD syndromic management, 
health education for school children, and training for HIV/STD counseling.  
Source: UNAIDS China Office annual reports (1998-2004). 
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Appendix 4.3. Main Chinese AIDS Related Civil Society Groups  
 
Institutionalized NGOs/NGO-to-be 
PLWHA organizations: 
Shanghai AIDS Sunshine  
China AIDS Care (Guangzhou) 
Hemophilia Home of China (Shanghai) 
Home of Love (Xi’an, Shaanxi) 
Mangrove Support Group (Beijing) 
Yunnan PLWHA Support Group  
General AIDS advocacy: 
Aizhixing Institute of Health 
Education (Beijing) 
Loving Source Institute for Education 
and Research (Beijing) 
Dongzhen Project for Helping AIDS 
Orphans (Beijing) 
NOHIV (a web-based virtual support 
group in Beijing) 
Community Development Research 
Center (Henan) 
AIDS Working Group (Beijing) 
Gay community: 
Gender Health Education Institute 
(Beijing) 
Friends Project (Qingdao, Shandong) 
Women’s groups: 
Women and Child Development 
Centre of Ruili  
Legal Assistance Center for Women 
and Children of Xishuangbanna  
Qianxi Women’s Health Association  
Non-AIDS specific organizations: 
Grassroots Community (Shanghai) 
Beijing Civil Society Development 
Research Center (Beijing) 
Green Volunteers Association 
(Chongqing) 
 
Rural community based groups 
Dongguan Village AIDS Care 
Association (Sui County, Henan) 
Shuangmiao Village Home of Care and 
Love (Shangqiu County, Henan) 
Wenlou Village AIDS Patients 
Association (Shangcai County, 
Henan) 
 
University student associations 
Beijing University 
Beijing University Medical School 
Renmin Univerity 
Peking Union Medical College 
Tsinghua Univerity (Beijing) 
National Ethnic Minority University 
Beijing Foreign Language University 
Beijing Broadcasting College 
Capital Medical College 
Beijing Chemical Industry University 
Shanghai Jiaotong University  
Fudan University (Shanghai) 
Shanghai Oceanic Transportation 
College 
Tianjing University 
Nankai University (Tianjing) 
Huazhong University of Science and 
Technology (Jiangxi) 
Anhui Medical College  
Xingjiang Normal University 
Sun Yat-sen University (Guangdong) 
Xiamen University (Fujian) 
Jimei University (Fujian) 
Nanjing Climatology College (Jiangsu) 
Nanjing University (Jiangsu) 
Jiangxi Agriculture University 
 
Religion-based groups 
Northern Jinde Light of Hope 
(Shijiazhuang, Hebei) 
Home of Red Maple (Xi’an, Shaanxi)  
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Appendix 4.4. Examples of Local CDC and hospital sponsored AIDS Care 
Centers 
 
Beijing You’an Hospital, Home of Love and Care 
Beijing Ditan Hospital, Home of Red Ribbon   
Liangshan Community Association for Drug Rehabilitation and Disease Prevention 
(Sichuan)  
Guiyang Garden of Health, Care, and Love (Guizhou)  
Welcoming Spring Flowers Organization (Wenxi county, Shanxi)  
Urumqi Red Ribbon Center (Xinjiang) 
 
Appendix 4.5.  
International NGOs and Foundations Working in AIDS Prevention in China 
 
International NGOs 
Chi Heng Foundation (Hong Kong) 
China AIDS Info. (Hong Kong)  
Hong Kong AIDS Foundation 
Harmony Home Association (Taiwan) 
Oxfam Hong Kong    
Salvation Army Hong Kong 
World Vision Hong Kong 
Aaron Diamond AIDS Research 
Center (U.S.) 
Aixin Foundation (U.S.) 
Australian Red Cross Society 
(Australia) 
Daytop (U.S.) 
DKT International (U.S.) 
Family Health International (U.S.) 
Futures Group Europe  
Helping AIDS in Resource Poor Areas 
(HARPA) (U.S.) 
Health Unlimited (U.S.) 
International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies 
(Switzerland) 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
(U.K.) 
International Planned Parenthood 
Federation  
Macfarlane Burnet Centre (Australia) 
Marie Stopes (U.K.) 
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors 
without Borders) – Belgium  
Médecins Sans Frontières – France  
Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the 
World) (France) 
Voluntary Service Overseas (U.K.) 
PATH (U.S.) 
Population Services International (U.S.) 
Project Hope (U.S.) 
Rotary Club (U.S.) 
Save the Children (U.K.)  
U.S.-China AIDS Foundation (U.S.) 
Yale-China Association (U.S.) 
 
International charities and 
foundations 
AIDS Relief Fund for China (San 
Francisco, U.S.) 
Asia Foundation (U.S.) 
Barry and Martin's Trust (U.K.)  
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(U.S.) 
China AIDS Orphan Foundation 
(Minnesota, U.S.)  
Clinton Foundation (U.S.) 
Ford Foundation (U.S.) 
Misereor (German Catholic Charity) 
Operation Blessing (Taiwan Christian 
Church) 
Taiwan Catholic Church 
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Appendix 5.1. Studying International NSAs’ Support to Chinese NGOs  
To trace the support from international NGOs to Chinese NGOs, I used the method of 
standardized interview to collect information from 12 conservation-related and 10 
AIDS-related Chinese NGOs. Three sets of questions were asked to survey 
international NSAs’ assistance to a Chinese NGO: 
 
1) Formation.  Two questions were designed to examine whether international NSAs 
were involved and had given significant support at the beginning of each local NGO. 
Any “yes” answer to one of the following two questions was coded as “Y” in the 
column of “Form”. 
A. Was the foundation of the local NGOs an outcome of an international NSA’s 
project or initiative in China?  
B. Did any international NSAs provide the first funding for the LNGO to start 
basic operation, rent an office, and recruit staff? 
 
2) Funding. If the local NGO gets financial support from international NSAs, the 
answer will was coded as “Y” in the column of “Fund”. 
 
3) Information sharing and technical support. If international NSAs provide any of the 
following types of assistance to the local NGO, it was coded “Y” in the column of 
“Info”: 
 A. regular meetings for information sharing 
 B. international NSAs sent experts to help with the local NGO 
 C. technical support for the local NGO to implement its own projects 
Detailed information on international NSA’s support to selected Chinese NGOs 
Chinese conservation 
related NGOs 
Form Fund  Info 
Friends of Nature N Y  Y 
Global Village of Beijing N Y  Y 
Green Earth Volunteers Y Y  Y 
Green Plateau  N Y  Y 
Green Watershed Y Y  Y 
Guizhou Friends of the 
Earth  
Y Y Y 
Greener Beijing N Y Y 
Green Rivers  N Y Y 
Snowland Great Rivers  N Y Y 
Saunders Gull protection 
Association of Panjin 
N Y Y 
South North Institute for 
Sustainable Development 
N Y  Y 
Xinjiang Conservation 
Fund 
Y Y  Y 
Total: 12 NGOs 4 12 12 
Chinese AIDS 
related NGOs 
Form Fund Info 
Guangzhou China AIDS 
Care 
N Y Y 
Beijing Mangrove 
Support Group 
N Y Y 
Beijing Positive Art 
Workshop 
Y Y Y 
Shanghai AIDS 
Shunshine 
N Y Y 
Yunnan PLWHA 
Support Group 
Y Y Y 
Home of Love, Xi’an N Y N 
Beijing Aizhixing 
Institute 
N Y Y 
Beijing Loving Source 
Institute 
N Y N 
Beijing Gender Institute N Y Y 
Dongzheng Project N Y N 
Henan Community 
Development Research 
Center 
Y Y Y 
Total: 10 NGOs 3 10 8 
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